Lex live: Economic miracles
It is a sad sights when even true believers lose faith.
The European Union has quietly dropped its goal to become the world’s most competitive economic area by 2010. Whatever that really meant, it would have required nothing short of a miracle. But what triggers an economic miracle? Just over two decades ago, the economist Mancur Olson suggested an unorthodox answer: namely that the key to long-term economic performance is the formation of narrow distributional coalitions.
The likes of guilds, trade associations and unions tend to defend the interests of their members at the expense of society at large, inhibiting competition and innovation. After periods of turmoil, such as revolutions or wars, it takes time to regroup. In post-war Germany and Japan, the results were rapid advances long after these economies had been rebuilt. In contrast, Britain had long been spared internal upheavals. This allowed distributional coalitions to secure privileges, damping growth. The same should soon occur in Japan and Germany, Olson predicted in his 1982 book, ‘The Rise and Decline of Nations’.
More recent research has shed new light on the development of distributional coalitions. While not irreversible, it takes a brave statesman, or indeed an Iron Lady, to challenge entrenched interests. On the continent, such figures are rare. In any case, calling for a Thatcherite revolution is about as popular as calling for the conventional kind.
Fortunately, Olson also had a less drastic policy recommendation: shifting decision making to a higher level. His leading example? The European Economic Community, the EU’s forerunner. Quite apart from providing a boost through lower tariffs, it side-stepped national distributional coalitions, eroding all sorts of growth obstacles in the process. Europe’s leaders should be forced to read the book. The scuffle over the EU services directive shows exactly why.
Lex专栏: 欧盟经济奇迹无望
欧盟已悄悄放弃了它的目标，那就是到2010年成为全世界最具竞争力的经济区。无论这一目标意味着什么，那都需要奇迹发生。但什么能引发经济奇迹呢？就在20年前，经济学家曼库尔?奥尔森(Mancur Olson)曾给出一个非正统答案，即长期经济表现的关键在于小范围分利集团(distributional coalitions)的形成。
行业公会、贸易协会以及工会之类的组织往往会保护其成员的利益，代价是牺牲社会普遍利益，从而抑制了竞争和创新。在动荡时期过后，比如革命或战争等，分利集团需要花一段时间来重新组合。在战后的德国和日本，重整的结果就是在这些经济体重建很长一段时间后，经济快速发展。相比之下，英国长期没有发生内部动乱，这使得分利集团得以确保其特权，从而抑制了经济增长。奥尔森在他1982年出版的《国家兴衰探源》(The Rise and Decline of Nations)一书中预言，同样的情景应很快在日本和德国发生。
更近的研究为理解分利集团的发展带来了新的见解。要挑战即得利益，需要一位勇敢的政治家，或者说就需要一位铁娘子。在欧洲大陆，这样的人物很罕见。无论如何，呼吁进行一场撒切尔式的革命，几乎与呼吁一场传统意义的革命一样受欢迎。
幸运的是，奥尔森也有一个不太激进的政策建议：把决策转移到更高的层面上。他的主要例子？那就是欧盟的前身、“欧洲经济共同体”(The European Economic Community)。欧共体所做的远不止降低关税来推动经济，它避开了国家的分利联盟，从而在此过程中减少了各式各样的增长障碍。应强迫欧洲的领导人读一读这本书。有关欧洲服务业指令的争吵正好说明个中原因。
