The Asian giants compete for energy
China National Offshore Oil Corporation is considering a nearly $14bn (￡7bn, �10.6bn) takeover of Unocal of the US. Sinopec, another Chinese state-controlled oil group, has struck a $70bn deal to buy Iranian crude oil and liquefied natural gas over three decades. China has sent $6bn to Rosneft, the Russian company that bought the main production unit of the embattled Yukos oil group, as advance payment for oil supplies.
India has just reached a $40bn agreement to import LNG from Iran and develop Iranian oilfields, and is promoting pipeline projects to bring oil and gas across neighbouring countries to supply its energy-hungry economy.
These deals are among the largest of their kind, but scarcely a week goes by without Indian or Chinese companies announcing similar, if smaller, energy transactions from Ecuador to Gabon. The race by the two emerging economic giants of Asia to secure fuel has begun in earnest.
With world energy supplies already tight, the question is not whether the rising demand from India and China will bring them into commercial competition with each other and with other big importers such as the US and Japan: that is already happening. The question is whether it will lead to diplomatic tension and ultimately increase the risk of military conflict in the Asia-Pacific region.
For the moment, the competition for resources is fierce but not hostile. The main evidence of concern is that Beijing, nervous about the possible use of US and Indian naval power to control oil supplies from the Middle East in the event of conflict, is rapidly strengthening its own navy. “The Chinese are building up a capability to defend those sea lanes,” says Gary Samore, director of studies at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. “There is a naval rivalry building up in south-east Asia and the Indian Ocean.”
There is no doubt that India and China, which together account for more than a third of the world's population, must greatly increase their imports of oil and gas if their economies are to continue growing at annual rates of 6-10 per cent. China was once an oil exporter but is now the world's biggest oil consumer after the US and is increasingly dependent on imports: already, a third of its oil is imported.
India, although its economy and its energy needs are smaller than China's, is even more dependent on imports than its dynamic neighbour. Mani Shankar Aiyar, petroleum minister, reckons India's import dependency will increase from 70 per cent of consumption this year to 85 per cent in 15 years.
In Mapping the Global Future, an assessment of the world's prospects in 2020, the US government's National Intelligence Council says China is expected to boost its energy consumption by 150 per cent and India by nearly 100 per cent if they maintain steady growth. “The single most important factor affecting the demand for energy will be global economic growth, particularly that of China and India,” says the report, released in December. Both countries lack domestic resources and need to ensure access to imports. “The need for energy will be a major factor in shaping their foreign and defence policies, including expanding naval power,” says the intelligence report, adding that this is likely to prompt China to be more “activist” in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Eurasia.
This, too, is already happening. In recent years, Beijing has courted nations rich in natural resources. Trips by Hu Jintao, the Chinese president, to countries such as Kazakhstan and Gabon are at least partly inspired by China's thirst for energy.
Rivalry between China and India would be a concern even if it occurred in a world where other demands for energy were unchanged. But that is not the case. With oil and gas remaining the essential fuels for industrial societies, the importance of Middle East suppliers will increase as reserves elsewhere are depleted.
“ Last year the UK for the first time became a net gas importer, as a result of which there is a lot of interest in pipeline and LNG deals in the UK and Europe,” says Anna Howell, a Hong Kong-based consultant for Herbert Smith, the international law firm. “That is exactly what we're already seeing here in India and China.”
Japan, the world's second largest economy, and South Korea, which recently sealed an agreement to buy $20bn of LNG from the Russian far east and Yemen, also remain highly dependent on energy imports. The continuing confrontation between China and Japan over a gas field in a disputed part of the East China sea and the fierce diplomatic battle (apparently won by Japan) over the route of a proposed Russian pipeline carrying Siberian oil show that the dangers of energy competition are real.
Not everyone, however, is pessimistic. Claude Mandil, executive director of the International Energy Agency, the club of industrialised oil consumers, says the difficulty of meeting China's and India's need for fuel imports can and should be eased by international and regional co-operation.
