A stark choice for Pyongyang: reform or the abyss
Is there anything that can now be done about North Korea's nuclear arsenal? After all, it has probably had one or two nuclear warheads for more than a decade and up to 10 for a couple of years. It has watched Pakistan test warheads, be punished and then forgiven. It has watched the alliance between South Korea and the US struggle during the Bush administration, with Seoul and Washington competing to see who will undo the joint command structure that has ensured military deterrence and stability on the peninsula more rapidly than the other.
The short answer is that we must try. Given North Korea's record of selling weaponry and nuclear technology abroad, its proclivities for brinkmanship and the likely domino effect of nuclear proliferation in east Asia, nuclear weapons in its hands make the world a notably less safe place. So a major new US policy effort is needed. The core of a new policy should be to force North Korea to decide between more economic and diplomatic engagement on the one hand and less on the other. The goal should be to make the status quo untenable for Pyongyang; forcing it to choose between a better relationship with the outside world - as well as more trade, investment and assistance - and the prospect of pressure and coercion. Does it want to become the next Vietnam, reforming its economy and society from within a communist system? Or does it wish to sink into the abyss of further economic decline and possible state failure?
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The US and its regional partners, South Korea, Japan, China and Russia, should offer Pyongyang carrots but threaten sticks if it remains recalcitrant. In offering incentives, they should be careful not to set a precedent for rewarding illicit behaviour by granting North Korea large benefits for undoing a nuclear programme it should not have had in the first place. They should make more comprehensive demands - not only denuclearisation, but reductions in conventional forces and missiles, elimination of chemical arms, structural economic reform, human rights improvements - as a condition for substantial increases in aid. If Pyongyang is prepared to make such a deal, or even move significantly towards reformist policies, Washington and other capitals should be clear that they are prepared to help finance a transition to a Vietnam-style economy in North Korea. Aid of $2bn-$3bn (£1.1bn-£1.6bn) a year for several years, to help build infrastructure and revitalise agriculture and improve the public health and even education systems, would make sense if North Korea were to move verifiably in this direction. US bans on trade and investment could also be gradually lifted; a temporary US diplomatic presence could lead to full relations and a permanent embassy within several years if all went well. The United Nations system, including the World Bank, could help as well under the direction of Ban Ki-moon, UN secretary-general designate.
This is an ambitious vision. It would probably not appeal initially to Kim Jong-il, North Korea's leader - who might worry that once reform was unleashed, he would suffer the fate of Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania, who was overthrown and executed, rather than that of the reformist leaders of modern-day Vietnam or China. But those two countries have shown the way by retaining a communist superstructure, which could make the idea palatable to Mr Kim and (regrettable as it may be) allow him to remain in power as he transformed his nation. Moreover, Mr Kim would be forced to choose between reform and the slow strangulation of his state.
Making such a choice stark and be-lievable will require remarkable diplomacy, given the unwillingness of South Korea and China to coerce North Korea under virtually any circumstance. But this week's nuclear test may create an opportunity, as it has shocked countries in the region normally inclined to treat North Korea with kid gloves.
Military options would not be off the table, especially if North Korea either threatened to sell nuclear materials abroad or continued construction on its large reactors. One possibility, though hardly a panacea, would be a "surgical" military strike against the larger reactors. Even though it is too late to prevent North Korea from having the plutonium for perhaps 10 bombs, it is not too late to prevent it becoming an industrial-scale producer of weapons.
But the riskiness of even such a limited use of force should focus all our minds on the need to construct a united front and pose Pyongyang a stark choice at this precarious moment.
The writer, senior fellow at Brookings, is co-author with Kurt Campbell of Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security (Basic Books)
如何对付朝鲜?
对
于朝鲜核武器的问题,世界还能做些什么吗?毕竟,朝鲜拥有一两个核弹头可能已逾十年,而近两年来可能拥有多达10枚核弹头。它看到,巴基斯坦试验核弹头受到了制裁,随后又得到了宽恕。它也看到,美韩联盟在布什(Bush)执政期间步履维艰:首尔和华盛顿方面争来争去,仿佛要看谁能更快打破联合指挥体制――这一体制曾确保了朝鲜半岛的军事威慑和稳定。
简短的答案是:我们必须尝试。考虑到朝鲜有将武器和核技术卖到国外的历史、施行“悬崖”政策的倾向,同时东亚有可能出现核扩散的多米诺骨牌效应,朝鲜拥有核武器会使世界的安全性明显下降。因此,美国需要制定一项新的重大政策。新政策的核心应该是,迫使朝鲜在是否更积极地参与经济和外交事务方面做出抉择。政策的目标应该是使平壤无法维持现状,迫使其在与外界建立较良好关系(以及获得更多的贸易、投资和援助)和可能遭遇压力和强制行动之间作出选择。它是否希望成为下一个越南,在社会主义体制内进行经济和社会改革?还是愿意陷入更深的经济衰退甚至“失败国家”的深渊中?
