Swedes show a dour Europe the way to reform
The partial climb-down by the French government over its youth employment contract is the worst thing that could have happened to the economic reform process. The French are squandering enormous political capital on a reform that, in its new guise, will have virtually no impact on the labour market. The conclusion French and other European politicians will draw from this mess is that economic reforms should be avoided in future.
Amid the insanity, however, it is worth remembering that there are countries where economic reforms have worked - and even proved popular. One is Sweden, which succeeded by defying conventional wisdom and adopting a tailor-made approach.
The Swedish government flouts much of the advice it receives from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The Swedish labour market is about as rigid as Germany's. Sweden has one of the world's most comprehensive tax-based welfare systems. Among the more startling OECD statistics is that the average Swede takes 17 weeks off work each year - mostly through a combination of holidays, sickness and parental leave.
Yet Sweden's macroeconomic performance is impressive. Between 1995 and 2004, labour productivity grew by an average annual rate of 2.5 per cent - higher than even the US. After a brief slowdown in 2003, gross domestic product increased by an annual rate of 3 per cent in 2004 and 2005. Since 2004, annual inflation rates have fallen and remained below 1 per cent - the lower band of the central bank's target range. The Swedish government runs a structural surplus of more than 1 per cent of GDP. No economy is perfect. But in terms of macroeconomic performance, Sweden comes close.
So how could Sweden have succeeded when its policies appear so flawed? The decision to stay out of the euro is not a convincing answer: the krona's exchange rate against the euro has been remarkably stable, except for a short period in 2000. Nominal interest rates were on average a little lower than in the eurozone but not low enough to explain the difference in performance.
It is not clear, either, that the success can be attributed to Sweden's social model. It is true that the country manages to combine a high degree of social security with flexibility. Flexibility, in this instance, does not mean a regime in which it is easy to hire and fire workers but one characterised by welfare-to-work programmes, ambitious retraining schemes, specific programmes to integrate the disabled into the labour market and a world-class education system. Sweden produces one of the largest proportions of high school graduates in the world and is a champion of life-long learning. In Sweden, it is not the system that is flexible. It is the people.
But while these supply-side
policies bring many long-term benefits, the Swedish model cannot explain the country's macroeconomic success during the last 10 years.
A more plausible explanation is Sweden's general approach to economic reform. By embedding economic reforms in a transparent economic strategy, Sweden managed to avoid the uncertainty emitted as a toxic byproduct of reform elsewhere. In Germany, the 2003-04 welfare reforms contributed to the poor economic performance during that period, as people reacted by reining in consumption. In France, the conflict over the youth employment contract has added to the country's general sense of malaise.
In contrast to many other European governments, the Swedes are clear about their policy goals and the instruments they will use to achieve them. They seek high levels of employment and social security, a low dispersion of wages, superior public services and a generous welfare state. In return, they accept higher taxes, tight labour market regulations, a fiscal surplus and a conservative monetary policy.
To make this work in practice, consecutive governments implemented tough reforms to welfare systems, pensions, the budget and the labour market. They also deregulated product markets to bring down inflation. Like it or not, it is a consistent strategy.
Compare this with the confused national economic thinking in Germany and France. The Germans prefer US-style income and corporate taxes and a Swedish-style public sector. The national economic strategy, if one can call it that, is full of such contradictions. In France, labour market reforms consist of a series of one-off political stunts.
Sweden also benefits from a more consensual political culture. The theological divide between anti-reform fundamentalists and true believers in US-style market freedoms is far less pronounced. While the Centre party, which is part of the opposition Alliance for Sweden, has proposed a youth employment contract similar to the one in France, it is seen as a vote-loser and will not form part of the manifesto for September elections.
Swedes do not agree on everything, but their debate on economic reforms is more measured. Anti-reform riots on the streets of Stockholm are unthinkable because policymakers know they must prepare the ground carefully and build effective coalitions.
The reason for Sweden's economic success, therefore, is not a superior social model or a clever macroeconomic strategy. It is not the policies the country has adopted - but how it has adopted them.
