THE
WRITINGS OF KWANG-DZE.
INTRODUCTION.
BRIEF NOTICES OF THE DIFFERENT BOOKS.
《庄子·内篇·逍遥游第一》
北冥有鱼，其名为鲲。鲲之大，不知其几千里也。化而为鸟，其名为鹏。鹏之背，不知其几千里也。怒而飞，其翼若垂天之云。是鸟也，海运则将徙于南冥。南冥者，天池也。
《齐谐》者，志怪者也。《谐》之言曰：“鹏之徙于南冥也，水击三千里，抟扶摇而上者九万里，去以六月息者也。”野马也，尘埃也，生物之以息相吹也。天之苍苍，其正色邪？其远而无所至极邪？其视下也，亦若是则已矣。
且夫水之积也不厚，则其负大舟也无力。覆杯水于坳堂之上，则芥为之舟。置杯焉则胶，水浅而舟大也。风之积也不厚，则其负大翼也无力。故九万里则风斯在下矣，而后乃今培风；背负青天而莫之夭阏者，而后乃今将图南。 蜩与学鸠笑之曰：“我决起而飞，抢榆枋，时则不至而控于地而已矣，奚以之九万里而南为？”适莽苍者，三餐而反，腹犹果然；适百里者，宿舂粮；适千里者，三月聚粮。之二虫又何知！
小知不及大知，小年不及大年。奚以知其然也？朝菌不知晦朔，蟪蛄不知春秋，此小年也。楚之南有冥灵者，以五百岁为春，五百岁为秋；上古有大椿者，以八千岁为春，八千岁为秋。而彭祖乃今以久特闻，众人匹之，不亦悲乎！
汤之问棘也是已：穷发之北，有冥海者，天池也。有鱼焉，其广数千里，未有知其修者，其名为鲲。有鸟焉，其名为鹏，背若泰山，翼若垂天之云，抟扶摇羊角而上者九万里，绝云气，负青天，然后图南，且适南冥也。 斥囗（左“安”右“鸟”音ｙａｎ４）笑之曰：“彼且奚适也？我腾跃而上，不过数仞而下，翱翔蓬蒿之间，此亦飞之至也，而彼且奚适也？”此小大之辩也。
故夫知效一官，行比一乡，德合一君，而徵一国者，其自视也，亦若此矣。而宋荣子犹然笑之。且举世而誉之而不加劝，举世而非之而不加沮，定乎内外之分，辩乎荣辱之境，斯已矣。彼其于世，未数数然也。虽然，犹有未树也。
夫列子御风而行，泠然善也，旬有五日而后反。彼于致福者，未数数然也。此虽免乎行，犹有所待者也。 若夫乘天地之正，而御六气之辩，以游无穷者，彼且恶乎待哉！故曰：至人无己，神人无功，圣人无名。
尧让天下于许由，曰：“日月出矣，而爝火不息，其于光也，不亦难乎！时雨降矣，而犹浸灌，其于泽也，不亦劳乎！夫子立而天下治，而我犹尸之，吾自视缺然。请致天下。”许由曰：“子治天下，天下既已治也，而我犹代子，吾将为名乎？名者，实之宾也，吾将为宾乎？鹪鹩巢于深林，不过一枝；偃鼠饮河，不过满腹。归休乎君，予无所用天下为！庖人虽不治庖，尸祝不越樽俎而代之矣。” 肩吾问于连叔曰：“吾闻言于接舆，大而无当，往而不返。吾惊怖其言犹河汉而无极也，大有径庭，不近人情焉。”连叔曰：“其言谓何哉？”“曰‘藐姑射之山，有神人居焉。肌肤若冰雪，淖约若处子；不食五谷，吸风饮露；乘云气，御飞龙，而游乎四海之外；其神凝，使物不疵疠而年谷熟。’吾以是狂而不信也。”连叔曰：“然，瞽者无以与乎文章之观，聋者无以与乎钟鼓之声。岂唯形骸有聋盲哉？夫知亦有之。是其言也，犹时女也。之人也，之德也，将旁礴万物以为一，世蕲乎乱，孰弊弊焉以天下为事！之人也，物莫之伤，大浸稽天而不溺，大旱金石流、土山焦而热。是其尘垢囗（左“米”右“比”）糠，将犹陶铸尧舜者也，孰肯以物为事！” 宋人次章甫而适越，越人断发文身，无所用之。
尧治天下之民，平海内之政。往见四子藐姑射之山，汾水之阳，杳然丧其天下焉。
惠子谓庄子曰：“魏王贻我大瓠之种，我树之成而实五石。以盛水浆，其坚不能自举也。剖之以为瓢，则瓠落无所容。非不囗（左“口”右“号”音ｘｉａｏ１）然大也，吾为其无用而掊之。”庄子曰：“夫子固拙于用大矣。宋人有善为不龟手之药者，世世以囗（左“氵”右“并”音ｐｉｎｇ２）囗（左“氵”右“辟”音ｐｉ４）囗（左“纟”右“光”音ｋｕａｎｇ４）为事。客闻之，请买其方百金。聚族而谋之曰：‘我世世为ｐｉｎｇ２ｐｉ４ｋｕａｎｇ４，不过数金。今一朝而鬻技百金，请与之。’客得之，以说吴王。越有难，吴王使之将。冬，与越人水战，大败越人，裂地而封之。能不龟手一也，或以封，或不免于ｐｉｎｇ２ｐｉ４ｋｕａｎｇ４，则所用之异也。今子有五石之瓠，何不虑以为大樽而浮乎江湖，而忧其瓠落无所容？则夫子犹有蓬之心也夫！” 惠子谓庄子曰：“吾有大树，人谓之樗。其大本臃肿而不中绳墨，其小枝卷曲而不中规矩。立之涂，匠者不顾。今子之言，大而无用，众所同去也。”庄子曰：“子独不见狸囗（左“犭”右“生”即黄鼠狼）乎？卑身而伏，以候敖者；东西跳梁，不避高下；中于机辟，死于罔罟。今夫嫠牛，其大若垂天之云。此能为大矣，而不能执鼠。今子有大树，患其无用，何不树之于无何有之乡，广莫之野，彷徨乎无为其侧，逍遥乎寝卧其下。不夭斤斧，物无害者，无所可用，安所困苦哉！
BOOK I. HSIÂO-YÂO YÛ.
