Will China's Banking Reform Succeed?
In a public address more than two years ago, China's newly appointed governor of the central bank, Zhou Xiaochuan, told a business audience that China would take a "gradualist" approach to reforming its banking system. Many thought the governor meant China was in no hurry to fix its banks.
Since then, however, China has injected more than $60 billion to recapitalize four of its five largest banks and has transferred some $200 billion worth of nonperforming loans out of these banks into specialized asset-management companies, almost twice as much as Korea spent to restructure its banks during the 1997-98 financial crisis. Many Chinese banks, including all the recapitalized ones, have brought in foreign "strategic investors" to become their shareholders. One has successfully gone public abroad, and another is expected to complete its overseas IPO soon. Two others have announced major investments by foreign investors and plans for overseas IPOs.
While welcoming this, many foreign analysts continue to greet China's banking reform with skepticism and question the judgment of foreign investors. They note that foreign investors are minority shareholders. Their influence in the running of these banks is likely to be limited to the degree of graciousness of the controlling shareholder or the government. In Korea, for example, the government-controlled Korea Exchange Bank got into trouble even though Commerzbank had become a 30% shareholder after the financial crisis, and LG Card, the country's credit-card issuer, failed after a consortium of international investors had acquired more than 20% of its shares. In both cases, foreign investors had board seats but proved totally ineffective in bringing about any meaningful changes in the way these firms were run. In the end, it is the willingness of the controlling shareholder to accept change that matters.
What makes foreign investors believe that China will be different? Is there any reason for China to want its banks to change the way they conduct their businesses? The reason is not the one most often given, namely that Chinese banks need to prepare themselves against an expected onslaught by foreign competitors come 2007 when China, as part of its entry into the World Trade Organization, will have to remove the last barriers to foreign competition in its banking sector. This threat is overrated, because it will take decades, if ever, and billions of dollars in investment, for any foreign bank to replicate the franchise of the largest of the Chinese banks. Without such a network of thousands of branches, foreign banks will not be able to take any meaningful market share from their Chinese counterparts, especially in the most lucrative retail business. In spite of the growth in volume of banking business in absolute terms, foreign banks have seen their market share in China fall in recent years. This is one reason why foreign banks trip over each other to get even a toehold in a Chinese bank.
A healthy banking system, however, is necessary for China to sustain its economic growth. No country with an open capital market and convertible currency, the direction in which China is moving, can sustain its growth if it has a weak and inefficient banking system. In spite of its rapid growth in recent years, the Chinese economy remains inefficient and wasteful. This can be seen by the fact that, on average, it takes many times more capital and other resources for China to produce one dollar of GDP than it does in developed countries.
These inefficiencies have not yet slowed down the economic expansion because the growth fueled by the country's extraordinarily high savings rate of 43% of GDP. China's ratio of fixed-asset investments to GDP has reached an even higher 50%. However China's growth model, consisting of throwing ever more resources at the economy, has reached its limit as a country cannot invest more than its savings over the long run.
As the savings are channeled into investments by banks, the inefficiencies and wastefulness simply turn into bad loans. As depositors seek payment, banks will eventually run out of money to finance economic growth if they continue to dole out money without getting it back. To continue to grow, China needs to clean up its banking system and force its banks to kick the habit of underwriting bad loans. A strong banking system will ensure more efficient allocation and use of scarce resources, allowing the economy to grow on the basis of improved productivity, as opposed to increased input.
Chinese leaders' resolve to reform the nation's banking system shows that they understand what it takes to sustain economic growth. They are wise and far-sighted enough to take painful measures without waiting until the going gets tough. Whereas many other countries regard foreign capital as the last resort or a necessary devil in solving a banking crisis, China is in the enviable position of having sufficient resources to clean up its banks without foreign help. The capital spent so far on recapitalizing the banks represents only a fraction of the more than $700 billion in foreign-exchange reserves that the country has amassed.
China wants foreign investors not so much for their capital, but for the expertise they bring in. As such, China is prepared to be generous. The deals announced so far allow foreign "strategic investors" to invest at only a slight premium over book value in already recapitalized banks, and significantly cheaper than comparable banks are traded at, such as the Chinese ones listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchange. It also gives them the right to adjust their prices if there is any further impairment to the asset value or if the future IPO price is below their entry cost. Investors are further rewarded with the right to tap into the most lucrative part of China's banking business, such as credit-card operations, through joint ventures with these banks. Foreign investors may be only minority shareholders. But it is whether they are treated as necessary devils or welcome angels that will make the difference between the success and failure of China's banking reform. Chinese banking officials do not wish foreign investors to simply take a ride. They want them to contribute to changing how banking business is conducted in China.
