China's Surfeit of Riches
China is suffering from a surfeit of riches. Last year, the country's foreign-exchange reserves grew by $206 billion to a total of $610 billion. Some of this capital came through the goods trade surplus; some through foreign direct investment or foreign-currency bank loans; and a large part through shadier routes.
But put aside the question of where all China's new foreign exchange came from -- and whether it was hot or cold. The important thing, at least as far as maintaining the yuan's peg to the dollar is concerned, is whether the authorities can cope with the pressures that such a foreign-exchange reserve build up entails. And whether they can continue to do so throughout 2005?
China is not the only country in Asia amassing reserves. Throughout the region, foreign-exchange reserves rose as currencies failed to completely adjust to the dollar's weakness. However, China's reserves are growing faster -- and are more significant in macroeconomic terms -- than most others. Japan's foreign-exchange reserves, at $844.5 billion, are the largest in the world. But the increase last year was small, equivalent to 3.7% of gross domestic product for 2004, and so easy to absorb. In contrast, net foreign-exchange inflows into China last year were equivalent to 12.9% of its GDP in 2004 (only Malaysia's were larger at 16.1% of GDP -- and because Malaysia's economy is more open, the pressures are even greater here).
China's foreign-exchange reserves now stand at 38% of GDP, and look likely to have another very strong year in 2005. The $60 billion current-account surplus for 2004 suggests that the yuan's peg to the falling dollar has allowed it to become more competitive. Exports into Euroland are booming. If, as seems likely, the current consolidation in the dollar is only temporary, the probable prognosis for 2005 is a yet more competitive yuan, a wider current-account surplus (exacerbated by showing imports of capital goods imports), and more unofficial capital flows. That means foreign-exchange reserves could easily grow by another $200 billion or more in 2005.
That foreign-exchange build up does have the advantage of providing the authorities with a cushion in the event of a crisis. However, such build ups are not a free lunch. After all, when exporters go to their banks and give up their dollar receipts they receive yuan at the official exchange rate. They then deposit this new money at the banks, and the banks are free to lend it on. That raises the obvious risk of inflation.
The Chinese government's strategy for dealing with the pressure is not to be underestimated. The three main tactics are: export, spend and suck.
Tactic one is export, giving out what amount to foreign-exchange reserve export licenses. There are increasing numbers of official holes in China's capital account. Last weekend Guo Shuqing, head of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, the People's Bank of China's foreign-exchange manager, announced plans to expand them. Take China's insurance companies for instance, which Mr. Guo said would soon get more foreign-exchange export licenses. More Chinese firms will be allowed to invest abroad, and Chinese firms raising dollars in overseas stock markets may be allowed to retain these funds.
The problem, however, is that this portfolio of micromeasures lacks something in scale. China Life has said that it plans to invest $3 billion overseas, Ping An Insurance plans to invest $1.75 billion. But even if insurers manage to invest half of all new premiums into overseas debt and equity assets, that would only amount to $2 billion a month at present. Nor is outward FDI highly significant: It officially only amounted to $3.6 billion for the whole of 2004, while overseas equity issues raised $7.8 billion last year. All this means the first tactic lacks scale at present.
Tactic two is to spend the money. In December 2003 the government converted $45 billion of foreign-exchange reserves into equity capital at two state-owned banks. More big bailouts of large banks are likely to follow. The talk is of how this pot of cash could be used to solve all of China's social ills, whether it is underfunded schools, hospitals, social security or speeding up the development of China's less prosperous western provinces. But none of this does anything to solve the inflationary pressures created by the inflow of money in the first place.
So tactic three is good: Suck up the money. And the authorities are doing this very successfully. The PBoC uses three instruments to sterilize foreign-exchange inflows. First, it has been auctioning central-bank bills to suck liquidity from the system. The PBoC is estimated to have withdrawn a net $67.4 billion through bills last year, meaning that it succeeded in sterilizing 32% of the yuan created by foreign-exchange inflows. The PBoC has also hiked the banks' required reserve ratio, to 7% in September 2004 (up from 6% previously), and then to 7.5% in April 2004. Another hike cannot be ruled out. Last April, the PBoC also started seriously suggesting that the banks go easy on lending.
So far, this seems to be working. Inflation in China is low -- and falling. The question is whether China can sustain the present situation. As foreign-exchange inflows grew rapidly in the fourth quarter of 2004, the PBoC had to issue more bills -- to both roll over previous notes and absorb new inflows. The risk in 2005 is that as new foreign-exchange inflows continue to build, bill issuance will have to rise and inflationary pressures will build.
The other cost is to the PBoC's bottom line: more bills mean more money paid out to investors. At present it looks like the central bank is just about breaking even on the spread between the bills it issues and the dollar assets in which it invests its foreign exchange. However, if rates do have to rise to cope with a resurgence in inflation, bill issuance will become more costly.
