在平壤设个美国大使馆，如何？
A U.S. Embassy in Pyongyang
The United Nations sanctions on North Korea are useful, but unless China and South Korea change their policies, these sanctions will not have much effect on Pyongyang's weapons programs. On the contrary, be braced for more North Korean tests.
Beijing, with an assist from Seoul, has been keeping the North on life support. If it saw Pyongyang's programs as seriously damaging to its own interests, it has the means to stop them. While the Chinese say they told Kim Jong Il not to do it, they don't want chaos in North Korea with millions of refugees coming across the border; and they don't want American forces on their border, either. We and the South Koreans urgently need to discuss these matters with the Chinese -- along with the contingency known, colloquially, as "loose nukes."
A few years ago, some of us thought that Beijing would block the North's nuclear weapons because these programs would put pressure on the Japanese to get weapons of their own. Do the Chinese believe that Japan will get nuclear weapons anyway, or is that they do not care what Tokyo does? It's a puzzle.
There are some coincident, and some conflicting, interests between Washington and Beijing, but there is a larger anomaly: The country with the greatest influence in North Korea is China, while the one most at risk (so we think) is the U.S. A serious divergence of perceived interests here would not be good for either of us. As someone who regards the China-U.S. relationship as basically win-win, it is distressing to contemplate the possibility of members of Congress coming to see China's help to North Korea as supporting a major security threat to the U.S.
South Korea has been part of the problem. Residents of Seoul are ever conscious of their vulnerability to shelling from across the DMZ. Seoul also wants to avoid chaos in the North and is trying to open it up economically and politically. And it sees itself competing with China for influence there. All this has led to large subsidies to the North under its "sunshine policy," without much to show for it. The South supports a regime whose weapons can destroy it and threaten its protector, the U.S. Worse, South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun evidently sees the U.S as more dangerous than the North. There is the potential here for a disastrous breach between Washington and Seoul.
Matters are now in flux. Even before the test, Mr. Roh and his Uri party had become very unpopular. According to a post-test poll by the JoongAng Ilbo daily, 65% of respondents said they favor South Korea getting nuclear weapons and that the policy of engaging the North had failed. These views might not last, but if they persist maybe sunshine subsidies will be cut and support for a South Korean bomb will build.
This situation is now so serious that we and the South Koreans need to work hard to come together. What should we try to accomplish regarding the North's weapons? Having worked on them for over 30 years, getting nuclear weapons seems to be in the North's DNA, although it has been expressed in fits and starts over time. The Kim family's chosen isolation, with attendant poverty and growing military weakness, has made WMDs central to its survival.
These weapons pose two main dangers to us. One is a nuclear attack by the North -- which would result in its destruction. The other, much greater, threat is the sale of weapons materials to anyone who will pay. Therefore, President Bush has said that while the U.S. has no intention of attacking North Korea, "the transfer of nuclear weapons or material . . . to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States and we would hold North Korea fully accountable of the consequences of such action." Think, although not exclusively, of Iran and Hezbollah, with the U.S. and Israel as the prime targets.
Without a change in position by Beijing and Seoul, there is little chance of getting rid of the North's weapons. Another challenge, with better odds, is stopping the completion of the large reactor under construction, that will make much more plutonium available for sale. If it comes into production, we face the daunting task of deterring sales -- a task for which we would need help from many others, including the Chinese, as well as military options.
* * *
What about diplomacy? It is elementary that we need both sticks and carrots in such a situation. In 1994, the credible threat of an American attack on its Yongbyon reactor, combined with a package of benefits, produced an agreement that slowed the North's program for nearly a decade. (Though it didn't keep Pyongyang from circumventing it by starting a uranium enrichment effort -- it's that DNA again.)
More immediately relevant sticks include not only the Security Council endorsed sanctions, but also our actions against banks that help the North's counterfeiting and other nefarious financial transactions, as well as our efforts to disrupt sales of drugs and arms. They are good in themselves, and add some muscle to diplomacy.
