Warren Buffett, Unplugged
OMAHA, Neb. -- Warren Buffett, the billionaire investor and insurance executive, was in his office here this summer when he received a faxed letter about a company he'd never heard of.
The letter was from an adviser to Forest River Inc., an Elkhart, Ind., recreational vehicle maker. He proposed that Mr. Buffett buy the company for $800 million.
Mr. Buffett liked what he saw: The company had a big market share and little debt.
The next day, Mr. Buffett offered to buy Forest River and to let its founder, Peter Liegl, continue running it. He sealed the deal, at an undisclosed price, in a 20-minute meeting one week later. As the meeting wrapped up, Mr. Buffett told Mr. Liegl not to expect to hear from him more than once a year. Says Mr. Liegl: "It was easier to sell my business than to renew my driver's license."
Mr. Buffett has relied on gut instinct for decades to run Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Watch him at work inside his $136 billion investment behemoth, and what you see resembles no other modern financial titan. He spends most of his day alone in an office with no computer. He makes swift investment decisions, steers clear of meetings and advisers, eschews set procedures and doesn't require frequent reports from managers. Occasionally he picks up the phone, calls his broker and trades $100 million or more of stock.
James Maguire is a "specialist" with one of the premiere jobs in the business: He is responsible for trading Berkshire Hathaway.On a recent Wednesday, he received only 13 phone calls, including one wrong number. There were no urgent confabs with his staff. He found time to work on new lyrics to "Love Me Tender" for a birthday party for his friend Bill Gates, and to demonstrate a newspaper-throwing technique he learned while delivering papers as a boy in Omaha.
The older Mr. Buffett gets -- he turned 75 in August -- the more his minimalist approach poses thorny questions for Berkshire. How will his successor be able to take over when so much of Berkshire's DNA resides in Mr. Buffett's head? And in the wake of a recent investigation into a controversial transaction by a Berkshire subsidiary, would a different management style have helped Berkshire avoid trouble?
Mr. Buffett says he has no immediate plans to step down and does not intend to name a successor beforehand. Mr. Gates, Microsoft's chief executive and a Berkshire director, praises Mr. Buffett's hard-to-imitate management style. "It's baffling to think who else could do it," he says.
The uncertainty troubles some outsiders. In April, Fitch Ratings revised the ratings outlook on $7.5 billion of Berkshire's high-investment-grade debt to "negative" from "stable." Fitch analyst Donald Thorpe says the credit-rating firm doesn't "believe that Mr. Buffett's talents can be easily replaced, or that Berkshire's current investment strategies would be sustainable in his absence."
Though his empire has grown, Mr. Buffett says his routine has changed little over the years. He says he spends the better part of most workdays thinking and reading. He fields a handful of phone calls, and on most days, he confers with the chiefs of a few Berkshire subsidiaries. He seldom holds meetings. "There isn't much going on here," he says of his office on a typical day.
Mr. Buffett, with a personal net worth of $43 billion, is the nation's second-richest man, after Mr. Gates. His nearly 55-year record has brought him recognition as one of the best investors ever, earned him fierce loyalty from Berkshire shareholders and inspired legions of investors who attempt to ape his moves.
Mr. Buffett calculates that since 1951, he has generated an average annual return of about 31%. The average return for the Standard & Poor's 500 over that period is 11% a year. A $1,000 investment in Berkshire in 1965 would be worth about $5.5 million today. Over the past decade, Berkshire shares have tripled in price, returning twice as much, in percentage terms, as the S&P 500. Berkshire's Class A shares closed yesterday at $90,500. In recent years, the company's growth has slowed, as Mr. Buffett has become wary of deploying cash reserves due to market conditions. (See related article.)
Berkshire Hathaway, of which he owns about 31%, is a large and complex business. It has substantial stakes in Coca-Cola Co., Wells Fargo Co. and American Express Co. And it boasts 42 subsidiaries in businesses ranging from insurance to ice cream to bricks.
Mr. Buffett believes that managers of these companies ought to be left to run their businesses without interference from him, and without having to hew to any unifying corporate strategies or goals. "We delegate to the point of abdication," Mr. Buffett says in Berkshire's Owner's Manual, a six-page manifesto posted on the company's Web site.
This approach sets him apart from other chief executives. Former General Electric Co. Chief Executive Jack Welch, for example, decentralized management but closely monitored his managers, who had to meet strict goals. Microsoft Corp. requires that its offices and businesses around the globe coordinate their efforts so the company's products fit together.
Even the job of investing Berkshire's $45 billion stock-investment portfolio -- bigger than all but eight of the 7,063 U.S. stock mutual funds tracked by Lipper Inc. -- is far less systematic than it is at most investment firms. Berkshire has no investment committee or asset-allocation guidelines, and Mr. Buffett does not meet with analysts or advisers.
