Foreign Beer Makers Drink to China
SHANGHAI -- It feels like happy hour in China again.
In recent months, foreign beer makers have been pouring investment into the country with a vigor not seen since the mid-1990s. The biggest Chinese merger-and-acquisition deal of the year has been in beer: Anheuser-Busch Cos.' swoop on Harbin Brewery, in which it paid $720 million (�580.8 million) for China's fourth-largest brewer. The American company outbid archrival SABMiller PLC for a company with just a 4% share of the market.
That's not all. Belgium's Interbrew SA this year has bought several breweries near Shanghai, leaving it with big positions in China's two richest provinces, Guangdong and Zhejiang. Scottish & Newcastle PLC last week completed a deal to pay $65 million for a 19.5% stake in Chongqing Brewery Co., which brews ales on the upper reaches of the Yangtze River. Carlsberg AS and Foster's Group Ltd., both of which left China in the 1990s with much acrimony, are back.
One of the biggest guessing games in financial circles these days is what company will be the next acquisition target. This month, shares of Guangdong Brewery Holdings have surged 21% on expectations that a Harbin-like bidding war might ensue between potential suitors and Heineken-Asia Pacific, a joint venture between Asia-Pacific Breweries Ltd. and Heineken NV that currently holds a 21% stake in the company.
FROTHING UP
? Heard in Asia: China Beer Buzz: Who's Next as Foreign Breweries Tap In?
06/08/04
? Page One: Burned Once, Brewers Return to China -- With Pint-Size Goals
03/10/04
It is as if the late 1990s, when foreign brewers were dying in the Chinese market, never happened. "There's a renewed interest in China," says Andre Parker, SABMiller's managing director for Asia. "There was that first wave, and then many international brewers went home, their fingers burned. Now there's a second wave coming in."
South African Breweries (which became SABMiller in 2002 when it bought Miller Brewing of the U.S.) has been a rare international brewing success in China. Its formula: Buy stakes in brewers from second-tier cities, cut costs and improve efficiency, and essentially leave the brands alone. The idea has been to sell huge amounts of low-cost beer rather than trying to create demand for pricier stuff. By doing this, SABMiller avoided many of the pitfalls that plagued others, including overpaying for big-city investments, being gouged in the restaurant and bar trade, and learning the hard way that China wasn't ready for expensive or even midprice beer.
"Their success is traditionally built on their knowledge of building mass distribution and brands in very low-priced, primitive markets like Africa," says John Chan, a consultant who held senior positions with Foster's, of Australia, and New Zealand's Lion Nathan Ltd. in the 1990s. "They make the least margin per bottle compared to Heineken, Anheuser-Busch and Suntory, but they make up for it in volume."
The Harbin bidding war illustrates big changes in China's beer industry -- ones that alter the competitive landscape for large investors. Ten years of rising wealth among middle-class consumers have made China even more tantalizing than the first time around.
Just as importantly, 10 years of consolidation, during which a few brewers have built up large-scale production and distribution networks, may make it feasible economically to distribute a beer brand across China's vast regions. Analysts say the enormous price paid by Anheuser-Busch suggests it has much more on its mind than simply making a regional beer -- it may be looking to leverage Harbin in other ways, perhaps even taking that company's Hapi brew national.
Anheuser-Busch itself hasn't said much about the purchase. The company declined to comment. In a statement issued at the time it won the bidding for Harbin, Patrick Stokes, the company's chief executive, said that the purchase would boost the company's position in China's northeast and leverage the strengths of his company, Harbin and Tsingtao Brewery Co. (Anheuser-Busch owns a 9.9% stake in Tsingtao.)
The first time foreign brewers came to China, they ran into vicious price wars and realized that China's size, fragmentation and low incomes made it a fundamentally low-end, localized game. Today, beer consumption is rising, the middle class is expanding and consolidation has halved the number of brewers.