瞧瞧人家瑞典！
法国政府在该国青年就业合同上做出部分退让，这是经济改革进程中可能发生的最坏一件事。披上新伪装的这些改革，实质上对劳动力市场毫无影响，而法国却在这些改革上浪费大量政治资本。法国与其它欧洲国家的政客在这次混乱中将得出的结论是：今后应避免经济改革。
然而在这些荒谬行径中，有一点值得记住，那就是经济改革在某些国家确实发挥了作用，甚至受到了欢迎。瑞典就是其中之一，它的成功源于抛弃正统理念，采取切合自身的做法。
瑞典政府对经合组织(OECD)给它的很多建议不屑一顾。瑞典的劳动力市场同德国一样呆板僵化。瑞典有全球最完善、以税收为基础的福利制度之一。据经合组织统计数据，令人惊奇的是，瑞典人平均每年缺勤17周，包括休假、病假和产假(父母都有)。
然而，瑞典的宏观经济表现令人赞叹。在1995至2004年间，瑞典劳动生产率年均增长2.5%――甚至比美国还要高。国内生产总值(GDP)经历了2003年的短暂减速后，2004和2005年达到了3%的年增长率。2004年以来，瑞典的年通胀率一直在下降，并保持低于1%的水平，即瑞典央行目标区间的下端。瑞典政府一直保持着超过GDP 1%的结构盈余。没有哪个经济体是完美的，但就宏观经济表现来看，瑞典已经接近完美。
瑞典的政策似乎瑕疵不少，那么它何以取得成功呢？瑞典不加入欧元区的决定不是令人信服的答案：除了2000年的一小段时间，瑞典克朗兑欧元的汇率一直相当稳定。瑞典的名义利率平均要比欧元区低一点，但这点差距不足以解释它与欧元区国家在宏观经济表现上的差异。
瑞典的成功能否归因于其社会模式，也不是太清楚。的确，瑞典设法将高度的社会保障与灵活性结合在了一起。灵活性在这里并非意味着可以轻松雇佣和解雇工人的制度，相反，它的特色是各种“从福利到工作”的计划、雄心勃勃的再培训方案、帮助残疾人进入劳动力市场的特殊方案，以及世界级的教育体系。瑞典培养的高中毕业生比例全球最高，在终生学习方面也是全球首屈一指。在瑞典，灵活的不是它的制度，而是瑞典人民。
虽然这些供应方政策带来了许多长期效益，但瑞典模式无法解释该国过去10年在宏观经济上的成功。
一个看似更合理的解释是瑞典经济改革的总体方针。通过将经济改革嵌入透明的经济战略，瑞典成功避免了其它地方改革的有害副产品――不确定性。德国2003至2004年的福利改革，是造成这段时间经济表现欠佳的一个原因，因为人们对改革的反应是放慢了消费。法国在青年就业合同上的冲突，加剧了该国的整体萎靡感。
与其它许多欧洲国家政府形成鲜明对比的是，瑞典人对他们的政策目标和用于达到目标的工具都非常清楚。他们寻求高水平的就业率和社会保障、低水平的工资差异、出色的公共服务，以及一个高福利国家。作为交换，他们接受较高的税收、严格的劳动力市场法规、财政盈余和保守的货币政策。
为推行这些政策，历届政府对福利制度、养老金、预算以及劳动力市场进行了艰巨改革。他们还解除了对产品市场的管制以抑制通胀。不管你喜不喜欢，这是连贯的战略。
这与德国和法国毫无章法的全国经济思路形成对比。德国偏爱美国式的所得税与公司税和瑞典式的公共部门。德国的全国经济战略(如果可以这么叫的话)充满了这样的矛盾。法国的劳动力市场改革，则是由连串的一次性政治做秀组成。
瑞典还得益于更倾向共识的政治文化。反改革人士与美式自由市场信徒的意识形态分界线远没有那么鲜明。作为瑞典反对派联盟一部分的中央党(Centre party)，也提议了一个与法国类似的青年就业合同，但该提议被认为会让政党失去选民支持，因此不会出现在9月大选的竞选宣言中。
瑞典人并非在所有事情上都意见一致，但他们在经济改革方面的辩论更为温和。斯德哥尔摩街头发生反改革骚乱是不可想象的事情，因为决策者知道，他们必须小心地打好基础，建立起有效的联盟。
因此，瑞典经济成功的原因不是出色的社会模式或更高明的宏观经济战略。关键不是瑞典所采用的政策，而是瑞典推行政策的方式。