Despite its size, Berkshire has no public-relations, human-relations, investor-relations or legal departments. It holds no quarterly earnings calls for investors and analysts, and gives no guidance on future earnings. Its headquarters is staffed by just 17 employees.
Berkshire's audit department is a one-woman show: Rebecca Amick, 53. A lone employee, 44-year-old Mark Millard, executes the trades Mr. Buffett directs for Berkshire's $25 billion bond portfolio and for its $16.5 billion in foreign-exchange investments.
Marc Hamburg, the 56-year-old chief financial officer, oversees financial reports produced by Berkshire's 42 units and regulatory reporting to the Securities and Exchange Commission. He also writes news releases, which, until a few weeks ago, he sent to the media via fax machine. Mr. Hamburg has a finance staff of seven, far fewer than the dozens of workers most big companies assign to each aspect of his job. When financial reports for the SEC are due at the end of each quarter, Mr. Hamburg explains, "people work very hard."
Mr. Buffett tells the chiefs of his business units not to produce any special reports for him. When Berkshire was acquiring wholesale food distributor McLane Co. in May 2003, for example, he told Chief Executive Grady Rosier that whatever reports he was producing for its then-owner, Wal-Mart Stores Inc., would be fine for Berkshire. Mr. Rosier says Mr. Buffett has never pushed for more detailed information. "Warren just doesn't call," he says.
Mr. Rosier called Mr. Buffett recently to discuss two company jets. "Warren, I have two Learjets, a 1981 and a 1982," he says he told Mr. Buffett. "They are nearly 25 years old now, and I am thinking about getting a new airplane. Is that an issue?"
AN OWNER'S MANUAL
Excerpts from Warren Buffett's "An Owner's Manual":
Charlie [Munger] and I are the managing partners of Berkshire. But we subcontract all of the heavy lifting in this business to the managers of our subsidiaries. In fact, we delegate almost to the point of abdication: Though Berkshire has about 180,000 employees, only 17 of these are at headquarters.
Charlie and I mainly attend to capital allocation and the care and feeding of our key managers. Most of these managers are happiest when they are left alone to run their businesses, and that is customarily just how we leave them. That puts them in charge of all operating decisions and of dispatching the excess cash they generate to headquarters.
Most of our managers are independently wealthy, and it's therefore up to us to create a climate that encourages them to choose working with Berkshire over golfing or fishing. This leaves us needing to treat them fairly and in the manner that we would wish to be treated if our positions were reversed."That is your decision," Mr. Rosier recalls Mr. Buffett replying. "That is your company to run." Says Mr. Rosier: "Wal-Mart left us alone, too. But not like this."
Over the years, not all of Berkshire's investments have been winners, of course. In 1998, Mr. Buffett bought NetJets Inc., a fractional-use aircraft leasing company, for $725 million of cash and stock after a 20-minute meeting with its founder. Despite fast revenue growth, the company posted losses in each of the past three years -- including a pretax loss of $41 million in 2003 -- amid tough competition in Europe. Dexter Shoes, a Maine shoemaker purchased by Berkshire for $420 million in stock, stumbled for eight years. It was absorbed in late 2001 by another Berkshire unit, which took a $219 million write-off.
On occasion, problems of such severity arise that Mr. Buffett abandons his hands-off approach. Trouble surfaced several years ago at General Re, Berkshire's reinsurance unit, due to bad underwriting policies and a complex derivatives business. Mr. Buffett moved to reduce the company's exposure to derivatives, financial instruments that are tied to the value of stocks, bonds or other securities. He later called them "financial weapons of mass destruction."
Earlier this year, regulators began investigating a transaction General Re did in 2000 with American International Group Inc. They are examining whether AIG manipulated its books to mislead investors, and whether executives at the Berkshire unit knew the transaction was improper. Mr. Buffett has told investigators he didn't know details about the questionable transaction. Investigators have not accused him of any wrongdoing.
On that recent Wednesday morning, at just before 9, Mr. Buffett pulled his slate-colored Lincoln Town Car with vanity license plate "THRIFTY" into a parking garage in downtown Omaha. Mr. Buffett, exhibiting no apparent signs of reduced vigor, walked swiftly toward Berkshire headquarters, which occupies a single floor of a nondescript office building. Recently, on the advice of his doctor, he adopted a three-day-a-week workout regimen with a personal trainer. "I always feel good," says Mr. Buffett, whose diet is heavy on hamburgers and soft drinks.
