Upbeat and galloping ahead
"Although we have suffered the effects of Sars (severe acute respiratory syndrome) and some natural disasters, the situation of China's economic development this year is pretty good."
This was the optimistic picture painted by Zhang Xiaoqiang, vice-chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission, in an interview with the FT last month.
Recent performance has been impressive. The November issue of "Consensus Forecasts" reports expected economic growth this year at 8.5 per cent. Industrial value-added grew 16.7 per cent between January and October over the same period of last year. In the first 10 months, foreign trade was up 36.4 per cent over the corresponding period in 2002.
The question is whether these good times can last. The answer is: yes, at least for some time.
The worry is whether China's economy is overheating now, with a threat of subsequent overcooling. But, at the aggregate level, China shows few of the symptoms of an overheating economy.
"Consensus Forecasts" reports expected consumer price inflation at 0.8 per cent this year and just 1.4 per cent in 2004. The balance of payments is remarkably strong, with a current account surplus forecast by the International Monetary Fund at $25bn this year.
China is accumulating foreign currency reserves at an astonishing rate: at the end of September 2003, these had reached $383.9bn, up $97.5bn since the end of 2002. Not surprisingly, therefore, Mr Zhang describes the economic trend as good "in terms of the structure, quality and efficiency of our economy".
What Mr Zhang is more concerned with is imbalances in specific sectors. Investment in steel production, for example, rose by 134 per cent in the first half of this year over the same period of last year. Similarly, the output of vehicles is forecast to rise by 30 per cent this year, after 37 per cent in 2002.
Investment is also being made in capacity to produce an extra 10m vehicles a year.
Yet, as Wu Xiaoling, vice-governor of the People's Bank of China, told the Financial Times, such sectoral imbalances are not surprising. "China is a transitional economy and we are faced with many institutional and structural problems. From one perspective, it is a little hot, but from another it is a little cold."
The People's Bank's particular focus is on the rapid growth of money and credit. Bank lending rose by 20 per cent in the year to the third quarter of this year, against 13 per cent over the year to the third quarter of 2002 and only 5 per cent over the year to the third quarter of 2001.
Similarly, growth of M1 has risen from just under 12 per cent in the year to February 2002 to 19 per cent in the year to October 2003. This surge in credit growth is closely related to the rise in investment. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, gross fixed investment will rise 19.7 per cent this year, after 15.5 per cent in 2002 and 10.4 per cent in 2001.
Investment is more unstable than GDP in virtually all economies. But its ability to destabilise the Chinese economy is exceptional because of its high weight in GDP, at around 40 per cent. The rise in investment has accounted for more than half the growth in China's GDP in 2001 and 2002.
Up to this point, however, the surge in fixed investment does not match that of 1992 and 1993. Nor does the rise in investment herald a surge in inflation, at least in the near term. That would also require a big jump in world commodity prices. Without this, the rise in capacity under way is more likely to herald gluts, and so falling prices.
As Ms Wu states: "We are trying to guard against inflation and also to guard against a further slide into deflation, because overcapacity can bring deflation in the future." Over-investment brings with it yet another danger: that of a big increase in non-performing loans in the banking system.
Liu Mingkang, chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission told the FT the ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) to assets in the banking system is falling every year by 3-4 percentage points. Official estimates put NPLs at the big four commercial banks at 22 per cent. On this basis, then, the problem should be eliminated within five or six years.
Unfortunately, unofficial estimates of NPLs put them at more than 40 per cent of assets. Worse, the investment boom could create a surge in NPLs a few years down the road. Even the great hope, home lending, which has risen to 16 per cent of the portfolio of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the country's largest bank, in the past four years, might prove dangerous if property prices fell sharply.
Yet Ms Wu is confident that "the trend of rapid credit growth has been reined in" already. To achieve its end, the People's Bank has used moral suasion. It also raised the reserve ratio it imposes upon commercial banks, from 6 to 7 per cent in August.
Many observers suspect neither measure will be effective, so long as China's fixed exchange rate is generating a huge increase in foreign currency reserves. In response, the government has accelerated liberalisation of the capital account.
The People's Bank is also attempting to sterilise the monetary consequences of the reserve accumulation. Between April 22 and mid- November, it issued central bank bills 42 times, to a total value of Rmb545bn ($65bn).
Meanwhile, interest rates are low enough to ensure that such sterilisation is not too costly: the spread between the short-term interest rates at which the People's Bank can borrow and those it earns on China's foreign currency reserves is less than a percentage point.
Although the distribution of China's reserves is unknown, Ms Wu remarks that "you can be assured we are pursuing a diversification strategy". By investing in euros, for example, China should be able to raise returns on its foreign currency holdings. It is too soon to tell whether Ms Wu is right in her belief that the growth of money and credit is under control. But the likelihood is that the government will not slam on the brakes, unless the overheating becomes far greater.
Inflation may rise, but is most unlikely to explode. While the investment surge may mean more bad loans in years to come, that should be manageable, too, so long as the Chinese people continue to have virtually no alternative to bank deposits as the principal home for their liquid savings. Instead, it may merely postpone full financial liberalisation.
China now seems set to grow even more rapidly than usual, for a sustained period. The authorities seem more concerned over excesses in specific sectors than over the overall condition of the economy. For the moment, therefore, neither a drastic tightening of credit, nor a change in exchange rate regime, to slow reserve accumulation and monetary growth, is likely. The economy is galloping ahead. With the occasional pull on the reins, China is enjoying the ride.