The three characters which form the title of this Book have all of them the ideagram , (Ko), which gives the idea, as the Shwo Wän explains it, of 'now walking, now halting.' We might render the title by 'Sauntering or Rambling at Ease;' but it is the untroubled enjoyment of the mind which the author has in view. And this enjoyment is secured by the Tâo, though that character does not once occur in the Book. Kwang-Sze illustrates his thesis first by the cases of creatures, the largest and the smallest, showing that however different they may be in size, they should not pass judgment on one another, but may equally find their happiness in the Tâo. From this he advances to men, and from the cases of Yung-dze and Lieh-dze proceeds to that of one who finds his enjoyment in himself, independent of every other being or instrumentality; and we have the three important definitions of the accomplished Tâoist, as 'the Perfect Man,' 'the Spirit-like Man,' and 'the Sagely Man.' Those definitions are then illustrated;--the third in Yâo and Hsü Yû, and the second in the conversation between Kien Wû and Lien Shû. The description given in this conversation of the spirit-like man is very startling, and contains statements that are true only of Him who is a 'Spirit,' 'the Blessed and only Potentate,' 'Who covereth Himself with light as with a garment, Who stretcheth out the heavens as a curtain,
p. 128
[paragraph continues] Who layeth the beams of His chambers in the waters, Who maketh the clouds His chariot, Who walketh on the wings of the wind,' 'Who rideth on a cherub,' 'Who inhabiteth eternity.' The most imaginative and metaphorical expressions in the Tâo Teh King about the power of the possessor of the Tâo are tame, compared with the language of our author. I call attention to it here, as he often uses the same extravagant style. There follows an illustration of 'the Perfect Man,' which is comparatively feeble, and part of it, so far as I can see, inappropriate, though Lin Hsî-kung says that all other interpretations of the sentences are ridiculous.
In the seventh and last paragraph we have two illustrations that nothing is really useless, if only used Tâoistically; 'to the same effect,' says Ziâo Hung, 'as Confucius in the Analects, XVII, ii.' They hang loosely, however, from what precedes.
An old view of the Book was that Kwang-dze intended himself by the great phäng, 'which,' says Lû Shû-kih, 'is wide of the mark.'
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
《庄子·内篇·齐物论第二》
南郭子綦隐机而坐，仰天而嘘，苔焉似丧其耦。颜成子游立侍乎前 ，曰：“何居乎？形固可使如槁木，而心固可使如死灰乎？今之隐机 者，非昔之隐机者也？”子綦曰：“偃，不亦善乎而问之也！今者吾 丧我，汝知之乎？女闻人籁而未闻地籁，女闻地籁而不闻天籁夫！”
子游曰：“敢问其方。”子綦曰：“夫大块噫气，其名为风。是唯 无作，作则万窍怒囗（左“口”右“号”）。而独不闻之囗囗（“戮 去“戈”音ｌｉｕ４）乎？山林之畏佳，大木百围之窍穴，似鼻，似 口，似耳，似笄，似圈，似臼，似洼者，似污者。激者、囗（左“讠 ”右“高”音ｘｉａｏ４）者、叱者、吸者、叫者、囗（左“讠”右 “豪”音ｈａｏ２）者、囗（上“宀”下“夭”音ｙａｏ１）者，咬 者，前者唱于而随者唱喁，泠风则小和，飘风则大和，厉风济则众窍 为虚。而独不见之调调之刁刁乎？”
子游曰：“地籁则众窍是已，人籁则比竹是已，敢问天籁。”子綦 曰：“夫吹万不同，而使其自己也。咸其自取，怒者其谁邪？”
大知闲闲，小知间间。大言炎炎，小言詹詹。其寐也魂交，其觉也 形开。与接为构，日以心斗。缦者、窖者、密者。小恐惴惴，大恐缦 缦。其发若机栝，其司是非之谓也；其留如诅盟，其守胜之谓也；其 杀如秋冬，以言其日消也；其溺之所为之，不可使复之也；其厌也如 缄，以言其老洫也；近死之心，莫使复阳也。喜怒哀乐，虑叹变蜇， 姚佚启态——乐出虚，蒸成菌。日夜相代乎前而莫知其所萌。已乎， 已乎！旦暮得此，其所由以生乎！
