The balancing act of global financial stability
The debate over exchange rates and global imbalances has generated more heat than light. According to one analysis, the US has rightly abandoned its strong dollar policy in order to tackle its gaping current account deficit. According to another, it has not - and it has no reason to do so, given Asian central banks' insatiable appetite for dollar reserves.
Asia should curtail its intervention and let its currencies float upwards to help eliminate global imbalances. Or then again, it should not, since this would mean capital losses on its reserves, higher interest rates and weaker demand in its principal export market.
Europe should restore fiscal discipline by rebuilding its shattered stability pact, and the European Central Bank should cut interest rates in order to prevent the euro's appreciation getting out of hand. Or it should not: it is better off now that it has put this pro-cyclical engine of fiscal perversity behind it and has a central bank that is serious about price stability.
The reason for this incoherence is that the debate has not focused on fundamentals, specifically the policy mix in all three regions. In most of Asia, monetary policy is too loose while fiscal policy is too tight. The region remains wedded to a strategy of export- and investment-led growth predicated on low exchange rates and low interest rates. This combination encourages inefficient investment and periodic overheating of the property market.
In Europe, the problem is the opposite: fiscal policy is too loose while monetary policy is too tight. Structural reform is making for a period of slow growth, pressure for social spending is limiting the scope for cutting expenditure and a new-minted central bank is playing a game of chicken with national fiscal authorities.
In the US, the problem is that fiscal policy is projected to remain loose for so long that if the dollar continues to fall the Federal Reserve will have to raise interest rates further and faster than is healthy. A loose fiscal policy and tight monetary policy would be precisely the opposite of what is appropriate to encourage private investment and thus exploit the opportunities offered by surging productivity.
Tackling the fiscal problem in the US now would obviate the need for a much tighter monetary policy later. It would moderate how far the dollar has to fall to limit the current account deficit, thereby relieving pressure on the Fed to raise rates significantly as the weaker exchange rate translates into higher prices. It would create a more investment-friendly environment than the otherwise inevitable combination of loose fiscal and tight monetary policy. This is why calls for the Fed to begin tightening now are ill-founded. The underlying imbalance is fiscal; monetary tightening would deal with the symptoms not the disease.
In Asia, curtailing intervention in the foreign exchange market would cause exchange rates to rise but growth would not suffer if fiscal policy supported demand, in particular in South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan. The resulting allocation of resources between traded and non-traded goods sectors would be more efficient and there would be a reduction in the threat to the stability of local financial systems posed by lending to property market speculators.
Japan is a special case. In our view, calls for Japan to abandon efforts to depreciate the yen are premature. It would be safer to wait for convincing evidence that deflation has been banished. Of course, the spectre of yen depreciation raises hackles elsewhere in Asia. Japan's neighbours fear their export competitiveness would be undermined if the yen weakened relative to their currencies. But if Japan's prices were to rise at the same time as the yen fell, which is after all the policymakers' goal, there would be no reason for its neighbours to be afraid.
In Europe, tighter fiscal policy combined with more relaxed monetary policy would make for a more competitive exchange rate and an environment that was more friendly to investment, especially if deficits were cut by curtailing public spending. With more investment in technology and capacity, European growth could get back on track.
While exchange rate fluctuations sometimes take on a life of their own, more commonly they are the symptoms rather than the cause of underlying problems. This is the case now. The debate over exchange rates would be more productive if it focused more directly on the underlying problems.
The writers are professors of economics at, respectively, the University of California, Berkeley, and Korea University
全球金融稳定的平衡之道
围绕汇率和全球性不均衡状况的辩论众说纷纭，令人莫衷一是。根据某一项分析，美国正确地放弃了强势美元政策，籍以对付其庞大的经常项目逆差。而根据另一项分析，美国并没有这么做，而且也没有理由这么做，因为亚洲各央行对美元外汇储备的胃口没有止境。
实行汇率干预政策的亚洲国家应当适可而止，让其货币向上浮动，协助消除全球性不均衡状况。可话又说回来，亚洲国家不应该停止干预汇率，因为此举将造成其外汇储备的资本损失，并带来更高的利率，还使其主要出口市场的需求减弱。
欧元区应当通过重建目前分崩离析的《稳定公约》，恢复财政纪律，而欧洲央行应当减低利率，以防止欧元的升值趋势失控。可从另一方面说，这些建议都不可取：欧元区还是放弃僵硬的财政政策更好，因为这种政策助长了经济发展的周期性，而央行力求保持物价稳定也是正确的。
这种不和谐的根本原因，在于辩论没有针对基本面，尤其是所有三个区域的政策组合。在亚洲大多数地方，货币政策过于宽松，而财政政策过于紧缩。该地区一如既往地迷恋以出口和投资为主导的增长策略，依赖低汇率和低利率。此种组合鼓励低效率的投资，并使房地产市场每隔一段时间即出现过热现象。
欧元区的问题正好相反。在该地区，财政政策过于宽松，而货币政策过于紧缩：结构性改革正使经济经历一段慢速增长时期，社会福利支出的压力，则压缩了削减开支的空间，而掌权不久的欧洲央行与各国财政当局之间，正在进行一场较量胆量的"小鸡游戏"。
美国的问题是，宽松的财政政策预期将持续如此之久，假如美元比值继续下滑，美联储将不得不增大加息的幅度和速度，从而超越正常的进程。宽松的财政政策与紧缩的货币政策这一组合，恰恰是最不利于鼓励私人投资，并由此利用劳动生产率大幅提高所带来的商机的。
因此，现在就处理美国的财政问题，有助于避免日后不得不实行大幅收紧的货币政策。就限制经常项目逆差而言，此举有望减小美元的必要贬值幅度，从而缓解美元贬值造成美国物价上涨的状况，进而减轻美联储大幅加息的压力。同时，相对于不实施此举必然会出现的宽松财政政策与紧缩货币政策这一结果，此举有望创建一个更好的投资环境。这就是为什么有关美联储应该立即开始紧缩的呼吁是站不住脚的。根本性的不均衡是在财政政策方面；货币政策的收紧只能治标，而不能治本。
在亚洲，中止对汇市的干预固然会使有关国家和地区的货币比值上升，但只要财政政策支持需求，就不致影响经济增长，特别是在韩国、马来西亚、泰国和台湾。此举有望提高贸易与非贸易商品行业之间的资源分配效率，并减小由于向房地产市场投机者贷款而对当地金融系统的稳定构成的威胁。
日本则是一个特例。在我们看来，呼吁日本放弃人为压低日元比值还为时过早。更稳妥的做法，应该是等待出现令人信服的证据，表明日本的通缩已被杜绝。当然，日元贬值的情形，将使亚洲其他地方不满。日本的邻居们担心：假如日元相对于它们的货币贬值了，它们的出口竞争力将被削弱。不过，假如在日元贬值的同时，日本的物价上升了(这毕竟也是政策制定者的目标)，日本的邻居们就无需担心。
在欧洲，较为紧缩的财政政策与较为宽松的货币政策相结合，将带来更具竞争力的汇率，营造更好的投资环境，尤其是在能够通过削减公共支出而缩小赤字的情况下。随着对科技和产能的投资增加，欧洲的经济增长有望重上正轨。
汇率波动有时候固然来势汹汹，但通常它们都是根本问题的症状，而不是这些问题的起因。目前的情况也不例外。如果能够更直接地针对根本问题，那么有关汇率的辩论将更有成效。
本文作者分别是美国加州大学伯克利分校和高丽大学的经济学教授