向上的中国经济
"尽管我们受到了非典和一些自然灾害的影响，今年中国经济的总体发展情况还是相当不错的。"
这是中国国家发展和改革委员会副主任张晓强上月接受《金融时报》采访时所表示的乐观表态。
中国经济近期确实表现不俗。根据2003年11月号的《共识预测》，中国经济2003年将实现8.5%的增长。1至10月工业增加值同比增长16.7%，同期外贸总额同比增长36.4%。
问题是这样的好时光能否持续？答案是"能"，至少在今后一段时期内会是如此。
人们担忧的是中国经济是否已处于"过热"状态，以及接下来是否会面临"过冷"的威胁。但从整体上说，中国经济基本上没有呈现过热迹象。
《共识预测》预期2003年中国的消费品价格通胀率仅有0.8%，而2004年也将仅上涨1.4%。国际收支相当强劲，据国际货币基金组织预测，2003年中国的经常帐户盈余将达到250亿美元。
外汇储备正以惊人的速度增加：截至2003年9月底，中国外汇储备已从2002年底的975亿美元增加到3839亿美元。难怪张晓强先生表示，"无论就经济的结构、质量还是效率而言，"中国经济的发展势头都是良好的。
张先生更担心的是个别行业内部出现失衡。比如，2003年上半年钢铁生产项目的投资总额同比增长134%。同时，汽车产量继2002年增长37%之后，2003年将再增长30%。
目前在建的汽车投资项目，还能把每年产能再提高1000万辆。
不过，中国人民银行(PBoC)副行长吴晓灵在接受《金融时报》采访时表示，这些行业性的失衡现象并不奇怪。"中国经济正处于转型期，我们面临很多制度和结构性问题。从一个角度看，经济有点热，但从另一个角度看又有点冷。"
央行的关注焦点是货币供应量和贷款额的快速增长。2003年前三个季度，银行贷款总额同比增长20%，而2002年同期的同比增长幅度为13%，2001年同期仅为5%。
与此同时，狭义货币供应量(M1)的增幅，已从2002年前两个月的略低于12%，上升至2003年前十个月的19%。如此迅猛的信贷增长与投资增长密切相关。根据英国《经济学人》资讯中心(Economist Intelligence Unit)的研究，2003年中国的固定投资总额同比增长19.7%，而2002年和2001年的固定投资总额同比增长幅度分别是15.5%和10.4%。
投资总是比国内生产总值(GDP)更不稳定，这对所有经济体而言几乎都是如此。但它对中国经济的不稳定作用将格外突出，因为投资在中国GDP中所占的比率高达大约40%。2001年和2002年，中国GDP增幅中有一半以上来自投资增长。
然而，固定投资的增长至今还没有达到1992年和1993年时的狂热程度。投资的增长也没有引发通货膨胀，至少在近期将是如此。而且，如果没有全球基础商品价格的大幅上升，也不会发生严重的通货膨胀。若真如此，产能的提高更可能带来商品过剩，以及随之而来的物价下跌。
正如吴女士所指出的："我们正设法防止通货膨胀，同时也在设法防止通缩，因为产能过剩可能导致未来发生通缩。"过度投资还将带来另一个问题，即银行系统中不良贷款大量增加。
据中国银监会主席刘明康向《金融时报》介绍，目前中国银行系统中不良贷款对资产的比率每年下降大约3至4个百分点。官方估计四大商业银行的不良贷款比率为22%。据此推算，这个问题理应在五、六年后彻底解决。
不幸的是，据非官方的估计，不良贷款对资产的比率高达40%以上。更糟的是，当前的投资热潮有可能导致几年后出现大量不良贷款。即使是被寄予厚望的住房贷款业务，也可能因为房地产行情的下滑而出现险情。过去四年间，住房贷款在中国工商银行的信贷组合中所占的比重已上升到16%。中国工商银行是中国最大的银行。
不过，吴女士相信，"快速的信贷增长趋势已得到控制"。为实现其宏观调控目标，中国央行采用了"道义劝说"这样的手段，并于2003年8月将各商业银行的存款准备金率由6%调高至7%。
许多观察家怀疑，只要中国仍然实行固定汇率制度，使中国的外汇储备继续大幅增加，央行的这两项措施就不会有效。作为回应，中国政府已加快了资本帐户的开放速度。
中国央行还试图冲销外汇储备激增在货币政策上造成的后果。2003年4月22日至11月中旬期间，中国人民银行发行了42期央行票据，发行总量达5450亿元人民币。
同时，低利率能确保这种冲销操作的代价不致太大：中国央行借贷的短期利率与其从国家外汇储备得到的收益之间的利差，还不到一个百分点。
虽然中国外汇储备的分布状况不为人所知，但吴女士表示"你可以放心的是，我们正在贯彻多元化政策"。比如，通过增持欧元资产，中国应能提高其外汇储备的回报率。要判断吴女士关于货币和信贷供应量已得到控制的说法是否正确，现在还为时过早。但眼下，中国政府不太可能打算踩刹车，除非经济过热的迹象变得十分明显。
通胀率有可能上涨，但失控的可能性极小。尽管投资猛增有可能意味着未来数年会出现更多的坏债，但只要中国民众除了银行储蓄之外几乎无法找到其他地方可以存放他们的流动资产，这个问题也应该是能够对付的。这种情况可能只会推迟金融服务业的全面开放。
中国经济有望在相当长时期内保持高于常规的增长率。官方似乎仅担心在某些行业内部出现过度投资，而对经济的总体状况颇为满意。因此，就目前而言，中国不太可能骤然收紧信贷或改变现行汇率政策，以减缓外汇储备及货币供应量的增加。中国经济正在奔腾前行，除了偶尔收一收缰绳之外，中国正在纵马驰骋。
