Lunch with the FT: Paul Kennedy
Just off London’s Jermyn Street, in the shaded comfort of an 18th-century restaurant, several men of a certain age are happily grazing. Some are perched at the bar, peering into their starters; others are relaxing in wood-panelled booths. My interviewee just about blends in.
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This is Wiltons, which advertises itself as “noted since 1742 for the finest oysters, fish and game”. My guest is 61-year-old Paul Kennedy, a bestselling historian who is distinguishable from his besuited confreres by his blue cravat, green jacket and a hint of grey stubble.
I am late, out of breath, out of place and consumed by a single issue: is Professor Kennedy’s most famous book, which sold more than two million copies and put the US administration on the backfoot, plain wrong? Since the book in question - The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers - predicted the decline of the US, the rise of China and a glorious future for Japan, it seems an obvious question for these troubled times.
But first I have to apologise, order (Kennedy has had sufficient time to study the lavish menu) and find out a little more about the journey that took him from the industrial world of north-east England to this preserve of the privileged.
Kennedy, whose father worked in the shipyards, was the first in his family to go to university, although he almost gave up his studies to become a racing tipster. Now a professor at Yale, he returns to Newcastle whenever he can.
“I have a deep affection for my native Tyneside, the teachers who taught me and the rather close Catholic Irish immigrant community in which I grew up and was somehow protected from the world for many, many years,” he says. “When I was born, there were 23 shipyards on the river Tyne. Now I think there is one left.”
His voice trails off as he contemplates his birthplace’s industrial decline. It is a theme that resonates deeply with his life’s work - Kennedy argues that a country’s economic and industrial strength largely determines its military power and its place in the world. But it seems odd to discuss such subjects in so wilfully outdated a place as Wiltons.
When we were exchanging e-mails about where to eat, Kennedy said he had walked past the restaurant for years without ever daring to enter. Wiltons, which takes pride in its exclusivity and insists that gentlemen diners wear jackets, made him think of James Bond. Now that we are inside, talking above the raucous laughter from an adjoining table, our feet bumping against each other in our little booth, the restaurant seems more swaggering than suave.
The sommelier arrives, keen to coax us into ordering a particularly grand bottle of white wine.
“Mr Kennedy, I’m so sorry to disturb you, Meursault by the half is finished, but we do have a Montrachet which is a step in the right direction, slightly more buttery, very, very delicious,” he says. “Since it’s a special lunch, I’m sure it will complement it very well.”
I panic. “Are we talking three figures?” I gasp.
“No, we’re not talking three, we’re just under, so we’re OK,” the sommelier replies.
Kennedy seeks to establish some control. He speaks slowly, insistently, with a Tyneside lilt. “I don’t want to skin the FT alive,” he says, and the sommelier retreats, leaving a wine list behind him.
This, I will learn, is the pattern of the lunch. Kennedy gently imposes himself on the conversation, not letting my questions divert him from what he wants to say.
He is best known for his argument that the US’s economic power and military potential have been in relative decline since about 1945. When he outlined the theory in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in 1988 - a US election year - it made many waves.
Kennedy remembers one day during his summer holidays that year when he picked up a newspaper, hungry for news. Then, “sitting on the back deck of this little place in the Black Forest, I opened it up and there was a report saying: ‘US Secretary of State George Shultz makes six-nation Asian tour to confront Kennedy thesis that America is in decline.’ I fell off my chair,” he recalls.
But, I ask, hasn’t the book been invalidated by all the predictions that he got wrong? In the years after publication, the US grew stronger, not weaker. Japan, which he said would continue its rise to the top, stagnated. The Soviet Union, which he said would not collapse, collapsed. Overall, it seems to me, he exaggerated the importance of manufacturing, magnifying some of his theory’s flaws.
“I wonder if I could answer that in terms of a university professor grading essays,” he replies. “It does seem to me that what I say about China might be as high as an A minus. Possibly Europe is in that area too.”
