Spring and Autumn Era
The decline of the feudal system resulted from the rising influence of a growing educated class, which gained influence in government and commerce because of their ability. The word shi, which originally meant a knight, came to mean a literary person. States run by what later became a thriving bureaucracy gained power and consolidated themselves under monarchical government. As states began to tax individual landowners, peasants worked themselves free of their masters and practiced a labor-intensive agriculture for a mostly vegetarian diet. Millet was supplemented by wheat in the north and rice from the south, and soybeans helped to revive the soil.
The Chun Qiu , which means Spring and Autumn, summarizes important events by season and year from 722 to about 470 BC. Though the extant text is written from the viewpoint of Lu and is dated by its rulers, the events listed include all the civilized states of China. During this period a balance of power arose among the states of Qi, Qin, Jin, and Chu, although the small state of Zhou in the middle was still recognized as the nominal ruler of the Chinese world. Mencius claimed that Confucius composed the Spring and Autumn Annals and quoted Confucius as saying that he would be understood and condemned for it. However, it is unlikely that this dry chronicle of events was composed by the philosophical Confucius.
The work that describes the history of the Spring and Autumn era is the Zuo Zhuan (Commentary by Zuo on the Chun Qiu) . Much of this work seems to be early writing, though some comments and prophecies may have been put in as late as the middle of the fourth century BC. This book does describe events more fully and offer moral lessons and occasional comments, some by Confucius.
Followed by the Period of Warring States until the unification of China in 221 BC, these five centuries had almost constant wars. In 722 BC there were about 120 feudal states that acknowledged fealty to the Zhou king as the son of heaven. As the stronger states took over the weaker ones, by the end of the Spring and Autumn era there were only about 40 states. In the Period of Warring States these were reduced to seven, and in 221 the most of powerful of these, Qin, established the empire named after them we call China.
The feudal aristocracy eventually collapsed as ministers from powerful families enhanced their positions through warmaking. As war became less chivalrous, infantry and cavalry replaced knights fighting with chariots. Instead of calling on vassals like family members, taxes were used to raise armies. Tenant farmers could own their own land, but heavy taxes and usury led to consolidation of land-owning by the wealthy. As the powerful families fought with each other, they turned for help to the educated class of officials, who gained influence in increasingly bureaucratized administrations. Thus these were times of great change and social mobility, as aristocratic families were wiped out or banished to obscurity, and others with education or wealth earned in commerce or industry rose to great influence.
In 719 BC we find a high official of Lu advising his Duke that violence is not the way to gain the support of one's people. Commenting on Zhouxu, who rose to power in Wei by assassinating the previous duke, Guan Zhong said that by relying on cruelty and military force he has few followers and allies. Military force is like fire - if it is not kept in check, it may consume the user.
Guan Zhong was poor but was helped by his friend Bao Shuya. While the latter served one of the Duke's sons, Xiaobo, Guan Zhong served another son, Jiu, under Duke Xi of Qi (r. 730-698 BC). According to Han Fei-zi, Guan Zhong and Bao Shu agreed to recommend each other to whichever prince succeeded. When Duke Xiang (r. 697-686 BC) was killed in a civil war, Xiaobo became Duke Huan (r. 685-645 BC); Jiu was killed, and Guan Zhong was imprisoned. However, Duke Huan of Qi appointed Guan Zhong prime minister (even though Guan in supporting his brother had shot an arrow that hit his sash buckle in the struggle for power). Yet Bao Shuya stepped aside himself and recommended Guan Zhong to Duke Huan, saying Guan's ability could give the duke greater power. Though Bao worked under Guan, he was admired more because of his ability to appreciate men.
Duke Huan wanted to begin by strengthening his armed forces, but Guan Zhong recommended that he put his arms in storage, since for being on good terms with the feudal lords abroad and the people at home expending wealth on people is better than spending it on arms. In the second year Duke Huan went ahead with the production of arms anyway, and the year after that he wanted to attack Song; but Guan Zhong said that if the internal government is not strengthened, ventures abroad will not be successful. Duke Huan attacked Song anyway, and the feudal lords helped Song to defeat the troops of Qi. Continuing to defy Guan's advice, Duke Huan strengthened the armed forces and gave salaries to the brave; but Guan managed to keep the internal government in order secretly even while those contending for salaries were slashing each other to pieces and breaking necks. Next Duke Huan attacked Lu against Guan's advice. By 682 BC Qi had assembled 100,000 armored troops and 5,000 chariots, but Guan Zhong noted that there were other states just as powerful. Guan felt that since Qi was trying to use arms instead of moral force, the country was in danger. While the Duke of Lu threatened Duke Huan and himself with a sword, Guan Zhong suggested a compromise that was accepted.