So the world's brewers are back, once again asking: Has China's market matured enough to allow them to sell expensive beer? And for the companies with enough resources, can they sell it around the country?
In the 1990s, the idea of building a national brand in China was folly. The country had nearly a thousand individual, local breweries, most with devoted local followings. With local beers often costing two yuan (24 cents) for a large, 640-milliliter bottle at mom-and-pop shops -- where the vast majority of beer is bought -- companies that tried to charge five times that amount and more for an international brand flopped.
Ten years on, much has changed -- but much hasn't. On one hand, China remains intensely regional: Despite years of consolidation, there still are 500 brewers across the country. According to a study by Access Asia, a consumer-markets consultancy, the top-selling brand in each of China's 10 largest cities is different and, in nine cases, local to the city.
That affects how companies approach the market. "We are convinced that China is a continent and the provinces are the countries," says Patrice Thys, Asia-Pacific president of Interbrew, the Belgian conglomerate that owns Beck's and Stella Artois.
To be sure, the consolidation that has happened does matter. China's 10 largest breweries had a combined market share of 52% last year compared with just 22% in 1998. The big Chinese brewers are bigger, and some are interested in pushing their products nationwide -- most as midprice alternatives that fit between expensive foreign brands and ultralow-cost local brews. Meanwhile, the foreign companies that have stuck around, such as SABMiller and Anheuser-Busch, have more breweries around the country and more experience with distribution, giving them better chances to build nationwide brands.
SABMiller is looking to do that with the Snowflake brand brewed by its joint venture in Shenyang with China Resources Breweries. "We've taken the view that national brands are something of the future in China," Mr. Parker says. "There's enough reason to believe that when you look at the fast-developing consumerism that's developing in China now."
Mr. Parker is looking for more acquisitions in regions where the company isn't currently represented. This wouldn't have made sense during the first beer war, when all the company meant to do was build a regional bridgehead. It does make sense now, when it is trying to sell a northeastern beer around the country.
SABMiller launched Snowflake in Guangdong province last year, and it has had to truck beer to the south from northeastern Shenyang, which takes two or more days. "Going national with a brand does mean that we need to look at other areas," Mr. Parker says, listing Guangdong province and the rest of the southeastern seaboard as potential investment spots. "We are going to need to look for fill-out positions in areas where we don't have a presence." He says he expects to make at least two acquisitions this year.
Mr. Parker also plans to introduce an international brand, something SABMiller hasn't done in China for nearly a decade. The company, Mr. Parker says, is studying whether it wants to launch a midprice light lager, such as South Africa's Castle or Lion, or the American Miller Genuine Draft, or whether it wants to go higher-end with the more robust-bodied Pilsner Urquel. (A lager would put it in the mass segment of the market -- 93% of all beer drunk in China is lager.) Whichever, he promises the brand it chooses will be on the market by next summer.
This represents a gamble. Analysts note that despite their growth, premium brands still are a small part of the market in China. "It is a slightly more national market with an expanding middle class, which is slightly more open to a beer brand rather than strictly a functional product," says Yougang Chen, a consultant specializing in consumer markets with consultants McKinsey & Co.
Meanwhile, the logistical hassles of selling beer in China remain enormous. On a muggy, hot July day in Shanghai, far from SABMiller's production bases, a bicycle delivery man pedals achingly slowly through rush-hour traffic, several cases of Snowflake beer tied to his bike. "China's distribution infrastructure is probably like the U.S. in the 1950s," says Mr. Chan, the former beer executive. "But China will probably not have to wait 50 years to reach distribution efficiency like the U.S. They'll probably do it in 15-25 years."
Such delivery systems threaten the quality of a product that can be seriously degraded by high temperatures. Keeping a product fresh as it is shipped and stored around the country is a big issue, and problems extend from bad-tasting beer all the way to bottles exploding from excessive temperature changes during transport and storage. (China keeps statistics on such things: In 1999, the government counted 1,000 bottle explosions, which injured 800 people, disabled 80 and even killed one person.)
