Legalism, Qin Empire and Han Dynasty
Guan-zi
Book of Lord Shang
Han Fei-zi
Qin Empire 221-206 BC
Founding the Han Dynasty 206-141 BC
Wu Di's Reign 141-87 BC
Confucian China 87-30 BC
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Daoism and Mo-zi
We have seen how Chinese politics became more corrupt, cynical, and violent in the Spring and Autumn era and especially in the Period of Warring States. While many philosophers of the schools of Confucius and Mo-zi called for ethical reforms and Daoists let nature take its course or retreated into seclusion, others experimented with stricter laws and practical administration. One of the first of these was Guan Zhong, who advised Duke Huan of Qi in the early 7th century BC. His life and the fourth-century administrative reforms of the realists Shang Yang and Shen Buhai were discussed in Chapter 13 on the Zhou dynasty.
Guan-zi
About 302 BC King Xuan of Qi founded a scholarly academy known as Chi-Xia. An influential book named after Guan Zhong called the Guan-zi was probably written around the middle of the third century BC, supplemented over time, and edited into its final version by about 26 BC. Though still often recommending the same virtues the Confucians emphasized, this work is considered a forerunner of Legalism because of its practical political philosophy.
In the Guan-zi agriculture and wealth are considered the basis of good behavior. The spirits and ancestors are to be venerated, and the four cardinal virtues are propriety, justice, integrity, and conscience. Successful government depends on following the hearts of the people. If the ruler can provide the people with prosperity and leisure, they will make sacrifices for their state. Punishment alone is not sufficient, because if it becomes excessive, orders will not be carried out. Trusting those with virtue puts the state on a firm foundation. Cultivating grain, mulberry, hemp, and domestic animals supplies the storehouses. Employing those with skill, giving orders that accord with the will of the people, using stern punishments and consistent rewards, and not cheating the people lead to good government. Those who govern should be impartial like heaven and earth, the sun and the moon. Walls and armed forces are not enough to meet the enemy, and vast territory and abundant wealth will not hold the masses, unless the way is followed.
These scholars recommended that anyone who would question the present should investigate the past, and one can understand what is to come by studying what has gone before. To control the state one must be careful how one uses the people. The sovereign can instruct the people with wisdom and propriety but must also set an example and see that expenditures are proper while excesses are avoided. Laws establish the authority of the government and make use of the people's strength and ability. Serious attention must be paid to the granting of offices, their rewards, and to punishments. Collective responsibility for crime extends from the members to the head of the family, from them to group leaders, then to clan elders, the village commandant, subdistrict prefects, the district governor, and finally to the chief justice. Rewards were similarly applied, giving authority figures strong incentives to influence those under them.
The Guan-zi criticized such Moist ideas as abolishing the use of arms and universal love out of fear that the troops would not fight. The art of warfare is discussed, commending speed, lightness of equipment, well organized troops, destruction of enemy fields, well paid spies, and prohibition of unorthodox doctrines. As usual, military morality violates universal ethical principles. Yet in the model guidelines the prince is urged to conform to the will of heaven in initiating affairs of state. This is interpreted as not bestowing favors on those close to him nor disdaining those far away. The prince is warned not to reward just because he is pleased nor to kill because he is angry; for if his orders are capricious, they will not be carried out, and the people will turn to outsiders. Pragmatically this work suggests examining the results when promoting what one thinks is good and counting the cost when one rejects what one dislikes. The prince should encourage those he respects, provide salaries for those with merit, and honor those who achieve success. Here spreading universal love is considered spreading the princely mind.
The people can be influenced in a moral way by caring for them with kindness, humanity, justice, goodness, faithfulness, and propriety. They can be harmonized with music, limited with time, tested with words, sent forth with strength, and overawed with sincerity. However, one who is incompetent in government has barren fields, empty towns, offices in disarray, laws ignored, empty granaries, and full jails. The worthy withdraw, while the wicked advance; officials esteem flattery and look down on honesty. Citizens honor profit-seeking and despise martial courage; they love drinking and eating but abhor agricultural labor. The result will be exhaustion of fiscal resources and lack of food. Such a ruler is extremely severe and demanding, while the officials are disobedient and destructive, resulting in discord.