He chatted briefly with his assistant, then hurried into his modest-size office and shut the door. There is no computer in there, nor is there a stock-quote machine or stock-data terminal. He keeps a muted television set tuned to CNBC, the financial-news network. Although he occasionally carries a cellphone on the road, he does not use one in Omaha. He keeps no calculator on his desk, preferring to do most calculations in his head. "I deplore false precision in math," he says, explaining that he does not need exact numbers for most investment decisions. On the cabinet behind his desk are two black phones with direct lines to his brokers on Wall Street.
He had barely settled into his seat when one of them rang. It was John Freund, his longtime broker from Citigroup Inc.'s investment-banking unit. Mr. Freund briefed Mr. Buffett on a stock position he had been building for Berkshire. "If we bought a couple million, that would be fine," Mr. Buffett said, giving Mr. Freund a parameter for how many shares he wanted to buy that day. (Mr. Buffett declines to identify the stock.)
By the end of the day, Mr. Buffett had bought $140 million of the stock for Berkshire's investment portfolio -- equal to the entire asset value of many mutual funds.
Even with such heavy trading, Mr. Buffett's desk isn't littered with stock research. "I don't use analysts or fortune tellers," he says. "If I had to pick one, I don't know which it would be."
Mr. Freund says that when Mr. Buffett is buying stock, he pays little attention to some factors that shape other investors' decisions, such as the economic climate. "He doesn't wait to see what the Fed is doing" to make a trade, Mr. Freund says. Mr. Buffett also can move more quickly than his other clients, he says. "There is no investment committee," the broker explains. "That allows him to make immediate decisions."
Mr. Buffett gives Mr. Freund wide latitude to execute transactions. In 2003, for example, Mr. Buffett was buying shares of Chinese oil company PetroChina Co. Mr. Freund would often call Mr. Buffett at about 9 p.m. Omaha time, when the Hong Kong market was open, an hour at which Mr. Buffett is typically relaxing at home in a sweat suit, playing bridge online. He interrupted his games to place orders.
One night, when a 200-million-share block of PetroChina came on the market, Mr. Freund phoned Mr. Buffett to gauge his interest. "Let's bid," he recalls Mr. Buffett saying. Later that night, a Hong Kong broker called back to tell Mr. Freund he had bought the shares on Mr. Buffett's behalf. Mr. Freund rolled over and went back to sleep without bothering to wake Mr. Buffett with details of the trade, as some other clients would want. Mr. Buffett built a position that eventually totaled $488 million, according to a regulatory filing.
Mr. Buffett deliberately keeps the outside world at bay, believing it is the best way for him to remain "rational" as an investor. If he is interested in investing in a company, he studies the financials himself. "I've created a good environment," he says. "All I have to do is think and not be influenced by others."
Last year, Mr. Buffett says, he began buying Korean stocks for his personal brokerage account, investing a total of $100 million in roughly 20 Korean companies. He says that the investments were too small to be appropriate for the Berkshire portfolio. "These were not Berkshire-size remotely," he says.
He picked the stocks, which he declines to name, by leafing through a reference book compiled in Korea and provided by Citigroup to some clients. The book devotes a single page to each listed company. "You look for solid-looking companies at very low multiples of earnings, and sometimes with the added bonus of lots of excess cash," he said. After the shares rose in price, he unloaded some of them, though he still calls them cheap.
This year, Mr. Buffett's name surfaced in published reports about potential investors in Dow Jones & Co., the publisher of this newspaper. Mr. Buffett, whose company holds an 18.1% stake in Washington Post Co., declines to comment, as does a spokeswoman for Dow Jones. The Bancroft family, which holds a controlling stake, has said the company is not for sale.
Mr. Buffett, an Omaha native, learned about investing under the tutelage of the classic "value" investor Benjamin Graham, who preached buying beaten-down stocks with good underlying value. He became a broker in 1951 at Buffett-Falk & Co., his father's stock-brokerage firm in Omaha, before going to work for Mr. Graham in New York three years later. In 1965, Mr. Buffett bought control of Berkshire, a foundering New Bedford, Mass., fabric mill. He soon purchased National Indemnity Cos., an Omaha insurer, which gave Berkshire $20 million of assets.
In the ensuing decades, Mr. Buffett added several large insurance companies, including General Re and Geico, a national auto-insurance company. He also bought an eclectic mix of manufacturing and retail companies, from paint company Benjamin Moore & Co. to underwear maker Fruit of the Loom Inc.
After speaking with Mr. Freund that day, Mr. Buffett received calls from the chiefs of three Berkshire units. None of the conversations were lengthy. He spent most of the time listening, not advising. "A few of the [Berkshire] CEOs think if they talk to you, you'll tell them what to do," Mr. Buffett says. A prerequisite to a Berkshire purchase of any company is trusting that company's managers to make decisions, he says.