The fact that SABMiller didn't take its lumps in the 1990s means it will be a latecomer to the high end of the market. Anheuser-Busch has spent years, and in its early years lost millions of dollars, pushing its nationwide ambitions. Still, it has managed to push its Budweiser and Bud Ice brands into dozens of markets. These brands may cost upward of five times as much as a low-end competitor, but they now are well established.
Others are beefing up again, too. Interbrew, which had little success in the past with Stella Artois and Beck's, is reintroducing Beck's this year. Mr. Thys sees it selling 50,000 to 70,000 hectoliters, which he calls "pretty good for a reintroduction." Of course, caution remains something of a watchword. The company isn't interested, Mr. Thys says, in having "fantastic volume" in the first two years, followed by declines.
All of which makes the Harbin bidding war a potentially crucial turning point. The extravagant sum Anheuser-Busch paid suggests the company has far bigger plans than just selling local beer in a local market. (In the process, it paid $124 million to SABMiller, which had held a 29.4% stake in Harbin.)
One analyst notes that if Anheuser-Busch were only buying a regional brewer -- even a very strong one -- the price it paid for Harbin "doesn't make too much sense." On the other hand, he says, if Anheuser-Busch intends to leverage Harbin into a truly national brand, then the value of the local brewery "is much greater than most people think."
中国再成外资啤酒商的必争之地
看起来外国啤酒制造商对中国市场重新产生了兴趣。近几个月来，众多外国啤酒制造商一直在积极地投资中国市场，其热衷程度堪称上世纪90年代中期以来最为高涨的一次。今年目前为止中国最大的一笔并购交易就出自啤酒行业：安海斯(Anheuser-Busch)以7.2亿美元的大手笔击败了主要竞争对手SABMiller，夺得了哈尔滨啤酒(Harbin Brewery)的控股权。哈尔滨啤酒以4%的市场占有率在中国大型啤酒企业中排名第四。