India's Mr Aiyar takes the same view. He dismisses the idea that the tussle may become a new version of the “Great Game” for influence between rival 19th century imperial powers, saying he plans to visit Beijing later this year for consultations. One of his aims is to avoid damaging competition between Indian and Chinese oil companies for the overseas energy assets coveted by both countries. “India and China don't have to go through fratricide in order to arrive at the conclusion that it is better to co-operate on energy security,” he says. “Of course there will be competition where the market dictates.”
The need to secure oil and gas supplies for the Indian economy may also help improve relations with other neighbours including Pakistan, its long-time enemy. Among the pipelines under consideration are one bringing gas from Burma across Bangladesh, one from Iran across Pakistan, one from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan and Pakistan, and even one across India from Iran to China.
S. Chander, an energy and infrastructure expert at the Asian Development Bank, notes that reaching access agreements with neighbouring states is easier than before, at least financially. “For these countries like China and India with booming exports, to pay out a couple of hundred million dollars to Pakistan or Bangladesh is not a big deal, as it might have been five or seven years ago when foreign exchange was tight.”
The need for governments to co-operate on long-term infrastructure projects thus points at least to the possibility of improved relations between previously hostile states. “People are getting pragmatic,” says one Asia-based strategist at a big international oil company.
he energy squeeze is not so good for human rights or environmental protection, in central Asia or countries such as Burma. Governments in oil importing countries typically care more about energy security than the politics of the exporter. Democratic India has forged close relations with Burma's military junta and all but abandoned support for the pro-democracy opposition led by Aung San Suu Kyi. Like China, India is prepared to sacrifice other goals in the search for energy security.
In this search, both countries are implementing an array of policies designed to keep their power stations, factories and vehicle fleets running in the years ahead. The first and most obvious step is to boost domestic output of oil and gas, but the two governments accept that domestic production, even if it can be increased, cannot be enough to meet fast-growing demand.
The next step is to ensure good relations with suppliers, which is why India hosted a meeting of Gulf oil exporters and big Asian oil consumers (including China) last month. It also explains why India, China and Japan are all prepared to risk the wrath of the US by striking deals with Iran.
Another priority is to guard against disruptions to supply. Both India and China have decided to create oil stockpiles for this purpose and India has signed a memorandum of understanding with the IEA on the co-ordinated release of stored oil. China is expected to begin its stockpile this year.
The fourth strategy is to diversify sources of supply, both geographically and in terms of fuel types. In short, no one wants to depend on oil from the Gulf. China and India are enthusiastic new customers for LNG from various sources, with India's first terminal operating and several more being constructed and planned in each country.
“ The objective of LNG imports is to substitute for liquid petroleum imports from the Middle East,” says Mr Chander. “It will, if not reduce the dependency, then at least hold it to a manageable level.” Both Beijing and New Delhi are also eager to exploit more nuclear power. China wants to quadruple its output of nuclear-generated electricity in the next decade.
A fifth policy, favoured by environmentalists and finance ministries, is to allocate imported energy to the most suitable users and increase the efficiency with which the energy is used. Much fuel would be saved if India's cars and China's power stations and factories were as efficient as vehicles and plants in Japan and the west.
Yet analysts doubt that improved efficiency can make a noticeable difference to energy consumption. Joe Zhang, head of China research at UBS, argues that for the policy to work it must be universally adopted, or else the few plants that do invest in better equipment would simply be at a financial disadvantage. “If one factory does it, it's no use,” he says. “You need 200,000 other factories to do the same.”
Mr Zhang believes it is unfair to compare China's high energy use per unit of gross domestic product with the lower figures recorded in western countries because the whole point about China's economic growth is that the nation has attracted heavy, high-energy industries from richer countries. China, furthermore, is importing particularly large amounts of energy at the moment because it is building so much physical infrastructure roads, ports, buildings and power stations.
The last and most controversial strategy, pioneered with spectacular lack of success and large financial losses by Japan in the 1970s, is to try to achieve energy security by purchasing overseas exploration and production assets, or even whole oil companies. China has pursued what it calls a “go out” strategy for a decade and its oil companies have secured footholds in countries such as Venezuela and Sudan. The mooted Unocal bid is another example.