Of course, the Chinese government may still decide that more inflation and a dent in the PBoC's bottom line are a price worth paying in order to maintain the yuan's peg to the dollar. But if the price of the strategy rises, so will the likelihood of a rethink. 中国的外汇储备难题
（编者按：本文作者史蒂芬?格林 (Stephen Green) 是渣打银行 (Standard Chartered Bank) 驻上海的高级经济学家。）
钱多了也咬手？中国目前就面临这样的尴尬。 2004 年中国的外汇储备猛增 2,060 亿美元后，总额达到了 6,100 亿美元。这一部分是来自商品贸易顺差，一部分是外国直接投资或外币贷款，但很大一部分是通过其他不那么明确的渠道进入的。
但暂且抛开这些资金的来路不论──不管它是否是投机的热钱，重要的是当局能否处理好外汇储备如此迅猛增长带来的巨大压力，至少能否继续维持人民币与美元的挂钩汇率。现行的汇率水平能否维持至年底？
中国并不是亚洲唯一一个外汇储备大幅增加的国家。在这个地区内，由于许多国家的货币汇率都不对美元走软作出充分反应，外汇储备均呈现上升。但中国的外汇储备增速度要比大多数亚洲国家都快，如果参照宏观经济规模其增速就更加可观了。以 8,445 亿美元的外汇储备在全球居于第一的日本，去年外汇储备仅有小幅增长，相当于 2004 年国内生产总值的 3.7% ，吸纳消化自然不成问题。相比之下，中国去年的外汇净流入达到了 GDP 的 12.9% ，仅次于马来西亚的 16.1% ，但马来西亚的经济开放程度更高，因而其承受的压力也小于中国。
中国的外汇储备目前占到了 GDP 的 38% ，而且今年外汇储备看来还是免不了要大幅增长。 2004 年 600 亿美元的经常项目顺差说明人民币汇率与下跌的美元挂钩已使得中国的出口产品更具有竞争力。面向欧元区的出口大幅增长。如果目前美元的盘整只是暂时的（这看上去很有可能）， 2005 年中国产品的出口竞争力将继续增加，经常项目盈余扩大，并出现更多的灰色资本流动。这意味著外汇储备 2005 年轻轻松松就能再增加 2,000 亿美元或更多。
这样的外汇储备积累速度，的确可以令当局在危机时获得回旋余地。但这也要付出代价。毕竟根据规定，出口商将外汇收入以官方汇率兑换成人民币后，总是会将新的资金存入银行，而银行可以把这些资金随意放贷，这显然加大了通货膨胀风险。
中国政府针对这种压力采取了流出、消耗和吸纳三种战术。
一号战术：流出，具体来说就是拓宽国内外汇资本的流出渠道。上周末，中国国家外汇管理局局长郭树清宣布了相关计划。以中国保险业为例，郭树清称，该行业将获准更大幅度地向海外转移外汇资本。更多的中国公司将获准投资海外，中国企业在海外股市筹得的美元资金也可以留存，无需兑换成人民币。
但问题是这些小幅调整可能带来的效应或许有限。中国人寿 (China Life) 表示计划在海外投资 30 亿美元，平安保险 (Ping An Insurance) 则计划投资 17.5 亿美元。但即使中国保险业将一半的新保费收入投资于海外债券和股票资产，目前每月也只有 20 亿美元的规模。中国企业的海外直接投资也不是非常显著：根据官方的数据， 2004 年全年仅有 36 亿美元，而当年海外股票发行筹集额就高达 78 亿美元。所有这些意味著一号战术的效应有限。
二号战术是消耗。 2003 年 12 月份，中国政府动用 450 亿美元的外汇储备为两家国有银行注资，接下来可能还会有更多的类似行动。传言称，外汇储备或许可用于解决中国所有的社会问题，不管是资金短缺的学校、医院和社保基金，还是加快中国落后的西部省份的开发。但不管怎样，外汇资金流入造成的通货膨胀压力似乎仍无法消解。
因此，三号战术值得推荐：吸纳。当局在这方面非常成功，采用的工具有 3 种：一是拍卖央行票据，吸纳系统中的流动资金，估计中国央行去年净吸纳了 674 亿美元的资金，相当于外汇流入造成的人民币供应量增加的 32% 。其二是上调存款准备金率， 2003 年 9 月中国央行将商业银行的存款准备金率从 6% 上调到了 7% ， 2004 年 4 月又进一步上调至 7.5% ，目前也不能排除再次上调的可能。其三是劝诫，去年 4 月中国央行开始严肃地谈到要求商业银行节制放贷的问题。
迄今为止，三号战术似乎是有效的。中国的通货膨胀保持了低水平。问题是这种状况能否得到维持。在去年第四季度外汇流入迅速增长的情况下，中国央行曾不得不扩大票据发行规模，以承接到期的票据和吸纳新流入的资金。今年随著外汇流入的继续增长，央行可能也不得不扩大票据发行规模，这将造成通货膨胀压力的上升。
吸纳战术是有成本的，这关系到央行的盈利问题：更多的票据就意味著要向投资者支付更多的资金。目前看来，央行的票据利息支出和美元资产投资回报差不多处于持平状态。但如果为了控制通货膨胀的飙升，利率持续上升，票据发行的成本也会水涨船高。
当然，中国政府可能依然认为，为了维持人民币与美元的挂钩汇率，造成通货膨胀上升和中国央行盈利损失都是值得的。但如果这种做法的代价不断上升，他们进行重新思考的可能性也会上升。