非彼无我，非我无所取。是亦近矣，而不知其所为使。若有真宰， 而特不得其囗（左“目”右“关”借为朕）。可行己信，而不见其形 ，有情而无形。百骸、九窍、六藏、赅而存焉，吾谁与为亲？汝皆说 之乎？其有私焉？如是皆有为臣妾乎？其臣妾不足以相治乎？其递相 为君臣乎？其有真君存焉！如求得其情与不得，无益损乎其真。一受 其成形，不亡以待尽。与物相刃相靡，其行尽如驰而莫之能止，不亦 悲乎！终身役役而不见其成功，囗（上“艹”中“人”下“小”音ｎ ｉｅ２）然疲役而不知其所归，可不哀邪！人谓之不死，奚益！其形 化，其心与之然，可不谓大哀乎？人之生也，固若是芒乎？其我独芒 ，而人亦有不芒者乎？
夫随其成心而师之，谁独且无师乎？奚必知代而自取者有之？愚者 与有焉！未成乎心而有是非，是今日适越而昔至也。是以无有为有。 无有为有，虽有神禹且不能知，吾独且奈何哉！
夫言非吹也，言者有言。其所言者特未定也。果有言邪？其未尝有 言邪？其以为异于囗（“彀”字以“鸟”代“弓”音ｋｏｕ４）音， 亦有辩乎？其无辩乎？道恶乎隐而有真伪？言恶乎隐而有是非？道恶 乎往而不存？言恶乎存而不可？道隐于小成，言隐于荣华。故有儒墨 之是非，以是其所非而非其所是。欲是其所非而非其所是，则莫若以 明。
物无非彼，物无非是。自彼则不见，自知则知之。故曰：彼出于是 ，是亦因彼。彼是方生之说也。虽然，方生方死，方死方生；方可方 不可，方不可方可；因是因非，因非因是。是以圣人不由而照之于天 ，亦因是也。是亦彼也，彼亦是也。彼亦一是非，此亦一是非，果且 有彼是乎哉？果且无彼是乎哉？彼是莫得其偶，谓之道枢。枢始得其 环中，以应无穷。是亦一无穷，非亦一无穷也。故曰：莫若以明。
以指喻指之非指，不若以非指喻指之非指也；以马喻马之非马，不 若以非马喻马之非马也。天地一指也，万物一马也。
可乎可，不可乎不可。道行之而成，物谓之而然。恶乎然？然于然 。恶乎不然？不然于不然。物固有所然，物固有所可。无物不然，无 物不可。故为是举莛与楹，厉与西施，恢诡谲怪，道通为一。
其分也，成也；其成也，毁也。凡物无成与毁，复通为一。唯达者 知通为一，为是不用而寓诸庸。庸也者，用也；用也者，通也；通也 者，得也。适得而几矣。因是已，已而不知其然谓之道。劳神明为一 而不知其同也，谓之“朝三”。何谓“朝三”？狙公赋囗（上“艹” 下“予”音ｘｕ４），曰：“朝三而暮四。”众狙皆怒。曰：“然则 朝四而暮三。”众狙皆悦。名实未亏而喜怒为用，亦因是也。是以圣 人和之以是非而休乎天钧，是之谓两行。
古之人，其知有所至矣。恶乎至？有以为未始有物者，至矣，尽矣 ，不可以加矣！其次以为有物矣，而未始有封也。其次以为有封焉， 而未始有是非也。是非之彰也，道之所以亏也。道之所以亏，爱之所 以成。果且有成与亏乎哉？果且无成与亏乎哉？有成与亏，故昭氏之 鼓琴也；无成与亏，故昭氏之不鼓琴也。昭文之鼓琴也，师旷之枝策 也，惠子之据梧也，三子之知几乎皆其盛者也，故载之末年。唯其好 之也以异于彼，其好之也欲以明之。彼非所明而明之，故以坚白之昧 终。而其子又以文之纶终，终身无成。若是而可谓成乎，虽我亦成也 ；若是而不可谓成乎，物与我无成也。是故滑疑之耀，圣人之所图也 。为是不用而寓诸庸，此之谓“以明”。
今且有言于此，不知其与是类乎？其与是不类乎？类与不类，相与 为类，则与彼无以异矣。虽然，请尝言之：有始也者，有未始有始也 者，有未始有夫未始有始也者；有有也者，有无也者，有未始有无也 者，有未始有夫未始有无也者。俄而有无矣，而未知有无之果孰有孰 无也。今我则已有有谓矣，而未知吾所谓之其果有谓乎？其果无谓乎 ？
夫天下莫大于秋豪之末，而太山为小；莫寿乎殇子，而彭祖为夭。 天地与我并生，而万物与我为一。既已为一矣，且得有言乎？既已谓 之一矣，且得无言乎？一与言为二，二与一为三。自此以往，巧历不 能得，而况其凡乎！故自无适有，以至于三，而况自有适有乎！无适 焉，因是已！
夫道未始有封，言未始有常，为是而有畛也。请言其畛：有左有右 ，有伦有义，有分有辩，有竞有争，此之谓八德。六合之外，圣人存 而不论；六合之内，圣人论而不议；春秋经世先王之志，圣人议而不 辩。
故分也者，有不分也；辩也者，有不辩也。曰：“何也？”“圣人 怀之，众人辩之以相示也。故曰：辩也者，有不见也。”夫大道不称 ，大辩不言，大仁不仁，大廉不谦，大勇不忮。道昭而不道，言辩而 不及，仁常而不成，廉清而不信，勇忮而不成。五者圆而几向方矣！ 故知止其所不知，至矣。孰知不言之辩，不道之道？若有能知，此之 谓天府。注焉而不满，酌焉而不竭，而不知其所由来，此之谓葆光。
故昔者尧问于舜曰：“我欲伐宗脍、胥、敖，南面而不释然。其故 何也？”舜曰：“夫三子者，犹存乎蓬艾之间。若不释然何哉！昔者 十日并出，万物皆照，而况德之进乎日者乎！”
啮缺问乎王倪曰：“子知物之所同是乎？”曰：“吾恶乎知之！” “子知子之所不知邪？”曰：“吾恶乎知之！”“然则物无知邪？” 曰：“吾恶乎知之！虽然，尝试言之：庸讵知吾所谓知之非不知邪？ 庸讵知吾所谓不知之非知邪？且吾尝试问乎女：民湿寝则腰疾偏死， 鳅然乎哉？木处则惴栗恂惧，囗（“缓”字以“犭”代“纟”）猴然 乎哉？三者孰知正处？民食刍豢，麋鹿食荐，囗（左“虫”右“即” ）蛆甘带，鸱鸦耆鼠，四者孰知正味？猿囗（左“犭”右“扁”）狙 以为雌，麋与鹿交，鳅与鱼游。毛嫱丽姬，人之所美也；鱼见之深入 ，鸟见之高飞，麋鹿见之决骤，四者孰知天下之正色哉？自我观之， 仁义之端，是非之涂，樊然淆乱，吾恶能知其辩！”啮缺曰：“子不 利害，则至人固不知利害乎？”王倪曰：“至人神矣！大泽焚而不能 热，河汉冱而不能寒，疾雷破山、飘风振海而不能惊。若然者，乘云 气，骑日月，而游乎四海之外，死生无变于己，而况利害之端乎！”
瞿鹊子问乎长梧子曰：“吾闻诸夫子：圣人不从事于务，不就利， 不违害，不喜求，不缘道，无谓有谓，有谓无谓，而游乎尘垢之外。 夫子以为孟浪之言，而我以为妙道之行也。吾子以为奚若？”
长梧子曰：“是皇帝之所听荧也，而丘也何足以知之！且女亦大早 计，见卵而求时夜，见弹而求囗（左“号”右“鸟”音ｘｉａｏ１） 炙。予尝为女妄言之，女以妄听之。奚旁日月，挟宇宙，为其吻合， 置其滑囗（左“氵”右“昏”音ｈｕｎ１），以隶相尊？众人役役， 圣人愚钝，参万岁而一成纯。万物尽然，而以是相蕴。予恶乎知说生 之非惑邪！予恶乎知恶死之非弱丧而不知归者邪！
丽之姬，艾封人之子也。晋国之始得之也，涕泣沾襟。及其至于王 所，与王同筐床，食刍豢，而后悔其泣也。予恶乎知夫死者不悔其始 之蕲生乎？梦饮酒者，旦而哭泣；梦哭泣者，旦而田猎。方其梦也， 不知其梦也。梦之中又占其梦焉，觉而后知其梦也。且有大觉而后知 此其大梦也，而愚者自以为觉，窃窃然知之。“君乎！牧乎！”固哉 ！丘也与女皆梦也，予谓女梦亦梦也。是其言也，其名为吊诡。万世 之后而一遇大圣知其解者，是旦暮遇之也。
