For China, a Cautionary Tale
Resource-hungry Chinese companies are increasingly scouring the world for acquisitions, from farms to oil assets. But China Inc.'s early experiences in the place where it has made the greatest headway, Latin America, show the difficulty companies are having adapting to locales and challenges very different from home.
Throughout South America, Chinese managers have developed a reputation for insularity by cordoning off Chinese workers from their local counterparts, and by failing to work with local businesses and services. Unaccustomed to facing recalcitrant unions or angry shareholders at home, the firms have also reacted slowly to demands from local workers. What Chinese managers view as discipline and thrift, local communities have interpreted as arrogance and stinginess.
The problems haven't derailed Chinese interest. For years, Chinese investment flowed mainly to Hong Kong trading firms as a way to draw foreign companies into the country and pump up Chinese exports. But last year, for the first time, South America topped Hong Kong and the rest of Asia as the top destination for Chinese foreign investment, garnering about half of the $889 million China invested abroad in the first 11 months of 2004.
The swelling investment in South America reflects China's voracious appetite for oil, minerals and agricultural commodities -- and the fat coffers of Chinese firms, stuffed with foreign capital. Beijing has promoted a "go-out" strategy for Chinese companies, epitomized by the barnstorming trip China's President Hu Jintao made late last year in Latin America, where he stopped at four national capitals.
Operating abroad will become a growing challenge for China, as its firms look to transform themselves from their traditional role as low-cost suppliers to Western companies into full-blooded rivals. Many Japanese companies had similar reputations for insularity when they first ventured abroad. But they learned how to operate effectively and dominate markets; their investments were courted by host governments.
Several Chinese companies recently have made high-profile acquisitions. International Business Machines Corp. agreed to sell its PC division to China's Lenovo Group Ltd., a cut-rate computer maker. Meanwhile Chinese electronics firm TCL Corp. recently bought the television arm of France's Thomson SA, as well as the handset operations of France's Alcatel SA. Now China's third-largest oil and natural-gas company is looking at whether to make a bid for Unocal Corp., a U.S. oil giant.
From the perspective of many South American firms and communities, Chinese firms look rapacious. When Ecuadorian oil-services company Dygoil SA won a $69 million contract to upgrade wells for Ecuador's state oil company, Dygoil's financing options were dire: International creditors refused to lend the company operating capital and local banks were changing interest rates of up 20% annually. So Dygoil turned to China National Petroleum Co., which had access to rates of 3% to 4% from the Bank of China. CNPC agreed to come in as an investor. But just before the project began, CNPC decided to work alone and reduce Dygoil to a subcontractor.
"That's the way the Chinese work," says Dygoil president César Guerra. "Once they learn how, they don't need you." CNPC's unit in Ecuador, CNPC International (Amazon) Ltd., declined to comment. But Zhou Chunming, Beijing's commercial attache in Ecuador, says "Mutual cooperation is our only goal."
In the little town of Lago Agro in Ecuador's Amazon rainforest, the aloofness of Chinese companies is easy to spot. A tiny CNPC compound, with a single basketball hoop, sits near a mammoth campus, built in the 1970s by Texaco Corp. Storekeepers and restaurant owners say that their trade with the Chinese is almost nonexistent.
"We work on internal principles," explains Lijun Wang, a CNPC manager. "Each employee is restricted to the compound."
Abandoned buildings where workers once lived illustrate the trouble China's Shougang International Trade & Engineering Co. has had with its investment in a Peruvian mine.
Gree Electric Appliances , from Zhuhai, China, had big plans to manufacture air conditioners in Brazil, but has cut its proposed investment by half. Gree managers grumble that Brazil's labor unions interfere with everything from holiday work schedules to efforts to enforce discipline among workers. "It's simple in China," says Ye Yonqing, a Gree investment executive. "The managers decide everything."
Huawei Technologies Co. says it has learned the way to succeed in South America is for Chinese companies to stop being so Chinese. After six years of doing business in the region, China's biggest maker of telecom equipment has picked up these lessons: adapt to the culture, follow government policies and hire locals, according to Li Jie, spokesman for the Shenzhen-based company. Huawei appointed Brazilians to help manage its marketing and sales office, and technical support center.
Perhaps the most troubled Chinese investment -- and the one that did the most to damage the reputation of China in South America -- is Shougang International Trade & Engineering Co.'s purchase of Peru's state-run iron works, Hierro de Peru. The Chinese firm paid $120 million for the mine in 1993, five times the price of the closest bidder, and pledged another $130 million in investment.
Townspeople in San Juan Marcona buzzed with talk about how China would revive the dying Pacific port. A decade later, the town of 13,000 faces ruin. Last June, scores of workers blocked a highway to demand a pay raise of 85 cents a day and a daily ration of canned milk. Many were fired. Graffiti scrawled across the dirty walls recalls a decade's worth of protests and strikes. One reads: "Go Home Chinese Dogs."