It is an idea that attracts only scorn from financial analysts. “It's actually a silly thing to do,” says Mr Zhang. “Whether the energy is produced by you yourself or by somebody else in Canada or Australia, you still have to pay for it. It makes sense to buy the reserve, the resource, only if you are a better producer. It doesn't change your energy dependency at all.”
David Hurd, energy analyst at Deutsche Bank, adds that it is odd for CNOOC to think about buying Unocal, whose share price has recently been valuing its reserves at about $8 per barrel of oil equivalent, when it is buying gas assets in Australia for a quarter of the cost. “The argument about oil security is in my opinion irrelevant until you control the sea-lanes of the world,” he says. Pipelines are even more insecure, as shown by repeated sabotage of pipes in Iraq and in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan.
Indian companies are starting to play the same game, and Indian and Chinese groups are now partners in one project in Sudan. “We are a late starter,” says Ravi Mohan, chief executive of Crisil, the Indian credit rating agency. “In the early round of this, I think China is perhaps ahead of India, but India has woken up, so we can expect to see more action on this front.” Yet even the best of the strategies India and China are adopting to improve their energy security will make a difference only at the margins. The two countries will inevitably compete to buy oil and gas, just as they will compete with other energy importers in developed and developing countries. The challenge is not to stop the competition but to keep it amicable.
For the previous two articles go to 亚洲巨人互争能源 ( 下 )
然而，并不是所有人都感到悲观。国际能源署 (International Energy Agency) 总裁克劳德?曼迪尔 (Claude Mandil) 表示，满足中国和印度对进口燃料的需求面临困难，但通过国际和地区合作能够也应当得到缓解。
印度的艾亚尔先生持相同观点。有人认为，中印之间的争斗可能成为新版的“大博弈 (Great Game) ”（ 19 世纪帝国主义列强的影响力争夺战），但艾亚尔先生不以为然。他计划在今年晚些时候访问北京，以进行磋商。他此行的目的之一，是要避免印度和中国石油公司为争夺两国都觊觎的海外能源资产，而展开破坏性竞争。“印度和中国不必要通过互相伤害之后才得出这样的结论：两国在能源安全方面，合作是更好的出路。”他说，“当然，在市场力量发挥作用的情况下竞争总是难免的。”
印度经济需要确保石油天然气的供应，这可能也有助于改善印度与其它邻国的关系，其中包括宿敌巴基斯坦。目前正在考虑的几条石油管线中，有一条将来自缅甸的天然气经由孟加拉国输往印度，一条从伊朗经巴基斯坦进入印度，一条从土库曼斯坦经阿富汗和巴基斯坦进入印度，甚至还有一条从伊朗经过印度到达中国。