既使我与若辩矣，若胜我，我不若胜，若果是也？我果非也邪？我 胜若，若不吾胜，我果是也？而果非也邪？其或是也？其或非也邪？ 其俱是也？其俱非也邪？我与若不能相知也。则人固受其囗（左“黑 右“甚”音ｔａｎ３）囗（外“门”内“音”音ａｎ４），吾谁使正 之？使同乎若者正之，既与若同矣，恶能正之？使同乎我者正之，既 同乎我矣，恶能正之？使异乎我与若者正之，既异乎我与若矣，恶能 正之？使同乎我与若者正之，既同乎我与若矣，恶能正之？然则我与 若与人俱不能相知也，而待彼也邪？”
“何谓和之以天倪？”曰：“是不是，然不然。是若果是也，则是 之异乎不是也亦无辩；然若果然也，则然之异乎不然也亦无辩。化声 之相待，若其不相待。和之以天倪，因之以曼衍，所以穷年也。忘年 忘义，振于无竟，故寓诸无竟。”
罔两问景曰：“曩子行，今子止；曩子坐，今子起。何其无特操与 ？”景曰：“吾有待而然者邪？吾所待又有待而然者邪？吾待蛇囗（ 左“虫”右“付”音ｆｕ４）蜩翼邪？恶识所以然？恶识所以不然？ ”
昔者庄周梦为胡蝶，栩栩然胡蝶也。自喻适志与！不知周也。俄然 觉，则蘧蘧然周也。不知周之梦为胡蝶与？胡蝶之梦为周与？？周与 胡蝶则必有分矣。此之谓物化。
Next: Book II. Khî Wû LunBOOK II. KHÎ WÛ LUN.
Mr. Balfour has translated this title by 'Essay on the Uniformity of All Things;' and, the subject of the Book being thus misconceived, his translation of it could not fail to be very incorrect. The Chinese critics, I may say without exception, construe the title as I have done. The second and third characters, Wû Lun, are taken together, and mean 'Discussions about Things,' equivalent to our 'Controversies.' They are under the government of the first character Khî, used as a verb, with the signification of 'Harmonising,' or 'Adjusting.' Let me illustrate this by condensing a passage from the 'Supplementary Commentary of a Mr. Kang, a sub-secretary of the Imperial Chancery,' of the Ming dynasty ( ). He says, 'What Kwang-dze calls "Discussions about Things" has reference to the various branches of the numerous schools, each of which has its own views, conflicting with
p. 129
the views of the others.' He goes on to show that if they would only adopt the method pointed out by Kwang-dze, 'their controversies would be adjusted ( ) using the first Khî in the passive voice.
This then was the theme of our author in this Book. It must be left for the reader to discover from the translation how he pursues it. I pointed out a peculiarity in the former Book, that though the idea of the Tâo underlies it all, the term itself is never allowed to appear. Not only does the same idea underlie this Book, but the name is frequently employed. The Tâo is the panacea for the evils of controversy, the solvent through the use of which the different views of men may be made to disappear.
That the Tâo is not a Personal name in the conception of Kwang-dze is seen in several passages. We have not to go beyond the phenomena of nature to discover the reason of their being what they are; nor have we to go beyond the bigoted egoism and vaingloriousness of controversialists to find the explanation of their discussions, various as these are, and confounding like the sounds of the wind among the trees of a forest. To man, neither in nature nor in the sphere of knowledge, is there any other 'Heaven' but what belongs to his own mind. That is his only 'True Ruler.' If there be any other, we do not see His form, nor any traces of His acting. Things come about in their proper course. We cannot advance any proof of Creation. Whether we assume that there was something 'in the beginning' or nothing, we are equally landed in contradiction and absurdity. Let us stop at the limit of what we know, and not try to advance a step beyond it.