Benevolent government opens up fields, regulates shops, cultivates horticulture, exhorts the citizenry, encourages farming, repairs the walls and buildings, and circulates wealth by developing hidden resources, building roads, making markets convenient, and providing travel lodgings. Government is liberalized by easing exactions, lightening levies, relaxing punishments, pardoning crimes, and forgiving minor errors. The people are assisted by being compassionate to orphans, the widowed, the sick, and the unfortunate. They are further aided in distress by clothing the freezing, feeding the starving, assisting the poor, and comforting the upset. Benevolent government can then lead to just conduct and propriety, resulting in respect.
Heaven serves with its seasons, earth with its natural resources, spirits with their omens, and animals with their strength; but humans serve with their virtue. The Guan-zi notes that nothing destroys goods, impoverishes the people, endangers the country, or causes the ruler concern more than the armed forces; but from the ancient times no one has been able to dispense with them. Violent and reckless princes cannot avoid external disorders, but weak and irresolute princes cannot avoid internal disorders. Finally Guan-zi advises us that the enlightened kings governed by being cautious and making the people happy.
The best thing is to criticize oneself.
Then the people will not have to criticize.
The people will criticize those who are unable to criticize themselves.
Therefore, being able to judge one's own mistakes represents strength.
Cultivating one's moral integrity represents wisdom.
Not blaming evil on others represents goodness.
Therefore, when the enlightened kings made mistakes,
they took the blame themselves.
When they did well, they gave credit to the people.
When there are mistakes and one takes the blame oneself,
one becomes cautious.
When things are done well and credit is given to the people,
they are happy.1
Book of Lord Shang
At the same time the book named after Guan Zhong was circulating in the third century, there was another legalist tract going around attributed to the fourth-century chancellor of Qin, Shang Yang, called the Book of Lord Shang. It begins with a discussion led by Duke Xiao with three great officers on the world's affairs. The Duke wants to alter the laws but is afraid of being criticized by the people. Believing that the people's thoughts do not matter at the beginning, but they may rejoice in the completion, Shang Yang says, "The law is an expression of love for the people."2 He believes the wise do not model themselves on antiquity nor adhere to established rites if they can benefit the people. The wise create laws, but the foolish are controlled by them. The great emperors and kings of the past did not copy one another but acted according to practical requirements. Thus according to Shang Yang's advice, the Duke decided to bring the waste lands under cultivation.
In order to strengthen the country Shang Yang believed that everyone's efforts should be devoted to agriculture and war. A strict legalist, Shang Yang's book is definitely anti-Confucian, as seen by the beginning of the section on "Discussion About the People."
Sophistry and cleverness are an aid to lawlessness;
rites and music are symptoms of dissipations and license;
kindness and benevolence are the foster-mother of transgressions;
employment and promotion are opportunities
for the rapacity of the wicked.3
These eight things would make the people stronger than the government and the state weak. Shang Yang wanted the government to be stronger than the people so that the army will be strong, and the state can attain supremacy. If the officials are virtuous, the people will love their relatives; but if officials are wicked, people will love the statutes and spy on others so that crimes will be punished. Thus this book actually argues against virtue and the strength of the people but for a strong government and army. The poor should be urged to work by rewards, and the rich should be punished so that they will not be parasites. Private rewards to those below should be forbidden so that the people will fight forcibly against the enemy.
In the best ordered state the laws are clear, and the judgments are made by the families; in a merely strong state judgments are made by the officials; and in a weak and disordered state judgments are made by the prince. Shang Yang's book recommends statistical methods in cultivating the grass lands and making uniform rewards for soldiers. Orderly government is to be brought about by law, good faith, and correct standards. When rights and duties are clearly established by law, self-interest will not do harm.