亚洲开发银行 (Asian Development Bank) 的能源与基础设施专家 S ?钱德尔 (S. Chander) 指出，现在与邻国达成过境协议要比过去容易一些，至少从经济上说是如此。“对于中国和印度等出口旺盛的国家而言，向巴基斯坦和孟加拉国等国支付数亿美元不成问题，而要是在 5 年或 7 年前外汇紧张的情况下，就会十分困难。”
各国政府需要在长期基础设施项目上展开合作，这就至少为先前敌对的国家带来了改善关系的可能性。“人们正变得注重实际，”一家大型国际石油公司驻亚洲的策略分析师表示。
在中亚或缅甸等国，能源紧缺对于人权或环境保护不太有利。石油进口国的政府通常更关心能源安全，而不是石油出口国的政治。民主国家印度已同缅甸的军事集团缔结了密切的关系，而且几乎放弃了对昂山素季 (Aung San Suu Kyi) 领导的、亲民主的反对党的支持。和中国一样，印度正准备为寻求能源安全而牺牲其它目标。
在寻求保障能源安全的过程中，中印两国正在实施一系列政策，旨在让它们的电站、工厂和车辆在未来数年中能保持运转。首要而且最明显的步骤，就是增加国内石油天然气产量，但两国政府都承认，即使国内生产能够增加，也不可能满足快速增长的需求。
进一步行动是确保与供应国的良好关系。正因如此，印度在上月主办了海湾石油出口国和亚洲石油消费大国（包括中国）的会议。印度、中国和日本都准备冒着激怒美国的风险去和伊朗达成交易，原因也在于此。
另一项优先事务是保障供应不被中断。出于这个目的，印度和中国都已决定建立石油储备。印度已与国际能源署就动用石油储备的协调方面签署了一份谅解备忘录。预计中国将从今年开始储备石油。
第四项战略是实现供应来源多样化，包括供应地区多样化和燃料类型多样化。简言之，没有谁想仅仅依赖海湾的石油。中印液化天然气的新客户，都热衷于从多个来源获得供应。印度的第一个液化天然气接收站已开始运营，两国都在建设并规划更多的接收站。
“进口液化天然气是为了替代部分来自中东的液态石油进口，”钱德尔先生说，“这么做即使不能降低对中东石油的依赖，至少也能将这种依赖性维持在可控制的水平。”中国和印度政府还热衷于利用更多的核能。中国计划在未来 10 年内把核能发电量扩大到现在的四倍。
第五项政策是将进口能源分配给最合适的用户，并提高能源的使用效率。这一政策受到环保主义者和两国财政部门的欢迎。如果印度的汽车、中国的电站与工厂能像日本和西方国家的汽车和工厂那样高效利用能源，将会节省大量燃料。
但分析师门对提高能源利用效率能够显著改善能源消耗状况持怀疑态度。瑞士银行 (UBS) 中国研究负责人张化桥 (Joe Zhang) 认为，要使这一政策收到实效，必须普遍实行。否则，投资改善设备的极少数电厂会在经济上处于劣势。“只有一家工厂这么是没有什么用处的。”他说，“另外 20 万家工厂都必须这样做才行。”
张先生相信，把中国的每单位国内生产总值 (GDP) 高能耗数字与西方国家较低消耗的数据进行比较是不公平的，因为中国取得经济增长，很重要的是因为它把较富裕国家高能耗的重工业吸引了过来。此外，中国目前的能源进口量庞大，是因为中国正在建设大量有形的基础设施，如道路、港口、建筑和电站等。
最后也是最有争议的战略，是通过购买海外勘探和生产资产，甚至买下整个石油公司，试图借此保障能源安全。日本曾于上世纪 70 年代首先实施过这种战略，但明显不成功，而且造成巨大的经济损失。过去 10 年中，中国一直奉行自己称为“走出去”的战略，中国的石油公司已在委内瑞拉和苏丹等国立足。中国竞购优尼科这一有争议的举动是另一个实例。
金融分析师对这种做法持批评态度。“这么做其实很傻，”张先生说，“无论能源是你自己生产的，还是加拿大或澳大利亚的其他人生产的，你都得付钱。只有当你生产效率更高时，购买储量、资源才有意义。但这根本改变不了你对能源的依赖性。”
德意志银行 (Deutsche Bank) 的能源分析师戴维?赫德 (David Hurd) 补充说，中海油考虑收购优尼科令人觉得不可思议。优尼科的股价近来已将其石油储量估价提高到每桶石油当量约 8 美元，而中海油目前正在澳大利亚以该价格的四分之一购买天然气资产。“在我看来，除非你控制全球海上运输线，否则谈论石油安全是没有意义的。”他说。输油管甚至更不安全，伊拉克和巴基斯坦俾路支省的输油管被反复破坏就说明了这一点。
印度公司也开始玩同样的游戏，印度和中国石油集团目前已在苏丹的一个项目中成为合作伙伴。“我们起步晚，”印度信用评级机构 Crisil 的首席执行官拉维?莫汉 (Ravi Mohan) 说。“我认为，在前一轮的行动中，中国可能走在印度前面，但印度已经觉醒，因此我们可以期望在这方面采取更多行动。”但是就印度和中国目前采取的策略而言，对于改进能源安全来说，即便是最好的策略也只会产生细微的影响。两国将不可避免地为购买石油天然气展开竞争，正如它们将要与发达和发展中国家的其它能源进口商竞争一样。所面临的挑战并不是要制止竞争，而是如何让这种竞争保持友好态势。 FT 中印比较系列
亚洲巨人互争能源 ( 上 )