美国及其地区伙伴韩国、日本、中国和俄罗斯应该给朝鲜政府提供“胡萝卜”,但如果朝鲜仍旧冥顽不化,那么就应以“大棒”相威胁。在提供激励的时候,它们应该谨慎从事,不要仅仅为了让朝鲜取消其原本就不应拥有的计划,而给予其太多好处,从而开创回报违法行为的先河。这些国家应提出更为全面的要求:作为大幅增加援助的条件,不仅要拆除核武器,还要削减常规军事力量和导弹、销毁化学武器、进行经济结构改革、改善人权状况。如果朝鲜政府准备做这笔交易,或者甚至准备朝着改革政策的方向采取更大的行动,那么美国和其它国家政府就应明确,他们愿意资助朝鲜向越南式经济的转型。如果朝鲜确实要向着这一方向迈进,那么有必要在数年内每年提供20亿至30亿美元的援助,以帮助朝鲜进行基础设施建设,重振农业,改善公共医疗乃至教育体系。美国也可以逐渐解除对朝贸易和投资禁令;美国临时的外交存在可能导致两国建立全面关系,并且,如果一切进展顺利的话,数年内在朝鲜建立永久性使馆。包括世界银行(World Bank)在内的联合国(UN)系统,也可能在已被提名出任联合国秘书长的潘基文(Ban Ki-moon)指示下提供帮助。
这是一个雄心勃勃的设想。它最初或许无法打动朝鲜领导人金正日(Kim Jong-il)――他可能担心一旦改革铺开,他会遭受罗马尼亚前领导人尼古拉?齐奥塞斯库(Nicolae Ceausescu)的命运(被推翻并处死),而非当代越南或中国改革派领导人的命运。但是,这两个国家保留了社会主义上层建筑,从而指明了道路,让这一设想更合金正日的心意,使他得以在国家变革过程中继续把持大权(尽管这或许让人遗憾)。此外,金正日将被迫在施行改革和他的国家被缓慢扼杀之间做出选择。
鉴于实际上韩国和中国在任何情况下都不愿强迫朝鲜,要做出这样一个严峻而可信的选择,需要非同寻常的外交手腕。不过,本周的核试验可能将创造一个机会,因为这使该地区那些通常倾向于小心翼翼地对待朝鲜的国家感到震惊。
动武的可能性不能排除,特别是如果朝鲜威胁把核材料卖到国外,或继续修建大型核反应堆的话。可能性之一是对较大的反应堆实施“外科手术式”军事打击,虽说这算不上什么万灵丹。尽管阻挠朝鲜拥有10枚核弹头所需的钚原料已为时过晚,但阻止其批量制造核武器还来得及。
但是,即便是这种有限使用武力的风险,也应让我们聚焦这样的需要:值此动荡之际,建立一条联合阵线,迫使平壤接受严峻的选择。
本文作者是布鲁金斯学会(Brookings)高级研究员,曾与科特?坎贝尔(Kurt Campbell)合著《Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security》Basic Books 出版社出版)
(back)South Korea, Japan and Taiwan not rushing to join nuclear club
North Korea's claimed nuclear test has renewed discussions in neighbouring countries about whether they should develop atomic weapons programmes, a question that will fuel fears of a fresh arms race.
Although South Korea, Japan and Taiwan are all considered highly unlikely to join the nuclear club in the near future, analysts say the presence of three nuclear powers in north-east Asia - China, Russia and now, perhaps, North Korea - is giving pause for thought.
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South Korea is negotiating to take over wartime control of its military from the US, a change that has left many South Koreans feeling vulnerable and has led to calls for a stronger deterrent against the North.
But Monday's test, if validated, was also confirmation North Korea had breached the 1991 joint declaration under which both Koreas agreed not to produce nuclear weapons.
"There are people in the [South Korean] government who will raise doubts, questions about how long we should be bound by a political commitment supposed to bind North Korea but that North Korea is in material breach of," a senior South Korean government official told the Financial Times.
Many South Koreans take it as a given that they will become a nuclear state - by inheriting the North's weapons programme upon unification. A survey by the Dong-a Ilbo news-paper last year found that 52 per cent of South Koreans thought their country should have nuclear weapons.
But many analysts think this debate is only theoretical. "I don't think we need nuclear weapons in this country," said Chang In-soon, former president of the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute. "Energy security is a very serious issue so we will continue to have peaceful projects only."
Seoul has, however, raised the spectre that Tokyo might be prompted to join the nuclear club. Yu Myung-hwan, South Korea's vice-foreign minister, last week said a North Korean test could give Japan a "pretext" to go nuclear.