Towards the end of the Book our author's agnosticism seems to reach its farthest point. All human experience is spoken of as a dream or as 'illusion.' He who calls another a dreamer does not know that he is not dreaming himself. One and another commentator discover in such utterances something very like the Buddhist doctrine that all life is but so much illusion ( ). This notion has its consummation in the story with which the Book concludes.
p. 130
[paragraph continues] Kwang-dze had dreamt that he was a butterfly. When he awoke, and was himself again, he did not know whether he, Kwang Kâu, had been dreaming that he was a butterfly, or was now a butterfly dreaming that it was Kwang Kâu. And yet he adds that there must be a difference between Kâu and a butterfly, but he does not say what that difference is. But had he ever dreamt that he was a butterfly, so as to lose the consciousness of his personal identity as Kwang Kâu? I do not think so. One may, perhaps, lose that consciousness in the state of insanity; but the language of Young is not sufficiently guarded when he writes of
'Dreams, where thought, in fancy's maze, runs mad.'
When dreaming, our thoughts are not conditioned by the categories of time and space; but the conviction of our identity is never lost.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
《庄子·内篇·养生主第三》
吾生也有涯，而知也无涯。以有涯随无涯，殆已！已而为知者，殆 而已矣！为善无近名，为恶无近刑，缘督以为经，可以保身，可以全 生，可以养亲，可以尽年。
庖丁为文惠君解牛，手之所触，肩之所倚，足之所履，膝之所倚， 囗（上“丰”下“石”音ｈｕａ４）然响然，奏刀囗（左“马”右上 “丰”右下“石”音ｈｕｏ１）然，莫不中音，合于桑林之舞，乃中 经首之会。
文惠君曰：“嘻，善哉！技盖至此乎？”庖丁释刀对曰：“臣之所 好者道也，进乎技矣。始臣之解牛之时，所见无非全牛者；三年之后 ，未尝见全牛也；方今之时，臣以神遇而不以目视，官知止而神欲行 。依乎天理，批大囗（左“谷”右“阝”），导大囗（上“穴”下“ 款”音ｋｕａｎ３），因其固然。技经肯綮之未尝，而况大囗（左“ 车”右“瓜”音ｇｕ３）乎！良庖岁更刀，割也；族庖月更刀，折也 ；今臣之刀十九年矣，所解数千牛矣，而刀刃若新发于硎。彼节者有 间而刀刃者无厚，以无厚入有间，恢恢乎其于游刃必有余地矣。是以 十九年而刀刃若新发于硎。虽然，每至于族，吾见其难为，怵然为戒 ，视为止，行为迟，动刀甚微，囗（左“讠”右“桀”音ｈｕｏ４） 然已解，如土委地。提刀而立，为之而四顾，为之踌躇满志，善刀而 藏之。”文惠君曰：“善哉！吾闻庖丁之言，得养生焉。”
公文轩见右师而惊曰：“是何人也？恶乎介也？天与？其人与？” 曰：“天也，非人也。天之生是使独也，人之貌有与也。以是知其天 也，非人也。”
泽雉十步一啄，百步一饮，不蕲畜乎樊中。神虽王，不善也。
老聃死，秦失吊之，三号而出。弟子曰：“非夫子之友邪？”曰： “然。”“然则吊焉若此可乎？”曰：“然。始也吾以为其人也，而 今非也。向吾入而吊焉，有老者哭之，如哭其子；少者哭之，如哭其 母。彼其所以会之，必有不蕲言而言，不蕲哭而哭者。是遁天倍情， 忘其所受，古者谓之遁天之刑。适来，夫子时也；适去，夫子顺也。 安时而处顺，哀乐不能入也，古者谓是帝之县解。”
指穷于为薪，火传也，不知其尽也。
Next: Book III. Yang Shang KûBOOK III. YANG SHANG KÛ.
'The Lord of Life' is the Tâo. It is to this that we are indebted for the origin of life and for the preservation of it. Though not a Personal Being, it is here spoken of as if it were,--'the Lord of Life;' just as in the preceding Book it is made to appear as 'a True Governor,' and 'a True Ruler.' But how can we nourish the Tâo? The reply is, By avoiding all striving to do so; by a passionless, unstraining performance of what we have to do in our position in life; simply allowing the Tâo to guide and nourish us, without doing anything to please ourselves or to counteract the tendency of our being to decay and death.
Par. 1 exhibits the injury arising from not thus nourishing the life, and sets forth the rule we are to pursue.
Par. 2 illustrates the observance of the rule by the perfect skill with which the cook of the ruler Wän-hui of Wei cut up the oxen for his employer without trouble to himself, or injury to his knife.
p. 131
Par. 3 illustrates the result of a neglect of one of the cautions in par. 1 to a certain master of the Left, who had brought on himself dismemberment in the loss of one of his feet.
Par. 4 shows how even Lâo-dze had failed in nourishing 'the Lord of Life' by neglecting the other caution, and allowing in his good-doing an admixture of human feeling, which produced in his disciples a regard for him that was inconsistent with the nature of the Tâo, and made them wail for him excessively on his death. This is the most remarkable portion of the Book, and it is followed by a sentence which implies that the existence of man's spirit continues after death has taken place. His body is intended by the 'faggots' that are consumed by the fire. That fire represents the spirit which may be transferred elsewhere.
Some commentators dwell on the analogy between this and the Buddhistic transrotation of births; which latter teaching, however, they do not seem to understand. Others say that 'the nourishment of the Lord of Life' is simply acting as Yü did when he conveyed away the flooded waters 'by doing that which gave him no trouble;'--see Mencius, IV, ii, 26.
In Kwang-dze there are various other stories of the same character as that about king Wän-hui's cook,--e. g. XIX, 3 and XXII, 9. They are instances of the dexterity acquired by habit, and should hardly be pressed into the service of the doctrine of the Tâo.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Next: Book IV. Zän Kien ShihBOOK IV. ZÄN KIEN SHIH.