The Book of Lord Shang criticizes contemporary states that are disorderly because of private benefits going to those in office. Bad ministers let their standards be influenced by money in order to obtain emoluments. When the ministers compete with each other in selfishness and neglect the people, inferiors are estranged from superiors, dividing the state. States are in disorder, because the law is not applied. Crimes are committed, because their perpetrators are not caught. This book argues that if punishments are too light, crime cannot be eradicated; but when punishments are heavy, people will not dare to do wrong. Then everyone will be virtuous without rewarding the virtuous. Rewarding the virtuous is not permissible, because it is like giving rewards for not stealing. The good may be good toward others but cannot cause others to be good; they may love others but cannot cause others to love. Thus goodness is not sufficient for governing the empire. The wise insist on good faith and have a method (law) by which the whole empire can be compelled to have good faith. Thus when law is correctly administered, the result will be virtue.
The legalist argues that if a condition can be brought about where there is no other standard than the law, then the clever will be unable to do wrong. If people are controlled by law and if promotions are awarded by following systematic rules, then they will not be able to benefit each other with praise nor harm each other with slander. Then they will become accustomed to loving each other without flattery and hating each other without injuring each other, thus purifying love and hatred and producing the highest degree of order. Some of these principles of law are commendable, in my opinion, but the accompanying ideas of control by harsh punishments and that people should not be allowed to exert their capabilities in anything other than farming or war are abominable.
Han Fei-zi
Unlike the other great Chinese philosophers of this era (Lao-zi, Confucius, Mo-zi, Mencius, Zhuang-zi, and Xun-zi) who were impoverished noblemen, Han Fei-zi was a prince of the royal family in the state of Han. He was born around 280 BC and studied under the Confucian realist Xun-zi at the Chi-Xia academy along with Li Si, who considered Han the better student, according to Sima Qian's biography. Since he was not a good speaker, Han Fei submitted his writings to the rulers of Han. The king of Han, however, did not apply them; but Han Fei continued to complain that ambitious scholars and militarists were given prominence over honest gentlemen.
Eventually the writings of Han Fei came to the attention of the young king of Qin, who began ruling in 246 BC and went on to become the founding Emperor of the Qin dynasty, Shi Huang Di. His prime minister was Han Fei's old friend Li Si, who informed his sovereign these writings were Han Fei's. In 234 BC Qin attacked the state of Han, and their king An sent Han Fei as his envoy to Qin. The king of Qin was delighted to meet the philosopher, but Li Si warned the king that Han Fei was of the royal family of Han and likely to remain loyal to that state and therefore be against Qin. Charges were brought against Han Fei, who wanted to plead his case before the king, but he was not allowed an audience.
So Han Fei sent a written memorial in which he acknowledged the perpendicular alliance formed from a north-south line of countries against the western power of Qin; but he argued that they were weak and likely to run away in a confrontation, because they have no faith in rewards and punishments. In contrast the people of Qin respect courageous death, and it is a much more powerful country. Nevertheless Qin has not yet gained hegemony, because its counselors are not loyal. Han Fei suggested that Qin could conquer the powerful Chu in the south and Qi and Yan in the east as well as the three states of Zhao, Han, and Wei, which had formed out of Jin. He recounted several times in history when Qin lost its opportunity to gain this hegemony. Han Fei declared that if his advice was followed and Qin did not gain hegemony, then the king could behead him as a warning to others.
In another memorial Han Fei urged the king of Qin to treat Han as a loyal ally rather than an enemy so that the perpendicular alliance would not be mobilized against him. However, Li Si argued against this theory to the king and sent poison to Han Fei in prison. Han Fei, unable to communicate with the king, drank it and died in 233 BC. Although the king regretted his decision and pardoned Han Fei, it was too late.
Han Fei-zi is the main representative of the school of philosophy called Fa-jia, the legalists or realists. He drew the concept of law (fa) from the Book of Lord Shang and the idea of administration (shu) from the writings of Shen Buhai. From the logicians he borrowed the theory of forms and names (xing-ming), which he applied to politics as the correspondence between administrators' words and job descriptions and their actual functioning in practice.