After this, Duke Huan began to follow Guan Zhong's advice, which warned that a prince should not be greedy for territory or devote himself to the use of arms, because it distresses the people and makes deceit prevalent. Instead of attacking them, Duke Huan enfeoffed several small states. Finally Duke Huan agreed with Guan Zhong to strengthen the country, and he lightened taxes, relaxed customs restrictions, and regulated government levies and salaries. Next Guan suggested that he inquire after the sick and reward people rather than punish them. If he could do this for five years, the feudal lords would support him. After spreading around gifts abroad and domestically and getting capable men to manage relations with other states, Duke Huan's political control increased such that when the Di people attacked, the feudal lords all sent troops to help defeat the Di.
Duke Huan followed the counsel of Guan Zhong in encouraging the feudal lords to gather three years' provisions before strengthening their arms. His power was further advanced by offering to help militarily those who did this but still did not have enough armed forces. Finally Guan Zhong recommended that the relations between princes and ministers be harmonized by not setting up concubines as legal wives or killing their great ministers. Feudal lords were not to manipulate boundaries, hoard grain, nor prohibit the gathering of natural resources. Once these policies were established for at least a year, then punishments and rewards could be implemented. Instead of the death penalty and corporal punishment, criminals could redeem themselves by supplying arms.
As prime minister, Guan Zhong instituted many other reforms including state ownership of salt and iron. In an economic policy known as balancing the heavy and the light, he promoted commerce by standardizing weight scales and coins. Guan Zhong shared the people's likes and dislikes by giving them what they wanted and abolishing what they rejected. Sima Qian quotes from the book named Guan-zi.
When the granaries are full,
the people will understand social codes and moderation.
When their food and clothing are adequate,
they will understand honor and disgrace.
If the sovereign complies with the rules,
the six relationships will be secure.
If the four guidelines do not prevail,
the nation will perish.
The orders handed down like the source of a river
will be in accord with the hearts of the people.9
The six relationships are with father, mother, elder brother, younger brother, wife, and children, and the four guidelines or virtues are propriety, justice, integrity, and conscience. Guan also wrote, "Knowing that 'to give is to receive' is the most precious thing in governing."10 Confucius credited Guan Zhong with helping Duke Huan to bring unity and order to the entire realm, which they still enjoyed two centuries later. Were it not for Guan Zhong, Confucius admitted, they might be wearing their hair loose and folding their clothes like the barbarians.
Guan Zhong ordered the Lord of Yen to follow the governmental policies of the ancient Duke of Shao and insisted that Duke Huan keep his word in the convention of Ko. With his reforms and skillful diplomacy Guan helped Qi to become the most powerful state, and all of the feudal lords submitted to Qi. In 679 BC Duke Huan of Qi achieved the power and prestige known as ba (First Noble) and acted as the protector of state affairs for the Zhou king.
Until 591 BC this office of First Noble or protector was assumed by the most powerful of the rulers, who repelled invasions, punished the disobedient, arbitrated differences among the state rulers, received the revenues that before had gone to the king, and even settled disputes among the royal family.
When Guan Zhong was dying, Duke Huan asked what he should do after his wise counselor's death. Guan did not recommend his friend Bao Shuya to replace himself, because he was so inflexible in his hatred of evil that he could not forget a single deed to the end of his life. Then Guan suggested that the duke send away four men, who had ingratiated themselves into influence by denying their own children and families and one his own body by castration. Such men will not love him, he said. After Guan died, Duke Huan dismissed all four of them, but he then suffered a nervous breakdown and confusion in his court. So he restored the four men, but a year later they launched a coup against him; when the duke died in 645 BC, they did not even bury his body.
When the state of Jin was suffering a drought, Duke Mu of Qin refused to attack them, as one advisor had suggested, but sent them large shipments of grain. However, two years later when Qin was suffering a famine, Duke Yiwu of Jin, who had broken numerous promises, refused to ship grain to Qin but rather launched an attack against them in 645 BC. Duke Yiwu's chariot bogged down in the mud, and Duke Mu and his men tried to capture him but were surrounded by the Jin army. However, Duke Mu was saved by three hundred men he had earlier pardoned for eating one of his prize horses when they were starving at Mt. Qi. Though Jin's army was larger, they lost because the Qin fighters were more spirited, the Zuo Zhuan making the moral and psychological factors in warfare apparent. Duke Yiwu's advisor refused to rescue his duke caught in the mud, because he had neglected his advice.
Thus Duke Yiwu was captured and taken to Qin; but Duke Mu released him, because his wife, who was Yiwu's sister, and the Zhou sovereign requested it. He then made peace with Jin on the counsel that if he killed their ruler, hatred would be stored up. Abusing others is bad policy, doubling hatred and bringing about misfortune. When the Duke of Jin returned home, he had his advisor, who refused to flee, put to death for bringing about his defeat. Once again Duke Mu of Qin sent grain to Jin in their time of need, treating their people with kindness, hoping that a competent ruler would appear. In the end Qin did receive the land west of the Yellow River promised by Jin and began collecting taxes there.