This one can allow. The book hails China as the best-placed of the great powers, with the most coherent grand strategy, and argues that its economic reforms will translate into more political power. As for Europe, it says that the bloc needs to sort out a common defence strategy and modernise its economy - arguments still made today.
“Japan has to be a C, a C minus or something like that,” he says. “It was very much a synthesis of the existing debate.”
He pauses. “If you think about it, there were three really interesting things that happened on the world scene around 1990 which would take somebody from the year 1985 by surprise.
“One is the mysterious slowing down of Japan. Just comes to a halt. How could you ever think of that? Second is the disintegration of the Soviet Union. And the third is a truly impressive year-on-year annual growth of the US economy.”
So, I ask again, does that mean that he was wrong when he accused the US of imperial overstretch? “Look, I actually believe the country has enormous innate strength,” he says. “You can’t look at the figures for research investment or the flexibility of their capital markets and say it is like the Ottoman Empire, circa 1878. It just isn’t.”
He cuts off the tips of his asparagus starter and dips them in the accompanying sauce, which he declares to be halfway between Bearnaise and custard. Then he goes on.
“But I couldn’t see what was so offensive about the concept of managing decline. That is essentially what Lord Salisbury was doing [as British prime minister at the end of the 19th century] for years. It was strengthening your weak positions, pulling out from your exposed positions, making sure your core interests were protected.”
This is what he believes the US should be doing today - in part by withdrawing from Iraq, a move he predicts will relieve Washington of the same sort of unsustainable commitments that France freed itself from in Algeria and that Britain rid itself of in India and Palestine. He considers the Bush administration has bitten off more than it can chew, and that US supremacy cannot last.
“What if you went theoretically to some analytical political scientist or economist and said, given all that you know about the laws of economics and history and politics, do you think a country with 4.5 per cent of the world’s population can continue generation after generation to have this extraordinary position, especially when the global productive balances are shifting?” he asks.
“It seems a fairly simple question and it is hard to avoid the overall conclusion. So if you ask would I be more benign or nuanced about the US’s prospects if I wrote about it today, my answer would be that I actually envisaged people who could cleverly manage relative decline as opposed to those who blow it.”
The diatribe is over. Some poached halibut has arrived, which we agree is the high point of the meal, in culinary terms at least. But I look around and feel slightly ill at ease.
“By the way, is this the most male restaurant you’ve ever eaten in?” I ask. “Not a single female.”
“I can see a waitress,” Kennedy says, laughing gently into his halibut. “You chose it, I think.”
“No, you did,” I retort, bringing the conversation down a few hundred notches from our earlier discussion of grand strategy. “I gave you a shortlist.”
“Well, remember I’d never been in it.”
At this point, I think it’s best to move on to his new book. Called The Parliament of Man, it is a history of the United Nations and in some ways it is more idealistic than his earlier work.
While Kennedy makes clear his belief that a world system can only work if the big powers work together - as in 1815 or 1945 - he also maintains that the UN should become more democratic. He endorses proposals for a UN tax, for dedicated UN troops in national armies and for giving the world body more access to intelligence.
“It’s the only world organisation we’ve got,” he says as a formidable dessert of summer pudding arrives. “If we tried to create it now, either we couldn’t create anything or we would create something different, but it is our legacy, so what are we going to do? Either scrap it or improve the bloody thing.”
He says that he stopped his work on the book because of the death from cancer of his first wife, his childhood sweetheart. For a while he just absorbed himself in short-term projects. But he married again in 2001 and is now working on a study of Rudyard Kipling.
Although Kipling is often dismissed as an imperialist, Kennedy’s strategic mind is clearly impressed by a man who warned against the rise of the Kaiser’s Germany and wrote enduring poems, stories and novels.
“In 1917 the British government realised that it was going to have a major problem in handling in a tactful way the British war dead across the world,” he says. “So it set up the Imperial War Graves Commission. Kipling was a member, along with the architect Edwin Lutyens, who built the Cenotaph just along the way from here. The two of them went off to design the war memorials, with Kipling taking an enormous amount of interest in it. It was partly because of his son, who died in the war.”