A man has his place among other men in the world; he is a member, while he lives, of the body of humanity. And as he has his place in society, so also he has his special duties to discharge, according to his position, and his relation to others. Tâoist writers refer to this Book as a proof of the practical character of the writings of Kwang-dze.
p. 132
They are right to a certain extent in doing so; but the cases of relationship which are exhibited and prescribed for are of so peculiar a character, that the Book is of little value as a directory of human conduct and duty. In the first two paragraphs we have the case of Yen Hui, who wishes to go to Wei, and try to reform the character and government of its oppressive ruler; in the third and fourth, that of the duke of Sheh, who has been entrusted by the king of Khû with a difficult mission to the court of Khî, which is occasioning him much anxiety and apprehension; and in the fifth, that of a Yen Ho, who is about to undertake the office of teacher to the son of duke Ling of Wei, a young man with a very bad natural disposition. The other four paragraphs do not seem to come in naturally after these three cases, being occupied with two immense and wonderful trees, the case of a poor deformed cripple, and the lecture for the benefit of Confucius by 'the madman of Khû.' In all these last paragraphs, the theme is the usefulness, to the party himself at least, of being of no use.
Confucius is the principal speaker in the first four paragraphs. In what he says to Yen Hui and the duke of Sheh there is much that is shrewd and good; but we prefer the practical style of his teachings, as related by his own disciples in the Confucian Analects. Possibly, it was the object of Kwang-dze to exhibit his teaching, as containing, without his being aware of it, much of the mystical character of the Tâoistic system. His conversation with the duke of Sheh, however, is less obnoxious to this charge than what he is made to say to Yen Hui. The adviser of Yen Ho is a Kü Po-yü, a disciple of Confucius, who still has a place in the sage's temples.
In the conclusion, the Tâoism of our author comes out in contrast with the methods of Confucius. His object in the whole treatise, perhaps, was to show how 'the doing nothing, and yet thereby doing everything,' was the method to be pursued in all the intercourses of society.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Next: Book V. Teh Khung FûBOOK V. TEH KHUNG FÛ.
The fû ( ) consisted in the earliest times of two slips of bamboo made with certain marks, so as to fit to each other exactly, and held by the two parties to any agreement or covenant. By the production and comparison of the slips, the parties verified their mutual relation; and the claim of the one and the obligation of the other were sufficiently established. 'Seal' seems the best translation of the character in this title.
By 'virtue' ( ) we must understand the characteristics of the Tâo. Where those existed in their full proportions in any individual, there was sure to be the evidence or proof of them in the influence which he exerted in all his intercourse with other men; and the illustration of this is the subject of this Book, in all its five paragraphs. That influence is the 'Seal' set on him, proving him to be a true child of the Tâo.
The heroes, as I may call them, of the first three paragraphs are all men who had lost their feet, having been reduced to that condition as a punishment, just or unjust, of certain offences; and those of the last two are distinguished by their extraordinary ugliness or disgusting deformity. But neither the loss of their feet nor their deformities trouble the serenity of their own minds, or interfere with the effects of their teaching and character upon others; so superior is their virtue to the deficiencies in their outward appearance.
Various brief descriptions of the Tâo are interspersed in the Book. The most remarkable of them are those in par. 1, where it appears as 'that in which there is no element of falsehood,' and as 'the author of all the Changes or Transformations' in the world. The sentences where these occur are thus translated by Mr. Balfour:--'He seeks to know Him in whom is nothing false. He would not be affected by the instability of creation; even if his life were involved in the general destruction, he would yet hold firmly to his faith (in God).' And he observes in a
p. 134
note, that the first short sentence 'is explained by the commentators as referring to Kän Zâi ( ), the term used by the Tâoist school for God.' But we met with that name and synonyms of it in Book II, par. 2, as appellations of the Tâo, coupled with the denial of its personality. Kän Zâi, 'the True Governor or Lord,' may be used as a designation for god or God, but the Tâoist school denies the existence of a Personal Being, to whom we are accustomed to apply that name.
Hui-dze, the sophist and friend of Kwang-dze, is introduced in the conclusion as disputing with him the propriety of his representing the Master of the Tâo as being still 'a man;' and is beaten down by him with a repetition of his assertions, and a reference to some of Hui-dze's well-known peculiarities. What would Kwang-dze have said, if his opponent had affirmed that his instances were all imaginary, and that no man had ever appeared who could appeal to his possession of such a 'seal' to his virtues and influence as he described?
Lû Fang-wäng compares with the tenor of this Book what we find in Mencius, VII, i, 21, about the nature of the superior man. The analogy between them, however, is very faint and incomplete.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Next: Book VI. Tâ Zung ShihBOOK VI. TÂ ZUNG SHIH.
So I translate the title of this Book, taking Zung as a verb, and Zung Shih as = 'The Master who is Honoured.' Some critics take Zung in the sense of 'Originator,' in which it is employed in the Tâo Teh King, lxx, 2. Whichever rendering be adopted, there is no doubt that the title is intended to be a designation of the Tâo; and no one of our author's Books is more important for the understanding of his system of thought.
The key to it is found in the first of its fifteen paragraphs. There are in man two elements;-the Heavenly or Tâoistic, and the human. The disciple of the Tâo, recognising them both, cultivates what he knows as a man
p. 135
so as to become entirely conformed to the action of the Tâo, and submissive in all the most painful experiences in his lot, which is entirely ordered by it. A seal will be set on the wisdom of this course hereafter, when he has completed the period of his existence on earth, and returns to the state of non-existence, from which the Tâo called him to be born as a man. In the meantime he may attain to be the True man possessing the True knowledge.