When Yiwu died in 637 BC, his older brother Zhong Er (also called Duke Wen) returned from twenty years exile and with Duke Mu's help overcame Yiwu's son Yu to gain the rulership of Jin. In 632 BC he defeated the Chu at Chengbu, and he withdrew from Yuan (even though they were about to capitulate) in order to keep his word. Duke Wen of Jin was appointed ba or protector of the feudal rulers. The opposing general withdrew because of three military maxims - when facing an equal, retire; when difficulties lie ahead, withdraw; and a virtuous man cannot be opposed. When Duke Wen offered to restore the rulers of Cao and Wei, those rulers broke off their alliance with Chu. Though before he had tried to provoke an attack, now Duke Wen graciously withdrew when the Chu general attacked him, because Chu had showed him kindness in his exile. Finally victorious over Chu, Duke Wen called for an audience with the Zhou sovereign for which he was later criticized by the traditional Confucius.
How the chivalry in war was disappearing can be seen in an incident in which a Song official turned his halberd around to pull his opponent out of a well, after which the opponent killed him. The commentator declared that he had departed from propriety and disobeyed orders in saving his enemy and therefore deserved to die.
Filial piety is shown in the story of a starving man who is given food by Zhao Dun, but he packs up half of it to take it to his mother. Later the same man, while acting as one of the Duke's guards, turned his halberd against the other guards, who were going to kill Zhao Dun for criticizing his wicked ruler. Later the ruler was assassinated before Zhao Dun had crossed the border. So he returned but did not punish the assassin, although they did send for the legitimate successor. A historian wrote that Zhao Dun assassinated his ruler, and Confucius declared that Zhao Dun was a good official, who accepted a bad name for the sake of a principle.
The morality of the Zuo Zhuan is that attacking the rebellious is an act of punishment, and being gentle with the submissive is an act of virtue. Loyalty was also highly valued. One emissary who was caught agreed to be bribed in order to fulfill his mission even though he had to lie and break a promise to the bribers. Yet filial loyalty had its limits too. Wei Ko's father, when he became ill, asked him to see that his concubine was married; but when the illness became worse, he asked that she be killed and buried with him. The son followed the earlier orders when his father's mind was clearer, and he was later rewarded when he captured an old man in battle who appeared to him in a dream to tell him that he was the woman's father and was thanking him. Yet truthfulness was so valued by historians that three brothers were executed in succession for writing that a usurper had assassinated the duke; but when the fourth brother stepped forward, the murderer finally relented. Two years later the assassin and his family were killed by a fellow prime minister.
In 597 BC Jin was defeated by the armies of Chu king Zhuang, who was made protector. A major battle was fought between Qi and Jin in 589 BC. The incessant wars between Jin and Chu led Heang Seu of Song to go to Jin with a proposal for a comprehensive peace. He said, "War is destructive to the people, an insect that eats up the resources, and the greatest calamity of the small states."11 Arguing that if Jin did not accept the proposal, Chu would agree and draw all the states together, Jin agreed in order to keep the protectorship. Then he went to Chu, and they agreed also. Qi was reluctant to join but realized that it would disaffect the people if they refused to sanction the stopping of war. Heang Seu sent word to Qin, and they agreed. He notified all the smaller states and arranged a meeting at Song in 545 BC.
Jin and Chu, argued about which of them should have precedent but agreed to share the protectorship, although Qin and Qi were formally excepted because of their power and Chu and Tang because of their weakness. Otherwise all fourteen states agreed to the covenant of peace. Heang Seu asked for a reward for "arresting the cause of death" and was given sixty towns. However, Zihan, the Minister of Works, declared that it was the arms of Jin and Chu that kept the smaller states in awe. "Who can do away with the instruments of war?" he asked. "They have been long in requisition. It is by them that the lawless are kept in awe, and accomplished virtue is displayed."12 Denouncing the scheme as a delusion, he cut the document to pieces. Heang Seu consequently refused the towns, and his family wanted to attack Zihan; but Heang stopped them, saying he had been saved from ruin by him.
Nevertheless this agreement must have been effective for several years, because there were no wars for the next five years, only a battle with barbarians in the sixth year and no wars in the seventh and eighth years. This is by far the most peaceful part of the two and a half centuries of the Spring and Autumn era during which there was only one other time in which there were even two years in a row without a war.
During this lull, the ducal son of Wu made the following observations about music with their obvious implications for diplomacy and Chinese culture:
Direct but not overbearing, distant but not perfidious,
varied but not to excess, repetitive but not tiresomely so,
plaintive but not downcast, joyous but not unbridled,
employing but never depleting, expansive without being assertive,
doling out, yet not to a prodigal degree,
gathering in, yet not in a greedy manner,
resting without stagnating,
moving forward without becoming unduly facile.