The bill comes. I pay. Kennedy squeezes past me, darts to the gents and is gone.
Some days later, I finally make it down the road and walk by the Cenotaph in Whitehall. A few ragged bunches of flowers droop at its base. The inscription reads: “The Glorious Dead.”
After all the talk and controversy about great powers’ rise and fall, this is what remains: battered flowers and memorials for men who died in wars.
Wiltons, London SW1
1 x crab and avocado salad
1 x asparagus with Bearnaise sauce
2 x poached halibut
2 x summer pudding
1 x espresso
1 x double espresso
1 x bottle of mineral water
1 x half bottle of Pouilly Fume
Total ?169.88
与保罗?肯尼迪共进午餐
离
伦敦杰明街(Jermyn Street)不远，在一家建于18世纪、光线昏暗的餐厅里，年龄差不多的几位男士正在愉悦地进餐。其中有些人坐在吧台前，看着餐前的开胃小菜；其他人则在木制隔间中休息。接受我采访的人与这儿的环境还算相称。
这家餐厅就是Wiltons，它标榜自己“自1742年以来，一直以最棒的牡蛎、鱼和野味著称”。我的客人是现年61岁的畅销书作者、历史学家保罗?肯尼迪(Paul Kennedy)，蓝色领结、绿色夹克和些许灰白的胡须，使我能够在其他西装革履的客人中认出他来。
《大国的兴衰》错了吗？
我迟到了，气喘吁吁，有些狼狈，脑子里只有一个问题：肯尼迪教授那本最著名的作品整个儿都错了吗？该书销量逾200万册，而且使美国政府陷于被动。这本著作――《大国的兴衰》(The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers)――预言了美国的衰落、中国的崛起和日本的灿烂未来，对于这些动荡的岁月而言，这似乎是个显而易见的问题。
但首先我必须说声抱歉，然后点菜（肯尼迪已花了足够长的时间来研究这份奢华的菜谱），并询问他从英格兰东北部工业地区到这个特权人士专属之地的旅途情况。
肯尼迪的父亲在造船厂工作。他本人是家中的第一个大学生，尽管他差点为了当一位赛马点评人而放弃学业。如今在耶鲁大学(Yale)做教授的肯尼迪，只要有机会，随时都会回到纽卡斯尔。
“我深深爱着自己的故乡泰恩塞德(Tyneside)，那些教导过我的老师，以及我成长所在的相当紧密的爱尔兰天主教移民社区，许多年来，不知什么缘故，这里一直没受到外界的影响，”他表示。“当年我出生时，泰恩河(Tyne)上有23家造船厂。现在我想只剩下一家了。”
经济实力决定军事实力和国际地位
谈及故乡的工业衰落，他的声音渐渐低了下来。这是一个与其终生工作有着强烈共鸣的主题――肯尼迪认为，一个国家的经济和工业实力，很大程度上决定了它的军事实力和在世界上的地位。不过，在Wiltons这样一个如此老套的场合探讨这个话题，似乎有些怪怪的。