The Bush administration must find it irritating to be told by such lightweights as Kofi Annan that it should deal directly with Kim Jong Il (although more substantial figures such as James Baker are also saying this). Despite such endorsements, this position should be taken seriously. The administration's stance that the North's neighbors, who are in the six-party talks, should be at the table, is correct but incomplete.
There are two distinct propositions here. One is having diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. We should have them with every state, no matter how evil. We did it with Stalin's Soviet Union, but don't want to with Kim Jong Il's North Korea. An American delegation in Pyongyang might find itself isolated; but it might learn some things, and having a presence in what looks like an inherently unstable country could have a useful payoff if parts start to break loose.
As for one-on-one negotiations, there is a case for naming an experienced political heavyweight as our negotiator (enter the name of your favorite candidate here). Most of the items on the agenda have been around for some time, but it would be foolish to pretend that nothing major has occurred, and that there aren't new items such as the sanctions. This is an unsettled time with dangers and perhaps opportunities. Expectations need to be kept under control, but the game of getting something useful in exchange for giving something should not be scorned.
Of course, there is the argument that to do such things now signals that any state that sets off a bomb or launches a long-range missile can win recognition from us. Avoiding such awkwardness is a good reason for dealing with everybody in the first place, and, in the present instance, for having skilled diplomats to manage our switch.
Mr. Rowen, senior fellow of the Hoover Institution and director emeritus of Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center, was assistant secretary of defense from 1989-91.
在平壤设个美国大使馆，如何？
联合国对朝鲜的制裁是有效的，但是，如果中国和韩国不改变政策，这些制裁不会对朝鲜的核计划产生太大影响，相反，却有可能刺激朝鲜进行更多的核试验。