The five notes are harmonized, the eight airs well balanced.
Movements that are measured,
restraints that are properly ordered -
these are qualities shared by all who abound in virtue.13
Likewise in the same peaceful period the Cheng prime minister Zichan disagreed with an official, who suggested they abolish the village schools, where they gathered to discuss government administration.
Why do that?
In the morning and evening when the people are at leisure
or have finished their work, they gather
to discuss the good and bad points of my administration.
The points they approve of I encourage,
and those they criticize I correct.
They are my teachers.
Why would I want to abolish them?
I have heard of wiping out resentment
by loyal service and good works,
but I have never heard of stopping it by force.
True, one can cut it off for a time.
But it is like damming up a river.
When there is a major break in the dikes,
many persons are bound to suffer.
If the people's resentment were to break out in the same way,
I would never be able to save the situation.
It is better to leave a little break in the dikes
for the water to drain off.
It is better that I hear the people's complaints
and make them my medicine.14
Zichan also advised Zipi not to put Yin Ho in charge of a city, because he is too young and inexperienced to handle this responsibility. One should learn before entering government, not enter government in order to learn.
Decisions made by the nobles during the feudal period were increasingly taken over by the rulers and ministers of the states, but laws were not promulgated in writing until the state of Zheng cast a criminal code in bronze in 536 BC. This formalizing of the law was protested by a Jin official as arbitrarily taking away from the judgment of superiors. When laws are exactly defined, he argued, people will lose respect for their superiors and in a contentious spirit try to get away with whatever does not violate the letter of the law. Such laws indicated the government has fallen into disorder. Punishments were used and could be severe, especially in military situations. In civil matters fines were often exacted, though great officers were rarely punished.
King Ling came to power in Chu by murdering his nephew and was never able to control his violent tendencies. Three of his younger brothers revolted, and he was replaced and died in 529 BC. He was not able to live up to the old saying quoted by Confucius, "To overcome oneself and return to propriety is the way of benevolence."15
Sun-zi's Art of War
According to the historian Sima Qian, Sun-zi was given an audience in the state of Wu. Having read the thirteen chapters of Sun-zi's Art of War, the king of Wu (r. 514-496 BC) invited him to demonstrate the drilling of troops with the king's concubines. Sun-zi explained the commands for marching, and the women all answered, "Yes, sir;" but when the drum signals were given, the women burst out laughing. Sun-zi realized that if the orders are not clear and the signals not familiar, the general is at fault. He repeated the signals several times, but the women responded by laughing again. Believing that when the signals are clear but not followed, the officers are at fault, Sun-zi ordered the left and right commanders (two of the king's favorite concubines) beheaded. The king sent a messenger to stop the executions, but Sun-zi disregarded the sovereign's command. After the two commanders were beheaded and replaced, the women obeyed the orders with serious precision. Not wanting to watch but impressed with Sun-zi's military ways, the king appointed him commander of his army.
Sima Qian reported that Sun-zi wrote The Art of War after having his feet amputated. This book on military strategy and tactics has been very influential throughout Chinese history and is still respected by military minds today. Though astute for a military context, it is typical of a war mentality. Sun-zi outlined the art of warmaking in relation to five factors he called moral law, heaven, earth, the commander, and method and discipline. However, his concept of moral law had been reduced to complete accord with the ruler so that soldiers will follow him in disregard of their own lives or danger. Heaven refers to weather and time factors. Earth is concerned with distances, terrain, and the chances of life and death. The virtues of a good commander are wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage, and strictness. Method and discipline include the divisions and ranks of the army, maintenance of roads and supplies, and military expenditures.
Sun-zi declared that all warfare is based on deception. Thus not only the value of life is disregarded but truthfulness as well. Calculations are made to assure that victory over the enemy is achieved. Sun-zi was extremely clever and observant of ways to take advantage of the enemy's situation. Nonetheless his goal was not to kill the enemy but to break the enemy's resistance without fighting if possible. Taking over the opponent's territory was preferable to destroying them. The general's first aim is to balk the enemy's plans, second to prevent the joining of their forces, third to attack them in the field, and the worst policy is to besiege a walled city. For Sun-zi knowledge of oneself and the enemy is what leads to victory. To know oneself and be ignorant of the enemy will result in defeats as well as victories, and to be ignorant of both will surely end in disaster. Spies were recommended to gain knowledge of the enemy's situation and plans.
Sun-zi said that the enlightened ruler plans ahead, and a good general cultivates his resources, controls his soldiers with authority, brings them together by good faith, and makes them useful with rewards. He clearly recommended careful discretion as well as valor in the following admonitions:
Move not unless you see an advantage;
use not your troops unless there is something to be gained;
fight not unless the position is critical.
No ruler should put troops into the field
merely to gratify his own spleen;
no general should fight a battle simply out of pique.