当我们通过电子邮件商量在哪里就餐时，肯尼迪表示，多年来，他经常路过这家餐厅，却从没敢进去过。Wiltons以排他性为荣，坚持规定来此就餐的男士必须穿西装，这让他想起了詹姆斯?邦德(James Bond)。现在我们就坐在里边谈着话，邻桌传来嘶哑的笑声，在这小小的隔间里，我们脚顶着脚。这家餐厅似乎更显得狂妄自大，而非温文尔雅。
负责斟酒的服务员走了进来，热情地劝我们点一瓶特别奢华的白葡萄酒。
“肯尼迪先生，很抱歉打扰，您要的半瓶默尔索(Meursault)已卖完了，不过我们有蒙哈榭酒(Montrachet)，绝对是上佳选择，味道略微香一些，口感非常非常好，”他说道。“既然这是一顿特殊的午餐，我肯定这种酒将非常添彩。”
我有些惊慌，问道：“这酒的价格是否得要三位数呢？”
服务员答道：“不，不是三位数，比三位数略低一点，这样可以吗？”
肯尼迪试图取得某种控制。他开口了，缓慢且坚定，带着泰恩河畔的腔调：“我不打算狠宰《金融时报》。”服务员退了出去，把酒单留在了桌上。
温和地主导谈话
之后我将会发现，这正是此次午餐的特点。肯尼迪温和地主导谈话，不让我的问题把他从自己想谈的题目上转移开。
他最著名的观点是：从1945年前后以来，美国的经济实力和军事潜力一直处于相对衰落的趋势。他于1988年――这一年是美国大选年――在《大国的兴衰》中阐明这一理论时，掀起了轩然大波。
肯尼迪记得，当年暑期假日中的某一天，他拿起一份报纸，急着想看看新闻。当时，“我坐在黑森林(Black Forest)这么小一块台子上，打开报纸，看到有一篇报道这样写道：‘美国国务卿乔治?舒尔茨(George Shultz)将开始亚洲六国之行，以此反驳肯尼迪提出的美国正在衰落的观点。’我差点从椅子上跌落下来，”他回忆道。
然而，我问道，难道那些错误的预言没有否定这本书吗？该书出版后的多年里，美国发展得更为强大，而非疲弱。而他预言将继续崛起并占据头把交椅的日本，则停滞不前。他预言不会瓦解的苏联瓦解了。总的说来，我觉得他夸大了制造业的重要性，这凸显出他理论中的一些瑕疵。
对中国的预言似乎可以打A-
“我想用一位大学教授为论文打分的方式来回答这个问题，”他答道。“我的确觉得，自己对中国的预言似乎可以打A-。或许对欧洲的预言也能得到这么个分数。”
这是可以接受的。该书称中国处于大国中最有利的位置，拥有最为连贯的“大战略”(grand strategy)，并指出该国的经济改革将转化为更强的政治实力。谈到欧洲，书中表示，该地区需要制定一个共同的防务战略，并加快经济现代化步伐，这些说法如今依然适用。
“在日本问题上只能得C、C-等分数，”他表示。“这在很大程度上是对当前辩论意见的综合。”
他停顿了一下，说道：“如果你想想看，1990年前后，世界舞台上发生了三件真正有趣的事件，它们会令1985年时候的人们感到意外。”
“第一件事是日本经济神秘减速，就这么止步了。你怎么想得到呢？第二件是苏联解体。第三件是美国经济令人印象深刻的同比增长。”
美国“过分扩张”的说法错了吗？
于是，我又问，这是否意味着，他谴责美国“帝国过分扩张”是错的呢？“瞧，我确实认为美国拥有强大的内在实力，”他说道。“但你不能因为看到研究投资的数字或其资本市场的灵活性，就说它像1878年的奥斯曼帝国(Ottoman Empire)。的确不是这么回事。”
他切下开胃菜芦笋的尖，蘸上与之搭配的调味汁，他宣称这种调味汁的味道介于蛋黄酱和奶油蛋羹之间。然后，他接着说下去。
“不过，我看不出‘管理’衰落的概念有什么不对。19世纪末的英国首相――索尔兹伯里勋爵(Lord Salisbury)就一直是这样做的。它会使你软弱的地位得到强化，摆脱不利的处境，保证你的核心利益得到保护。”
“布什政府贪多嚼不烂”