Around midday, a call came in from David Sokol, chief executive of Berkshire's MidAmerican Energy subsidiary. Mr. Buffett put his hands behind his head and cradled the phone against his shoulder, nodding when Mr. Sokol told him that MidAmerican had received a government approval for its pending acquisition of utility PacificCorp. for $5.1 billion in cash, plus $4.3 billion of assumed debt. Mr. Buffett, sipping a Coke from a Styrofoam cup, soon ended the conversation.
Mr. Buffett tends to stick to investments for the long haul, even when the going gets bumpy. Mr. Sokol recalls bracing for an August 2004 meeting at which he planned to break the news to Mr. Buffett that the Iowa utility needed to write off about $360 million for a soured zinc project. Mr. Sokol says he was stunned by Mr. Buffett's response: "David, we all make mistakes." Their meeting lasted only 10 minutes.
"I would have fired me if I was him," Mr. Sokol says.
"If you don't make mistakes, you can't make decisions," Mr. Buffett says. "You can't dwell on them." Mr. Buffett notes that he has made "a lot bigger mistakes" himself than Mr. Sokol did.
That afternoon, Mr. Buffett phoned Ajit Jain, who runs the reinsurance business of National Indemnity. Hurricane Wilma was gaining force in the Gulf of Mexico. During the five-minute talk with Mr. Jain, conversation turned to Mr. Buffett's decision last year to slash Berkshire's exposure to "super cats," or catastrophic events. "If this year's hurricanes had happened last year, or two to three years ago [before Mr. Buffett cut the exposure], what percentage more would our losses have been?" Mr. Buffett asked Mr. Jain.
"One-hundred percent, worst case," Mr. Jain replied. Despite the reduced exposure, Berkshire has since reported net income of $586 million in the third quarter, down 48% from the year-earlier period, due in part to about $3 billion of hurricane-related losses.
Judgment calls such as Mr. Buffett's move to reduce hurricane exposure make his succession a difficult issue for Berkshire. Mr. Jain, 54, is believed to be one of the three candidates Mr. Buffett has recommended to the board to succeed him. In all likelihood, Mr. Buffett has said, his job will be split into three pieces: a CEO in charge of operations, a chief of investments and a chairman. Mr. Buffett declines to identify his candidate for the critical CEO position.
Succession has been a big topic of conversation of late at board meetings, directors say. "We delayed it until late and then devoted a lot of time to it," says Charles Munger, Berkshire's 81-year-old vice chairman and Mr. Buffett's closest associate.
"The chance of getting another Warren is zero," says Mr. Munger. Nevertheless, he brushes off concerns that Berkshire will suffer for it. He says it is likely Berkshire will continue to be run in a decentralized fashion "with enormous discretion in the subsidiary units and a hatred of bureaucracy." The three candidates recommended by Mr. Buffett present Berkshire with "a number of good options," he says.
Mr. Buffett has allowed about $40 billion of cash to accumulate at Berkshire because he hasn't found many attractive investments over the last couple of years. Some investors doubt that shareholders would stay patient if anyone other than Mr. Buffett had such a large cash horde, "especially when it is competing with so much hedge-fund money and mergers-and-acquisition activity these days," says Thomas Vandeventer, a portfolio manager at Citigroup Asset Management, which holds some Berkshire shares. Cash doesn't generate income, and some investors want their money fully invested.
It's unlikely that any successor would choose investments or acquisitions quite like Mr. Buffett does. He says he knows an attractive acquisition candidate when he sees it. "If I don't know it in five to 10 minutes," Mr. Buffett says, "then I'm not going to know it in 10 weeks."