Anger may in time change to gladness;
vexation may be succeeded by content.
But a kingdom that has once been destroyed
can never come again into being;
nor can the dead ever be brought back to life.
Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful,
and the good general full of caution.
This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact.16
Thus Sun-zi offered intelligent advice for military commanders, but he never questioned the ethics of a system that uses violence and deceit to take advantage of other people's weaknesses. In 506 BC Wu invaded Chu, occupying its capital at Ying. The state of Wu was overlord to Yue in 494 BC and became the greatest military power in China by 482 BC and had connected the Yangzi to southern Shandong by canal; but merely nine years later they were destroyed and annexed by Yue, which became protector in 470 BC but was eventually taken over by Chu in 334 BC.
Period of Warring States
Our knowledge of the quarter of a millennium ending in 221 BC with the founding of the Qin empire comes mostly from the Chan Guo Ce (Intrigues of the Warring States) and Sima Qian's Shi Ji, which contains the earliest biographies. During this period wars became larger and worse as iron and even steel were used as weapons, and millions of peasants as infantry. The powerful crossbow cocked with the feet became the weapon of choice in the fifth century BC, and in the next century cavalry replaced chariots. Iron also enhanced industry and agriculture, and large irrigation projects led to increased population and the building of great cities.
Ministers could enhance their power and influence by recommending and winning wars with other states. These officials often went from one state to another and used their ability to persuade rulers to gain high offices. Powerful families struggled for power, as in Jin where all but four were eliminated from contention. The most powerful family was then destroyed by the cooperation of the Zhao, Wei, and Han, who established states in 453 BC recognized by the Zhou King fifty years later. The last remnant of the Duke of Jin's territory was divided by these three states in 376 BC. In the far north the state of Yen developed.
Another man who wrote a book on the art of war was Wu Qi. He was a native of Wei and loved to command troops. When Qi attacked Lu in 408 BC, Lu wanted to make him their general; but they distrusted him, because Wu's wife was from Qi. However, the ambitious Wu Qi killed his wife to become Lu's general in their attack on Qi. He was also accused of killing more than thirty of those who ridiculed him in Wei. Later Wu Qi was appointed by Marquis Wen of Wei as general to attack Qin, even though he was greedy and lecherous, because he could command troops better than anyone. He ingratiated himself with the next Marquis of Wei by arguing that virtue is the treasure of the state. When suspicions rose against him, Wu Qi left Wei again and became prime minister of Chu, where he strengthened the army and criticized the traveling rhetoricians, who tried to persuade rulers to join alliances and counter-alliances. Wu Qi helped Chu overcome the southern tribes, annex two small states, fend off the three Jin states in the north, and attacked Qin in the west. However, the nobles' resentment was so great against him that when King Dao died, they revolted and attacked Wu Qi, who laid across the corpse of the king and was killed. When the heir succeeded, all those who had hit the king's body while shooting at Wu Qi were executed, wiping out seventy families.
Wey Yang (known as the Lord of Shang or Shang Yang) was recommended by the ailing prime minister of Wei to succeed him, but King Hui of Wei did not take this advice nor the advice that he should kill Yang if he did not make him prime minister. Wey Yang went to Qin and persuaded Duke Xiao to institute new ordinances in 359 BC. People were organized into groups of fives and tens to control one another by being responsible for reporting each other's crimes. Those who denounced culprits were given the same rewards as those who decapitated an enemy, and those who did not denounce a criminal received the same punishment as the criminal. Titles and honors were ranged in a detailed hierarchy. Agriculture and the military were emphasized to the exclusion of all other professions.
These laws were not effective until they mutilated the heir's tutor and tattooed his preceptor for the crimes of the crown prince, who himself had his nose sliced off a few years later for another crime. Those who criticized the new laws were threatened with banishment. Strict laws and the increased taxation of strong government enhanced the wealth and power of the Qin state. After Wei was weakened by an attack from Qi, Qin took advantage and attacked Wei in 340 BC. Wey Yang invited Wei's Prince Ang to discuss peace but betrayed Wei by capturing the prince, causing Wei's King Hui to regret he had not taken his old prime minister's advice to kill Wey Yang. Losing western territory to Qin, Wei had to move their capital east to Da Liang.
Yang was enfeoffed with fifteen cities and named Lord Shang, but after ten years as prime minister of Qin the rancor against him had grown. According to the historian Sima Qian, Zhao Liang advised him to turn inward and control himself. Zhao Liang criticized Shang Yang for neglecting the hundred families, building promulgation towers, and crippling people with savage punishments. The Lord of Shang could not even go out without a strong armed guard. Zhao Liang suggested he return the fifteen cities, tend gardens, and recommended the king exalt men of the mountains, nourish the aged, preserve the orphans, respect the elderly, promote the meritorious, and honor the virtuous. Shang Yang did not heed this advice. When Duke Xiao died, he had to flee the successor's orders for his arrest. Shang Yang went to Wei, but they considered him a traitor and a criminal and forced him back into Qin, where in 338 BC he was killed and torn apart by chariots as a warning to rebels.
