Ratings Take On Political Risk
Moody's Investors Service recently raised South Korea's credit outlook, citing diminished tensions in connection with North Korea's nuclear-weapons program.
That action came as a shock to Ian Bremmer, president of the New York-based research and consulting firm Eurasia Group. His analysis had come to the opposite conclusion: Japan and South Korea's negotiations with North Korea were undermining the U.S. nonproliferation policy and were making the Korean peninsula a more dangerous place.
Who's right? Global bond investors don't seem to know: One week after the Moody's upgrade of the country's outlook to stable from negative, South Korean government bonds have barely budged, suggesting investors weren't moved to buy by Moody's vote of confidence.
Credit-rating companies like Moody's Corp.'s Moody's Investors Service, McGraw-Hill Cos.' Standard & Poor's and Fimalac's Fitch Ratings have had respectable track records when examining a corporate balance sheet and determining a company's likelihood to meet its interest payments. They have often had a harder time predicting the ability and willingness of a foreign government to pay its debt. Painful, global selloffs of sovereign debt have sometimes followed.
"The great problem is that credit-rating agencies are supposed to be objective," says Christian Stracke, an emerging-markets bond analyst with the independent research group CreditSights. "You can offer a fundamental analysis of financial or economic data. But if the deciding factor in a credit rating is based on reading political tea leaves, that's going to be a problem."
Investors say credit ratings failed to reflect events that led to Russia's debt default in 1998, Indonesia's political turmoil in 1997 that sparked a regime change the following year, or Mexico's currency devaluation in 1994. All these countries saw their bonds plummet at the time as investors, realizing the risks too late, finally rushed to sell.
In fairness to the rating companies, accurately assessing political risk can require penetrating smoke-filled rooms, forecasting military juntas or measuring the likelihood of popular revolts. Yet the raters' ability to get the political risk right matters greatly. For hundreds of insurance companies and pension funds, internal guidelines for which bonds they are allowed to own are based on credit ratings.
Like many bond investors, Greg Hopper, a global high-yield fund manager for Julius Baer in New York, says he doesn't rely on rating companies when determining a country's political risk. Instead, he turns to think tanks, analysts at brokerage firms and private sources. "And we look at what the market is saying," he says. "The rating agencies sometimes play the role of the siren, luring people into some troubled waters."
The ratings companies respond that their political-risk analysis is thorough and consistent with the findings of think tanks and multilateral organizations like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Both Moody's and S&P say their analysts regularly visit the countries they rate, interview a variety of people in the private and public sectors, talk to outside experts, then discuss and debate the political-risk ratings in committees of as much as a dozen people.
"The debate is as wide-ranging as you can imagine," says Vincent Truglia, managing director for Moody's sovereign risk group. He notes that for the 100 or so countries rated, the political-risk component accounts for about 25% of a government bond's rating, though it can be much higher for some developing countries.
Still, even the raters concede no one has found a political-risk black box. Marie Cavanaugh, a managing director for S&P's sovereign ratings group, says that this kind of analysis may be the toughest element to score. S&P rates government borrowers on 10 different factors, and nine of them involve looking at numbers. But the political analysis -- does the country have a solid succession plan and stable institutions? Are there racial or economic divisions that could boil over? -- is by far the most subjective, she says.
So it's not surprising that the bond market often shrugs off the rating companies' political advice. That doesn't mean, however, that there is widespread agreement among investors about how politically risky a country may be.
Venezuela, for instance, is rated Caa1 by Moody's -- one of the lowest ratings, even among high-yield, or "junk," bonds -- and a full two notches below Brazil's B2 high-yield rating. Yet yields for Venezuelan bonds are comparable to those of Brazil. That means the market isn't demanding a higher premium from Venezuela, despite the lower rating.
Investors like Mr. Hopper say this is understandable. Venezuela is a big oil producer and boasts foreign reserves that more than cover its debt, while Brazil's don't. "Venezuela has been volatile, and at times overdiscounted by the market," he says. "The ratings agencies have contributed to that."