A collapse in the demand for steel and iron ore during the 1997 Asian financial crisis damaged Shougang's business prospects. But the company's local practices also alienated workers and the community. It failed to honor its pledge to modernize the company, and paid Peruvian officials a $25 million fine instead. Without the needed improvements, mine safety declined. According Peru's Labor Ministry, there were more than 170 accidents -- two of them fatal -- at Shougang facilities in 2003, the last year for which complete figures are available. Union leaders say conditions have improved somewhat in 2004.
In China, unions are arms of the government and workers rarely walk off the job, leaving Shougang unprepared for work stoppages in Peru in response to pay freezes. Shougang eventually brought over as many as 270 Chinese employees, who had been through crash courses in Spanish. But the two nationalities rarely worked together. Zhang Baoshan, a former Shougang vice general manager, recalls seeing a Chinese team repairing the wheel of one earthmover and the Peruvians repairing a second earthmover. Chinese who dated locals were asked to report to Shougang headquarters and often had their passports seized, says Mr. Zhang, who retired from Shougang in 2002.
When Shougang later decided to send its imported laborers home, it replaced them with cut-rate temporary workers who received none of the health or housing benefits that unionized workers are entitled to under Peruvian law. In time, those employees formed their own union to wring better wages and conditions from the Chinese.
For most of the past eight years, Shougang has barely broken even on the mine, despite recent high prices for steel. Shougang declined to discuss its labor problems. Shougang's chief spokesman in Beijing, Gu Liyun, says the company has abided by Peruvian law.
Some Chinese companies say they are learning from Shougang's many mistakes. After signing a deal to help build a chemical plant in South America, Sichuan Lu Tian Hua Co. dispatched executives to Bolivia to learn about the investment environment, raw material supply, local taxes as well as salaries and conditions for workers, according to Zhang Bin, an executive in the company's securities division, who adds, "We know a little bit about Shougang's stories."
中国公司海外投资谨记前车之鉴
急需各种资源的中国公司正越来越多地走出国门寻找收购对象，从农场到石油资产，全在它们的搜寻范围之内。但从中国企业在海外扩张方面取得最大进展的拉美地区看，这些中国公司在适应与国内情况迥然不同的环境和挑战方面仍然面临著困难。
在整个南美洲，中国的经理人员已经因他们惯于将中国来的员工与本地员工隔绝开来的做法而出了名，他们另一个广为人知的特点是不能与本地的企业和有关部门有效地合作。由于不习惯面对本地桀骜不驯的工会以及国内心怀不满的股东，这些中国公司对当地工人提出的各种要求也往往反应迟缓。被中国经理人视为体现了纪律和节俭的一些行为，在当地人看来却是傲慢和吝啬的表现。
不过这些问题并没有打消中国企业进军海外的兴趣。多年来，中国的海外投资主要都流向了香港的贸易公司，其目的是吸引外资企业到大陆投资办厂，以及推动中国的出口。但在去年，南美首次超过香港和亚洲其他地区成为中国最大的海外投资目的地。2004年前11个月，中国约8.89亿美元的海外投资约半数都投向了南美洲。