Han Fei-zi was also very much influenced by Daoism, making a strange combination of legalistic authoritarianism and passive acceptance. His essay on the "Way of the Ruler" shows this relationship. It begins,
The way is the beginning of all beings
and the measure of right and wrong.
Therefore the enlightened ruler holds fast to the beginning
in order to understand the wellspring of all beings,
and minds the measure
in order to know the source of good and bad.
He waits, empty and still, letting names define themselves
and affairs reach their own settlement.
Being empty, he can comprehend the true aspect of fullness;
being still, he can correct the mover.
Those whose duty it is to speak
will come forward to name themselves;
those whose duty it is to act will produce results.
When names and realities match,
the ruler need do nothing more
and the true aspect of all things will be revealed.
Hence it is said: The ruler must not reveal his desires;
for if he reveals his desires
his ministers will put on the mask that pleases him.4
Han Fei-zi did not want the ruler to be manipulated by his ministers, which is why he advised the sovereign not to reveal his will or express his likes and dislikes. The wise ruler does not expose his wisdom but has everyone know their place, does not display his worth but observes the motives of the ministers, and does not flaunt bravery in shows of indignation but allows subordinates to demonstrate their valor. The officials have their regular duties, and each is employed according to specific ability. The ruler practices inaction, but the ministers below tremble in fear. The inferior ruler uses his own ability; the average ruler uses the people's strength; and the best ruler uses the people's wisdom.
The ruler takes credit for accomplishments but holds ministers responsible for their errors. The ministers labor and display wisdom, but the ruler is their corrector and maintains an untarnished reputation. The ruler should know but not let it be known that he knows. Each person's words are to be compared with their results. Officials should not know what others are doing. No one must be allowed to covet his power in this authoritarian regime. The ruler uses the two handles of rewards and punishments to control others and examines results to see how they match his objectives. The ruler is to be immeasurably great and unfathomably deep, while any attempt of ministers to form cliques is to be smashed.
Thus ministers should not be allowed to shut out the ruler nor control the wealth of the state nor issue their own orders nor do good deeds in their own name nor build up cliques so that the ruler will not lose effectiveness, the means of dispensing bounties and command, his reputation for enlightenment, and his support. The way of the ruler is to observe calmly what others say and do without speaking or doing himself. He notes proposals and examines their results. He assigns tasks to ministers according to what they say and the accomplishments that result. Those whose deeds match their words are rewarded; when things do not match, they are punished. These rewards and punishments must be dispensed objectively so that even those close to the ruler may be punished and those far away can be sure of reward. Thus all will have to make effort, and none can be too proud.
Nevertheless for Han Fei-zi what transcends even the ruler is the law. "On Having Standards" explains that an enlightened ruler uses the law to select officials by weighing their merits without attempting to judge them himself. True worth will not remain hidden, and faults will not be glossed over. Praise will not help some advance, nor will calumny drive others from the court. Ministers are to be like the hands and feet of the ruler, not presuming to use their mouths to speak for private advantage or their eyes to look for private gain. Even the ruler must never use wise ministers and able servants for selfish ends so that the government can be consistent and good.
Han Fei-zi disdained those who leave their posts to search for another sovereign, controvert the law with false doctrines, censure their sovereign, try to gain a name for themselves by doling out charity, or even those who withdraw from the world and criticize their superiors or seek favorable relations with other states in order to make themselves indispensable in a crisis. If the ruler tries to monitor the government with his own eyes, ears, and mind, he can be manipulated by what is presented to him. Thus the ancient kings relied on law and policy to make sure that rewards and punishments were correctly implemented. Then even clever speakers could not deceive them. Authority and power should never be in more than one place or else abuse will become rife. If law is not respected, all the ruler's actions will be endangered. If penalties are not enforced, evil cannot be overcome. Even the highest minister must not be allowed to escape punishment, nor should the lowest peasant's reward be skipped. Thus those in high positions will not abuse the humble. If laws are clearly defined, superiors will be honored, and rights will not be invaded.
