Chinese Checks
China's economy has proved a seductress that's hard for investors to resist. From encouraging foreign direct investment to signing up with the WTO, Beijing has embraced foreign capital and know-how. Foreigners, in large part, have been rewarded with double-digit growth rates and cheap labor. But this happy affair is running into problems: Over the last few months, there is a growing perception that foreign companies have done too well from their investments. The Party leadership has publicly accused a few of capturing "excessive" market shares, acquiring too many stakes in China's strategic industries, and buying state assets at bargain prices. Above all, there seems to be a concern that overseas investors own too much of the technology crucial to China's economic development.
These sentiments aren't only murmured in private. Li Deshui, a former economic official, was quoted in March as criticizing "malicious acquisitions aimed at establishing monopolies." He cited beer, soft drinks and skin-care products as areas where foreign companies had done too well at the expense of their local counterparts.
Beijing's defensive economic nationalism is not primarily about restricting imports, although there has been some of this. For instance, China's high tariffs on imported automobile parts are currently the target of a case being brought before the WTO by the U.S. and the European Union.
The main focus is on making it more difficult for foreign companies to operate in China. Take foreign ownership of local companies operating in "strategic sectors," such as banking and brokerage houses. The most prominent example so far has been Beijing's rejection of Citigroup's attempt to buy 45% of Guangdong Development Bank last year, as part of a consortium that would have taken majority control. Despite the state-owned lender's heavy losses, Beijing refused to waive the 20% cap on the stake any single foreign investor can take in a Chinese bank. As a result, Citigroup was forced to scale down its bid, as were other foreign banks interested in buying Guangdong Development Bank. The deal has yet to be completed.
China's regulators are even designating automobile and machine-tool companies as sensitive sectors, making foreign acquisitions in these areas subject to particularly stringent scrutiny. Earlier this year, Hangzhou Advanced Gearbox Group halted three years of talks on a joint venture with Germany's ZF Group, saying it would be a mistake to give the foreign automotive-supplier company greater access to the Chinese market. Last week, private-equity fund Carlyle Group agreed to buy 50% of Xugong Group Construction Machinery Co. -- hardly the 85% it had originally intended to purchase. This followed a high-profile campaign against the deal by Sany Heavy Industries Co., one of Xugong's main domestic competitors.
Beijing is also placing new obstacles in the way of foreign companies that seek to establish independent, wholly owned operations in the mainland. Beijing has officially complied with its commitment to open up the domestic construction market, as part of the agreement on China's accession to the WTO in 2001. But it has placed formidable obstacles in the way of foreign companies trying to take advantage of this opportunity. Under regulations issued in December 2003, these companies are required to employ at least 200 staff in China before being allowed to sign any contracts in the country. Foreign companies wanting to compete for infrastructure projects must also have at least $36 million in registered capital in China.
Beijing's regulators are now codifying further protectionist language into law. In September, six ministries enacted regulations that give the Ministry of Commerce expanded power to block foreign purchases of local companies. The law's language is vague; a purchase that disturbs "the social or economic order or harm the public interest," for instance, could be reviewed. Foreign investors are also fretting about the country's new antimonopoly law, which has been drafted but not yet enacted.
China is also attempting to build "national champions" that can compete with foreign companies in the global marketplace. Beijing is well aware that, despite the country's integration into the global economy, it currently occupies a narrow slice of the value chain. China serves mainly as an assembly platform for manufactured goods, albeit of increasing sophistication. While that role brings in considerable revenue, it only represents a small fraction of the total value of the country's export goods. Other links in that value chain earn far more, such as research and development, product design, branding, marketing and distribution. The best-known examples of this trend are Lenovo's acquisition of IBM's personal computing division, and the creation of a Chinese-controlled joint venture between TCL and Thomson to produce television sets. The purchases help Beijing pursue its goal of boasting 50 of the world's 500 largest companies within the next decade.
This goal is laudable, taken on its own. The problem for foreign companies is that Beijing is willing to use tactics which give their Chinese counterparts an unfair advantage. These measures include state subsidies through politically motivated bank lending at below-market rates. For instance, Cnooc Ltd.'s abortive bid for Unocal Corp. last year was backed by several billion dollars in cheap loans from its government-owned parent company. It's also possible in future that Beijing will challenge patents and cap domestic retail prices to reduce the royalties paid to foreign patent and copyright holders.
China's economic nationalism is a marginal adjustment to, rather than a fundamental repudiation of, Beijing's broader embrace of globalization. As China's Commerce Minister Bo Xilai has argued, Beijing will not abandon the foreign economic policies that have served it so well. There's also no shortage of critics of economic nationalism within China, both among economists committed to free-market models, and among local companies who fear their own competitiveness may be compromised by state interference in the economy.
Nonetheless, the protectionist backlash is unlikely to go away anytime soon. Other "China risk" factors may receive far more publicity -- from the threat of a financial crisis to a political collapse, or even a conflict with the U.S. over Taiwan. But for companies doing business with China, it is the new surge in economic nationalism that poses, by far, the biggest threat for the foreseeable future.
Mr. Harding, director of research and analysis at Eurasia Group, chaired the firm's task force on the risks associated with developments in China over the next 10 years.