Write to Susan Pulliam at
susan.pulliam@wsj.com and Karen Richardson at
karen.richardson@awsj.com Corrections & Amplifications:
A conversation during late September between investor and insurance executive Warren Buffett and Ajit Jain, a manager of a Berkshire Hathaway Inc. subsidiary, happened on a day when Hurricane Rita was gaining force in the Gulf of Mexico. This article incorrectly identifies the storm as Hurricane Wilma. In addition, Bill Gates is chairman of Microsoft Corp. This article incorrectly identifies him as chief executive of Microsoft. 无为而治的沃伦?巴菲特
（这位亿万富翁像是个甩手掌柜，他敬电脑而远之，让手下的经理们自行其是，但他却获得了丰厚的投资回报。他刚刚过了 75 岁生日。有谁能接他的班呢？）
亿万富翁沃伦?巴菲特 (Warren Buffett) 今年夏天在其位于内布拉斯加州奥马哈的办公室接到一份他从未听说过的公司发来的传真。
发信人是印第安纳州休闲车生产商 Forest River Inc. 的一位顾问。此人建议巴菲特出资 8 亿美元收购这家公司。
信中列举的情况令巴菲特满意：这家公司拥有很高的市场占有率，而且几乎没有负债。
第二天，巴菲特即开出了对 Forest River 的收购价，并提议让该公司的创办人彼得?利格尔 (Peter Liegl) 继续掌管它。在一周后举行的一次历时 20 分钟的会议上巴菲特签署了收购协议，具体收购价不详。他在会议结束时对利格尔说，别指望一年中能有第二次得到他耳提面命的机会。利格尔说：“把我的企业卖出去比更新我的驾驶执照还容易。”
数十年来巴菲特一直依靠直觉来经营他的伯克希尔?哈撒维公司 (Berkshire Hathaway Inc.) 。观察一下巴菲特在他这家市值达 1,360 亿美元的投资大本营里的工作情况，你眼中所见与其他大型金融机构无任何相似之处。巴菲特一天大部分时间都待在自己那间没有电脑的办公室里。他迅速地做出投资决策，省去了例行的决策会议以及顾问们建言献策的程序，他摒弃了常规惯例，也不要求手下的经理们经常向他汇报工作。他偶尔会给自己的经纪商打电话，下达动辄上亿美元的股票交易指令。
在不久前的一个周三，巴菲特一天只接到了 13 个电话，其中一个还是人家拨错了号码。这里没有需要召开的紧急会议，因此他有时间为《温柔地爱我》 (Love Me Tender) 这首老歌填写新词，以便能为朋友比尔?盖茨 (Bill Gates) 的生日聚会助兴。巴菲特还偷闲秀了一把抛报纸的技艺，这一招是他在奥马哈当报童时学会的。
巴菲特今年 8 月刚过了 75 岁生日，随著年龄的与日俱增，他那种无为而治的管理方式也日益成为伯克希尔?哈撒维公司面临的一个严峻问题。鉴于该公司如此多的 DNA 只存在于巴菲特一人的头脑中，一旦他撒手而去，他的继任人将如何接班？鉴于旗下一家子公司的一桩引发争议的交易最近受到了政府监管机构的调查，如果该公司以其他方式管理这一麻烦可以避免吗？
巴菲特说他短期内尚无退休的计划，也不打算预先指定一位接班人。微软 (Microsoft) 董事长比尔?盖茨是伯克希尔?哈撒维公司的董事，他对巴菲特这种难以模仿的管理方式表示赞赏，并说，“真难以想像还有什么人能做到这一点。”
这种不确定性使外界一些人士感到困扰。今年 4 月，惠誉国际评级 (Fitch Ratings) 将伯克希尔?哈撒维公司 75 亿美元高投资级债券的评级前景从“稳定”调整为“负面”。惠誉的分析师唐纳德?索普 (Donald Thorpe) 说，该公司“不认为巴菲特的天才是常人所具备的，也不认为伯克希尔?哈撒维公司目前的投资策略在巴菲特离去后还能维持下去。”
虽然巴菲特的投资帝国在不断发展壮大，但他说自己的投资策略多年来却几乎没有改变。巴菲特称，他把一天中的大部分时间用来思考和阅读。他每天接听的电话屈指可数，他平时只和少数几家伯克希尔?哈撒维旗下子公司的负责人保持著联系。巴菲特很少召开会议，他在谈到自己办公室的日常情形时说：“这儿没有多少事可做。”