积极开拓中国市场的外资啤酒商可不止安海斯一家。比利时的英特布鲁(Interbrew)已经收购了靠近上海的几家啤酒厂，从而在中国最富裕的两个省广东省和浙江省占有重要地位。英资啤酒商苏格兰纽卡斯尔(Scottish & Newcastle Brewery)上周完成了出资6,500万美元购入重庆啤酒(Chongqing Breweries) 19.5%股权的交易。重庆啤酒是位于长江上游的一家淡色啤酒生产商。就连上世纪90年代忿忿撤出中国市场的嘉士伯(Carlsberg)和Foster's也卷土重来。
最近以来金融界最受人瞩目的猜测之一便是哪家啤酒公司将成为下个被收购对象。本月，粤海啤酒(Guangdong Brewery Holdings)股价飙升了21%，原因是市场认为在潜在的买家和持有粤海啤酒21%股权的Heineken-Asia Pacific Breweries将展开一场类似安海斯和SABMiller竞购哈尔滨啤酒一样的收购战。
从现在的情景根本想像不到上世纪90年代末期蜂拥涌入中国的外资啤酒商无不以悲剧收场。用SABMiller亚洲地区的董事总经理安德烈?帕克(Andre Parker)的话说就是，外资啤酒商重新对中国市场产生了兴趣。在第一轮来华投资的高潮期，许多外资厂商在损失惨重后撤回本土。如今，他们卷土重来。
South African Breweries是在中国取得成功的屈指可数的外资企业。该公司在2002年收购了美国的Miller Brewing之后改名为SABMiller。该公司成功的秘诀是：参股中等城市的啤酒企业；然后削减成本、提高效率；基本上保持原有品牌；销售大量的廉价啤酒，走大众化路线而不是试图开拓高档品牌的市场。SABMiller因此避开了困扰其他外资企业所面临的大部分问题，如为开拓大城市和餐馆和酒吧支付过高的投资，在付出惨痛代价后才知道在中国发展中高档啤酒的时机尚不够成熟。
90年代曾在Foster's和新西兰的Lion Nathan担任过重要职位的顾问约翰?陈(John Chan)表示，SABMiller之所以取得成功是因为他们一向知道要想在非洲等产品定价很低的初级市场上站稳脚跟，就必须在建立分销渠道和推广品牌坚持大众化路线。虽然同喜力(Heineken)、安海斯、Suntory等公司相比，SABMiller的利润率是最低的，但他们可以用销量来弥补利润率的不足。
哈尔滨啤酒的收购战反映出中国的啤酒行业已出现了重大转变。这种转变改变了大型投资者的竞争格局。过去10年来，中国中产阶级的财富不断积累，使得如今的中国啤酒市场比外资厂商第一次大举进入时更具诱惑力。
同样重要的是，经过10年的行业整合，一些啤酒企业的生产已形成规模化，也建立起了庞大的分销网络。这就使得从商业化的角度在广阔的中国市场上推广啤酒品牌成为可能。分析师们表示，从安海斯高价收购哈尔滨啤酒就可以看出，安海斯并不仅想把哈尔滨啤酒塑造为一家地区性啤酒商，还可能有更为雄心勃勃的计划。安海斯可能会通过其他途径发挥哈尔滨啤酒的优势，甚至有可能把“哈啤”品牌推向全国。
安海斯对于收购哈尔滨啤酒一事不愿多谈。该公司也对本文拒绝置评。但在赢得哈尔滨啤酒的收购战之后，安海斯的首席执行长帕特里克?斯多克(Patrick Stokes)在声明中称，这笔交易不但能巩固公司在东北地区的地位，还能发挥安海斯、青岛啤酒(Tsingtao)、哈尔滨啤酒各自的优势。安海斯持有青岛啤酒9.9%的股份。
外资啤酒商第一次大举进军中国时正好赶上了残酷的价格战，他们意识到从较小的规模、四分五裂的格局、以及低购买力来看，中国啤酒市场本质上是一个低档品牌大行其道、诸侯割据的市场。但如今的情况则不同了：啤酒消费量节节攀升，中产阶级队伍正在壮大，行业的整合使得企业数量减少了一半。
因此，全球的啤酒商卷土重来。他们这次仍然带著和上次相同的问题：中国市场是否已经成熟到可以销售高档啤酒的地步？对于那些拥有充足资源的企业来说，他们的产品能否行销全国？
上世纪90年代，在中国推出一个全国性的品牌无异于疑人说梦。当时中国共有近千家啤酒厂商，并且大多数啤酒品牌深受当地人的欢迎。在当时啤酒的主要销售渠道──夫妻店里，经常可以看到容积为640毫升的大瓶啤酒售价只有人民币2元（合24美分）。一些企业试图销售售价是这个价格的5倍甚至更高的国际品牌，但无不以失败而告终。