Chinese banking reform does not just redress the balance sheet, it involves systemic change. By and large, policy lending, which was responsible for much of the bad loans, has become history. The two-year-old China Banking Regulatory Commission, or CBRC, has severely tightened banking regulation. The central bank and CBRC have jointly imposed strict capital requirements on banks, penalizing those not meeting them by various means, including making it more costly for them to borrow and limiting their businesses. The central bank has removed the ceiling on interest rates so banks can better price risks. But the most significant step is China's effort to push its banks to adopt good corporate governance. Almost all the national banks have been, or are in the process of being, transformed into joint stock companies with boards whose independent directors must represent a third of the total. All the recapitalized banks are required to go public, preferably in overseas markets. This subjects them to greater transparency, tighter supervision and close scrutiny by overseas regulators and public shareholders.
While what China has accomplished thus far in its banking reform is impressive, Chinese banking still has a long way to go to meet international best practices. For example, it is still the government, rather than the board, that makes the ultimate decision on the appointment and removal of the top management of government-controlled banks. In order for a board to be fully effective, it must be able to hold the top management accountable, including having the power to hire, fire and compensate them with incentives that align their interests with those of shareholders. More broadly, it will take time for Chinese banks to build a real credit culture in which lending decisions are made on the basis of the credit worthiness of the borrower and risk analysis, regardless of relationships and government policies.
In hindsight, a "gradualist" approach means one step at a time, although the pace of change is anything but slow. It is always the most difficult to take the first step, which China has done. The rest of the journey will be very tough. Still, there is good reason to believe that China will get there eventually, given the vision and resolve its leadership has shown in banking reform so far.
Mr. Shan is a partner of Newbridge Capital, a private equity firm.
中国银行业改革能取得成功吗？
在两年多以前对企业界人士的一次公开演讲中，当时刚刚被任命为中国央行行长的周小川说，中国将采用“渐进”方式改革国内银行体系。许多人士当时认为周小川的意思是，中国并不急于对银行业进行改革。
但自那以来，中国已经向其最大的5家银行中的4家注入了600多亿美元资本金，并将这些银行约2,000亿美元的不良贷款转移至专门成立的几家资产管理公司，相关投入几乎是韩国在1997-98年亚洲金融危机后银行业重组开支的两倍。中国许多银行，包括那四家接受注资的大银行，都已为自己找到了海外“战略投资者”。这四家银行中已有一家在海外成功上市，另一家预计也将很快完成在海外的首次公开募股(IPO)。其余两家银行已宣布外资机构向其投入了大笔资金，并且它们也计划赴海外上市。