个人财富达 430 亿美元的巴菲特是美国第二大富翁，仅次于比尔?盖茨。他近 55 年的从业经历使他被公认为有史以来最成功的投资者，为他赢得了伯克希尔?哈撒维股东们的衷心拥戴，也导致企图模仿他的投资策略而致富的人层出不穷。
根据巴菲特的计算，自 1951 年以来他的年均投资回报率为 31% 左右。而标准普尔 500 指数在此期间的年均涨幅为 11% 。如果 1965 年时向伯克希尔?哈撒维公司投资 1,000 美元，那么这笔投资现在将值 550 万美元左右。在过去 10 年中，伯克希尔?哈撒维的股价已经上涨了两倍，涨幅为标准普尔 500 指数同期涨幅的两倍。伯克希尔?哈撒维 A 类股上周五的收盘价为 90,500 美元。近几年该公司股价的上涨速度已经慢了下来，因为出于对市场状况的担忧，巴菲特在运用公司的现金储备方面已开始变得谨慎。
巴菲特持股 31% 的伯克希尔?哈撒维公司是家庞大而复杂的企业。它持有可口可乐 (Coca-Cola Co.) 、富国银行 (, Wells Fargo Co.) 和美国运通 (American Express Co.) 的大量股票。从保险、冰激凌生产到制砖业，伯克希尔?哈撒维旗下 42 家子公司的业务遍及各个领域。
巴菲特认为，这些子公司的经理们应不受他的干预自行经营公司的业务，他们也不必遵循统一的公司经营策略或经营目标。巴菲特在刊登在伯克希尔?哈撒维公司网站上的一份声明中说：“我们放手让下边去干。”
这种工作态度使他迥异于其他首席执行长们。以通用电气 (General Electric Co.) 的前任首席执行长杰克?韦尔奇 (Jack Welch) 为例，他虽然将管理权下放给了手下的经理们，但同时也对他们予以密切监督，这些人必须达到严格的业绩目标。微软则要求其遍布全球的各办事处和子公司协调彼此的行动，以便该公司的产品能够相互兼容。
甚至伯克希尔?哈撒维公司在运作其 450 亿美元股票投资资金方面与大多数投资公司相比也远缺乏系统性。该公司没有投资委员会或资产分配指导原则，巴菲特从不会见分析师或投资顾问。就资金规模而言，该公司的股票投资在 Lipper Inc. 追踪的 7,063 家美国股票共同基金中位居第九。
伯克希尔?哈撒维公司市值庞大，但它却没有公共关系、人事关系、投资者关系以及法律部门，它也不召集分析师和投资者举行季度收益情况发布会，不对公司未来的收益情况提供预测。该公司总部只有 17 名员工。
这家公司的审计部只有丽贝卡?阿米克 (Rebecca Amick) 一名员工，这是位 53 岁的女士。伯克希尔?哈撒维公司也只有 44 岁的马克?米拉德 (Mark Millard) 一人负责执行巴菲特在债券和外汇方面的交易指令，而该公司债券投资组合的规模达 250 亿美元，它在外汇方面的投资更是高达 1,650 亿美元。
伯克希尔?哈撒维公司 56 岁的首席财务长马克?汉堡 (Marc Hamburg) 负责审看该公司 42 子公司上报的财务报告并负责向美国证券交易委员会 (SEC) 提交报告。他还负责撰写公司的新闻稿，而直到几周前他都是用传真机向媒体发送这些稿件的。汉堡手下的财务人员只有 7 名，而他负责的每项工作在其他大公司都需要有几十人来干。汉堡说，“当每个季度末向 SEC 提交财务报告时，我们还是很忙的。”
巴菲特告诉他旗下那些分公司的头头，不要为他准备什么特别的报告。比如 2003 年伯克希尔收购食品批发商 McLane Co. 时，巴菲特告诉 Mclane 首席执行长格拉迪?罗西亚 (Grady Rosier) 说，他们以前向东家沃尔玛连锁公司 (Wal-Mart Stores) 准备什么样的报告，今后照样办理就可以。罗西亚说，巴菲特从来不催他们提供更多的信息。他说：他从不打电话。
罗西亚最近给巴菲特打电话，问他有关公司两架飞机的事情。他记得他当时问巴菲特：沃伦，我有两架 Learjet ，一架是 1981 年的，一架 1982 年，差不多都用了 25 年了。我想买一架新的，你看有问题吗？
罗西亚记得巴菲特当时回答：你决定好了。是你在经营公司。罗西亚说，沃尔玛也让我们自己管理公司，但跟巴菲特不一样。
当然，这么多年来，伯克希尔投资的企业并不都是成功的。 1998 年巴菲特买下了 NetJets Inc. ，这是一家飞机租赁公司。巴菲特在与这家公司的创始人面谈了 20 分钟之后就决定花 7.25 亿美元现金和股票买下它。
然而，在过去三年中，由于欧洲市场竞争激烈，该公司虽然收入快速增长却连续出现亏损，其中 2003 年的税前亏损就达 4,100 万美元。伯克希尔用价值 4.2 亿美元的股票收购的缅因州制鞋企业 Dexter Shoes 在 8 年时间一直萎靡不振。 2001 年，伯克希尔的另一家子公司兼并了 Dexer ，由此产生了 2.19 亿美元的冲销额。