Han Fei-zi warned the ruler against eight villainies. Though a ruler may share his bed with beauties, he should not listen to their special pleas. He should hold attendants personally responsible for their words and not allow them to speak out of turn. He should not allow kin and elder statesmen to escape appropriate punishment nor advance them arbitrarily. Buildings may be constructed to delight the ruler, but officials should not be allowed to use them to ingratiate themselves. Orders for doling out charity in time of need must never come from ministers but from the ruler. The true abilities of those who are flattered must be determined, likewise the faults of those who are denounced. Military heroes should not be given unduly large rewards, and those who take up arms in a private quarrel must never be pardoned. Officials must not be allowed to have their own soldiers, and requests of feudal lords should be granted if they are lawful, but rejected if they are not.
In the essay "Ten Faults" Han Fei-zi listed them briefly and then gives numerous historical examples of each one. The list is as follows:
1. To practice petty loyalty and thereby betray a larger loyalty.
2. To fix your eye on a petty gain and thereby lose a larger one.
3. To behave in a base and willful manner and show no courtesy to the other feudal lords, thereby bringing about your own downfall.
4. To give no ear to government affairs but long only for the sound of music, thereby plunging yourself into distress.
5. To be greedy, perverse, and too fond of profit, thereby opening the way to the destruction of the state and your own demise.
6. To become infatuated with women musicians and disregard state affairs, thereby inviting the disaster of national destruction.
7. To leave the palace for distant travels, despising the remonstrances of your ministers, which leads to grave peril for yourself.
8. To fail to heed your loyal ministers when you are at fault, insisting upon having your own way, which will in time destroy your good reputation and make you a laughing stock of others.
9. To take no account of internal strength but rely solely upon your allies abroad, which places the state in grave danger of dismemberment.
10. To insult big powers even though your state is small, and fail to learn from the remonstrances of your ministers, acts which lead to the downfall of your line.5
Han Fei-zi also wrote on the difficulties of persuading a ruler. This requires more than general knowledge and the ability to express oneself well. The most difficult part is to know the mind of the person one is trying to persuade so that fitting words can be used. One does not talk about profit to one who is seeking a reputation for virtue; and if one is talking to someone who wants profit, it is useless to talk about virtue. If the person secretly wants gain but claims to be virtuous, and you talk about virtue, he will pretend to listen but ignore you. If you talk about profit, he will appear to reject your advice but secretly follow it. Han Fei-zi also discussed many other complicated situations, many of them quite dangerous for the advisor because of the insecurity of the sovereign. He concluded that it is not difficult to know something; the difficulty is in knowing how to use what one knows.
For Han Fei-zi the wise governs by rectifying laws clearly and establishing severe penalties in order to prevent the strong from exploiting the weak and the many from oppressing the few, to enable the old and infirm to die in peace and the young and orphans to grow freely, to make sure frontiers are not invaded, the ruler and minister are on intimate terms, fathers and sons support each other, and people do not worry about being killed in war or taken prisoner. He believed that stupid people want order but dislike the true path to order, which he considered to be the severe penalties, even though they are hated by people. Mercy and pity are welcomed by the people, but Han Fei-zi believed they endanger the state. Although he acknowledged that the legalist who makes laws in the state acts contrary to prevailing public opinion, he nevertheless believed that this is in accord with the way, virtue, and justice.
In "Precautions within the Palace" Han Fei-zi wrote that it is dangerous for the ruler to trust others, for whoever trusts others will be controlled by them. Ministers have no blood bonds with their ruler, and they never stop trying to spy into the sovereign's mind. Thus many rulers are intimidated, and some are even murdered. If the ruler trusts his son or his consort, evil ministers may find ways to use them for their private schemes. The ruler must make sure that no one receives unearned rewards nor oversteps their authority. Death penalties must be executed, and no crime must go unpunished. However, if too much compulsory labor is demanded of people, they will feel afflicted and join local power groups. Local power groups then work to exempt people from labor service which enables their leaders to grow rich on bribes. Thus the ruler should keep labor services minimal so that the power groups will disappear, and all favors will come from the sovereign. Han Fei-zi was afraid that if the ruler lends even a little of his power to others, the superior and inferior will change places. Thus no ministers should be allowed to borrow the power and authority of the ruler.
