Trichet must be decisive
The European Central Bank is a much-maligned institution. Fellow central bankers, economists and commentators have ritually attacked it for failing to communicate appropriately, being obsessed with inflation and monetary targets, not caring enough about the eurozone's low-growth economy and not being responsive enough to sudden shocks. A few of these criticisms are justified, most are exaggerated, some are downright false.
Next month, Jean-Claude Trichet will take over as president of the ECB. Future economic historians will probably regard Wim Duisenberg, his predecessor, more kindly than his contemporaries have done. Judged by technical benchmarks for monetary policy, the ECB's monetary stance has been appropriate for the eurozone as a whole. The charge that the ECB should have paid closer attention to specific countries is an absurd one to level at the central bank of a monetary union.
Criticisms of the bank's lack of responsiveness and poor communication, however, are fair. These are the areas that Mr Trichet, currently governor of the Bank of France, has to tackle as a priority.
The biggest economic threat to the eurozone would be a sudden devaluation of the dollar. Europe has virtually no influence over whether this happens and, if it does, how far the dollar falls. The present level of the dollar is widely judged to be unsustainable. When Asian central banks start to dump their dollar reserves, the US currency will fall not only against Asian currencies but also against the euro. If the dollar overshoots, it will undermine eurozone competitiveness and put pressure on Mr Trichet to stimulate growth.
The eurozone does not have an exchange rate policy. If Europe wanted to adopt one, the ECB and finance ministers would have to agree on such a policy jointly. This is highly improbable. It is even less likely that they could co-opt the US into such an arrangement. So Mr Trichet and his colleagues will have monetary policy as their main tool to tackle a fast-depreciating dollar. The test will be whether Mr Trichet can persuade his colleagues to cut short-term interest rates from their present level of 2 per cent possibly to near-zero.
The other imperative for Mr Trichet will be to communicate the ECB's decisions clearly and consistently. This will undoubtedly involve putting an end to the messy business of formulating policy by consensus. Participants in the annual Konstanz seminar earlier this year - including top European and US monetary economists - disagreed not only about what ECB policy should be but also about what it is. In 1998, the ECB set an inflation target of less than 2 per cent. More recently, the bank said the target should be close to 2 per cent. Then officials further clarified the position by saying that the target should be close to, but less than, 2 per cent. After all this clarification, even experts are confused.
Why not simply admit that the target is 2 per cent? Because the ECB hates to show that it has gone soft on inflation. Instead it has chosen to confuse. But a 2 per cent target is entirely consistent with the reality of the ECB's policymaking. Since the ECB was established five years ago, average annual eurozone inflation has exceeded the 2 per cent limit three times.
Many of the ECB's problems, in particular its sluggish response, result from its consensus-based approach. Monetary policy decisions are not voted on. Instead, they emerge after long discussion. Consensus may have been important, for political reasons, when the bank began operations but the times and the problems have changed. Mr Trichet must establish a rule that the board of governors always takes a vote, ensuring that the ECB makes monetary policy decisions when necessary, not when it is politically expedient to do so.
Mr Trichet should implement these changes even if it means overriding some members of the board. Otherwise, he will find himself on the defensive and will waste time dealing with semantics instead of policy. If he bites the bullet, however, there is a good chance that the ECB will come to be regarded as one of the European Union's most successful institutions.
特里谢需要果断
欧洲央行(ECB)是一个倍受攻击的机构。各国央行官员、经济学家及评论员总是批评它沟通不当，并且过分关注通货膨胀和货币目标，而且对欧元区经济增长过低关心不够，对突发性冲击的反应也不够迅速。这些批评中，少数正确，多数言过其实，有一些则完全错误。
下月，让-克劳德o特里谢(Jean-Claude Trichet)将接任欧洲央行行长。与同时代人相比，将来的经济史学家很可能对特里谢的前任德伊森贝赫(Wim Duisenberg)评价更友善。根据货币政策的技术指标判断，欧洲央行的货币政策对欧元区这个整体而言是适当的。欧洲央行是一个货币联盟的央行，因此，批评它没有给予具体国家更多关注实在荒谬可笑。
不过，批评该央行反应迟缓，沟通欠佳，倒不失公允。这些方面的问题特里谢先生必须优先解决。特里谢先生目前是法国央行(Bank of France)行长。
欧元区在经济上面临的最大威胁可能是美元的突然贬值。这一情况会不会出现，如果出现，那么美元下跌幅度多大，在这个问题上，欧洲几乎束手无策。人们普遍认为，美元无法维持当前的水平。一旦亚洲各国央行开始抛售美元储备，不仅美元兑亚洲货币的汇率将下跌，而且美元兑欧元的汇率也将下跌。如果美元过度贬值，欧元区的竞争力将受损，同时将增加特里谢先生刺激经济增长的压力。
欧元区没有汇率政策。如果它想采用一种，那么这种政策必须获得欧洲央行和各成员国财长一致认可，而这是极不可能的。让美国同意他们的这种安排更加不可能。因此，对特里谢先生和他的同事来说，货币政策将是他们应对美元快速贬值的主要工具。但特里谢先生面临的考验是，能否说服他的同事将短期利率从目前的2%削减到接近零的水平。
特里谢先生面临的另外紧要任务是，明确并始终一致地表述欧洲央行的决策。毫无疑问，要实现这个目标，需要结束目前借助于一致同意来制订政策的混乱局面。在今年年初的康斯坦茨(Konstanz)年度研讨会上，与会者不仅对欧洲央行应制订什么样的政策意见不一，而且对欧洲央行目前实行的是什么政策也持不同看法。参加这次会议的包括欧美顶级货币经济学家。1998年，欧洲央行设定了低于2%的通货膨胀率目标。后来，该行表示，通胀率目标应接近2%。接着，官员们进一步阐明立场，表示通胀率目标应接近2%、但在2%以下。不过，经过这么多解释，就连专家们也糊涂了。
欧洲央行何不直接承认通胀率目标是2%？因为它不愿表现出对通胀的态度有所软化。相反，它选择了含混不清的说法。但2%的目标与欧洲央行的决策现实是完全一致的。自欧洲央行五年前成立以来，欧元区的年均通胀率已有三次超过2%的上限。
欧洲央行的许多问题，尤其是反应迟缓的问题，是其基于一致同意的决策方法造成的。在欧洲央行，货币政策不是通过表决决定的，而是经过长时间讨论形成的。当欧洲央行刚开始运作时，出于政治原因，一致同意可能十分重要，但现在时代变化了，问题也改变了。特里谢先生必须制订一项规则，要求任何决策均由理事会表决做出，从而确保欧洲央行在制订货币政策时确实从实际需要出发，而不是出于政治利益。
即使变革意味着违背理事会部分成员的意愿，特里谢先生也应该实施这些变革。否则，他会发觉自己陷于守势，而且会把时间浪费在咬文嚼字、而不是制订政策上。然而，如果他能勇敢地把变革推行下去，那么欧洲央行将很有可能成为人们心目中最成功的欧盟(EU)机构之一。