The historian Ban Gu (32-92 CE) wrote that Shang Yang destroyed the well-field system of sharing land; with private ownership of land commoners who became wealthy were able to encroach on the land of the peasants. The Legalist philosopher Han Fei-zi admired Shang Yang for emphasizing rewards and punishments, and he mentioned Shen Buhai for using methods of governing with responsible officers by matching actualities with their names or concepts.
Shen Buhai served Marquis Zhao of Han as prime minister for at least fifteen years until he died in 337 BC. Sima Qian wrote that during this time the state was well run, the troops were strong, and no one encroached on Han (not an easy accomplishment in a weak state during this period). Shen Buhai worked to regulate and instruct the people by using methods and techniques that awarded offices according to the abilities of individuals and the responsibilities of the positions. He was one of the first to emphasize the clarification of language so that actions matched words and concepts.
Although often lumped together with the legalists because of his development of the bureaucratic system, Shen Buhai was really more influenced by Daoist ideas than by the policies of Shang Yang. The ruler is to practice complete acquiescence so that his only concerns are for the people; he does not act himself (wu-wei), but lets the ministers perform their designated functions according to technique rather than theory. Nevertheless the intelligent ruler does have discriminating laws and methods according to definite principles, though he dims his luster while peacefully ordering the world with correct words. Bad rulers try to do things themselves, use perverted words, and thus cause disorder. The wise ruler is careful not to give too many commands but relies on the methods and techniques of well-placed and trained officers. Shen said,
If the ruler's intelligence is displayed, men will prepare against it;
if his lack of intelligence is displayed, they will delude him.
If his wisdom is displayed, men will gloss over him;
if his lack of wisdom is displayed, they will hide from him.
If his lack of desires is displayed, men will spy them out;
if his desires are displayed, they will tempt him.
Therefore he says, 'I cannot know them;
only non-action can control them.'"17
Every official is responsible for good order. If the ruler takes too much initiative, the ministers will refrain from criticizing in order to keep their positions; they will curry favor and cease to be the eyes and ears and mind for the ruler. When the ruler tries to use his own limited eyes, ears, and mind alone, the state is doomed. A better way is to cultivate technique and practice supervision. A quiet mind waits for the right time and then responds. Pure, impartial, and simple, one can set everything straight. The one who does not take initiative has collaborators, and the one who does not go first has followers. Acquiescence is the ruler's technique; action is the method of the minister. Therefore whoever sees independently has clear vision; whoever hears independently has sharp hearing; and whoever can reach decisions independently is able to rule the whole world.
Han's Marquis Zhao complained to Shen-zi that his method is difficult to use. Shen-zi replied that his method is to scrutinize achievement and give rewards and to bestow office based on ability; but the ruler was finding it difficult, because he listened to the requests of courtiers. Later Shen-zi requested that his cousin be appointed to an office. The Marquis responded by asking whether he should violate his doctrine or use technique and reject his petition. Shen-zi went home and asked to be punished. Yet Shen-zi's book says that a ruler should use technique instead of punishment by persuading, supervising and holding subordinates strictly responsible. Another incident also indicates that Shen Buhai may not have practiced what he preached, because he waited to advise his ruler until he knew what would please him rather than using independent thinking.
Su Qin grew up in Luoyang of eastern Zhou, but King Xien's courtiers did not trust him. So Su Qin went to advise Hui, who was proclaimed king of Qin in 325 BC. Having executed Shang Yang, he did not like rhetoricians. Su Qin was also unsuccessful in Zhao but went on to Yen, where he convinced their ruler he must ally himself with Zhao against Qin. The Marquis of Yen sent Su Qin to Zhao loaded with gifts, and there he persuaded the Marquis of Zhao that he must also be allied against the powerful Qin with the other five states. Then Su Qin got King Xuan of Han, King Xiang of Wei, the king of Qi, and the king of Chu all to join the alliance against Qin. Thus Su Qin became the master of the alliance of six states and served as prime minister for all of them. Wealthy and successful Su Qin paid back all his previous debts and returned to Zhao, where he was enfeoffed.
According to the historian the soldiers of Qin did not dare to come out of the Hangu Pass for fifteen years, though scholars doubt this; but then Qin got Qi and Wei to attack Zhao. Su Qin fled to Yen, and all the alliances collapsed. Qi took advantage of the death of Yen's ruler by attacking them. So Su Qin went to the king of Qi and convinced him to give ten cities back to Yen and make peace with Qin as well. Su Qin returned to Yen, overcame the slanders of the Yen courtiers, and became the lover of the king's mother, which pleased the king. Yet Su Qin feared punishment and fled to Qi, where he was attacked by an assassin who escaped. While dying, Su Qin told the king to tear apart his dead body in the marketplace as a warning, and this led to the capture and execution of the assassin.