10年的时间可以改变很多事情，但也有很多情况依然如故。一方面，中国的啤酒业仍然呈诸侯割据局面：尽管已经经过了多年整合，但目前全国仍有500家啤酒企业。
消费市场咨询机构Access Asia的研究报告显示，中国十大城市中每个城市销量最高的啤酒品牌均不相同，而且有9个城市的头号啤酒商是本地公司。
英特布鲁的亚太区总裁田博善(Patrice Thys)说：“我们觉得中国就像一块大陆，各个省就像大陆上的各个国家。”这个比利时啤酒巨头拥有Beck's和Stella Artois品牌。
当然，这些年的整合的确给中国啤酒市场带来翻天覆地的变化。去年中国前10大啤酒商的市场占有率总和达到52%，而1998年仅为22%。大啤酒商日益发展壮大，有些还致力于将产品推向全国──多数为中档价位产品，介于高档的外国品牌和超低价本地品牌之间。与此同时，像SABMiller和安海斯这类早已对中国市场垂涎欲滴的外国公司开始在中国拥有越来越多的啤酒厂和越来越多的分销经验，这也有助于它们建立全国性的品牌。
SABMiller已经与中国华润啤酒(China Resources Breweries)在沈阳成立合资公司，正力图通过“雪花啤酒”打造全国性品牌。帕克说：“我们认为建立全国性品牌将成为中国啤酒市场的未来发展趋势。看看中国迅速发展的消费意识，你就会对这一点深信不疑。”
帕克正在寻求更多的并购机会，占领其尚未打入的地区市场。在第一场啤酒战中这可能无关紧要，当时整个公司正忙于在某一个地区占有一席之地。然而眼下，在SABMiller努力将一个东北品牌推向全国之际，跨地区并购就显得尤为重要。
SABMiller去年在广东省推出了雪花啤酒，但它必须花费两三天时间从东北地区沈阳市将啤酒千里迢迢地运至广东。帕克说：“要想推广全国品牌，我们必须在其他地区寻找并购机会。”他表示，广东省和东南沿海地区将成为他们的潜在投资地点。他说，他预计公司的业务将很快发展壮大，高档品牌在中国只是初露头角。
咨询公司麦肯锡(McKinsey & Co.)的消费者市场顾问陈有钢表示，随著中产阶层日益扩大，啤酒市场已经开始呈现全国性发展趋势，人们的品牌观念日益开放，已不再把啤酒仅仅看作一种严格意义上的实用产品。
与此同时，啤酒销售的物流系统仍然有待改善。7月份的一个闷热日子里，在距离SABMiller上海生产基地很远的地方，一个运输工正在艰难缓慢地蹬著自行车踏板，穿梭在车水马龙的街道中，若干箱雪花啤酒就绑在他的自行车上。
曾经担任过啤酒业管理人士的陈有钢说，中国的分销基础设施与美国五十年代的水平相当，但中国要达到美国目前的分销效率可能不需要50年时间。他们或许在15-25年内就能实现。
这种分销系统必然对产品质量构成威胁，高温的天气会令啤酒质量大打折扣。在运输和储藏过程中保持产品新鲜已经成为一个很大的问题，高温不仅会导致啤酒变味，而且运输和储藏过程中的温度变化常常会引发酒瓶爆炸。（中国还保留著对这类事件的统计数据：根据政府的统计，1999年曾发生1000次酒瓶爆炸事件，导致800人受伤，80人残废，1人死亡。）
SABMiller在90年代并未涉足中国市场，这意味著它也将成为高端市场的后来者。安海斯已花费几年时间推广全国品牌，早期甚至曾经亏损数百万美元。但它已经成功地将百威(Budweiser)和百威冰啤(Bud Ice)推广到数十个啤酒市场。推广这些品牌可能要比推广低端品牌耗资5倍以上，但它们毕竟已经站稳脚跟了。
其他啤酒商也纷纷卷土重来。过去在推广Stella Artois和Beck's时曾经一无所获的英特布鲁今年又重整旗鼓，再次推出Beck's。田博善预计今年销量将达到5百万-7百万升，他表示，这次重新推出将取得巨大成功。当然，有时候谨慎一点或许更好。田博善表示，公司不希望前两年产量突飞猛进，之后再走下坡路。
这一切都使得对哈尔滨啤酒的竞购成为了啤酒争霸战的潜在转折点。安海斯的大手笔并购决不是仅仅为了获得一家本地啤酒厂商。
一位分析师指出，如果安海斯仅仅是为了打造一家本地啤酒厂商，即使是一个非常强劲的本地厂商，那它为哈尔滨啤酒支付的价格就太不值了，相反，如果安海斯想以哈尔滨啤酒为杠杆创出一个真正的全国性品牌，那么哈尔滨啤酒的价值就要远远超出人们的想像。