Our author then proceeds to give his readers in five paragraphs his idea of the True Man. Mr. Balfour says that this name is to be understood 'in the esoteric sense, the partaking of the essence of divinity,' and he translates it by 'the Divine Man.' But we have no right to introduce here the terms 'divine' and 'divinity.' Nan-hwâi (VII, 5b) gives a short definition of the name which is more to the point:--'What we call "the True Man" is one whose nature is in agreement with the Tâo ( ) and the commentator adds in a note, 'Such men as Fû-hsî, Hwang-Tî, and Lâo Tan.' The Khang-hsî dictionary commences its account of the character or 'True' by a definition of the True Man taken from the Shwo Wän as a , 'a recluse of the mountain, whose bodily form has been changed, and who ascends to heaven;' but when that earliest dictionary was made, Tâoism had entered into a new phase, different from what it had in the time of our author. The most prominent characteristic of the True Man is that he is free from all exercise of thought and purpose, a being entirely passive in the hands of the Tâo. In par. 3 seven men are mentioned, good and worthy men, but inferior to the True.
Having said what he had to say of the True Man, Kwang-dze comes in the seventh paragraph to speak directly of the Tâo itself, and describes it with many wonderful predicates which exalt it above our idea of God;--a concept and not a personality. He concludes by mentioning a number of ancient personages who had got the Tâo, and by it wrought wonders, beginning with a Shih-wei, who preceded Fû-hsî, and ending with Fû Yüeh, the minister of
p. 136
Wû-ting, in the fourteenth century B. C., and who finally became a star in the eastern portion of the zodiac. Phäng Zû is also mentioned as living, through his possession of the Tâo, from the twenty-third century 13. C. to the seventh or later. The sun and moon and the constellation of the Great Bear are also mentioned as its possessors, and the fabulous Being called the Mother of the Western King. The whole passage is perplexing to the reader to the last degree.
The remaining paragraphs are mostly occupied with instances of learning the Tâo, and of its effects in making men superior to the infirmities of age and the most terrible deformities of person and calamities of penury; as 'Tranquillity' under all that might seem most calculated to disturb it. Very strange is the attempt at the conclusion of par. 8 apparently to trace the genesis of the knowledge of the Tâo. Confucius is introduced repeatedly as the expounder of Tâoism, and made to praise it as the ne plus ultra of human attainment.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Next: Book VII. Ying Tî WangBOOK VII. YING TÎ WANG.
The first of the three characters in this title renders the translation of it somewhat perplexing. Ying has different meanings according as it is read in the first tone or in the third. In the first tone it is the symbol of what is right, or should be; in the third tone of answering or responding to. 1 prefer to take it here in the first tone. As Kwo, Hsiang says, 'One who is free from mind or purpose of his own, and loves men to become transformed of themselves, is fit to be a Ruler or a King,' and as Zhui Kwan, another early commentator, says, 'He whose teaching is that which is without words, and makes men in the world act as if they were oxen or horses, is fit to be a Ruler or a King.' This then is the object of the Book--to describe that government which exhibits the Tâo equally in the rulers and the ruled, the world of men all happy and good without purpose or effort.
It consists of seven paragraphs. The first shows us the model ruler in him of the line of Thâi, whom I have not
p. 137
succeeded in identifying. The second shows us men under such a rule, uncontrolled and safe like the bird that flies high beyond the reach of the archer, and the mouse secure in its deep hole from its pursuers. The teacher in this portion is Khieh-yü, known in the Confucian school as 'the madman of Khû,' and he delivers his lesson in opposition to the heresy of a Zäh-kung Shih, or 'Noon Beginning.' In the third paragraph the speakers are 'a nameless man,' and a Thien Kän, or 'Heaven Root.' In the fourth paragraph Lâo-dze himself appears upon the stage, and lectures a Yang Dze-kü, the Yang Kû of Mencius. He concludes by saying that 'where the intelligent kings took their stand could not be fathomed, and they found their enjoyment in (the realm of) nonentity.'
The fifth paragraph is longer, and tells us of the defeat of a wizard, a physiognomist in Käng, by Hû-dze, the master of the philosopher Lieh-dze, who is thereby delivered from the glamour which the cheat was throwing round him. I confess to not being able to understand the various processes by which Hû-dze foils the wizard and makes him run away. The whole story is told, and at greater length, in the second book of the collection ascribed to Lieh-dze, and the curious student may like to look at the translation of that work by Mr. Ernst Faber (Der Naturalismus bei den alten Chinesen sowohl nach der Seite des Pantheismus als des Sensualismus, oder die Sämmtlichen Werke des Philosophen Licius, 1877). The effect of the wizard's defeat on Lieh-dze was great. He returned in great humility to his house, and did not go out of it for three years. He did the cooking for his wife, and fed the pigs as if he were feeding men. He returned to pure simplicity, and therein continued to the end of his life. But I do not see the connexion between this narrative and the government of the Rulers and Kings.
The sixth paragraph is a homily by our author himself on 'non-action.' It contains a good simile, comparing the mind of the perfect man to a mirror, which reflects faithfully what comes before it, but does not retain any image of it, when the mind is gone.
p. 138
The last paragraph is an ingenious and interesting allegory relating how the gods of the southern and northern seas brought Chaos to an end by boring holes in him. Thereby they destroyed the primal simplicity, and according to Tâoism did Chaos an injury! On the whole I do not think that this Book, with which the more finished essays of Kwang-dze come to an end, is so successful as those that precede it.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Next: Book VIII. Phien MâuBOOK VIII. PHIEN MÂU.
This Book brings us to the Second Part of the writings of our author, embracing in all fifteen Books. Of the most important difference between the Books of the First and the other Parts some account has been given in the Introductory Chapter. We have here to do only with the different character of their titles, Those of the seven preceding Books are so many theses, and are believed to have been prefixed to them by Kwang-dze himself; those of this Book and the others that follow are believed to have been prefixed by Kwo Hsiang, and consist of two or three characters taken from the beginning, or near the beginning of the several Books, after the fashion of the names of the Books in the Confucian Analects, in the works of Mencius, and in our Hebrew Scriptures. Books VIII to XIII are considered to be supplementary to VII by Aû-yang Hsiû.