虽然许多外国分析师对上述进展表示欢迎，但他们仍对中国银行业的改革持怀疑态度，并质疑外国投资者入股中资银行之举是否明智。他们指出，海外投资者只不过是这些银行的小股东，他们能对这些银行的经营管理发挥多大影响将取决于这些银行的控股股东或中国政府的态度。以韩国政府控股的韩国外换银行(Korea Exchange Bank)为例，虽然德国商业银行(Commerzbank)在亚洲金融危机后获得了其30%的股份，但这家银行在经营上仍陷入了困境；韩国的信用卡发行商LG Card也发生了同样遭遇，虽然此前一个由国际投资者组成的财团已经获得了该公司20%以上的股份。在上述两个案例中，虽然外国投资者在公司董事会获得了席位，但事实证明它们对显著改变这些公司的经营方式并未发挥影响。说到底， 要看银行的控股股东是否愿意接受对企业未来的经营至关重要的变革。
是什么使海外投资者相信中国的情形会有不同呢？中国有理由想要该国的银行改变其做生意的方式吗？与人们通常认为的不同，中国进行银行业改革并不是为了应对2007年中国银行业全面对外开放后来自外资银行的激烈竞争。根据中国加入世界贸易组织(World Trade Organization)时达成的协议，中国届时将不得不取消银行业阻止外资竞争的最后一道障碍。但这种竞争威胁实际上是被夸大了，因为任何一家外资银行要想使自己在华经营网点的数量赶上中国最大银行中的任意一家，都需要花费数十年时间、投入数十亿美元资金才行。如果没有这样一个由数千家分支机构组成的经营网络，外资银行在市场占有率的争夺方面是无法从其中国同行那里讨到什么大便宜的，特别是在最有利可图的零售业务方面。外资银行在华业务的绝对量近年来虽然有了增长，但它们在中国银行市场的占有率这些年实际上是下降了。这也是外资银行为何争先恐后要在中国银行业取得一个立足点的原因之一。
但一个健康的银行体系对于中国保持经济的持续增长是必不可少的。中国正在朝开放资本市场和实现本币可兑换的方向迈进，而任何一个具备了这两项条件的国家如果没有一个强劲、有效的银行体系都无法实现经济的持续增长。虽然中国经济近年来增长迅速，但其效率依然很低且浪费严重。这一点从如下事实中就可看出：中国每创造1美元GDP所消耗的资金和其他资源是发达国家平均水平的许多倍。
这种经济增长的低效率之所以未能减缓经济的增长速度，是因为中国的储蓄率非常高，存款总额相当于GDP的43%。中国的固定资产投资与GDP之比甚至更高，达到了50%。但中国这种需不断消耗更多资源的经济增长模式已经接近极限，因为从长远来看，一个国家的投资额是无法超过其储蓄额的。
当银行将储蓄存款借贷出去用于投资之时，经济增长中的低效率和浪费就转化成了银行坏帐。如果银行继续眼睁睁看著自己发放出去的贷款有去无回，为了向储户还本付息，最终它们将无力再为经济增长提供资金支持。为了使经济继续增长，中国需要整顿银行体系，并迫使各银行改掉最终将坏帐一笔勾销的不良做法。一个强健的银行体系将确保稀缺的资源得到更有效的分配和使用，使得经济能够在劳动生产率提高的基础上获得增长，而不是只靠增加投入来推动。
中国领导人改革该国银行体系的决心表明，他们知道为确保经济持续增长需要做哪些工作。他们的智慧和远见足以使他们及时采取痛苦的改革措施，而不会等到客观环境更加严峻时才被迫采取行动。许多其他国家将外资视为爆发银行业危机时的最后一根救命稻草，或者是为渡过危机必须吞下的一枚苦果，但中国在清理银行坏帐方面根本无需借助外资的帮助，中国有足够的资金自己做到这一点，这是令人称□的。相对于中国超过7,000亿美元的外汇储备而言，该国迄今为止向银行业注入的资金并不算大。
中国寄希望于海外投资者的主要不是他们的资金，而是他们带来的专业经验和技能。因此，中国准备善待这些海外投资者。从迄今为止宣布的外资入股中国银行业的交易来看，在那些已经被政府补充了资本金的银行，海外“战略投资者”的每股收购价只略高于这些银行的每股帐面价值，比中国同类银行的股价要低很多，例如那些在港上市中资银行的股价。这些海外战略投资者还有权调整其股份收购价，只要其投资的资产价值未来出现任何减损，或是其所投资的银行未来的IPO价格低于其收购该银行股份时的每股定价。
通过与中资银行成立合资企业的方式，这些海外战略投资者还有权涉足中国银行业最有利可图的部分，如信用卡业务。海外投资者可能不会被允许拥有中资银行的控股权，但决定中国银行业改革成败的是海外投资者是被看作必须吞下的苦果还是应张开双臂欢迎的天使。中国银行业官员并不希望海外投资者仅仅坐享其成。他们希望这些投资者对改变中国银行业的运作方式做出贡献。
中国的银行业改革并不仅仅涉及改善资产负债表，这是一场体制性的变革。政策性贷款目前在中国已经大体上成为了历史，这类贷款应为中国银行业的坏帐负主要责任。成立已两年的中国银行业监督管理委员会(CBRC)大大加强了对银行业的监管。中国央行和银监会已联合对各银行规定了严格的资本金要求，并对那些达不到这一要求的银行采取了各种惩罚性措施，包括加大这些银行向央行借款的成本并对其业务进行限制等。央行还取消了银行的贷款利率上限，以便贷款业务的风险能够更好地在利率中得到反映。但中国在银行业改革方面迈出的最重要一步是，政府努力推动各银行加强公司治理。几乎所有的中资银行都已经实现或正在进行股权结构的多样化，这些银行的董事会中独立董事必须占到董事总数的三分之一。政府补充了资本金的银行都被要求公开上市，最好是在海外市场上市。这就要求它们加大自身透明度，加强监管并接受海外监管机构和公众投资者的密切监督。
虽然中国迄今为止在银行业方面的改革令人印象深刻，但中国的银行业要达到最佳国际标准还有很长的路要走。例如，政府控股银行管理高层的最终任免权仍掌握在政府而非银行董事会手中。银行的董事会要充分发挥效用，它必须能使银行的管理高层尽职尽责，有权聘用、解雇银行的高层管理人士，有权对银行的管理层进行奖励，以便将管理层的利益与股东的利益联系起来。从更广泛的角度看，中国银行业需要花时间建立起一种真正的信贷文化，即贷款决策应建立在借款人的信用可靠性以及对贷款风险的分析评估上，不能仅靠银行与贷款人的关系或政府的政策。
事后来看，所谓“渐进式”方式意味著一次只迈出一步，且步伐迈得很慢。迈出第一步往往是最困难的，但中国已经迈出了这关键的第一步。虽然剩余的路程仍然充满艰辛，不过，鉴于中国领导人迄今为止在银行业改革方面所表现出的远见和决心，有充分理由相信中国最终将取得银行业改革的胜利。
（编者按：本文作者单伟健是私人资本运营公司新桥资本(Newbridge Capital)的合伙人。）
