Do-it-yourself is the best 'plan B' for free trade
When gardens are neglected, weeds sprout. The withering of the Doha trade round has led, predictably, to a flourishing crop of alternatives. As well as accelerating the growth of preferential bilateral deals, which frequently generate more political puffery than economic substance, the collapse of the talks has revived interest in grand initiatives spanning entire regions.
One is Japan's big idea of expanding existing plans for an east Asian economic community to include India, Australia and New Zealand. A yet more ambitious proposal, floated by Fred Bergsten, director of the Institute for International Economics in Washington DC, on this page last week, is for a free trade area of the Asia Pacific embracing the 21 members of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation forum.
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Such schemes may excite diplomatic war-gamers. But as trade liberalising tools they are no magic bullets. Mr Bergsten thinks fear of exclusion from a FTAAP would shock Doha laggards out of their inertia. But leaving aside the fact that the Doha talks have foundered partly on US agricultural protectionism, the argument is based on a version of history subscribed to in Washington but nowhere much else.
It holds that the Uruguay round came to closure in 1993 because Apec leaders scared a recalcitrant Europe into resuming negotiation by making a vague, US-inspired call for closer intraregional links. But if Europe was swayed at all it was because it feared the US was preparing to unplug itself from multilateralism - not because it believed a grouping as formless and strife-ridden as Apec could agree on much. The conventional explanation of the Uruguay round's endgame remains the most plausible: Europe's internal agricultural reforms allowed it to offer just enough on farm trade to escape blame for scuppering the talks, while the US settled for a far weaker deal than it had been holding out for.
In similar vein, Washington has claimed more recently that its use of muscular bilateral trade diplomacy will re-energise the multilateral system by unleashing a wave of "competitive liberalisation". The Doha debacle has exposed that theory for what it is. In practice, bilateralism has fed off itself, intensifying the rush into preferential deals while draining energy from the Doha talks, polarising the US Congress and further diminishing its appetite for trade initiatives of all descriptions.
The belief that faster progress can be made in regional groupings than in the World Trade Organisation also defies abundant evidence to the contrary. Apec's dreams of freeing by 2020 trade and investment in the Pacific rim remain dreams. Plans for a free trade area of the Americas are moribund. South America's Mercosur is in trouble, as are its talks on closer links with the European Union. Disputes between the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have dogged their efforts to implement even limited liberalisation. South Asia's plans for a customs union look like a joke, as they exclude trade between India and Pakistan. Regionalism's only big successes are the EU and the North American Free Trade Agreement - and the former is too sui generis to be replicable.
Worthwhile deals demand committed leadership and drive, such as Germany once gave to Europe and the US to Nafta. Those ingredients are missing from other regional schemes, although China's weight may enable it to pull off a planned deal with Asean. Who will get most out of it is another question.
In the absence of strong leadership, regional trade talks simply rake over the same problems that have proved insoluble in other forums. It is optimistic, too, to suppose the US and China could manage their differences better in a FTAAP than bilaterally.
So, has trade liberalisation hit the buffers? Not necessarily. One "plan B" has proved its worth: it is for governments to stop leaning on each other to open markets and do it by themselves.
Economic analysis has found repeatedly that the benefits from removing trade barriers unilaterally are vastly greater than from negotiating them away - even when negotiations succeed. China, Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia, Chile and, to a lesser extent, India have put it into practice and reaped rich economic dividends.
Unilateral market opening works, partly because it requires governments to commit themselves to a clear strategy. Second, in every case where it has delivered the economic goods, it has been buttressed by purposeful concurrent domestic reforms.
The lesson is that the best trade liberalisation begins at home. Of course, it takes more political blood and sweat than do lofty, and usually empty, summit declarations, futile haggling or grand designs that stand little chance of completion. That, no doubt, is why only those who seriously mean business attempt it.