中国经济领域涌动民族主义思潮
中国经济释放出的巨大魅力让全世界的投资者都很难抗拒。对中国自己来说，通过鼓励海外直接投资、加入世界贸易组织(WTO)等一系列举措，中国吸引到了大量资本，也学到很多知识和经验，而享受中国廉价劳动力之惠的外国投资者在中国大都能实现两位数的增长。不过，这场皆大欢喜的姻缘现在也遇到了问题。
最近几个月以来，认为在华海外企业得到回报太多的观点得到了越来越多的人认同。中国领导人曾公开谴责一些企业在中国的战略行业攫取了“过多”市场份额、收购到太多股份，而且收购国有资产时出价太低。更重要的是，似乎中国高层流露出这样一种担心，那就是海外投资者掌握了太多对中国经济发展至关重要的技术。
这种情绪并非只在人们的私下议论中可以听到。据媒体三月份报导说，原中国国家统计局局长李德水曾批评那些“为建立垄断而进行的恶意并购行为。”他以啤酒、软饮料和护肤品为例指出，海外企业在这些领域的大举进入严重损害了国内企业。
北京在经济领域的民族主义诉求主要并非希望限制进口（虽然也有一些这方面的举动，比如，中国对进口汽车仍实行高关税，这已招致欧盟和美国的不满，他们已就此向WTO提出申诉。），而是加大外资企业在中国的经营难度。以外资在银行、证券经纪公司等“战略性行业”参股的问题为例。最突出的一个事例是花旗集团(Citigroup)收购广东发展银行(Guangdong Development Bank) 45%股份的计划去年被有关方面制止。以花旗为首的一个财团原打算持有该行的多数股。
虽然这家国有银行负债累累，但北京方面仍不愿意对花旗财团网开一面，豁免有关外资持股比例上限的规定（即：单一一家外资公司在一家中国银行的持股最高不得超过20%）。后来花旗和其他有意收购广发行股份的银行只得下调收购目标。目前这起交易仍未完成。
主管部门甚至将汽车和机械设备也列为敏感行业，外资在这些领域的收购因此要受到特别严格的审查。今年早些时候，杭州前进齿轮箱集团(Hangzhou Advanced Gearbox Group)与德国ZF Group已持续3年的合资谈判宣告停止，据说原因是有人认为，让外国汽车零部件供应商加大进入中国市场的力度是一种错误做法。
上周，从事股权投资的凯雷集团(Carlyle Group)同意将对徐工集团工程机械公司(Xugong Group Construction Machinery Co.)的收购目标由原来的85%大幅下调到50%。在此之前，在徐工的国内主要竞争对手三一重工(Sany Heavy Industry Co.)的发难之下，国内舆论围绕收购凯雷的计划展开了激烈争论。
北京对希望在中国大陆成立全资公司的外国企业设置了新的障碍。北京原则上的确遵守了开放建筑市场的原则，这一点也是中国在加入WTO时的承诺之一。但在具体操作上，对那些希望抓住这一机会的外国公司，北京却设立了巨大的障碍。据2003年12月颁布的有关规定，外国公司必须在中国境内成立公司并至少在中国雇佣200名员工，才能在中国境内承包工程。希望参与基础设施建设项目的外商在中国还必须至少拥有3,600万美元注册资金。
有关主管部门现在将更多的保护性条款写进了法律法规。今年九月，国家六部委联合出台规定，准许商务部在审批外资收购中国企业方面拥有更大否决权。新规定用词很含糊；比如，其中一个条款写道：那些扰乱“社会或经济秩序、或损害公共利益”的收购计划要接受审查。外国投资者对中国新出台的反垄断法（草案）也很头痛。
与此同时，中国还试图培养能在全球市场上与外国公司抗衡的“国宝级企业”。中国很清楚，虽然现在它正日益融入全球经济，但在全球经济的价值链上，它只占有很小的一环。
虽然中国的制造技术日益提高，但在整个制造业链条上，中国主要还只占据组装的环节。虽然这类业务给中国厂家带来了可观的收入，但这部分收入在中国出口商品的价值总量中只占有很小比例。而这条价值链上的其他环节──如研发、产品设计、品牌推广、市场营销和分销等──所占的利润要多得多。最能说明这一点的例子是联想(Lenovo)收购国际商业机器公司(IBM)个人电脑业务和TCL与法国企业汤普森(Thomson)组建的中方控股的电视机合资公司。这两笔交易或许有助于中国实现其未来十年在全球最大500家企业中拥有50席的目标。
这个目标本身值得称赞。问题是对外国公司而言，北京方面很喜欢采用让中国企业能获得不公正优势的做法，比如，这些企业可以通过政策性银行以低于市场的利率水平获得补贴性贷款。中海石油(CNOOC)去年计划收购美国加州联合石油公司(Unocal Corp.)的时候就通过其国有母公司获得了数十亿美元的低息贷款。这次收购最后未能成功。将来，北京还有可能对外国专利发难，通过限制国内零售价来减少支付给外国专利和版权持有人的特许费。
中国对全球化趋势总体还是持比较接受的态度，可以肯定的是，中国在经济领域的民族主义思潮是在这一基本立场上的微调，而并非从根本上否定其立场。用商务部部长薄熙来的话说，中国的对外经济政策非常有效，中国不会放弃。而且，对这种民族主义思潮，中国国内也不乏批评的声音。批评方既有支持自由市场模式的经济学家，也有担心过多的政府干预会削弱自身竞争力的国内企业。
不过，这种保护主义思潮不太可能很快销声匿迹。其他的“中国风险”因素──金融危机的威胁、政治崩溃或因台湾问题与美国发生冲突等等──或许会吸引更多的公众关注，但对那些与中国有贸易往来的外国企业而言，在可以预见的将来，这种民族主义才是最大的威胁。至少目前来看是这样。
（编者按：Harding为Eurasia Group研究及分析主管，是该公司“中国未来10年发展带来的相关风险”专责小组的负责人。）