对南美投资的迅速增长反映了中国对石油、矿产品和农产品的渴求。而外商大举投资中国使中国公司手头拥有了充足的资金，也成为中国对南美洲投资大幅增长的一个前提条件。中国政府一直在鼓励本国企业采取“走出去”的战略，而中国国家主席胡锦涛去年末对拉美四国的高调访问更是彰显了这一战略。
对于那些希望摆脱西方公司低成本供应商这一传统角色的中国企业来说，如果它们想成为西方跨国公司真正意义上的竞争对手，那么赴海外开展业务就成了它们越来越无法回避的一个挑战。许多日本公司在一开始尝试进军海外时也曾落下过与当地环境格格不入的名声。但它们已经学会了如何在海外有效开展业务并主导当地市场；它们的投资获得了当地政府的欢迎。
中国几家公司最近进行了数桩大张旗鼓的收购。国际商业机器公司(International Business Machines Corp.)同意将其个人电脑业务出售给中国的低价电脑生产商联想集团(Lenovo Group Ltd.)。与此同时，中国的电子产品生产商TCL集团(TCL Corp.)最近收购了法国汤姆逊公司(Thomson SA)的电视机业务，以及法国阿尔卡特公司(Alcatel SA)的手机业务。现在，中国的第三大油气公司正在考虑是否要竞购美国的石油巨头Unocal Corp.。
在许多南美公司和社区看来，中国企业给人以贪婪的感觉。厄瓜多尔的石油服务公司Dygoil SA曾赢得一笔为该国的国有石油公司进行油井升级改造的6,900万美元合同，但遇到十分严峻的融资形势：国际债权人拒绝向该公司提供经营资金，本国银行又要求高达20%的利率。Dygoil因而向中国石油天然气集团公司(China National Petroleum Co.)寻求合作，因为后者可以以3%到4%的利率从中国银行(Bank of China)借到钱。中国石油同意以投资者身份参与到该项目中来，但在该项目即将开始实施时，中国石油却决定自己单独干了，并把Dygoil降到了分包商的地位。
Dygoil的总裁塞萨尔?古瑞拉(Cesar Guerra)说，“这就是中国人的做事方式，一旦他们知道了怎么做，他们就不需要你了。”中国石油在厄瓜多尔的子公司中国石油国际（亚马逊）公司(CNPC International (Amazon) Ltd.)拒绝对此发表评论。但中国驻厄瓜多尔使馆商务参赞邹传明表示，“双边合作是我们的唯一目标。”
在厄瓜多尔亚马逊雨林地区的小镇Lago Agro，中国公司的万事不求人心态展现无遗。在德士古公司(Texaco Corp.)建于上世纪七十年代的一座庞大设施旁，中国石油的一处小小营地赫然在目，那里还有一个篮球架。当地的小店店主和餐馆老板都说，他们与这里的中国人基本没生意可做。
中国石油的一位经理王利军(音)解释说，“我们有内部纪律，每位员工的活动都不能超出营地范围。”
中国珠海的格力电器股份有限公司(Gree Electric Appliances)曾制定过在巴西建设大型空调器生产厂的计划，但现在已将拟议中的投资削减了一半。格力电器的经理们抱怨说，巴西的工会样样都要干涉，从假日安排到在工人中执行纪律，没有它们不管的。该公司一位投资主管说，在中国事情就简单了，经理们可以决定一切。
华为技术有限公司(Huawei Technologies Co.)表示，它已学会了中国公司在南美洲的成功之道，那就是不要再那么中国化。这家中国最大的电信设备生产商在南美开展业务已有6年，该公司发言人李杰(音)说，华为在这里学到的经验是：适应当地的文化，执行政府的政策并雇佣当地的人。华为已聘用了当地人来帮助其管理在巴西的营销和销售办事处及技术服务中心。
首钢国际贸易工程公司(Shougang International Trade & Engineering Co.)购买秘鲁国营公司Hierro de Peru的交易可能是一桩遭遇麻烦最大的中国海外投资，它对中国在南美的声誉损害也最大。首钢1993年斥资1.2亿美元收购了这家铁矿，这一出价较与其最为接近的另一报价高4倍。首钢当时还承诺要再向这座铁矿投资1.3亿美元。
该矿所在地San Juan Marcona的人对中国人将如何使这座太平洋沿岸的港口小镇起死回生议论纷纷。10年后的今天，这座1.3万人口的小镇处在了生死存亡的紧要关头。去年6月，众多工人封锁了一条通向矿山的高速公路，他们要求将日工资增加85美分，并要求顾主每日分发罐装牛奶。许多罢工工人遭到了解雇。如今的San Juan Marcona，肮脏墙壁上随处可见的涂鸦是10年来持续不断抗议和罢工事件的写照。有幅标语写道：“中国狗滚回去。”
1997年爆发的亚洲金融危机导致对钢铁和铁矿石的市场需求急剧下降，也损害了首钢的商业前景。但该公司在San Juan Marcona的所作所为也使它疏离了当地工人和社区。它未履行对这家铁矿进行升级改造的诺言，而是向秘鲁官员缴纳了2,500万美元罚款了事。由于未进行必要的升级改造，这家铁矿的安全程度下降了。据秘鲁劳工部(Labor Ministry)称，该矿2003年发生了170余起事故，其中两起造成了人员死亡。2004年的事故数尚未完全统计出来。据工会领袖称，2004年的情况有所好转。
在中国，工会是政府的下属部门，工人们也很少采取罢工行动，这使首钢对其工资冻结决定在秘鲁铁矿引发的停工行为感到措手不及。首钢最终想出的解决办法是从中国派来了多达270名员工，这些人来之前接受了西班牙语速成培训。但中、秘两国人员很少在一起工作。首钢前副总经理张宝山回忆说，他曾看到一组中国工人在修一辆重型推土机的轮子，而另一组秘鲁工人则在修另一辆重型推土机。张宝山说，当时中国人与秘鲁当地人约会要向首钢总部报告，他们的护照也经常被收缴。张宝山已于2002年从首钢退休。
当首钢后来决定让这些中国工人回国后，它取而代之的是费用低廉的本地临时工，这些人没有任何医疗和住房福利，而根据秘鲁的法律，加入了工会的工人有权获得这些福利。这些临时工及时组建了自己的工会，并向中国顾主要求获得更高的工资和更好的生活条件。
在过去8年的大部分时间，首钢在秘鲁的这一铁矿仅仅能够做到收支平衡，尽管钢铁价格最近有显著上涨。首钢拒绝谈论它遇到的劳工问题。首钢在北京的发言人古丽云(音)说，该公司一贯遵守秘鲁的法律。
一些中国公司说它们正在从首钢的众多错误中吸取经验。四川泸天化公司(Sichuan Lu Tian Hua Co.)签署了一项在南美帮助建造一座化工厂的协议后，就派遣管理人员到玻利维亚去了解当地的投资环境、原材料供应、税收法规以及有关工人工资和劳动条件的相关规定。该公司的一位管理人士说：“我们对首钢的经历有所了解。”
