Probe opens old wounds at NYSE
Critics of the New York Stock Exchange's regulatory powers - and of its ability and willingness to use them - have one word for those who argue that it must retain its prized status as a self-regulatory organisation, which gives it vast power over what its users can and cannot do.
The word is "Oakford".
This was a brokerage firm that went out of business at the end of the 1990s after several NYSE floor brokers were charged with "flipping" stocks - trading ahead of customers at prices between the bid and offer levels - and sharing the profits with Oakford.
Flipping was considered illegal by the Securities and Exchange Commission. But it was a fairly common practice on the NYSE floor in the 1990s. When the SEC began investigating, it found the exchange had effectively turned a blind eye.
The accused floor brokers found that courts supported their contention that they could not have been doing wrong when their own regulator - the NYSE - condoned the practice. The SEC was forced to retreat, turning what should have been a victory against rogue trading into an embarrassment.
Relations between the SEC and the NYSE have been sour ever since. They have not obviously improved. (The chairman of the NYSE in the early 1990s was William Donaldson, who now heads the SEC.)
It emerged last week that the SEC had forced the NYSE to step up the pace and scale of a new probe. This involves alleged excessive interference between buyers and sellers by the specialist firms that control activity on the floor.
The NYSE said it had found evidence of such practices among five firms - Van der Moolen, LaBranche, Goldman Sachs/Spear Leeds & Kellogg, Fleet Specialist and Bear Wagner. They face a collective fine of up to $150m - the most severe monetary penalty since the NYSE became its own regulator in 1934.
The pressing question for the NYSE now - given that trading abuses were not supposed to recur after Oakford - is whether the specialists' activities were the result of poor regulation or point to a wider problem about the role of the specialists.
Benn Steil, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who is on the board of the London-based electronic market virt-x, argues that the failure at the NYSE is not regulatory but structural. Instances of trading malfeasance are "inevitable" so long as the NYSE relies on and indulges the specialist system, Mr Steil says, and so long as stock trading remains so intermediated that it is difficult to establish an audit trail for regulators to follow.
NYSE members insist, however, that changes were made in the wake of Oakford and will be made again in the wake of the latest evidence of rogue trading. "I believe we're seeing a [regulatory] system here that's working," says Samuel Lek, chairman of Lek Securities, a brokerage.
"It would be wrong to say nothing has changed [in NYSE regulation] since Oakford. They didn't get rid of floor brokers but they did end abuses. It's the same with the specialists."
John Reed, NYSE interim chairman, has spoken out against splitting regulatory and market functions. He is backed by many NYSE members nervous about any change in the regulation of the 211-year-old stock market. Yet with other exchanges such as Nasdaq severing ownership ties with their own regulators, there is pressure for the NYSE to do the same.
Mr Reed told Congress last week that a package of reforms for the NYSE would be unveiled soon, mostly to overhaul corporate governance. He indicated the commercial and regulatory divisions would, at the least, have separate reporting structures. This would partly address the regulatory lacunae revealed by successive scandals at the NYSE.
It may also begin to change the perception in some quarters that the regulatory division is the enforcer of the wider NYSE mission to maintain its dominance of US equity trading. In this view, the last thing anyone should expect is a regulatory revolution.
Dale Oesterle, a professor at Ohio State University, says there is a longstanding institutional unwillingness at the NYSE to address its own regulatory failings, leading to a cycle of scandal to which it has been forced to react ad hoc. There is "a pattern of incremental rule change, but it's just window dressing, and we move forward to the next scandal".
Mr Reed has given the impression that he intends to change a lot of things at the NYSE. Investors will know quite soon whether he can deliver.
