Deficit Attention Disorder
From 1914 to 1918, as war-torn and import-hungry Europe liquidated claims it had built up against the U.S. in the previous century, America went from being the world's largest debtor to being its largest creditor. Now, once again, the U.S. is the largest debtor nation and, with its record-breaking current-account deficits equal to nearly 6% of GDP, investors and policy makers are worried about the sustainability of the U.S. external position. Will it take another European conflagration to restore America's balance?
In fact, such a conflagration may actually be taking place -- not in the form of war in Europe but as a series of demographic changes that may have almost the same economic impact. Europe, along with Japan, is aging rapidly and its population declining. Over the next 40 to 50 years, Europe's population is expected to drop from 380 million to 340 million, and Japan's from 130 million to 110 million. Worse, the median age for these two societies is expected to rise from 36 today to over 52 by the middle of the century.
This demographic shift will represent economic challenges comparable with those faced during the Great War, albeit over a longer time frame. As Europe ages and its population declines, there will be enormous pressure to break the social model. Rising demands from pensioners, greater expenditures on health, increased military spending, and various other costs will have to be provided by a rapidly declining work force.
A reasonable long-term protective strategy might be to increase current European and Japanese claims on foreign economies in order to make the future adjustment process easier. Over the next decade, Europeans and Japanese would have to save as much as possible and use these savings to accumulate claims abroad. As their foreign claims accumulate while economic conditions are (relatively) good, they will be able to draw down on these claims to pay for the import of goods and services that they will need during their great adjustment periods.
Where should they accumulate these claims? Although China and India are growing rapidly and may become economic powerhouses in the future, there is little doubt that only the U.S. has the size, the economic vitality, the long-term security and the financial flexibility to support this massive savings program.
The U.S., although facing its own demographic challenges, is in much better demographic shape than almost any other major country. Higher fertility and immigration rates should raise the population from 290 million to over 420 million by 2050, while keeping the rise in median age from 34 years to 36 years.
Seen in this light, the current "unsustainable" global balance of payments is not only not unsustainable but also perhaps even necessary. With demographic crises threatening not just Europe and Japan, but also Russia and China, it makes sense for threatened countries to accumulate claims against the only part of the world economy that seems healthy and large enough to help the adjustment process.
Of course, the only way to accumulate such claims is by running significant current-account surpluses against the U.S. These surpluses, the obverse of the U.S. deficit, will be reversed in the future as aging countries liquidate their claims against the U.S. to manage their adjustments.
The U.S. itself will benefit from this process, as it did in the 19th century, if foreign investment in the U.S. boosts production by more than the amount of foreign claims. There may be strong U.S. resistance to this process if the short-term imbalances threaten U.S. markets, but the American financial system is astonishingly good at absorbing shocks. If capital imports were directed primarily into equity markets, rather than Treasurys, the process would be smoother for all involved, but even capital directed toward Treasurys will accomplish the goal.
Seen in this light, concerns about whether the world can continue to finance the U.S. current-account deficit are overstated. Not only can the world continue to finance the U.S. deficit into the foreseeable future, but the deficit may arise precisely because a large part of the world must continue to accumulate financial assets in the U.S. to help badly needed future adjustments. Instead of bewailing the current balance of payments and the supposedly unsustainable U.S. current-account deficit, Europe, Japan and the U.S. must work together to ensure that the adjustments forced upon the world by demographic changes work smoothly over the long term.
Mr. Pettis is a professor of finance at Peking University.
人口状况与赤字
1914至1918年间，欧洲饱尝战争之苦，对进口商品几近渴求，而这段时间美国不仅还清了上个世纪以来欠欧洲的所有债务，并且还从世界第一大债务国变成了第一大债权国。如今，美国又再次成为最大的债务国，经常项目赤字屡创新高，几乎占到了美国国内生产总值(GDP)的近6%。投资者和政策制定者们都担心，美国这种依靠借债度日的状况还能维持多久，难道还需要欧洲再遭受一次天灾人祸才能让美国恢复收支平衡吗？
实际上，这样的天灾人祸还真有可能发生，不过当然不是以战争的形式，而是与一系列的人口状况变化有关，它对经济所产生的影响和一场战争差不多。目前，欧洲以及日本的人口平均年龄正在逐渐增大，而人口数量在不断减少。在今后40至50年里，预计欧洲人口将从3.8亿减少到3.4亿；日本人口从1.3亿减少到1.1亿。更糟糕的是，预计到本世纪中期，这两个地区人口的年龄中值将从目前的36岁提高到52岁。
这种人口状况的变化所带来的经济问题决不亚于第一次世界大战，只不过其时间范围可能要更长一些。随著人口走向老龄化以及人口数量的减少，欧洲在打破现有社会模式方面面临著巨大的压力。社会上对养老金的需求日益增加、医疗支出不断增大、军费开支也成上升之势，类似的种种开销都不得不依靠正迅速萎缩的劳动力大军来提供。
对于欧洲和日本而言，一个比较行之有效的长期策略就是增加目前的国际收支盈余，目的是要让将来进行的调整更加容易。在未来10年，欧洲和日本应该尽可能多地储备资金，并用这些资金来增加国际收支盈余。当这些地区经济相对较好时，国际收支盈余会不断增加，因此当进入到重要调整时期时，它们就可以利用这些盈余为进口所需要的商品和服务提供资金。
那么它们应建立对哪些地区的收支盈余呢？虽然中国和印度增长迅猛，并有可能在未来成为经济强国，但是要支持如此庞大的存储计划，毫无疑问只有美国才有这样的实力，美国的经济规模、经济活力、长期安全性以及金融灵活性都使其成为不二之选。虽然美国也有自己的人口问题，但情况要比几乎其他所有主要国家都要好。由于美国生育率较高，并且外来移民源源不断流入，因此到2050年之前，美国人口应能从目前的2.9亿上升到4.2亿以上，而人口年龄中值也仅仅从34岁增至36岁。
由此可见，目前“难以为继”的国际收支平衡不仅不是“难以为继”，甚至可能还是很有必要。不仅欧洲和日本存在人口危机，俄罗斯和中国也面临同样的威胁，因此这些国家有必要依赖对世界某一地区的收支盈余，这一地区要看起来状况不错、并且经济规模大到足以为这些国家的调整提供帮助。当然，具体方式只有一种，那就是保持对美国大量的经常项目盈余。这些盈余在美国看来就是赤字，但当将来那些人口老龄化的国家为了进行调整、而逐步消耗这些盈余时，美国的经常项目赤字可能就会变成盈余了。
就像在19世纪那样，美国自身也会从中受益，前提是美国吸收到的外商投资对生产的推动超过了这些赤字的影响。如果短期内的失衡威胁到了美国市场，美国可能对此进行强烈的抵制，好在美国的金融体系吸收冲击的能力惊人地强。如果资本流入主要投向证券市场而不是美国国债市场，那么对于有关各方而言过程可能会顺利得多，不过即使是投入到美国国债上也能实现同样的目标。
因此，外界对全球是否还能继续支撑美国经常项目赤字的担忧被夸大了。在可以预见的将来，世界不仅可以继续支撑美国的经常项目赤字，而且赤字规模还会进一步增长，因为全球大部分地区必须继续在美国积累金融资产，为将来的调整做准备。欧洲、日本和美国不应只顾哀叹国际收支平衡状况和美国似乎难以为继的经常项目赤字，它们还必须同心协力，保证在未来很长一段时期内为顺应人口状况变化所进行的调整能够顺利进行。