But Japanese scholars and government officials say that Japan is unlikely to seize on North Korea's test as an excuse to develop an independent nuclear deterrent of its own.
Shinzo Abe, the prime minister, said yesterday: "There will be no change in our non-nuclear arms principles."
Japan, which has one of the world's most developed nuclear power industries, could probably make a bomb within weeks. But public "allergy" to nuclear weapons because of the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as constitutional obstacles to deploying them, make it unlikely that Mr Abe's new government would push the issue, they said.
Robert Dujarric, a security expert at the National Institute for Public Policy in the US, said that as long as Tokyo was convinced that the US-Japan alliance provided a credible deterrent, Japan would not substantially alter its policy.
When China's foreign ministry spokesman was asked if he was concerned that the North's test might encourage South Korea and Japan to develop nuclear arms, he replied that Beijing opposed all nuclear proliferation.
Chinese scholars and analysts say Beijing has reason to worry about the expansion of a nuclear club already already stretched to include India and Pakistan.
Although China's threat of war against Taiwan would in theory give the island one of the strongest incentives to develop nuclear weapons, military analysts and nuclear scientists say Taipei is unlikely to re-enter the ranks of threshold countries.
亚洲邻邦会效仿金正日吗?
朝
鲜进行核试验引发了周边国家有关它们自己是否应当研制核武器的新一轮讨论,这一问题将加剧人们对于新一轮军备竞赛的担忧。
分析人士表示,尽管一般认为韩国、日本和台湾在近期加入核俱乐部的可能性甚微,但东北亚地区存在三个核国家(中国、俄罗斯,还有难以预料的朝鲜)的局面,正促使人们反思。
韩国正与美国谈判,旨在从美军手中收回对韩国军队的战时控制权,这一变化让许多韩国人觉得缺乏安全感,并激起了加强对朝威慑的呼声。
但是,朝鲜周一进行的核试验还证明,它已经违反了南北朝鲜于1991年发表的联合声明,即两国同意实现朝鲜半岛无核化。韩国政府一位高级官员对《金融时报》表示:“这一政治承诺本应对朝鲜形成约束力,但朝鲜却严重违反了它。韩国政府中会有一些人发出疑问:我们还要被这一政治承诺束缚多久?”
许多韩国人认定韩国自然会成为核国家――因为韩国会在南北统一后接管朝鲜的核武器。去年,一项由《东亚日报》(Dong-A Ilbo)进行的调查发现,52%的韩国人认为他们的国家应当拥有核武器。
但许多分析人士认为,这种争论仅限于理论层面。“我认为我们国家不需要核武器,”韩国原子能研究院(Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute)前院长Chang In-soon表示。“能源安全是一个非常严肃的问题,因此我们将继续仅从事和平用途的项目。”
然而,首尔担心,朝鲜核试验可能促使东京加入核俱乐部。韩国外交通商部副长官尹永宽(Yu Myung-hwan)上周表示,朝鲜核试验可能为日本研制核武器提供“借口”。
但一些日本学者和政府官员表示,日本不太可能以朝鲜核试验为借口,独立开发自己的核威慑力量。
日本新任首相安倍晋三(Shinzo Abe)本周向国会表示:“日本不拥有核武器的原则不会改变。”
日本拥有世界上最先进的核能产业之一,有可能在数周内研制出核弹。但日本学者和官员们表示,鉴于广岛和长崎给日本人民留下的记忆,以及研制核武器所面临的宪法障碍,日本公众对核武器“反感”,因此安倍晋三领导的新一届政府不太可能推动这一进程。
美国国家公共政策研究院(National Institute for Public Policy)安全专家罗伯特?杜加里克(Robert Dujarric)表示,只要东京确信,美日同盟能够提供可靠的威慑,日本就不会从根本上改变其政策。
当中国外交部发言人被问及,中国是否担心朝鲜核试验会促使韩国和日本研制核武器时,他回答道,中国政府反对任何形式的核扩散。
但中国学者和分析人士称,中国政府的确有理由担心全球核能俱乐部可能扩大,就像上世纪90年代印度和巴基斯坦进行核试验那样。
尽管中国威胁对台湾发动军事打击,理论上成为台湾研制核武器的最有力动机之一,但军事分析家和核科学家们表示,台湾不太可能重新走上发展核武的道路。
“如果台湾决定加强它的防御力量,以抵御中国大陆进攻、或避免被迫按照中国大陆的条件协商统一问题时,核武器可能是一个选择,”台湾的中国高等政策研究会(Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies)秘书长杨念祖(Andrew Yang)表示。“但我们甚至还没有讨论到台湾是否应当加强防御力量的问题。”