But Mohamed El-Erian, an emerging-market bond portfolio manager for Pacific Investment Management Co., or Pimco, thinks Moody's has it about right. Venezuela's political situation has been highly volatile, and the deeply divisive President Hugo Chávez faces a referendum in August with the outcome uncertain. "Some think Venezuela's oil reserves are so large it can compensate for economic and political uncertainty," he says. "We don't agree."
Russia also generates widespread disagreement. Moody's last year raised the government debt to investment grade, and S&P is expected to follow later this year. The bonds had been enjoying a huge rally until the government began investigating, and ultimately indicting, officials at oil giant OAO Yukos.
Although Russian President Vladimir Putin has recently tried to dispel fears that the government intends to bankrupt the company, his actions raised concerns about the concentration of political power in the president and whether other companies would come under attack.
Eric Fine, the proprietary emerging-market bond trader for Morgan Stanley, says the ratings companies -- impressed with Russia's budget surplus and high reserves -- have failed to gauge the political risk. "Except for the Kremlin, Russia's government institutions are weak," he says. "The market is assessing close to zero political risk."
Then there's assessing political risk in a country like Pakistan, where President Pervez Musharraf has had to contend with insurgents and assassination attempts. How do you factor that into a credit rating? "You would ask what the probability was for an event like that," Mr. Truglia says, "and what the most likely outcome would be."
Pakistani five-year bonds yield just 7.1%. That compares with the higher 10.5% yield on Brazilian bonds of similar maturity and with the same rating. The lower yield suggests the market hasn't assigned much risk to Pakistan. But with countries at the low end of the ratings spectrum, things aren't always as they appear. Mr. Stracke of CreditSights says that overseas Pakistani and Gulf State money buys a lot of these bonds, political risk or not.
主权评级：占卜的游戏？
穆迪投资服务公司(Moody'S Investors Service)最近上调了韩国的信用前景评级，称北朝鲜核武器危机引起的紧张局势有所缓和。
这让纽约研究和咨询公司Eurasia Group的总裁布莱莫(Ian Bremmer)感到震惊。他此前作出的分析结果与穆迪截然不同。他认为，日本和韩国与北朝鲜的核武谈判破坏了美国的核不扩散政策，也令朝鲜半岛的局势更加紧张起来。
这两种观点谁对谁错呢？国际债券市场的投资者们似乎也难有定论，穆迪将韩国前景评级从负面升至稳定后一周，韩国国债的表现几乎没有什么变化，表明穆迪的这张信任投票并未给投资者带来多大影响。
