世界承受不起美中交恶
Why Washington and Beijing need strong global institutions
This week, George W. Bush, the US president, meets Hu Jintao, his Chinese counterpart, during the first US visit by a Chinese head of state since 1997. As the authors of an important recent study remark: "The US-China relationship is too big to disregard and too critical to misread".* The two countries are fated to co-operate. The question is how best they can do so.
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One could not imagine a worse-matched couple: the one a democracy, the other an autocracy; the one a child of the enlightenment, the other the avatar of the world's most enduring agrarian empire. It will take an effort not just of imagination, but of will, for the two to work well together. Yet failure to do so could lead to another dismal epoch of disorder. The world must not let the opportunity for peaceful exchange and prosperity slip through its fingers, as it did so tragically in the first half of the twentieth century.
An interdependent world requires the willing, sustained and disciplined co-operation that multilateral institutions alone can underpin. This is true particularly in the area of economics. It applies not least to a focal issue for presidents Bush and Hu: exchange rates and "global imbalances". The malign interaction between exchange rate policies and protectionist pressures is the biggest threat to economic openness.
Many in the US Congress blame China for their country's huge and growing current account deficits. While the US economy is expanding strongly, protectionist pressure is contained. But what will happen during the next downturn? As Harvard university's Martin Feldstein has also noted recently, such a downturn is hardly unlikely, since only exceptionally low savings and high borrowing by US households have sustained US domestic demand at levels sufficient to offset the country's huge trade deficits.**
Why is the only workable solution a multilateral one? The first part of the answer is economic: the global balance of payments is inherently multilateral. Even if one focuses, wrongly, on bilateral balances, the US deficit with mainland China accounts for only a quarter of its overall deficit. In the global picture, we find that China's current account surplus was roughly a sixth of the aggregate surpluses of oil exporters and advanced economies (other than the US) in 2005 (see charts).
The second part of the answer is political. If the relationship between the US and China is treated as a purely bilateral one, all disputes become matters of power and prestige. To "win" is to impose the former; to "lose" is to sacrifice the latter. At present, the US is more powerful than China. If it imposes its will bilaterally, perhaps by threatening import tariffs, as it did when breaking up the Bretton Woods exchange rate system in 1971, it inflicts humiliation. Yet today's China is not in the same relationship with the US as Japan and Europe during the cold war. A series of bruising bilateral conflicts between the two powers will destroy the working relationship on which the world will depend in coming decades.
The final part of the answer is that a resolution will be achieved only by first reaching a mutual understanding of the challenge. Discussions of exchange rate policy require an intellectual honest broker. That is what the International Monetary Fund exists to be. By providing a credible and authoritative analysis of the global position, it can turn what would otherwise be a conflict between powers into a discussion of mutual interests. This is why reform of the IMF, an issue to be discussed at the spring meetings in Washington this weekend, is no arcane or minor matter.
In an interesting recent discussion, Raghuram Rajan, the IMF's chief economist, argues that "surveillance is likely to be most effective when countries use it as a basis for constructive give and take".*** President Bush's administration has shown little interest in international finance and still less in reform of the IMF. It has been mistaken. A reformed Fund would greatly facilitate the discussion both it and we need.
China remains a pivotal player in the global balance of payments. It ran a current account surplus of about $150bn (£84bn) last year (see chart). If oil prices had been lower, its surplus would have been considerably bigger. Its currency reserves - a measure of its enormous interventions - are likely to exceed $1,000bn by the end of this year. Given the country's reserves and the sustained inflow of foreign direct investment, it could run a current account deficit of $50bn without any risk. That would generate a swing of some $200bn in its external position. The world needs to persuade a cautious Chinese leadership that such changes (which would require a faster currency appreciation) are not just a demand from the "sole superpower", but in its own interest. Moving in this direction would also show its ability to play a leading role in the global economic system.
The will of a single country, however powerful, cannot guarantee a global order. If nothing else, the rise of China guarantees this. Multilateralism is a way to help the world's powers work together, in the interests of all. If this approach is to work, however, the institutions that oversee it must be credible and legitimate. That is why both a substantial reweighting of voting shares in the IMF and selection of its head from a global pool of qualified candidates are priorities.
The way in which the discussion of global exchange rate and macroeconomic policy is handled also bears on the wider issue of how the US and China are to act in the world. Are relations between them to be an endless tussle over power or are they to secure their interests in a more co-operative multilateral setting?
The brilliant vision of US leadership during and after the second world war was that institutionalised co-operation could be the basis for a novel global order. This vision is as relevant to the the era of a rising China. In deciding how to reform the multilateral institutions it established, the US can also help determine how China itself sees its new role.
The US can renew the multilateral approach for a new age; or it can bury it. Let it choose wisely.
