more dynamic eurozone is a necessity not a luxury
Even casual observers will have noticed there is something rotten in the economic state of core Europe: the current cyclical recovery is exceptionally weak; underlying productivity performance is disappointing; and divergences among the eurozone economies are growing worryingly large. Yet French politicians disagree only on whether a oui or a non to the European constitution would better protect their citizens from “ultra-liberalism” and Franz Müntefering, chairman of Germany's ruling SPD, describes investors who desire a high return as “locusts”. In Italy, Silvio Berlusconi, the prime minister, substitutes rhetoric for action. Those whom the gods wish to destroy, they first make mad.
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Klaus Regeling of the European Commission's directorate for economic and financial affairs notes that in previous eurozone recoveries the average rate of quarter-on-quarter economic growth was 0.7 per cent over the first year and a half. This time it has been only 0.4 per cent.*
Again, the Conference Board, the US-based business research group, points out that output per hour has grown significantly more slowly in “old Europe” (the 15 members of the pre-enlargement European Union) than in the US since 1995 (see chart).** Some of this poor performance may be cyclical, but not all.
Finally, some economies are floundering. The worst performing significant economies during the recovery have been the Netherlands, whose quarterly growth averaged 0.3 per cent, and Italy and Germany, whose quarterly growth averaged only 0.2 per cent. The Netherlands had strong growth before the most recent downturn. Germany and Italy did not. In the first quarter of 2005, Germany surprised on the upside, with quarterly growth of 1 per cent, driven by strong exports. But Italy confirmed its role as laggard: gross domestic product shrank by 0.5 per cent after a decline of 0.4 per cent in the last quarter of 2004.
Italy is also close to the bottom on productivity (though Spain's performance is even worse). Between 1995 and 2004, its output per hour grew at a miserable 0.5 per cent a year. This was much worse than the EU-15 average of 1.5 per cent, which was itself far behind the 2.5 per cent of the US. Over the same period, Germany managed 1.8 per cent a year, France 2.1 per cent and the UK 2 per cent.
Divergences in productivity performance and wage behaviour have generated huge cost divergences. Germany's real effective exchange rate has depreciated by about a sixth against Italy's since 1999. In turn, the volume of Germany's exports of goods and services has risen by a stunning 47 per cent between the first quarter of 1999, when the euro was launched, and the end of last year. Allegedly uncompetitive Germany is the world's largest exporter. Meanwhile, the volume of Italy's exports rose by a mere 12 per cent over the same period and stagnated after 2001 (see charts).
When Germany's domestic demand starts to pick up again, its economy is likely to do well. Italy's challenges are far greater. An excellent short paper from the European Commission argues that the poor performance of Italy's exports is a function not only of weak productivity performance but also of an unfavourable specialisation. Italy remains specialised in the production of relatively low technology products, such as furniture, tiles, textiles and shoes, all of which are vulnerable to competition from low-wage suppliers, above all China.***
Analysis suggests that Italy's unfavourable specialisation reflects inadequate internal competition, shown in a weak service sector and undeveloped capital markets, a relatively poor quality of education and a lack of attraction for inward foreign direct investment. The ratio of the stock of inward FDI to GDP is about half that in Germany or France. Italy still relies on family capitalism: just look who is prime minister.
Italy may stagnate for years as
it struggles to restore lost competitiveness without the traditional remedy of a devaluation. Suppose that the real economy were to grow at just 1 per cent a year and inflation were also to be 1 per cent, as competitiveness was slowly restored. The fiscal deficit would need to fall below 2.4 per cent of GDP if the ratio of public debt to GDP were to remain at the already dangerously high level of 120 per cent.
If deficits were bigger, as they could easily be in an environment of very low growth, the debt ratio would rise even higher. If financial markets recognised the danger, interest rate spreads on Italian bonds could jump, increasing the fiscal pressure. This would become a tightrope walk. If Italy were to fall off, it could provoke a financial crisis that would threaten not just Italy but even the wider eurozone.
What does all this mean? Making the eurozone economy work better is not a luxury. It is a necessity.
First, aggregate demand needs to grow faster. Between the last quarter of 2000 and the last quarter of 2004, nominal demand grew at only 3.7 per cent a year. This is too slow. The European Central Bank could have pursued (and should now pursue) a more aggressive monetary policy.
Second, all economies, but particularly the bigger ones, need to push through the reforms that will make their economies more flexible, efficient and productive.
Finally, it is the weakest economies that must do most. To their credit, German business, workers and, to a lesser, though not negligible, degree, the German government have taken steps to remedy the country's loss of competitiveness after unification. The same is not true of Italy. Yet if such a big country fails to regain its competitiveness, it risks suffering from and imposing an economic, social and political crisis. The eurozone is a collective endeavour that requires collective responsibility.
The time for excuses is over. The world needs a more dynamic eurozone. But so do the people of the zone itself. Politicians who indulge in populist rhetoric instead are betraying their responsibility to their people, their partners and the world.