The title of this eighth Book, Phien Mâu, has been rendered by Mr. Balfour, after Dr. Williams, 'Double Thumbs.' But the Mâu, which may mean either the Thumb or the Great Toe, must be taken in the latter sense, being distinguished in this paragraph and elsewhere from Kih, 'a finger,' and expressly specified also as belonging to the foot. The character phien, as used here, is defined in the Khang-hsî dictionary as 'anything additional growing out as an appendage or excrescence, a growing out at the side.' This would seem to justify the translation of it by 'double.' But in paragraph 3, while the extra finger increases the number of the fingers, this growth on the foot is represented as diminishing the number of the toes. I must consider
p. 139
the phien therefore as descriptive of an appendage by which the great toe was united to one or all of the other toes, and can think of no better rendering of the title than what I have given. It is told in the Zo Kwan (twenty-third year of duke Hsî) that the famous duke Wän of Zin had phien hsieh, that is, that his ribs presented the appearance of forming one bone. So much for the title.
The subject-matter of the Book seems strange to us; that, according to the Tâo, benevolence and righteousness are not natural growths of humanity, but excrescences on it, like the extra finger on the hand, and the membranous web of the toes. The weakness of the Tâoistic system begins to appear. Kwang-dze's arguments in support of his position must be pronounced very feeble. The ancient Shun is introduced as the first who called in the two great virtues to distort and vex the world, keeping society for more than a thousand years in a state of uneasy excitement. Of course he assumes that prior to Shun, he does not say for how long a time (and in other places he makes decay to have begun earlier), the world had been in a state of paradisiacal innocence and simplicity, under the guidance of the Tâo, untroubled by any consideration of what was right and what was wrong, men passively allowing their nature to have its quiet development, and happy in that condition. All culture of art or music is wrong, and so it is wrong and injurious to be striving to manifest benevolence and to maintain righteousness.
He especially singles out two men, one of the twelfth century B. C., the famous Po-î, who died of hunger rather than acknowledge the dynasty of Kâu; and one of a more recent age, the robber Shih, a great leader of brigands, who brought himself by his deeds to an untimely end; and he sees nothing to choose between them. We must give our judgment for the teaching of Confucianism in preference to that of Tâoism, if our author can be regarded as a fair expositor of the latter. He is ingenious in his statements and illustrations, but he was, like his master Lâo-dze, only a dreamer.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Next: Book IX: Mâ ThîBOOK IX. MÂ THÎ.
'Horses' and 'Hoofs' are the first two characters of the Text, standing there in the relation of regent and regimen. The account of the teaching of the Book given by Lin Hsî-kung is so concise that I will avail myself of it. He says:--
'Governing men is like governing horses. They may be governed in such a way as shall be injurious to them, just as Po-lâo governed the horse;--contrary to its true nature. His method was not different from that of the (first) potter and carpenter in dealing with clay and wood;--contrary to the nature of those substances. Notwithstanding this, one age after another has celebrated the skill of those parties;--not knowing what it is that constitutes the good and skilful government of men. Such government simply requires that men be made to fulfil their regular constant nature,--the qualities which they all possess in common, with which they are constituted by Heaven, and then be left to themselves. It was this which constituted the age of perfect virtue; but when the sages insisted on the practice of benevolence, righteousness, ceremonies, and music, then the people began to be without that perfect virtue. Not that they were in themselves different from what they had been, but those practices do not really belong to their regular nature; they arose from their neglecting the characteristics of the Tâo, and abandoning their natural constitution; it was the case of the skilful artisan cutting and hacking his raw materials in order to form vessels from them. There is no ground for doubting that Po-lâo's management of horses gave them that knowledge with which they went on to play the part of thieves, or that it was the sages' government of the people which made them devote themselves to the pursuit of gain;--it is impossible to deny the error of those sages.
'There is but one idea in the Book from the beginning to the end;--it is an amplification of the expression in the preceding Book that "all men have their regular and constant
p. 141
constitution," and is the most easily construed of all Kwang-dze's compositions. In consequence, however, of the wonderful touches of his pencil in describing the sympathy between men and other creatures in their primal state, some have imagined that there is a waste and embellishment of language, and doubted whether the Book is really his own, but thought it was written by some one in imitation of his style. I apprehend that no other hand would easily have attained to such a mastery of that style.'
There is no possibility of adjudicating definitely on the suspicion of the genuineness of the Book thus expressed in Hsî-kung's concluding remarks. The same suspicion arose in my own mind in the process of translation. My surprise continues that our author did not perceive the absurdity of his notions of the primal state of men, and of his condemnation of the sages.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Next: Book X. Khü KhiehBOOK X. KHÜ KHIEH.
It is observed by the commentator Kwei Kän-khüan that one idea runs through this Book:--that the most sage and wise men have ministered to theft and robbery, and that, if there were an end of sageness and wisdom, the world would be at rest. Between it and the previous Book there is a general agreement in argument and object, but in this the author expresses himself with greater vehemence, and almost goes to excess in his denunciation of the institutions of the sages.
The reader will agree with these accounts of the Book. Kwang-dze at times becomes weak in his attempts to establish his points. To my mind the most interesting portions of this Book and the last one are the full statements which we have in them of the happy state of men when the Tâo maintained its undisputed sway in the world, and the names of many of the early Tâoistic sovereigns. How can we suppose that anything would be gained by a return to the condition of primitive innocence and simplicity? The antagonism between Tâoism and Confucianism comes out in this Book very decidedly.
p. 142
The title of the Book is taken from two characters in the first clause of the first paragraph.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Next: Book XI. Zâi Yû