According to Han Fei-zi the ruler should be so strict that if what a minister says beforehand does not tally with what he says or does later, he must be punished even though he may have fulfilled his task with distinction. This, he believed, will keep the subordinates responsible. Han Fei-zi held that the ruler must be strict enough to put these theories into practice even though it means going against the will of the people. He noted how Lord Shang had to be guarded with iron spears and heavy shields, and eventually the people of Qin tore apart his body with two chariots. When Guan Zhong first instituted his reforms in Qi, Duke Huan had to ride in an armored carriage.
Writing on "Pretensions and Heresies," Han Fei-zi argued that it is the duty of the sovereign to establish the laws and standards of right and distinguish these from private interests. Most ministers want to exalt their private wisdom; but if they condemn the law as wrong, their creeds must be regarded as heresy and suppressed. The ruler must forbid private favors and enforce what is ordered. Yet the private virtue of ministers is to practice personal faith with friends and not be encouraged by reward or discouraged by punishment. This, Han Fei-zi believed, leads to disorder; but where public virtue is practiced, there is order. Though ministers have selfish motives, their public duty is to obey orders and behave unselfishly in office. Thus ministers must use their calculating minds to put aside selfish motives and serve the ruler. The ruler also calculates how to protect the state from injury by private interests and uses rewards and penalties to overawe them.
The commentaries on the teachings of Lao-zi in the Han Fei-zi may have been by his followers in an era when legalism was trying to survive by merging with Daoism. Some of the interpretations become rather absurd, as when compassion is extended to military victory and defense in order to be compassionate to one's soldiers (What about the enemy's?) and even more absurdly to the weapons themselves. What could be more perverted than that?
When Han Fei-zi's sage-king makes laws, the rewards must be enough to encourage the good, and his authority strong enough to subjugate the violent; his preparation must be sufficient to accomplish his task. In this system the good live on and flourish, while the bad fade away and die. If the pronouncements of the sovereign are clear and easy to understand, his promises can be kept. If the laws are easy to be observed, his orders will be effective. If the superiors are not self-seeking, the inferiors will obey the law.
Han Fei-zi also recommended seven tactics to the sovereign and then gave historical examples of how they work. The first is to compare and inspect all available and different theories. Second, punishments must be definite and authority clear. Third, rewards are to be bestowed faithfully, and everyone is to exercise their abilities. Fourth, the ruler should listen to all sides of every story and hold speakers responsible for their words. So far these are clear and straightforward, but the last three use deception and manipulation to enhance the power of the ruler. The fifth is to issue spurious edicts and pretend to make certain appointments. Sixth, one may inquire into cases by manipulating different information, and seventh, words may be inverted and tasks reversed. Ostensibly the purpose of the last three is to help the ruler find out the truth by using indirect methods, but the lack of integrity and damage to credibility certainly makes them questionable for the long term.
Han Fei-zi argued that people can be deterred from even small crimes by serious penalties, and then they will not commit major crimes at all. Thus he hoped that a strong government will not allow any serious crimes. Yet the problem is that criminals are not always caught no matter how vigilant the government may be. He noted that the gold-diggers in the south could not be stopped from stealing gold-dust even though some were caught and stoned to death in the marketplace, and there is no chastisement more severe than that.
Duke Jing once asked a poor man about the prices in the market. Yen-zi replied that ordinary shoes are cheap, but shoes for the footless are expensive. Duke Jing, who had been busy inflicting many punishments (cutting off feet), was embarrassed. Thinking he was too cruel, he abolished five laws of the criminal code. Yet he was criticized by Han Fei-zi, who argued that loosening censure and giving pardons benefit the crooks and injure the good and thus do not lead to political order.