穆迪投资服务公司、麦格劳-希尔公司(McGraw-Hill Cos.)旗下的标准普尔公司(Standard & Poor's)，以及Fimalac旗下的惠誉国际评级(Fitch ratings)等评级公司历来在评估企业资产负债状况以及偿债能力方面享有很高的声望，但在评估外国政府偿付债务的能力和意愿方面却遇到困难。有时，跟在这些相互矛盾的评级之后的则是痛苦的全球性的主权债券抛售浪潮。
独立研究机构CreditSights的新兴市场债市分析师施特拉克(Christian Stracke)说，难题是，人们往往期望信贷机构作出客观评级。信贷机构可以通过审阅财务报告或者经济数据得出基本面分析报告，但如果政治性因素成为决定信贷评级的主要因素，变成预言家眼前借以预言某人未来的杯中茶渣，那可就难了。
投资者批评说，对于俄罗斯1998年拒绝偿债、印尼1997年动荡导致后来数年政权更迭、以及1994年墨西哥货币贬值等一系列重大风险，信贷评级机构均未能准确预测，等投资者意识到风险巨大已经为时太晚，随之兴起的抛售狂潮导致这些国家债市暴跌。
公平来说，评级机构要想准确评估政治风险，就意味著需要潜入烟雾缭绕的会议室，预测军人团体的作为，或者衡量民众反叛的可能性。不过，评级机构能否准确评估政府风险事关重大。数百家保险公司和退休基金的内部章程都规定，债券投资要根据信贷评级而定。
和许多债市投资者一样，霍泊(Greg Hopper)说他在评级某个国家政治风险的时候并不依赖于评级机构的判断，而是参考智囊机构，证券公司分析师和私人消息渠道的信息，同时也会关注市场人士的看法。他是纽约Julius Baer一只全球高收益基金的经理人。他说，有时评级机构扮演的就是水妖塞壬的角色，把人诱惑到无法抽身的困境当中。
评级机构则表示，它们对政治风险的评估是全面深入的，与智囊机构以及世界银行(World Bank)和国际货币基金组织(International Monetary Fund)等国际性机构的看法也是一致的。穆迪和标普都表示，它们的分析师会定期造访其评级涵盖的国家，拜会各类私营和共同团体人士，与外部专家交谈，还要与至少十几人组成的委员会讨论政治风险评级问题。
穆迪负责主权评级的董事总经理特鲁利亚(Vincent Truglia)说，讨论和辩论的事宜无所不包，范围之广超过众人所想。他还指出，当前追踪和评级的100多个国家当中，政治风险评估的权重只占该国国债评级的25%，当然对个别发展中国家而言，这笔比例要更高一些。
不过，即使是评级者自己也承认他们很难发现政治风险的黑箱操作。标普主权评级部门董事总经理卡瓦纳夫(Marie Cavanaugh)表示，这类分析恐怕是最难以评价的部分了。标普为发债主权国家的信贷评级设立了10项评估标准，其中9项都是数据分析。但政治风险这一项是主观性最强的，例如该国是否有一份稳妥的权利交接方案，是否存在可能会引起动荡的种族或经济上的分歧？
因此债市投资者在评级机构对政治因素的分析面前不为所动，这并不奇怪。不过，这也并不意味著投资者对某个国家的政治风险有什么共识。
以委内瑞拉为例，穆迪的评级是Caa1，即使在所有高收益垃圾债券评级中也是最差一种，比穆迪对巴西债券的评级B2还要低整整两级。但委内瑞拉债券和巴西债券的收益率表现却大致相同，这表明投资者并不希望委内瑞拉的债券收益率过高，尽管它们的评级更低一些。
像霍泊这样的投资者认为，这很好理解。委内瑞拉是石油生产大国，外汇储备已升至偿债所需的水平之上；而巴西却不然。霍泊说，委内瑞拉局势一直动荡不安，很多时候市场对它的评估过低，而评级机构对此应负有很大责任。
但是，Pacific Investment Management Co.(Pimco)的新兴市场债券投资组合经理人伊林(Mohamed El-Erian)认为，穆迪对委内瑞拉的评级基本正确。委内瑞拉的政治局势一直动荡不安，8月份全民公决结果难料，总统查韦斯(Hugo Chavez)因此处境艰难。他说，有些人认为委内瑞拉拥有足量原油储备，仅此就足以抵消经济和政局前景不明带来的风险，Pimco可不这么看。
俄罗斯也是一个引起评级机构诸多分歧的热点。穆迪去年将俄罗斯政府债券评级升至投资等级，标普也有望于今年如法炮制。在俄罗斯政府对石油巨头尤科斯(OAO Yukos)展开正式调查，并最终提起诉讼之前，俄罗斯国债持续大幅上扬。
尽管俄罗斯总统普京(Vladimir Putin)近来试图缓解市场人士对政府意欲迫使尤科斯倒闭的忧虑，他的种种举动还是让人担心，总统权利过于集中，其他公司恐怕也难免遭受冲击。
摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)新兴市场债市交易员法恩(Eric Fine)表示，俄罗斯的预算盈余和高额外汇储备令评级机构印象深刻，所以未能准确评估俄罗斯的政治风险。他说，除了中央政府之外，俄罗斯其他政府机构都很脆弱。而市场对俄罗斯政治风险的评估几乎为零。
再来说说巴基斯坦。巴基斯坦总统穆沙拉夫(Pervez Musharraf)不得不应对各处起义和暗杀企图。如何将这些问题纳入评级当中呢？特鲁利亚说，你应该想想实际爆发这些危险的可能性到底有多大，最可能爆发的是什么。
巴基斯坦5年期国债收益率仅为7.1%，而评级类似的巴西同期限国债的收益率则高达10.5%。收益率较低表明市场人士认为巴基斯坦面临的风险较小。但对那些评级很低的国家来说，事情恐怕并不像人们认为的那样。CreditSights的施特拉克说，巴基斯坦海外人士和海湾国家资金大量买入巴基斯坦债券，置政治风险于不顾。
(back)US Supreme Court: Courts Can Order Intel EC Discovery
The U.S. Supreme Court, voting 7-1, Monday said federal courts have the authority to require Intel Corp. (INTC) to turn over documents for a European antitrust investigation.