麻烦最初是几年前在伯克希尔的再保险子公司 General Re 出现的，起因是保单出现问题和综合衍生品业务。于是巴菲特决定削减衍生品业务。他称这些衍生品是“大规模杀伤性金融工具”。
今年早些时候，监管机构开始调查 General Re 与美国国际集团 (American International Group Inc.) 2001 年的一桩交易。他们要搞清美国国际集团是否曾篡改帐目误导消费者以及伯克希尔的人是否知道这桩交易是不正当的。巴菲特对投资者表示，他不知道这桩问题交易的具体细节。调查方后来未指责巴菲特有什么过错。
在最近的那个周三的早晨，接近 9 点的时候，巴菲特先生开著他那台车牌是“ THRIFTY ”（意为“节俭”，有点显摆意味吧？）的兰灰色 Lincoln Town 轿车驶入奥马哈下城区的一个停车场。 75 岁的巴菲特快步走向伯克希尔总部所在的一幢外观毫无特征的办公楼（伯克希尔在楼里占用了单独一层），其矫健的步态丝毫不减当年。
他与助手简单交谈了几句，然后快步走进自己那间面积中等的办公室并关上门。办公室里没有电脑，也没有股票报价机或其他股票数据终端。电视机被调在了播放财经新闻的 CNBC 频道上，不过声音被关掉了。
虽然他有时候在路上会带著手机，但他在奥马哈从来不用。办公桌上没有计算器，他的计算大多数都是在脑子里完成的。他说，他的大部分投资决策并不需要很准确的数字作依据。在他办公桌后面的小柜子上有两部黑色电话机，直通他在华尔街的经纪商。
当其中一部电话打进来的时候，他正要坐到座位上。那是他的长期经纪人、花旗集团投资银行分部的约翰?弗洛恩德 (John Freund) 。他向巴菲特简单报告了一下他为伯克希尔建的股票帐户里的头寸情况。巴菲特说，如果我们买进了几百万股就好了。然后他告诉弗洛恩德他当天希望买进的股票的数字。（他不愿向记者透露具体是哪只股票。）在那天结束之前，巴菲特为伯克希尔的投资组合又买进了价值 1.4 亿美元的股票，这个数字对许多共同基金来说相当于一家基金的资产总价值。
即使是作这么大的交易，巴菲特的桌子上也见不到多少股票研究资料。他说，我用不著分析师或是占卜师。如果一定要我挑一个，我也不知道要挑什么。
弗洛恩德说，巴菲特买股票的时候，很少关注那些会影响其他投资者买卖决策的因素，比如经济形势等等。弗洛恩德说，他不会等著看 Fed 的决定再决定股票买卖。弗洛恩德还说，巴菲特还比他的其他客户反应更敏捷。他们没有投资委员会之类的机构，这使巴菲特可以当即拍板。
巴菲特在执行交易方面给弗洛恩德很大的自由度。比如 2003 年，巴菲特买进了中国石油 (PetroChina Co.) 的股票，弗洛恩德经常需要在奥马哈当地时间晚上 9 点（香港股市开盘时间）左右打电话给巴菲特，而这个时间通常是巴菲特穿著运动衫在家放松的时刻，比如在网上打桥牌什么的。他会中断游戏去下单。
一天晚上，当市场挂出一份 2 亿股中国石油股票的卖单时，弗洛恩德打电话给巴菲特想看他有无兴趣。弗洛恩德回忆到，巴菲特说：我们买吧。那晚晚些时候，一个香港交易员打电话给弗洛恩德，告诉他已经为巴菲特买进了该股。
弗洛恩德没有打电话骚扰巴菲特，他在床上翻了个身接著睡觉。如果是其他一些客户，他们可能会希望知道交易的详情。据有关监管文件显示，巴菲特在该股上的头寸最后总计达到 4.88 亿美元。
巴菲特刻意将外部世界挡在外面，他相信，这是使他能保持作一个“理性”投资者的最佳途径。如果他对投资一家公司感兴趣，他会自己去研究这家公司的财务状况。他说：我给自己创造了一个良好的环境。我需要做的只是思考，并且不受其他人的影响。
巴菲特说，去年他开始为自己的个人证券帐户买入韩国股票，大约向 20 家韩国公司一共投资了 1 亿美元。他说这对伯克希尔来说少得不值一提。“这根本不是伯克希尔的手笔，”他说。
他不愿透露这些股票的名称，说花旗集团 (Citigroup) 为一些客户在韩国编了一本参考书，对提到的上市公司都各用一页篇幅进行了介绍。他也就是随便翻了翻，挑了几家而已。“找些看起来业务稳固、本益比极低、有时还有大笔现金进项的公司，”他说。股票上涨之后，他已经抛出了一些，不过他认为这些股票的价格仍然很便宜。
今年，巴菲特被当作道琼斯公司 (Dow Jones & Co.) 的潜在投资者，名字屡屡见诸报端。巴菲特的公司持有华盛顿邮报公司 (Washington Post Co.) 18.1% 股份，他拒绝就此猜测发表评论，道琼斯公司发言人也拒绝置评。控股道琼斯公司的 Bancroft 家族则表示，不会出售这家公司。