*China: The Balance Sheet, C. Fred Bergsten and others, (New York: Public Affairs, for the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Institute for International Economics, 2006); **The Case for a Competitive Dollar,
www.nber.org; ***The Ebbing Spirit of Internationalism and the International Monetary Fund, March 8 2006,
www.imf.org 世界承受不起美中交恶
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周,美国总统布什(George W. Bush)会见中国国家主席胡锦涛,这是中国国家领导人1997年以来首度访美。正如最近一份重要研究报告的作者所述:“美中关系事关重大,不容忽略,而且至关重要,不容误判”*。两国注定要合作,问题是如何最好地合作。
人们无法想象比美中更不“般配”的一对国家了:一个是民主政体,另一个是威权政体;一个是启蒙运动的产物,另一个是世界上历史最悠久的农业帝国。双方的良好合作不仅需要想象,还要有意志。否则可能导致又一个糟糕的无序时代。世界绝不能让和平交流和繁荣的机会从指尖溜走,重演20世纪上半叶的悲剧。
一个相互依赖的世界,需要可由多边机构独自支撑的自愿、持久、守纪的合作,在经济领域尤为如此。这适用于布什总统和胡锦涛主席关注的一个问题:汇率与“全球失衡”。汇率政策和保护主义压力之间的恶性互动,是对经济开放的最大威胁。
许多美国国会议员把美国不断扩大的巨额经常账户赤字归咎于中国。美国经济在强劲扩张,而保护主义压力得到了抑制。但下一轮经济低迷到来时会发生什么呢?正如哈佛大学的马丁?费尔德斯坦(Martin Feldstein)最近也指出的那样,这种经济低迷并非不可能,因为只是美国家庭格外低的储蓄和格外高的借贷,才将美国内需维持在足够抵消美国巨大贸易逆差的水平**。
为什么唯一可行的解决方案是多边的呢?答案的第一部分在于经济:全球国际收支在本质上是多边的。即便人们错误地聚焦双边平衡,美国对中国大陆的赤字也只占其总体赤字的四分之一。在全球背景下,我们发现,中国经常账户盈余大致相当于石油输出国家和发达经济体(除美国外)2005年盈余总额的六分之一。
答案的第二部分在于政治。如果美中关系被纯粹当成双边关系来看待,那所有争议就变成权力和威望问题了。“赢”就是施加权力,“输”就是失去威望。目前美国比中国更强大。如果美国在双边关系中强加自己的意志――也许通过威胁征收进口关税的方式,就像它1971年打破布雷顿森林(Bretton Woods)汇率体系时所做的那样,那美国就会令别国蒙羞。但今天中国与美国的关系,与冷战时期日本和欧洲与美国的关系不同。有损两大强国的一系列双边冲突,会毁掉今后几十年世界所依赖的工作关系。
答案的最后一部分是,只有首先对挑战达成共同谅解,才能达成解决方案。汇率政策谈判需要一个睿智诚实的中间人,这正是国际货币基金组织(IMF)存在的目的。它能提供可信、权威的全球局势分析,把大国间的潜在冲突转变成有关共同利益的讨论。这就是将于本周末在华盛顿春季会议上讨论的IMF改革问题,既不晦涩,也非次要的原因。
在最近一次有意思的讨论中,IMF首席经济学家拉古拉姆?瑞占(Raghuram Rajan)指出,“各国都将监督作为建设性妥协的基础时,监督才可能最有效”***。布什政府对国际金融没什么兴趣,对国际货币基金组织改革更是不屑一顾。这是错误的。改革后的IMF能有效推进布什政府和我们都需要的讨论。
中国仍是全球国际收支中的关键角色。去年,中国的经常账户盈余约为1500亿美元。假如石油价格更低的话,盈余会更可观。到今年底,中国的外汇储备(中国大力入市干预的衡量标准之一)很可能超过1万亿美元。鉴于中国的外汇储备规模和持续流入的外国直接投资,中国可以毫无风险地承受500亿美元的经常账户赤字,这将使中国的国际收支情况发生约2000亿美元的变动。世界需要让谨慎的中国领导层相信,这种变化(其本身需要加快货币升值进程)不仅是“唯一超级大国”的要求,也符合其自身利益。朝着这个方向努力,还将展示中国在全球经济体系中扮演领导角色的能力。
单个国家的意志无论多么强大,也无法保证全球秩序。即使没有别的因素,单是中国的崛起也足以确保这一点。多边主义是帮助世界大国合作的一个途径,对各方都有利。但要使这一方式奏效,那么负责监督的机构就必须是可信、合法的。这就是为什么当务之急是大幅调整国际货币基金组织的投票权,以及从合格的全球候选人中推选总裁。
全球汇率及宏观经济政策讨论的处理方式,也与美中的全球行为方式这一更大的问题有关。美中关系是无止尽的权力角逐,还是在更为合作的多边框架中保障各自的利益?
制度化的合作可成为新型全球秩序的基础,这是美国领导人在二战期间及战后的真知灼见。在中国崛起之际,这个愿景同样适用。美国在考虑如何改革自己创立的多边机构时,也能帮助决定中国如何看待其自身的新角色。
面向新时代,美国可以重启多边方式,也可以将其埋葬。让它做出明智的选择吧。
*《中国:资产负债表》(China: The Balance Sheet),C?福雷德?伯格斯坦(C.Fred BergSten)等著(《纽约:公共事务》(New York: Public Affairs),战略与国际研究中心(Center for Strategic and International Studies)和国际经济研究所(Institute for International Economics),2006);
**《提高美元竞争力的理由》(The Case for a Competitive Dollar),
www.nber.org;
***《国际主义精神的衰落和国际货币基金组织》(The Ebbing Spirit of Internationalism and the International Monetary Fund),2006年3月8日,
www.imf.org。
作者简介:马丁?沃尔夫 (Martin Wolf)是《金融时报》的副主编 (associate editor)和首席经济评论员。他对全球经济有着精辟的深刻分析,获得了国际上各界广泛普遍的承认赞赏。最近,在他荣获 2003 年度“最佳商务记者奖”评奖中,他获得了其中的“十年杰出成就奖 ”等殊荣。沃尔夫先生1971年毕业于牛津大学,获经济学硕士。然后,他到世界银行任职工作,并于1974年出任世行资深经济学家。1999年以来,他一直是每年一度的 “世界经济论坛 ”的特邀评委成员。