调查揭开纽约证交所旧疮疤
有些人对纽约证交所(NYSE)的监管权及其使用该权力的能力和愿望提出批评；另一些人则认为，纽约证交所必须保留其作为自我监管组织的宝贵地位--这一地位赋予它极大的权力，可决定它的会员能做什么，以及不能做什么。但批评人士有一个词要告诉这些人。
这个词是"Oakford"。
Oakford是一家股票经纪公司，于上世纪90年代末停业。此前，纽约证交所数名场内经纪商被控进行"先行交易"，并与Oakford分享利润。"先行交易"是指交易员先于客户进行交易，并在买入价和卖出价之间赚取差价。
按照美国证券交易委员会(SEC)的规定，先行交易为非法操作。但在上世纪90年代，这种操作在纽约证交所交易大厅里相当普遍。证交会在开始调查后发现，纽约证交所实际上对此采取了熟视无睹的态度。
被控的场内经纪商辩解说，由于得到监管者纽约证交所的宽恕，他们的行为不可能不正当。他们发现，他们的辩护得到法庭的支持，证交会因此被迫撤诉，从而导致本应是监管部门对流氓交易获胜的一次审判，最终以尴尬收场。
自那以后，证交会与纽约证交所的关系一直比较僵，目前也未明显改善。(上世纪90年代初，纽约证交所主席一职由威廉o唐纳森(William Donaldson)担任，而他目前担任证交会主席。)
上周，证交会命令纽约证交所加快展开一项新调查，并扩大调查范围。调查内容包括，特设经纪商涉嫌在买方和卖方之间过度干涉。特设经纪商是场内交易活动的控制者。
纽约证交所称，它发现了五家特设经纪商进行此类操作的证据。这五家公司分别是：Van der Moolen、LaBranche、高盛/斯必李&凯洛格(Goldman Sachs/Spear Leeds & Kellogg)、Fleet Specialist及Bear Wagner。这些公司面临一项总额达1.50亿美元的罚款，这是自纽约证交所1934年成为自己的监管者以来最严厉的一次罚款。
在Oakford事件后，本不应该再出现滥用交易职权的行为。因此纽约证交所现在迫切需要明确的是：这些特设经纪商的活动是监管不力的结果，还是应归咎于更大的问题，即特设经纪商的角色问题。
本o斯泰尔(Benn Steil)是美国对外关系委员会(Council on Foreign Relations)的一名成员，同时担任设在伦敦的virt-x电子交易市场的董事。他说，纽约证交所的失职不是出在监管上，而是在结构上。斯泰尔先生说，只要纽约证交所继续依赖并纵容特设经纪商制度，只要中介在股票交易中的作用仍如此之大，以至于很难建立一个让监管者进行监视的审计跟踪系统，那么交易违规行为就"不可避免"。
但纽约证交所的会员强调说，Oakford丑闻爆发后，证交所进行了改革。随着最近出现流氓交易（rogue trading)的迹象，证交所还将进一步改革。经纪公司Lek Securities的董事长塞缪尔o莱克(Samuel Lek)表示："我相信，纽约证交所会有一个行之有效的（监管）制度。"
莱克表示："要说（纽约证交所的监管）自Oakford丑闻后完全未变是错误的。纽约证交所没有取消场内经纪商，但确实结束了经纪商滥用职权的行为。在特设经纪商方面也是如此。"
纽约证交所是一家已有211年历史的证券交易市场。证交所临时董事长约翰o里德(John Reed)明确反对将证交所的监管职能和市场职能分离。许多会员对他表示支持。纽约证交所的监管如有任何更改，都会令这些会员感到担心。但纳斯达克(Nasdaq)等其它证券交易市场都在将所有权和监管权分离，因此纽约证交所面临采取同样行动的压力。
里德先生上周在国会表示，纽约证交所即将公布一揽子改革措施，主要是在公司治理方面进行彻底改革。他指出，改革后商业部门和监管部门至少会有单独的汇报结构。这将部分弥补纽约证交所一系列丑闻所暴露出的监管漏洞。
在某些领域，人们的一个观念可能也会因此开始改变。这个观念就是，监管部门执行的是纽约证交所一个更远大的使命，这就是保持证交所在美国股票交易中的主导地位。从这一点来看，人们最不希望看到的就是一场监管革命。
俄亥俄州立大学教授戴尔o奥斯特勒(Dale Oesterle)表示，长期以来，纽约证交所一直不愿从制度上解决自身的监管失效问题，导致丑闻周而复始，迫使证交所只能头痛医头，脚痛医脚了。证交所形成了"一种规则渐变模式，但这只是装装门面，丑闻还会爆发"。
人们有这样的感觉：里德先生打算对纽约证交所进行大刀阔斧的改革。他是否能够成功，投资者很快就会清楚。