巴菲特在奥马哈长大，在杰出的“价值型”投资者本杰明?格雷汉姆 (Benjamin Graham) 的教诲下学会了投资诀窍。格雷汉姆总是宣扬要买进大幅下跌但极具潜在价值的股票。巴菲特 1951 年到他父亲在奥马哈的股票经纪公司 Buffett-Falk & Co. 担任交易商，三年后到纽约为格雷汉姆工作。 1965 年，巴菲特买下了马萨诸塞州新贝德福德的纺织厂伯克希尔，很快又买下了奥马哈保险公司 National Indemnity Cos. ，为伯克希尔注资 2,000 万美元。
接下来的几十年里，巴菲特通过伯克希尔陆续收购了几家大型保险公司，包括 General Re 和美国汽车保险公司 Geico 。他还收购了一系列生产和零售公司，从涂料公司 Benjamin Moore & Co. ，到内衣生产商 Fruit of the Loom Inc. ，不一而足。
那天和弗洛恩德谈过之后，巴菲特接到伯克希尔三家子公司主管的电话，每个电话都不长。大部分时间巴菲特都是在听，并不提建议。“伯克希尔没有哪个 CEO 会觉得跟你谈谈，你就会告诉他们该干什么，”巴菲特说。伯克希尔收购任何一家公司的前提就是信任这家公司的经理，由他们决策。
中午的时候，伯克希尔子公司 MidAmerican Energy 的首席执行长大卫?索科尔 (David Sokol) 打来电话。巴菲特两手放在脑后，用肩膀夹著电话，一边听索科尔说著 MidAmerican 收购 PacificCorp. 的计划获得了政府批准的有关情况，一边点头。 MidAmerican 计划出资 51 亿美元现金，并承担 43 亿美元的债务，来收购公用事业公司 PacificCorp. 。巴菲特用一只 Styrofoam 杯子一小口一小口慢慢啜饮可乐，很快就结束了这次谈话。
即使投资项目遇到了困难，巴菲特也倾向于长期坚持投资。索科尔回忆起 2004 年 8 月份一次让他深受鼓舞的会面，当时他准备告诉巴菲特，因为一项锌项目受挫，公司不得不冲销大约 3.6 亿美元。索科尔说，他被巴菲特的反应惊呆了。巴菲特说：“大卫，我们都会犯错。”那次会面只用了 10 分钟。
“要是我的话，肯定把那个索科尔给炒了，”索科尔自己说。
但巴菲特说，“要想不犯错误，只能不作决策。”他说自己犯过比索科尔“更大的错误”，“不能犹豫不决。”
当天下午，巴菲特给 National Indemnity 的再保险业务主管 Ajit Jain 打了一个电话。丽塔飓风在墨西哥湾的威力正在逐渐升级。短短 5 分钟的谈话很快转到巴菲特去年决定削减伯克希尔巨灾保险风险的决定。“要是今天这样的飓风去年就来了，或者（在降低风险）两三年之前就来了，那我们现在的损失会多多少？”巴菲特问 Jain 。
“最差会多出一倍的损失，” Jain 回答。虽然及时降低了风险，伯克希尔第三季度的净利润还是较上年同期锐减 48% ，为 5.86 亿美元，部分原因就是飓风带来的大约 30 亿美元的损失。
能做出像削减承保风险这样的明智预见，让巴菲特的继任遴选成了伯克希尔的大难题。现年 54 岁的 Jain 据信是巴菲特向董事会推荐的三名继任人选之一。很可能像巴菲特曾经说过的那样，他的工作会分成三部分：一位负责业务经营的首席执行长、一位首席投资长，加一名董事长。巴菲特拒绝透露关键的首席执行长继任人选。
董事们说，继任问题成了最近董事会谈论的主要话题。“我们尽可能地推迟到最后一刻，然后投入大量时间和精力去解决，” 81 岁的副董事长、也是巴菲特的最亲密的伙伴查尔斯?芒格 (Charles Munger) 说。
“再找一个沃伦的可能性等于零，”他说。但尽管如此，他认为伯克希尔不会因此受到冲击。他说，伯克希尔很可能会继续保持无为而治的风格，“子公司自行决策大量业务，痛恨官僚作风的公司文化。”他还说，巴菲特推荐的三名候选人给伯克希尔提供了“不少好选择”。
巴菲特任由伯克希尔的现金堆积到 400 亿美元，因为这几年没发现多少合适的投资机会。有些投资者怀疑，如果不是巴菲特坐镇，股东们看著公司积累这么多现金还会不会保持耐心，花旗集团资产管理部门的投资组合经理托马斯?范迪温特 (Thomas Vandeventer) 说，何况当前共同基金也拥有大笔资金，还有大量并购交易层出不穷。花旗集团资产管理部门持有伯克希尔部分股票。他解释说，现金不会产生收益，有些投资者希望自己的资金被充分投资利用起来。
任何一名继任人都不太可能选择巴菲特这样的投资或收购做法。巴菲特说他看到一个收购项目时就知道它是不是有吸引力。“要是 5-10 分钟内我还看不出来，”他说，“我可不会再花上 10 个星期去弄清楚。”
