China Is No Superpower
Does the rise of China mean the eclipse of the United States? One answer was given by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick in an important recent speech to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. "Since 1978, the United States has encouraged China's economic development through market reforms," he said, in his Sept. 21 address. "Our policy has succeeded remarkably well: the dragon emerged and joined the world."
Some Americans -- whether out of fear, fatalism or hope -- would give an even stronger answer. Drawing on events such as Beijing's recent second successful manned space trip, they argue that China threatens to replace the U.S. as the world's major superpower. There is much talk about how big the Chinese economy will be in coming decades, and whether it will surpass America.
Many in Europe and some within the U.S. exaggerate China's rise as a stick to beat the Bush administration. Any rise with the potential to take President George W. Bush down a peg or two is inevitably maximized by those for whom Bush's America would not be their first choice as the world's sole superpower.
Amid all this hype, it's worth recalling a few important facts that are often forgotten. The American economy today is seven times the size of China's. Even the Japanese economy is three times the size of China's. Some even overlook the fact that China is a Leninist regime -- the kind that mostly went up in a puff of smoke 15 years ago.
None of this is to deny that China's economy is expanding rapidly, with annual GDP growth of 8-9% according to official figures. The global consequences of this are clear, with China seeking new markets while sucking in increased imports, with its oil consumption now second only to that of the U.S. At a broader level, Beijing has not been slow to expand its military, spur nationalist spirit and use its growing diplomatic clout to seek greater international influence well beyond Asia.
China's foreign policy seeks to maximize stability at home (for example, by keeping the status quo across Xinjiang's borders with Central Asia) and sustain China's impressive economic growth (for example, by safeguarding the huge American market). A third goal is to maintain peace in China's complicated geographic situation with no less than 14 abutting neighbors. So far so good. This is a prudent foreign policy, though it may be too mercantilist for the responsible partnership Mr. Zoellick suggested the U.S. hopes to achieve with Beijing.
China also has two dubious goals. One is to replace the U.S. as the chief source of influence in East Asia. Hence Chinese efforts to drive a wedge between Japan and the U.S.; and Chinese whispers in Australian ears that Canberra would be better off looking only to Asia and not across the Pacific. The other is to "regain" territories that Beijing feels fall within its sovereignty. These include not only Taiwan, but also a large number of islands east and south of China and, eventually, portions of the Russian Far East -- to which Beijing has laid territorial claims in the past.
Whether Beijing can achieve these foreign-policy goals depends on how long its rigid political system lasts, and the reaction of other powers to China's ambitions. At home, a middle-class push for property rights, rural discontent, increased use of the Internet, huge numbers of unemployed, a suddenly ageing population bringing financial and social strains, all dramatize the contradictions inherent in "market Leninism." Traveling one road in economics and another in politics does not make for a settled destination.
China's economy may continue to grow at its present rate. Or China may retain its Leninist party-state. But both can not happen. Either the economic or the political logic will soon gain the upper hand.
The successful rise of a new hegemon entails not only ambition on the part of that rising power and capacity to fulfill the functions of No. 1, but also -- crucially -- acquiescence by other affected powers.
This last condition is extremely unlikely to be fulfilled. The U.S. will not allow an authoritarian China to become the new world hegemon and has no shortage of allies it can call on. Japan's new assertiveness and India's weight are major factors. And should Beijing seek to pursue a Chinese version of the Monroe Doctrine in Asia, Washington could also count on Australia, Indonesia and Vietnam for assistance.
American interests in Asia lie, as they have for the past century, in keeping China and Japan in balance, and not allowing either one to forge ahead of the other. Equally, a Japan that saw China eclipse the U.S. -- its major ally and whose primacy in East Asia explains six decades of Japanese restraint -- would surely challenge China.
U.S.-China policy should blend full engagement with preserving an equilibrium in East Asia that discourages Beijing from expansionism. No contradiction exists between these twin stances. There are two Chinas, after all. A command economy that sags and a free economy that soars. A Communist Party that scratches for a raison d'etre and 1.3 billion individuals with private agendas. Being wary of authoritarian China yet engaging with emerging China is a reasonable dualism.
The expansionist claims of Beijing are unique among today's powers. But the Chinese regime is a rational dictatorship that has, for the past quarter century, been patient in fulfilling its goals. It surely realizes that others -- such as the U.S., Japan, Russia and India -- have a variety of reasons for denying China the opportunity to be a 21st century Middle Kingdom. If Beijing continues to be faced with a countervailing equilibrium that keeps the peace in East Asia, it will probably act prudently.
In Beijing and Shanghai and Xian, I find less talk of China being near to eclipsing the U.S. than I do at Harvard and in the U.S. media. Overall, China may not be the new colossus it appears to its self-made foes or to distant lotus-eaters. A Leninist-ruled Chinese superpower eclipsing the U.S. is not on the horizon.
Mr. Terrill is an associate in research at Harvard University's Asia Center and author of, most recently, "The New Chinese Empire" (Basic Books, 2004).
