After 9/11
IT HAS BECOME A CLICHE to say that the world has changed since Sept. 11, 2001, but to many of us the surprise is that the economy hasn't changed more.
I was attending a meeting of the National Association for Business Economics in the World Trade Center on Sept. 11, and as my fellow economists and I were running out of the building, our discussion soon turned to the economic impact. (OK, we're a bit weird.)
The economy was already in a "soft spot," with small declines (0.5% annual rate) in the third quarter of 2000 and the first quarter of 2001, interspersed with stronger positives in the fourth and second quarters (2.1% and 1.2%, respectively). The declines were very concentrated in manufacturing, however, and the three "Ds" that define recession -- depth, duration, and diffusion -- were clearly not met. Before the attacks, the majority of economists believed we were not in a recession.
After the attack, the consensus shifted to recession. Our belief was that consumers would be scared, and that this fear would spread the recession from the manufacturing sector into the service sector. Business people would be uncertain and delay hiring and investment decisions.
We were too pessimistic. It takes a lot to stop Americans from spending money. Although consumers did crawl into their shells for a time, they soon found things to spend money on. Sales of furniture, electronics, and appliances jumped, as did home sales and construction, pushed by the lowest mortgage rates in 45 years.
The economy was helped by panic among manufacturers. Auto manufacturers put on heavy discounts to sell cars, and Americans were seduced by the low prices. October 2001 was the best month for car sales in U.S. history, and only a few were people like me who decided that if we had to get out of town in a hurry, we wanted a car that would start.
Policy helped the rebound. The 2001 tax cuts provided extra income at almost precisely the time the economy needed a boost. The Fed, which had already cut rates from 6.5% to 3.5% before September 11, cut them even more sharply, eventually to 1%.
But we were right about business. Uncertainty combined with the overinvestment of the late 1990s to slow the rebound in capital spending. Hiring was unusually soft, reflecting higher productivity but perhaps even more the tendency to use contract workers rather than add to full-time payrolls.
The use of contract workers allows more flexibility, since if orders drop off the workers can simply not be used the following week, and also allows the employer to avoid benefit costs, especially health insurance.
Although the economy survived the Sept. 11 attacks better than we expected, terrorism remains a major risk. In the most recent survey done by the National Association for Business Economics, 40% of respondents cited terrorism as the major short-term risk to the economy. The percentage doubled from 19% in the March survey, reflecting to a large extent the decline in other worries, particularly about employment, which had tied with the deficit as the biggest problems six months ago.
But the focus of terror fear is now more on oil prices and Middle East stability than on U.S. confidence. We have shown we can overcome fear, but not that we can overcome oil shortages. The association's survey was taken as oil prices surged above $45 per barrel for the first time in history, and as the terror alert level was being raised.
The rise in oil prices was clearly a factor in slowing the economy in the spring. The average household is now spending about 5% of its income on energy, up from 4.2% two years ago. The rise in costs effectively cuts the money available to spend on other consumer items by 0.8%. This burden slowed growth, but didn't stop it. The biggest impact was a slowdown in car sales, but as in the aftermath of Sept. 11, this was offset by rebate offers from the car makers.
At $45 per barrel, oil is a drag on the economy. What would it take for the drag to cause a recession? One advantage today is that energy is a smaller share of the economy than it used to be. Although households are spending 5% of their income on energy, that ratio was 8.2% in 1981, during the second OPEC crisis, and 5.7% in 1970, before OPEC got started. The ratio was 6.6% in 1960. The smaller percentage of income going to energy means that the economy is less vulnerable to energy price shocks.
But high enough oil prices can still mean recession. A return to $75 oil, which we hit in today's dollars back in 1981, would probably be enough to cause recession. Given the problems in the Middle East, Venezuela, Russia, and other oil-producing regions, that price is by no means unachievable.