* The Economic Situation in the Spring of 2005: Policies for Sustained Growth, April 21 2005,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy-finance/index-en.htm;** Robert McGuckin and Bart van Ark, Performance 2005: Productivity, Employment and Income in the World's Economies,
www.conference-board.org; *** Stuck in a rut?, Ecfin Country Focus, 12 May 2005,
http://europa.eu.int/commmartin. 欧元区必须恢复经济活力
即便是漫不经心的观察家，也会注意到欧洲核心国家经济状况很糟糕：当前的周期性复苏极为脆弱；基本劳动生产率表现令人失望；欧元区各经济体之间的分化不断扩大，令人担忧。然而，法国政界存在不同意见的地方，只是在接受或拒绝欧洲宪法之间，哪一项选择更能保护本国公民免受“极端自由主义”的危害；德国执政的社会民主党(SPD)主席弗兰茨＃明特费林(Franz Müntefering)把希望获得高回报的投资者称为“蝗虫”。意大利总理西尔维奥?贝卢斯科尼(Silvio Berlusconi)则以口号代替行动。老天如果要毁灭某些人，会先让他们发疯。
欧盟委员会经济和金融事务总司长克劳斯?雷格林(Klaus Regeling)指出，在欧元区以往的经济复苏中，头一年半季度环比增长的平均速度为0.7%，而这次仅有0.4%。*
美国商业研究机构Conference Board也指出，1995年以来，“旧欧洲”(欧盟扩大前的15个成员国)单位小时产出的增长大大慢于美国(见图表)。**如此糟糕的表现有些是周期性因素，但并非全部如此。
目前有些经济体已经陷入困境。在本次经济复苏中，迄今表现最差的重要经济体是荷兰、意大利和德国，其平均季度增长率分别只有0.3%、0.2%和0.2%。荷兰在最近出现的增长下滑前有过强劲增长，德国和意大利则不然。2005年第1季度，在出口强劲的带动下，德国经济出现出人意料的增长，季度增长率达到1%。而意大利则已经习惯落后者这个角色：自国内生产总值(GDP)继2004年第4季度下降0.4%以来，又萎缩了0.5%。
在劳动生产率方面，意大利也几乎是最后一名(仅好于最差的西班牙)。1995至2004年间，该国单位小时产出每年仅增长0.5%，大大低于欧盟15国1.5%的平均值，更远远落后于美国的2.5%。同期，德国、法国和英国分别增长1.8%、2.1%和2%。
劳动生产率表现和工资水平两方面的分化，导致巨大的成本差异。1999年以来，相对于意大利，德国的实际汇率已贬值约1/6。相应的，自1999年第1季度欧元启动以来至去年年底，德国的商品和服务出口量已经迅猛增长了47%。德国虽被人指摘为缺乏竞争力，但却是世界最大的出口国。而同期，意大利的出口量仅增长12%，2001年以后，增长甚至出现停滞(见图表)。
只要德国的内需开始重新增长，经济表现就会好起来。但意大利面临的挑战则严峻得多。欧盟委员会一份很好的简短报告认为，意大利出口表现不佳，不仅是因为其劳动生产率低下，而且还因为意大利的专业分工缺乏竞争优势。意大利仍擅长生产技术含量较低的产品，如家具、瓷砖、纺织品和鞋类，这些产品都极易遭到来自低工资国家(尤其是中国)的竞争。***
分析报告显示，意大利在专业分工中的不利形势，反映出国内竞争不足，具体表现为服务业薄弱，资本市场不发达，教育质量相对低下，对外国直接投资(FDI)缺乏吸引力。流入的外国直接投资占GDP的比重只有德国和法国的一半左右。直到现在，意大利仍要依赖家庭资本主义：只要看看意大利总理是谁就明白了。
在无法采用贬值这种传统补救手段的情况下，意大利经济可能停滞多年，艰难恢复已丧失的竞争力。假设竞争力在缓慢恢复的过程中，实体经济每年仅增长1%，通胀也为1%，那么，要使公共债务占GDP比重维持在120%这个已经危险的高水平上，财政赤字占GDP的比重就必须降到2.4%以下。
如果财政赤字超过2.4%(这在经济缓慢增长的情况下很可能出现)，公共债务比重将继续升高。如果金融市场认识到这一危险，意大利将不得不大幅提高公共债券的利率，从而加大财政压力，使意大利陷入“走钢丝”的困境。假如意大利从钢丝上掉下来，就可能引发金融危机，不仅会威胁到意大利，甚至将威胁到整个欧元区。
这一切意味着什么？重振经济对欧元区已经不是可有可无的奢侈之举，而是绝对必要的行动。
首先，总需求需要加快增长。2000年4季度至2004年4季度，名义需求的年增长率只有3.7%，这太慢了。欧洲央行(ECB)本应(至少现在应该)采取更积极的货币政策。
其次，所有经济体(特别是经济大国)应推行彻底的经济改革，提高经济的灵活性、效率和劳动生产率。
最后，最薄弱的经济体必须付出最大努力。值得肯定的是，德国企业、工人和政府(政府作用相对较小，但不容忽视)已经采取行动，恢复德国统一后丧失的竞争力。但意大利的情况则不然。如果这样一个大国不能恢复竞争力，就有遭受或引发经济、社会和政治危机的风险。欧元区是一个整体，需要承担共同的责任。
寻找借口的时期已经过去了。世界需要一个更富有活力的欧元区，欧元区人民也希望如此。热衷于利用辞令蒙蔽民众的政客们，正在背叛他们对国民、伙伴国家和全世界的责任。
*2005年4月21日 ，《2005年春季的经济形势：持续增长政策》，
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy-finance/index-en.htm；
**Robert McGuckin和Bart van Ark合著的《2005年的表现：世界各经济体的劳动生产率、就业和收入》，
www.conference-board.org；
***2005年5月12日， “Ecfin Country Focus”书中的“Stuck in a rut?”一文，
http://europa.eu.int/comm作者简介：马丁?沃尔夫(Martin Wolf)是《金融时报》的副主编(associate editor)和首席经济评论家。他对全球经济有着精辟的深刻分析，获得了国际上各界广泛普遍的承认赞赏。最近，在他荣获2003年度“最佳商务记者奖”评奖中，他获得了其中的“十年杰出成就奖”等殊荣。沃尔夫先生1971年毕业于牛津大学，获经济学硕士。然后，他到世界银行任职工作，并于1974年出任世行资深经济学家。1999年以来，他一直是每年一度的“世界经济论坛”的特邀评委成员。