The ruling is a blow to the computer chip giant, which has been fighting a discovery order prompted by an Advanced Micro Devices Inc. (AMD) effort to spur a European Commission investigation into the overseas business practices of Intel .
"We hold that the District Court had authority....to entertain AMD's discovery request" Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote in the majority opinion.
While the ruling said a federal law gives U.S. courts the authority to require legal discovery for a foreign court proceeding, the court's opinion added the law does not "require a federal district court to provide judicial assistance to foreign or international tribunals."
AMD turned to U.S. courts in 2001 to force Intel to turn over business-practices documents to the EC, which has been conducting a preliminary investigation into Intel 's marketing practices.
Under the Supreme Court's holding in the case, Intel can continue to fight the discovery motion. "We leave it to the courts below to assure an airing adequate to determine what, if any, assistance is appropriate," Ginsburg said.
美国法院将命令英特尔移交欧盟调查文件
美国最高法院周一以7票对1票裁定联邦法院有权要求英特尔公司(Intel Corp., INTC)移交其在一项欧洲反垄断调查中的文件。
上述裁决对于该晶片巨头来说无疑是一记重击，此前高级微设备公司(Advanced Micro Devices Inc., AMD)针对英特尔向法院申请一项开示命令(discovery order)，要求英特尔公开欧盟委员会(European Commissio)对其海外业务展开的一项调查的情况。
法官Ruth Bader Ginsburg在多数意见中指出，坚持地区法院有权接受高级微设备公司的开示命令的申请。
尽管判决表示，联邦法律赋予美国法院具有要求公开外国法院审理情况的权力，但是美国最高法院的意见还指出，法律并不要求联邦地区法院对外国或国际法院提供司法协助。
高级微设备公司于2001年要求美国法院强制英特尔转交欧盟调查中有关业务操作的文件，欧盟曾对英特尔的市场开拓业务进行过初步调查。
根据美国最高法院在该案件中坚持的立场，英特尔可能继续反对开示动议。
最高法院明确表示，仍在起作用的部分因素导致其中一位联邦法官否决了该开示请求，这些因素包括对联邦法律能否保护这些文件的保密特性的分析。
该争议围绕著的是Intergraph Corp. (INGR)针对英特尔已结束的反垄断案的密封文件，而这些文件正是AMD一直孜孜以求的目标。
欧盟委员会并未要求获得这些材料。欧盟委员会在最高法院作证时表示，并不想得到这些文件，也不想让法官允许进行开示。欧盟委员会在致最高法院的简要声明中称，相信如果允许美国法院对其调查进行强制开示的话，就等同于允许美国对欧盟委员会的反垄断调查进行干预。
最高法院的裁决肯定了旧金山联邦上诉法院第九巡回审判庭(Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals)的裁决，后者的裁决认为，美国法律可以批准该开示请求。处于议论中的该法律是一项长期存在的法律，目的是对与国际法庭有关的案件审理材料进行强制开示。
一位联邦审判法官可能结束此案，他将根据最高法院的决定对该开示请求进行复议