中国不会成为超级大国
中国的崛起是不是意味著美国的衰落呢？美国副国务卿佐立克(Robert B. Zoellick)最近在美中关系全国委员会(National Committee on US-China Relations)所做的重要讲话给出了一个答案：“从1978年以来，美国一直在鼓励中国通过市场改革推动经济发展，”他在9月21日的讲话中说，“我们的政策取得了巨大的成功：中国龙终于崛起并屹立于世界舞台。”
不管是出于恐慌、宿命还是期待，一些美国人更愿意给出一个更有力的答案。他们以中国最近第二次成功发射载人飞船等事件为据，认为中国正在对美国的世界超级大国地位构成威胁。如今，对于中国经济在未来几十年将达到怎样的规模以及能否超越美国的议论已经不绝于耳。
许多欧洲人和一部分美国人说，中国的崛起对布什(George W. Bush)政府不啻当头一棒，这未免有些言过其实。对那些觉得布什领导下的美国并非世界唯一超级大国首选的人们来说，只要有望杀杀美国总统布什的锐气，任何国家崛起的影响都会不可避免地被放大。
在传言四起的情况下，我们有必要重提一些常常为人们忽略的重要事实。当前，美国的经济规模是中国的7倍，就连日本经济也是中国的3倍。一些人甚至忽略了这样的事实：中国仍是一个列宁主义政权──这种政体在15年前大多已经灰飞烟灭了。
无可否认的是，中国经济正在迅速增长。官方数据显示，中国年均GDP增长率达到8-9%。它给全球带来的影响显而易见，中国正在寻求新的出口市场同时不断增加进口，目前石油消耗量位居全球第二，仅次于美国。更广泛地说，在扩大军力、振奋民族精神、利用日渐强大的外交力量来寻求亚洲以外更大国际影响等方面，中国的步伐也一点都不慢。
这种对外政策的目的是确保国内稳定（比如说，维持新疆与中亚边境地区的现状）和保持经济快速增长（如捍卫巨大的美国市场）。第三个目标是维持中国与至少14个邻国和地区存在领土纠纷的地域的和平。截至目前，一切尚好。这是一个稳健的对外政策，不过对于佐立克所言美国希望与中国结成的负责任的伙伴关系而言，可能太过重商主义了。
中国或许还有两个目标。其一是取代美国成为在东亚地区最具影响力的国家。因此，中国在竭力阻挠日本与美国的关系；中国向澳大利亚暗示，如果它只将目光关注于亚洲，而不是跨越太平洋的话，它的状况会更好。另一个目标是“收复”中国宣称拥有主权的地域，其中不仅包括台湾，还涉及中国东部和南部海域中的许多岛屿，最终还有俄罗斯远东的部分地域。
上述对外政策目标能否实现，要取决于中国僵化的政治体制能持续多久以及其他大国对中国野心的反应。在国内，中产阶层对知识产权保护的呼声、农民的不满情绪、互联网的普及、大量的失业人口、人口的骤然老龄化等诸多问题给中国带来了巨大的财政和社会压力，体现了“市场列宁主义”内在的矛盾和冲突。经济上走一条路，而政治上却走另一条路，这不利于实现既定的目标。
中国经济可能会继续保持当前的增长速度。或许，中国会保留列宁主义政体。但是，这两种情况不能并存，终有一方会很快占据上风。
一个新霸权的诞生不仅需要凭藉崛起一方的野心和履行头号大国职责的能力，重要的是还要获得其他受影响国家的认可。
要满足最后这个条件的可能性恐怕是微乎其微。美国决不会允许中国成为新的世界霸主，而且它在这方面也不愁找到盟友。日本的自负和印度的势力不容小视。而且，如果中国想要在亚洲推行中国版本的门罗主义，美国可能还会从澳大利亚、印尼和越南方面寻求援助。
一个世纪以来，美国人在亚洲的利益重心一直在于保持中国与日本之间的势力均衡，不允许其中任何一方超过另一方。同样地，如果中国超越了美国（日本的主要盟友、它在东亚的权威影响力使得日本过去60年来一直甘居其后），日本必定会向中国发起挑战。
美中政策应当把保持东亚地区的均衡纳入进去（正是这种均衡格局避免了中国走上扩张主义道路），这两方面没有冲突。在中国，计划经济渐行渐远而市场经济迅速发展，共产党在竭力寻找继续存在的理由，13亿人口拥有各自的私人目标。适应一个崛起的中国同时警惕霸权主义中国的出现是一个合理的对策。
在当今大国当中，中国的扩张主义倾向是不同寻常的。但是，独裁体制使其过去25年来在实现这一目标上面一直保持克制。它想必已经意识到，美国、日本、俄罗斯和印度等其他国家有各种理由可以阻挠其成为21世纪的世界霸主。如果中国仍面临一个维持东亚和平的势力制衡态势，它很可能会谨慎从事。
在北京、上海和西安，我发现关于中国快要超越美国的谈论比我在哈佛和美国媒体见到的要少得多。总的来说，中国可能不会成为新的霸权，一个超越美国的列宁主义政体下的中国超级大国不会出现。
（编者按：Terrill是哈佛大学亚洲研究中心研究员，最近出版《The New Chinese Empire》一书。）