When Su Qin's machinations were uncovered, Qi was furious with Yen while Yen was terrified of Qi. Su Qin's younger brothers, Su Dai and Su Li took over their brother's diplomatic work. Su Dai advised the king of Yen, the weakest of the states, to send hostages with Su Dai to Qi, but strife broke out in Yen; Qi attacked them and killed the Yen king and new prime minister. The brothers were afraid to enter Yen and were treated well in Qi, but Dai was then sent to Song, which was attacked by Qi. Dai wrote a letter to Yen king Zhao, who welcomed him and planned an expedition against Qi. Though Qi had taken Song in 286 BC, they were driven out of their own capital by Yen in 284 BC. Qin summoned the king of Yen; but Su Dai advised him not to go, because achievements made states mortal enemies of the tyrannical Qin, which had recently killed hundreds of thousands in the three Jin states of Zhao, Wei and Han. Thus King Zhao of Yen did not go to Qin, and Su Dai was exalted and sent to form alliances with the feudal lords as his brother Su Qin had done. Some joined the alliance and others did not, but Su Dai and Li Su both died of old age renowned among the feudal lords.
Zhang Yi of Wei studied with the same teacher as Su Qin. In Chu Zhang Yi was accused of stealing a jade disk and beaten. Zhang Yi went to Zhao to see Su Qin but was rejected and ended up in Qin, which was what Su Qin intended. Zhang Yi was made prime minister of Qin in 328 BC and five years later served Wei as prime minister on behalf of Qin. When the king of Wei died, the new king Ai would not listen to Zhang Yi; so he secretly had Qin attack Wei. In defeating Han's army Qin cut off 80,000 heads. Surrounded by dangerous states, Zhang Yi now persuaded King Ai of Wei to ally himself with powerful Qin.
Zhang Yi returned to Qin in 317 BC to become their prime minister once more. Three years later Wei abandoned Qin for new alliances but was attacked by Qin and served Qin again. Qin wanted to attack Qi, but Qi had allied itself with Chu. So Zhang Yi went to Chu to become their prime minister, offering King Huai of Chu territory and a daughter of Qin for an alliance, but meanwhile Qi submitted to Qin. When the suspicious king of Chu attacked Qin, Qi helped Qin defeat Chu and cut off 80,000 heads. Qin demanded territory from Chu, and the Chu king requested Zhang Yi, whom he imprisoned. The queen of Chu pleaded for Zhang Yi, and King Huai released him and was persuaded by Zhang Yi to ally himself with Qin.
Then Zhang Yi went to Han and convinced their king that with only 300,000 troops compared to more than a million in Qin, Han should ally itself with Qin and attack Chu. Zhang Yi returned to Qin, where he was made a lord of five towns before being sent off to the king of Qi, whom he persuaded to join Qin. He then succeeded in getting the kings of Zhao and Yen to serve Qin also. However, while Zhang Yi was returning to Qin, King Hui died and was replaced by King Wu, who disliked Zhang Yi. News of this caused all these states to renounce their alliance with Qin and return to their alliance with each other. Zhang Yi ended up as prime minister of Wei, where he died. The historian Sima Qian concluded that Su Qin and Zhang Yi were "truly men capable of ruining a country."18
As Qin's power increased, so did schemes and treacheries. In 293 BC Qin attacked Han and Wei and cut off 240,000 heads, and the next year they took two cities from Chu. In 288 BC King Zhao of Qin pronounced himself Western Emperor while the King of Qi declared himself Eastern Emperor, but the bloody wars still occurred frequently. During this time four war lords arose who slowed the expansion of Qin.
The Lord of Mengchang's father was a wealthy general in Qi. The son showed his ability by treating retainers better than his father had. He was invited to Qin, but Su Dai warned him not to go. Nevertheless King Min of Qi sent the Lord of Mengchang to Qin on a mission, and King Zhao invited him to become prime minister of Qin. Advisors to King Zhao made him suspicious that the Lord of Mengchang would favor Qi, and so he was imprisoned; but he escaped. When he got back to Qi, King Min made him prime minister. The man who was to collect the Lord of Mengchang's income for him gave it to a worthy man and was demoted; but later when Mengchang was suspected of revolting, the worthy man offered himself as a guarantee and cut his throat in front of the palace. This stimulated King Min to investigate the case and clear Mengchang, who decided to retire in Xueh. Su Dai made Mengchang jealous of the new prime minister Lu Li so that Mengchang wrote a letter to the prime minister of Qin encouraging him to attack Qi. This led to Lu Li fleeing. After King Min destroyed Song in 286 BC, he wanted to remove the Lord of Mengchang, who fled to Wei, where he became prime minister, allied with Qin and Zhao and with Yen attacked and defeated Qi, causing King Min to flee.