Han Fei-zi did not consider personnel administration easy, but the ruler must regulate officials with rules and measures, and then compare their actions with their words. Projects that are lawful should be carried out; those that are not should be stopped. Results matching proposals should be rewarded; those not producing corresponding results should be punished. Han Fei-zi believed that only about one person out of a hundred would act correctly simply out of virtue, but everyone loves profit and dislikes injury. Thus effective government cannot rely on virtue. He believed that if the punishment for desertion is heavy, no one will run away from the enemy.
Han Fei-zi criticized those who believed that heavy penalties injure the people and are unnecessary, because light penalties can be used. He argued that heavy penalties are more likely to deter than light ones, and therefore they can prevent all crime. I believe the error in his logic is that he incorrectly generalizes that heavy penalties will stop all crimes, which is not the case. He noted that people often trip on ant-hills, but no one stumbles over a mountain. He argued that people will either ignore light penalties or trip on them like traps. This may be true, but may not using heavy penalties like mountains lead to a monstrous society?
Han Fei-zi described five kinds of customs as vermin, which he felt caused a disordered state. Scholars, who praise ancient kings for their virtue, put on a fair appearance but cast doubt on the laws of the time and confuse the ruler. Persuaders present false schemes and borrow influence from abroad to further their private interests but injure the welfare of the state's land and grain. Heroic swordsmen gather bands of followers and violate the government's prohibitions. Courtiers gather in private homes and bribe influential men to get out of military service. Finally, artisans and merchants make and collect useless articles and luxuries, accumulating wealth, cornering markets, and exploiting farmers.
Han Fei-zi pointed out that even the wise Confucius was subordinate to Duke Ai of Lu because of his authority. He realistically argued that the people and even kings are not able to rise to the goodness and justice of a Confucius, who could convince only seventy followers. Rather the enlightened ruler should make punishments certain as well as severe so that people will fear them. Rewards should be generous and consistent so that people will seek them. The best laws are uniform and inflexible so that people understand them. Rewards must not be delayed nor should mercy deflect the administering of punishment. Praise accompanying the reward and censure following the punishment both stimulate people to do their best. The wise ruler takes into consideration the scarcity or plenty of the time. Punishments may need to be light but not because of compassion, while severe penalties are not imposed because the ruler is cruel. Circumstances change, and the ways of dealing with them must also change. Here Han Fei-zi showed some flexibility but still did not waver from his calculated policy.
One method Han Fei-zi recommended for making rewards and punishments more effective was to have people watch each other and be responsible for reporting crimes in their community. By rewarding those who denounce criminals and punishing those who refuse to do so as complicit, he hoped that all kinds of culprits would be detected. However, this innovation, which was actually a regression to primitive times, was implemented by Lord Shang in Qin in the fourth century BC; it was one of the reasons he was so unpopular and led to his death.
Han Fei-zi coldly and calculatingly suggested methods of behavioral modification as political theory under an authoritarian system of monarchy. He brought these to the attention of the leaders in the powerful state of Qin, where he became the first casualty of a policy that allows no one to challenge the authority of the ruler. Next we shall examine what happened when Qin implemented these ideas in its conquest of China.
Qin Empire 221-206 BC
In 221 BC when Qin took over Qi, the last of the other six states, King Zheng's first official act was to declare himself First August Emperor (Shih Huang Di) of what we still call China from the name of his state of Qin. He abolished the traditional practice of having posthumous names assigned by one's successor and expected his successors to be called August Emperor of the second generation and third on down to one thousand and ten thousand generations, but ironically his dynasty was to end about four years after his own death.
According to current cosmology the element water was to succeed the fire of the Zhou dynasty, and so the First Emperor adopted the corresponding characteristics of water such as the color black, the number six, and the harsh punishments of strict laws as indicated by the season winter. For this reason he refused to pardon any crimes. The chancellor suggested that feudal kings be set up in each region as the Zhou dynasty had done, but the commandant of justice, Li Si, argued that the son of heaven had been unable to control feudal rulers. Since the power of the new Emperor had united all the civilized areas between the seas, they should be made into provinces and districts in the usual Qin administration. The Emperor agreed with this, hoping that the unending warfare of the kings and marquises could thus be pacified by his sole rule.