后911时代：油价担忧阴云难散
“911改变了世界”已经是人人耳熟能详了，但要说911以后全球经济并没有多大改变，恐怕很多人都会感到意外。
911当天我去世界贸易中心(World Trade Center)参加全美商业经济协会(National Association for Business Economics)组织的一次会议。我和同行的几位经济学家在逃过一劫之后，很快就谈起了这一事件对经济的影响。（我们这么做是显得有点匪夷所思。）
当时经济已经表现疲软，2000年第三季度和2001年第一季度的经济小幅下滑（折合成年率下降0.5%），好在第四季度和第二季度分别上涨了2.1%和1.2%。不过，下滑趋势主要集中在制造业，而标志著经济衰退的三大因素──深度、持续时间和扩散性都没有清晰显现。在911之前，大部分经济学家都认为我们并未陷入衰退。
但在那之后，经济界的普遍看法出现逆转，人们普遍认为经济陷入了衰退期。当时作出这一论断的基础是，消费者受到惊吓，会促使衰退气氛从制造业弥散到服务业。企业界人士难以预见未来，会推迟招募员工和进行投资。
我们那时太悲观了。看来要让美国人停止消费还需要更大力量。虽然消费者有一阵子不愿外出活动，但他们很快就找到了消费点。家具、电子产品和家用电器的销售相继激增，然后是房屋销售和建筑业借著抵押贷款利率处于45年来最低点之机迅猛发展。
制造商遭受的痛苦打击反而推动了经济增长。汽车生产商提供大幅折扣，吸引了大量美国人前往购车。2001年10月份甚至成为美国历史上汽车销售最旺盛的一个月，只有少数像我这样的人才觉得，如果有急事出门，只要有一部能发动的车子就行了。
各项政策也促使经济反弹。2001年的减税恰逢其时地为经济送去了提振力量，让美国人手中拥有了更多可支配收入。继911之前将基准利率从6.5%降至3.5%之后，美国联邦储备委员会(Fed)进一步大幅降息，直至1%的历史低点。
但我们对企业界的看法是对的。不确定性，加之九十年代后期的过度投资导致资本支出反弹减速。招募员工的势头异常低迷，生产率虽然得到增高，但主要是因为企业更多地聘用合同工而非全职员工。
聘用合同工的好处在于灵活性加大，因为一旦工厂订单不继，下周工人就不必来上班了。另外，雇主也不必承担福利开支，尤其是不必支付医疗保险了。
虽然911后的经济表现好过我们的预期，恐怖袭击的阴影依然挥之不去。全美商业经济协会的最新调查显示，40%的受访者认为恐怖袭击是经济面临的最大的短期风险，比3月份调查得出的19%增长了一倍。原因在于对其他因素的担忧大幅下降，而就在6个月前就业和赤字还是人们最担心的问题。
但现在，人们对恐怖袭击的担忧更多地集中在高额油价和中东局势，而非美国的信心方面。美国人已经证明，我们可以克服恐惧心理，但是无法战胜原油短缺。上述调查是在油价有史以来首次突破每桶45美元以后进行的，也是在提升了恐怖袭击警告级别的背景下进行的。
油价高企明显是今年春天经济放缓的原因之一。每户家庭目前的能源开支占消费总额的5%，两年前只有4.2%。能源消费比例上涨导致其他消费品比例下降了0.8%，促使经济增长减缓，但尚未止步不前。受影响最大的是汽车销售，但在911之后，汽车生产商的大量购车返款已经抵消了这种影响。
高达每桶45美元的油价是经济的拖累。但是拖累怎样才会导致经济出现衰退呢？当今经济结构一大改善之处就在于原油所占比例已经缩小。虽然每户家庭的能源开支占到了5%，但在1981年第二次欧佩克危机期间这个比例高达8.2%，欧佩克成立前的1970年也达到过5.7%，1960年也有6.6%。能源开支缩小就意味著经济承受能源价格冲击的抵抗力加大。
但油价涨到足够高的水平的话，还是可以造成经济衰退的。如果油价升至每桶75美元（相当于1981年的水平），将足以导致经济陷入衰退。考虑到中东、委内瑞拉、俄罗斯和其他产油区的情况，油价升至如此高位的可能性确实存在。