与《亚太自由贸易区》一文商榷
如
果花园疏于管理，杂草就会萌生。可以预见的是，多哈(Doha)回合世贸谈判的枯萎，促成了各种选择的繁荣。谈判破裂不仅促使特惠双边协议增加（这种协议往往会产生更多的政治鼓吹资本，而不是经济内容），而且还使人们对区域的宏伟计划兴趣重燃。
其中一个是日本扩展现有计划的宏大想法，将印度、澳大利亚和新西兰纳入一个东亚经济共同体。而华盛顿国际经济研究所(Institute for International Economics)所长弗雷德?伯格斯登(Fred Bergsten)最近在英国《金融时报》宣传的更具雄心的设想，则是建立亚太自由贸易区(FTAAP)，将亚太经合组织(APEC)论坛的21个成员都囊括其中。
这些计划也许会让外交战争游戏玩家兴奋不已。但作为贸易自由化的工具，它们并非妙方。伯格斯登认为，对被排除在亚太自由贸易区之外的恐惧，将把拖多哈回合谈判后腿的人震出惯有的轨道。但暂且搁置多哈回合谈判破裂的部分原因在于美国的农业保护主义这一事实，这项主张也很勉强，因为它是以华盛顿认同、而其它多数地方不以为然的历史观为基础。
它认为，乌拉圭回合谈判在1993年圆满结束，是因为持顽抗态度的欧洲被Apec领导人吓坏了，因此决定重启谈判，在美国的授意下，含混地呼吁建立更紧密的地区间联系。但是，如果说欧洲确实动摇了，那也是因为它担心美国正准备从多边主义中脱身，而不是因为它真的认为，像Apec这样一个杂乱无章、差异悬殊并冲突不断的组织可以达成多少共识。对乌拉圭回合谈判最后阶段的常规解释依然是最为似是而非的：欧洲内部的农业改革让它刚好能够提供足量的农业贸易，从而逃脱对它破坏谈判的指责，而美国达成的协议则远弱于当初坚持的条款。
同样，华盛顿更近一些时候曾宣称，其强有力双边贸易外交的运用，将发起一轮“竞争自由主义”浪潮，为多边体系重新注入活力。多哈回合谈判的破裂，已暴露出这一理论的问题。实际上，双边主义已经愈演愈烈，在加快签署特惠协议步伐的同时，耗尽了多哈回合谈判的能量，分化了美国国会，并进一步降低了对各种贸易举措的胃口。
认为区域性分组可以比世贸组织(WTO)更快取得进展的观点，同样无视了大量与之相悖的客观证据。Apec让环太平洋地区的全部贸易和投资到2020年都实现自由化的梦想，如今依然只是梦想。建立美洲自由贸易区(FTAA)的计划也濒临废弃。南美洲的南方共同市场(Mercosur)陷入困境，该地区与欧盟就建立更紧密联系的谈判亦是如此。东盟(Asean)10个成员国之间的争端，已影响到其执行哪怕一个相当有限的自由化议程的努力，它们最近做出的加速这一进程的誓言面临着巨大障碍。南亚建立关税联盟的计划看上去就像一个笑话，因为该计划排除印度与巴基斯坦之间的贸易。地区主义取得的重大成就，只有欧盟和《北美自由贸易协定》(NAFTA)――前者过于独特，难以复制。
要达成有价值的协议，需要坚定的领导力和推动，就如德国之于欧洲，美国之于《北美自由贸易协定》。这些因素没有出现在其它地区性计划中，尽管中国凭借其经济和政治实力，或许能按计划与东盟达成协议。然而，谁将从中获益最多，则是另外一个问题。
没有强有力的领导，地区贸易谈判只会重提事实证明在其它论坛上无法解决的同样的问题。认为与双边方式相比，美国和中国通过“亚太自由贸易区”能更好地处理它们之间的分歧，这也只是个乐观的想法。更可能的情况是，将双方的争执换到一个更大的舞台上，会使争执愈演愈烈，并发起一场对地区影响力的争夺战――正如美国与巴西对西半球的激烈争夺，使“美洲自由贸易区”遭到彻底破坏一样。
那么，既然多哈回合贸易谈判已然搁置，双边协议实际成果寥寥，地区一体化项目前景渺茫，贸易自由化进程是否已陷入停顿了呢？不一定。一个“B计划”已经证明其价值：各国政府在开放市场时不要再彼此依赖，而是要从自身做起。
经济分析一再发现，单方面消除贸易壁垒带来的益处，远远大于通过谈判消除壁垒带来的益处――即便谈判能够获得成功。这并不纯粹是理论。中国大陆、新加坡、香港、澳大利亚、智利和印度（程度不及前者）已付诸实践，并获得了巨大的经济回报。
单方面开放市场之所以奏效，部分原因在于这种方式需要政府一开始就致力于一项清晰的战略，而不是在贸易伙伴的压力下才勉强采取行动。其次，在所有单方面开放市场取得经济成果的案例中，这种政策都始终受到有的放矢且步调一致的国内改革的支持。
教训是，最好的贸易自由化始于国内。诚然，与目标崇高而内容往往空洞的峰会宣言，以及没有意义的争论或几乎无法实现的重大计划相比，它需要政府付出更多心血。难怪，只有真正认真的国家才会尝试这样做。