So the empire was divided into 36 provinces, each with a governor, military commandant, and superintendent. Weapons from all over the empire were confiscated and brought to the capital at Xian-yang, where they were melted down and cast into bells and statues of twelve giants weighing 29 tons each. All weights and measures were standardized as was the writing system. According to the historian Sima Qian, 120,000 rich and powerful families from all over the empire were moved to the capital. Replicas of the palaces of the conquered states were reconstructed near Xianyang. Extensive mansions with elevated walks and fenced pavilions were filled with beautiful women and treasure taken from the feudal states.
Broad highways were built and lined with trees. The Emperor traveled and erected stone markers with inscriptions praising his accomplishments and claiming that "all is gauged by law and pattern."6 He exalted agriculture and abolished "lesser occupations." The edicts proclaimed that evil and wrongdoing were no longer permitted; so everyone was to practice goodness and integrity. When the Emperor had difficulty crossing a river because of winds, he ordered 3,000 convict laborers to cut down all the trees on the mountain of the offending goddess. In 218 BC when an attempted assassination failed, he ordered a search of the entire empire for ten days. Further inscriptions claim that he captured the kings of the six states, united all under heaven, ended harm and disaster, and then laid aside his arms for all time; he ordered the whole universe and had established justice, and his honored office holders so understood their duties that everything proceeded without ill feeling or doubt.
The Emperor had local walls and fortifications torn down, waterways improved, and canals built. He claimed that when the land was fixed, the masses were freed from their forced labor; but in fact for ten years an army of 300,000 under General Meng Tian was not only fighting the barbarians in the north but also building the Great Wall to defend the empire. In 214 BC 500,000 men, who had run away from conscription or evaded taxes, were sent to invade Luliang. Convicts were sent to populate newly conquered territories.
One day in 213 BC when the Emperor was entertaining seventy scholars with wine, one of them complained that the sons and brothers of the Emperor were commoners and that if anyone threatened him he would not be able to respond, because the Emperor had gone against the ancient tradition. The Emperor asked for discussion, and the chancellor Li Si replied that the greatest emperors did not imitate each other. He criticized past feudal strife and praised the Emperor's unified rule. Li Si then complained that scholars study antiquity and criticize their own age to mislead and confuse people. This discussion of the Emperor's laws causes problems and should be prohibited. Li Si therefore recommended that all historical records other than Qin's be burned. Anyone other than approved academicians with literature or writings of the philosophers must turn them in to be burned within thirty days or be subjected to tattoo and "wall dawn" labor. Books on medicine, divination, agriculture, and forestry were exempt, apparently because they were considered of practical value; but they could only be studied under the tutelage of a law official. Furthermore anyone who used antiquity to criticize the present was to be executed along with his family.
The next year the Emperor felt his palace at Xianyang was too small; so he ordered the building of an immense palace at Epang that was connected to the Xianyang palace by an elevated walk across the Wei River. 700,000 people condemned to castration and convict labor were called up for this project and to build the Emperor's secret mausoleum at Mount Li, where 30,000 households were transported. All 270 palaces in the Xianyang area were connected by elevated walks and walled roads. Anyone revealing where the Emperor was visiting at the moment was put to death.
Once the Emperor happened to notice the large number of carriages and attendants of the chancellor. A eunuch reported this to Li Si, who reduced the number of his carriages; but the Emperor was so outraged by the leak of information that he had all those eunuchs who attended him that day executed, since none confessed. Two advisors, noting the increasing arrogance of the Emperor and the futility of anyone trying to give him advice on pain of death, fled in secret. This led to an investigation of all the scholars in the capital and the execution of 460. Meanwhile increasing numbers of convicts were being transported to the border regions. When the oldest son Fusu tried to remonstrate with the Emperor, he was sent to supervise the activities of General Meng Tian in the north.