The Lord of Mengchang was now independent of the feudal lords and allied himself with the new King Xiang of Qi. When Mengchang was prime minister of Qi and there was no harvest, he sent Feng Huan to collect his interest payments so that he could provide for his many retainers. Feng Huan wisely feasted the debtors while he determined who could pay and who could not. Those who could afford it had to pay by a certain date, but Feng Huan burned the tallies (contracts on wood) of the other debtors. Nevertheless the negative consequences of Mengchang and his retainers were still felt generations later when the historian Sima Qian observed that the people in Xueh were hot-tempered and violent. They explained, "The Lord of Mengchang attracted the families of perhaps sixty thousand highwaymen and criminals to Xue."19 Such was the legacy of this war lord.
Zhao's Lord of Pingyuan caused the loss of 400,000 soldiers in a decisive battle with Qin at Changping in 260 BC. In spite of the efforts of the Lord of Xinling (called the Noble Scion of Wei by Sima Qian), Wei was also eventually defeated by Qin. The fourth war lord to succumb to the power of Qin was the Lord of Chunshen in the state of Chu. In 256 BC Qin attacked Han and killed 40,000, then attacked Zhao and beheaded or captured 90,000. The Zhou sovereign joined with feudal rulers to attack Qin; but when Qin attacked Zhou, its ruler submitted and surrendered its entire territory of 36 cities and 30,000 inhabitants. The next year the Zhou people fled to the east, and the nine sacred vessels passed into the hands of Qin in 149 BC, marking the final disappearance of the Zhou dynasty that had been only a figurehead for several centuries.
Li Si of Chu studied the art of government with the Confucian philosopher Xun-zi before going to Qin and advising Zheng, who became king of Qin in 246 BC. Li Si suggested that the house of Zhou had been declining for a century while Qin's power had increased; this king could unify the world. King Zheng secretly sent men out with gifts to the feudal lords who could be bribed and swords to kill those who were not. When the Qin clansmen wanted the king to expel all foreigners from his court, Li Si (a foreigner from Chu himself) persuaded him that foreigners have much to offer. Li Si rose from Chief of Scribes to Commandant of Justice and succeeded as Prime Minister the wealthy merchant Lu Buwei in 237 BC. In a decade the armies of Qin successively destroyed the six states of Han (in 230 BC), Zhao (228), Wei (225), Chu (223), Yen (222), and Qi (221) to establish the Qin king Zheng as August Emperor (Huang Di) of China. The period of warring states had been ended by the formation of a tyrannical military empire.
Qin Empire 221-206 BC
Confucius, Mencius and Xun-zi
Notes
1. I Ching tr. Wilhelm and Baynes, p. 262.
2. Ibid. p. 317.
3. The Book of Songs (Shih Ching) tr. Arthur Waley, p. 61.
4. Ibid., p. 68.
5. Ibid. p. 118-119.
6. I Li tr. John Steele, 5:9.
7. Shu Ching tr. James Legge, 2:3:2, p. 52.
8. Ibid. 5:21:3, p. 233-234.
9. The Grand Scribe's Records (Shih Chi): Memoirs of Pre-Han China by Ssu-ma Ch'ien, tr. Tsai-fa Cheng et al, 62, p. 11-12.
10. Ibid. p. 13.
11. Chun Ts'ew, with the Tso Chuen tr. James Legge, 9:27:2, p. 534.
12. Ibid.
13. The Tso Chuan tr. Burton Watson, 9:29:8, p. 151.
14. Ibid. 9:31:6, p. 161.
15. Ibid. 10:12:9, p. 167.
16. The Art of War by Sun Tzu, tr. Giles and Clavell, 12, p. 76.
17. Shen Pu-hai by Herrlee G. Creel, fragment 16, p. 365.
18. Shi Chi by Sima Qian, tr. Burton Watson, 70, p. 142.
19. Ibid. 75, p. 200.
Copyright © 1998-2005 by Sanderson Beck
This chapter has been published in the book CHINA, KOREA & JAPAN to 1800. For ordering information please click here.
Contents
Shang, Zhou and the Classics
Confucius, Mencius and Xun-zi
Daoism and Mo-zi
Legalism, Qin Empire and Han Dynasty
China 7 BC to 1279
Mongols and Yuan China
Ming Empire 1368-1644
Qing Empire 1644-1799
Korea to 1800
Japan to 1615
Japan 1615-1800
Summary and Evaluation
Bibliography
Qing Decline 1799-1875
Qing Dynasty Fall 1875-1912
Republican China in Turmoil 1912-1926
Nationalist-Communist Civil War 1927-1937
China at War 1937-1949
Korea 1800-1949
Japan's Modernization 1800-1894
Imperial Japan 1894-1937
Japan's War and Defeat 1937-1949
Chronological Index
BECK index