北京在首尔的帮助下一直在设法维持朝鲜的生存。如果北京认为平壤的核计划严重损害了它自己的利益，它是有办法阻止平壤的。虽然北京说，它已告知金正日别再继续了，但北京并不希望看到朝鲜陷入混乱，因为那样将导致数百万朝鲜难民越过边境进入中国境内。同时，北京也不希望美国军队驻扎在中国边境。美国和韩国急需就这些事与中国磋商，同时，还要讨论一下如出现所谓的“核弹流失”将产生怎样的恶果。
几年前，我们中有些人认为，北京会阻止朝鲜核试验，因为该计划会迫使日本人设法拥有自己的核武器。中国人真的认为日本人将拥有核武器吗？抑或他们并不在乎日本人做什么？这个问题还是个谜。
华盛顿和北京之间既有一致的利益，也存在一些利益冲突，而一个更大的不和谐之处是：对朝鲜影响最大的国家是中国，而面临风险最大的国家（在我们看来）是美国。中美两国在潜在利益上存在的严重分歧对双方都不是好事。
有人认为中美之间基本是一种双赢的关系，在这种思路下，想到国会成员有可能将中国援助朝鲜视为是在支持美国的一个主要安全威胁将是一件很扫兴的事。
韩国方面也是一个问题。首尔居民对有可能遭到穿越非军事区打过来的炮弹的袭击一直提心吊胆。首尔也不希望朝鲜发生混乱，而且，它还希望在经济和政治领域对朝鲜实行开放。
韩国还意识到要跟中国争夺在朝鲜的影响力。在所有这些想法支持下，韩国积极推进“阳光计划”，不事声张地向朝鲜提供了大量经济援助。韩国是在支持一个能用武器毁灭自己并威胁到自己的保护人──美国的政权。更糟糕的是，韩国总统卢武铉(Roh Moo Hyun)明显认为，对韩国来说，美国比朝鲜更危险。华盛顿和首尔之间有可能出现灾难性的裂痕。
事情现在正在变化。实际上，即使在核试验之前，卢武铉及其所在的开放国民党在韩国已很不受民众欢迎。据韩国日报JoongAng Ilbo在核试验后进行的民意调查显示，65%的受访者支持韩国拥有核武器，并认为韩国对朝鲜大送秋波的政策已经失败。这些观点也许不会坚持很久，但如果大家一直这么认为，那么，对朝鲜的援助将被减少或取消，而支持韩国拥有核武器的力量将进一步壮大。
现在形势已非常严重，美国和韩国有必要设法坐到一起。在朝鲜核计划的问题上，我们究竟应该努力达成怎样的目标？朝鲜人在核武器上已花费了30多年心血，拥有核武器的念头已经渗透到他们的血液里，虽然他们的外在表达时有不同。金正日父子实行的与世隔绝的政策让朝鲜陷入了极度贫穷，军力也日渐衰弱，这一切让拥有大规模杀伤性武器对其生存处境至关重要。
这些武器对我们意味着两方面的威胁。一是朝鲜直接发动核攻击──这将导致朝鲜的自我毁灭。另一个威胁更可怕，那就是它将制造核武器的原料出卖给其他国家。
如果北京和汉城方面不改变立场，摆脱朝鲜核威胁的可能性将微乎其微。我们更有可能面临的另一个挑战是，如果朝鲜正在建设的大型核反应堆中途停工，这样将有更多的钸可以出售。如果钸开始进入生产，我们将要面对阻止其出售的艰巨任务，这将需要得到包括中国在内的其他许多国家的帮助，还有可能需要诉诸军事手段。
外交手段如何？这种形势下，软硬兼施的胡萝卜加大棒子策略必不可少。1994年，在袭击宁边反应堆的强硬威胁和一系列利益许诺的双重作用下，朝鲜终于同意冻结核计划，致使其这项计划推迟了将近10年（虽然最终朝鲜还是绕开协议开始了浓缩铀的研发──这又是天性使然）。
说到当前应手的大棒子，除联合国安理会授权的制裁措施外，我们还应采取行动，阻止银行为朝鲜的邪恶资金往来提供便利，同时努力打击毒品和武器交易。这些手段本身便具功效，配合使用则更可增加外交手段的威力。
对于由安南这样的轻量级人物来告诉它应当直接和金正日打交道，布什政府一定会感觉非常恼火（尽管重量级别相对大些的詹姆斯?贝克(James Baker)也是这么说）。虽是如此，这一建议还是应该予以认真考虑。参加六方会谈的朝鲜邻国不应置身事外，布什政府的这一立场是对的，但不够全面。
这里有两个明确的建议。一是和平壤建立外交关系。我们应当与所有国家建立外交关系，无论这个国家是多么邪恶，都应如此。我们和斯大林时代的苏联建立了这种关系，但对金正日统治下的朝鲜却不愿这么做。派驻平壤的美国代表团或许会受到孤立，但它在那里也或能学到一些东西。在这样一个看上去从来就是动荡不安的国度，一旦国势出现变化，置身其中或可得到有益的收获。
至于一对一的谈判，一个可行的方案是任命一位有丰富政治经验的重量级人物充当我们的谈判代表（你可以在这里加入你认为够得上级别的候选人的名字）。谈判议程上的大多数条款已经存在有一段时间了，但不能愚蠢地认为没有重大问题出现，或是没有新的条款要谈。这是一个尚不安定的时代，危险与机遇并存。期望应当有度，但以施换得的游戏不应予以轻视。
当然，有人会说现在这么做等于是表明，一旦一个国家试爆了核弹、试射了远程导弹，它就能得到我们的重视。其实，从一开始就和所有国家打交道正是为了避免这种棘手局面的出现，就当前而言，之所以要派经验丰富的外交家去进行斡旋，也正是为了避免这种尴尬。
(Henry S. Rowen是Hoover Institution高级研究员，斯坦福大学Shorenstein亚太研究中心荣誉退休院长，1989-1991年曾担任美国国防部助理部长。）