他认为这是美国目前应该采取的做法――包括从伊拉克撤军，他预言此举将使美国政府从某种无法完成的任务中脱身，正如法国当年从阿尔及利亚抽身，英国从印度和巴勒斯坦抽身一样。他认为，布什政府贪多嚼不烂，美国的霸权地位无法持久。
他问道：“假设你去问问一些政治分析家或经济学家：根据您所了解的所有经济学、历史和政治学法则，您认为，一个拥有全球4.5%人口的国家，能一代又一代地占据这种非凡的地位吗？特别是在当前全球生产平衡正发生变化的时候。那么，他会怎么回答呢？”
“这似乎是一个非常简单的问题，很难避免总体结论。因此如果你问我，现在撰写有关美国前景的文章，会不会措辞更温和或更微妙一些，我的回答是，实际上，我能想象到，会有一些人能聪明地管理相对衰落，而另一些人只会把事情办砸。”
攻讦结束。烹制大比目鱼上桌了，我们都认为这是这顿饭的亮点，至少从厨艺的角度而言如此。不过，我看了看周围，略觉得有些别扭。
“顺便问一下，这是你到过的最男性化的餐厅吗？”我问道。“一位女性都没有。”
“我能看见一位女服务生，”肯尼迪说道，轻声笑了笑，开始吃他的比目鱼。“我记得，是你选的这个地方。”
“不，是你选的。”我反驳道，把谈话主题从我们先前讨论的“大战略”降到低得多的境界。“我给了你一份备选名单。”
“好吧，但要记住我可从来没来过这里。”
有关联合国的新书
我觉得最好把话题转向他的新书。书名叫作《人类议会》(The Parliament of Man)，写的是联合国(United Nations)的历史，从某种程度上讲，这本书比他早期的作品有着更为浓厚的理想主义色彩。
虽然肯尼迪明确表示，他坚信只有在大国通力合作的情况下，一个全球体系才能起到作用――正如1815年或1945年的情况那样，但他同时主张，联合国应该变得更为民主。他赞同为联合国征税的提议，赞同在国家军队中设立专门执行联合国任务的部队，并让这家全球机构得到更多情报。
“这是我们拥有的惟一世界组织，”在一道令人赞叹的夏日布丁甜点上桌的时候，他表示。“如果我们现在企图去创建它，要么什么都建立不起来，要么会创建一个不同的组织，但我们已经有这样一个机构。那么我们应该怎么做呢？要么放弃它，要么去改进这个组织。”
他表示，自己在写这本书的时候一度停笔，因为青梅竹马的第一任妻子患癌症去世。有一段时间，他潜心于一些短期项目。不过，2001年，他再次结婚，目前正在进行一项对拉迪亚德?吉卜林(Rudyard Kipling)的研究。
尽管吉卜林常被贬低为帝国主义者，但肯尼迪的战略思想显然受到他的影响。吉卜林曾就德意志帝国的崛起发出警告，并写下了一些不朽的诗歌、故事和小说。
英帝国的兴衰
“1917年，英国政府意识到，自己在得体处理英国战争死难者方面将遇到重大问题，”他说道。“因此，它建立了帝国战争坟墓委员会(Imperial War Graves Commission)。吉卜林是成员之一，其他成员还有建筑师埃德温?鲁琴斯(Edwin Lutyens)，他修建的纪念碑，从这里沿着路走就能看到。他们二人着手设计战争纪念馆，吉卜林对此抱有很大的兴趣。部分原因在于，他的儿子就死于这场战争。”
账单来了，我付了钱。肯尼迪从我旁边挤了过去，直奔洗手间，然后走了。
几天后，我终于顺路走过白厅街的纪念碑。它的底座上参差不齐地摆放着一些已然枯萎的花束。碑文写道：“光荣的死者”。
在一切关于大国兴衰的讨论和争议过去之后，留下来的只有残损的花朵和战争死难者的纪念碑。
Wiltons餐厅，伦敦西南1区
1份蟹肉鳄梨沙拉
1份芦笋配蛋黄酱调味汁
2份烹制大比目鱼
2份夏日布丁
1份浓咖啡
1份双倍浓咖啡
1瓶矿泉水
半瓶宝利芬迈(Pouilly Fume)（一种高品质法国葡萄酒）
总价：169.88英镑
