Why there must be a limit to directors' liability
To talk of limiting directors' liabilities following several corporate scandals and the recent report on Equitable Life may seem strange timing. But they underline the importance of limiting liability rather than arguing against it.
There are two reasons for limiting directors' liability. One is sheer fairness. Since 1854, the owners of a company - shareholders who are entitled to its profits and assets - have had strictly limited liability for the company's conduct or performance. This has helped trigger an explosion in enterprise.
The executive directors, the "hired hands" who run the companies on behalf of the shareholders, and the non-executive directors, who provide guidance, have unlimited liability. This is not just in theory but in practice. The directors of Equitable Life are being sued collectively for ￡3.3bn, a sum that threatens them with lifelong ruin. Several non-executive directors are also being sued, even though they may have joined the board after the crucial decisions were already made. And we are not talking about criminal wrongdoing or individuals acting for personal financial gain.
The other reason for limiting the liability of directors is the effect that unlimited liability will inevitably have on the willingness of anyone to take on a director's role in a society that is becoming ever more litigious.
This is particularly true for non- executive directors, who are not involved in day-to-day activities and do not receive a high reward for exposing themselves to risks. Individuals become non-executive directors because they want to help shape a company's strategy and guide its performance. Though they can play a stimulating and satisfying role, they increasingly have to weigh the advantages against the risks.
There should certainly be some risk. Consider a simple analogy. By taking the wheel of a car, a person assumes responsibility for how it is driven. Similarly, anyone taking a position at the wheel of a company, albeit as one of several co-drivers, has to take responsibility for how the company performs. That person has the power to destroy jobs, savings and pensions. So there should be a penalty for bad lapses of judgment or any form of negligence. But the question is one of proportionality. While directors should be held accountable, there must be a reasonable limit.
A reasonable solution would be to limit the liability to, say, four times an executive director's annual salary or a non-executive director's fee. This is stiff, but not life-destroying. Such an approach would also have the advantage of differentiating between the highly paid chief executive and the typical non-executive in terms of what penalty is appropriate, without destroying the principle of the unitary board, which forms the basis for UK corporate governance. Without such an approach companies will find it increasingly difficulty to attract the right individuals.
Almost half of UK respondents to a survey had turned down a board position over the past 12 months on the grounds that it was too risky, one search company reported. It is not just the potential financial liability; it is the prospect of fighting a case without the financial means to do so. There is always insurance but watertight insurance covering unlimited liability is beyond the reach of most companies.
There is a further danger, less recognisable but equally insidious. Those who serve on boards will become more risk-averse, presiding over the administration of the business rather than providing genuine leadership. While scandals and high-profile failures grab the headlines, shareholders lose far more money through underperforming businesses than through spectacular failures. And strong risk aversion leads inexorably to underperformance.
Risk is at the very heart of enterprise. It is an element of every decision so it needs to be embraced, rather than avoided at all costs. Individuals need to join boards fully aware of their responsibilities and obligations, ready to play a part in driving the business forward. They need to participate in crucial decisions - using their experience and exercising their judgment - knowing they will be held accountable for the outcome.
If they act incompetently or negligently, they should be held liable, but they should not be expected to carry out their duties with the spectre of lifelong ruin for them and their families hanging over their heads. That is not going to produce the boards or company performances that are needed. It is, therefore, in everyone's interests to limit directors' liability.
为什么董事应承担有限责任
在爆出几起公司丑闻并出现关于公平人寿保险(Equitable Life)的报道后，谈论限制董事责任或许显得不合时宜。但是，这些丑闻和报道正是强调了限制董事责任的的重要性，而不是反对限制董事责任的重要性。
限制董事责任有两个理由。其一就是为了公平。自1854年以来，公司的拥有者（对盈利和资产享有权利的股东）一直对公司的行为或业绩承担精确的有限责任。这在一定程度上激发了企业的迅猛发展。
执行董事与非执行董事均承担无限责任。执行董事是代表股东管理公司的"雇工"，而非执行董事则提供指导。无限责任不光是理论上的，在实践中也是如此。公平人寿保险公司的董事正受到集体起诉，要求他们赔偿33亿英镑，这笔钱可能会毁了他们一生。有几个非执行董事也遭到起诉，尽管他们可能是在关键决策做出后才加入董事会的。而我们在这里谈论的并非刑事犯罪行为，或是那些做事只考虑自身经济利益的个人。
限制董事责任的另一个原因是，在一个诉讼越来越多的社会中，无限责任不可避免地会影响人们担任董事角色的意愿。
就非执行董事而言尤其是这样。非执行董事不参与公司的日常活动，也不因为承担风险而获得高酬劳。个人之所以成为非执行董事，是因为他们想帮助制定企业战略，并指导公司的表现。虽然他们能扮演一个激励性和令人满意的角色，但他们越来越必须权衡利益与风险孰轻孰重。
自然会有一些风险。打个简单的比方，一个人在掌握汽车的方向盘后，就对该车的驾驶负有责任。同样，任何人在掌握公司的方向盘后（尽管他只是几个合作驾驶员之一），他就必须对公司的表现承担责任。此人有力量对公司的就职、储蓄和养老金造成破坏。因此，如果他判断失误或有任何失职行为，都该加以惩罚。但问题在于度。虽然董事应当承担责任，但必须有个合理的限度。
一个合理的解决方案是将责任限制在，比如说，一个执行董事年薪的4倍，或非执行董事酬金的4倍。这种做法很严厉，但不会毁掉他们的一生。这种方法还有个好处：就合适的惩罚是多少而言，可对高薪首席执行官和一般非执行董事区别对待，同时又不会破坏单一董事会的原则。单一董事会制度是英国公司治理的基石。若不采取这种方式，公司就会发现，吸引合适的人加入董事将会越来越难。
一家调研公司提供报告称，在一项调查中，英国近半数回复者曾在过去12个月里拒绝接受董事会职位，理由是风险太大。这不仅是因为可能要承担经济责任，而且还因为将来可能会在没有经济保障的情况下打一场官司。保障总是有的，但大部分公司得不到有关无限责任的严密保障。
还有个更深层的危险，这种危险不太容易察觉，但潜藏的危险同样大。那些在董事会供职的人会变得更厌恶风险，因而只是主持企业的行政事务，而并不提供真正的领导。虽然一些公司丑闻和令人瞩目的破产事件上了新闻头条，但对股东来说，因公司业务不佳而损失的钱，比引人瞩目的公司破产令他们损失的金钱更多。而对风险的强烈排斥必将导致业务表现低下。
风险是企业运作的核心。它是每项决定的要素，因此有必要去接受它，而不是不惜一切代价去逃避它。个人在加入董事会时，要充分了解自己的责任和义务，并准备在推动企业发展中发挥作用。他们必须参与重大决策的制定，运用自己的经验并进行判断，同时清楚他们要对产生的结果负责。
如果他们表现不合格或玩忽职守，他们就该承担责任。但不应期望他们在行使职责的同时，还要忧惧自己和家人一生被毁。这样不会产生所需要的董事会和公司业绩。因此，限制董事的责任符合每一个人的利益。
