Asia could solve America’s debt trap
It takes two to tango. This has been one of the twin themes of my recent columns on global current account imbalances (November 24 and December 1 and 8). The huge deficits being run by the US are the mirror image of the surplus savings of the rest of the world. But the dance is becoming ever wilder. That has been my second theme. It is necessary to call a halt before serious injury occurs. The “blame game” among policy-makers is idiotic: they have created the problem together and must solve it together.
The aim is to reduce the rest of the world's reliance on the spillover of excess demand from the US and from a few other high-income countries (particularly the UK, Spain and Australia), while sustaining global economic activity. To achieve this, we need two changes: a reduction in aggregate demand, relative to potential supply, in deficit countries (and offsetting increases in surplus ones); and a depreciation of the real exchange rate in deficit countries, to switch output towards and demand from tradeable goods and services.
How difficult would the needed adjustments be? The first step towards an answer is deciding what a sustainable US current account deficit might be. In a recent column (FT, December 15), Raghuram Rajan, the chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, argues that the US could sustain a current account deficit of 3 per cent of gross domestic product (half the current level) indefinitely. Given US potential growth, net external liabilities would stabilise at 50 per cent of GDP, against roughly 30 per cent today. Given the chronic savings surplus of Japan and several other high-income countries, such deficits and liabilities seem reasonable for the world's biggest and most dynamic advanced economy.
Suppose, then, that the current account deficit were to be reduced from 6 per cent to 3 per cent of GDP over half a dozen years. With potential growth of supply at 3? per cent a year, real domestic demand would then need to grow at around 3 per cent. Between 1996 and 2005, real demand will have grown 0.4 percentage points a year faster than output (see chart). So, overall, real domestic demand would be growing about a percentage point a year more slowly than it has over the past decade. That would be noticeable, but not agonising.
The corresponding reduction in the rest of the world's current account surplus would be about 1 per cent of its combined GDP. This seems quite modest. But the eurozone and Japan, which account for over a third of global GDP at market prices, would need to expand demand relative to supply. This would represent a marked reversal of the past decade's trends (see chart).
Now turn to the required changes in real exchange rates. To achieve a fall in the current account deficit, at full employment, of 3 per cent of GDP, the increased domestic supply and reduced domestic demand for tradeable goods and services in the US would amount to about an eighth of current output in this sector. Some analysts suggest that the needed overall real exchange rate adjustment could be close to 30 per cent from the peak three years ago. This would imply a further depreciation nearly as large as the one so far.
If a halving of the current account deficit, in relation to GDP, and a 30 per cent overall fall in the real exchange rate from the peak in early 2002 is the adjustment we seek, will the market deliver? The answer is: only if it is allowed to do so.
As economists at Deutsche Bank have argued, a new informal dollar area has emerged that contains countries that either run fixed exchange rates against the dollar (notably China) or at least intervene heavily in foreign currency markets. This new dollar area contains over half the world economy. But it will also run an overall deficit of about $260bn ()in 2004 (see chart). It is not surprising that the dollar area's currencies have been declining against the rest.
As the pain grows, argues Deutsche Bank, the eurozone may also embark on foreign exchange interventions and so join the informal dollar area, even in the teeth of opposition from the European Central Bank. Most of the world would then be underwriting the US external (and domestic) financial deficits. That would be a nirvana for US policy makers, in the short term. But it would also spostpone and exacerbate needed adjustments.
There is a better way: all round adjustment. The pivotal players here will be the Asian developing countries. Under almost any circumstances, Japan will run current account surpluses for years. The same is true for continental Europe. Both are regions with a natural tendency to save more than they can invest. But non-Japan Asia contains the world's fastest growing economies and biggest populations. These are the countries that would normally be expected to run current account deficits, financed by long-term capital inflows.
Yet that has not happened, largely because exchange rate intervention and monetary sterilisation are thwarting the natural adjustment. The result has been an astonishing accumulation of foreign currency reserves (see chart). By any conceivable standards, these countries have more reserves than they need. China, for example, holds reserves equal to a third of GDP, up from a sixth just four years ago. What is the point of exporting real goods in return for pieces of paper whose value will tumble when the Chinese seek to cash them in? It would be far more sensible to tolerate current account deficits equal at least to the inflow of foreign direct investment.
The world will only dispense with its dependence on the accumulation of mountainous US liabilities if non-Japan Asia above all, China play the role to be expected of the world's fastest growing and most populous countries. Continent-sized countries should not go on playing the mercantilist game of piling up reserves indefinitely.
Non-Japan Asia needs to become a large net importer of capital. Aggregate current account deficits of at least $150bn a year, in today's prices, would be very helpful. Facilitating the emergence of the efficient capital markets and dynamic consumer demand needed for this is much the highest priority in global macroeconomic policy. Such reforms not only offer the only durable escape from the US debt trap. They are also exactly the changes Asia needs for its own long-term development.
亚洲：美国债务陷阱的出路
跳探戈需要两个人。在笔者最近有关全球经常账户失衡的专栏文章中(11月24日、12月1日和8日)，这一直是两大主题之一。美国的巨额赤字恰恰反映了世界其他国家的储蓄盈余。但这探戈舞正越跳越狂野。这是笔者的第二个主题。在严重伤害出现前，必须喊停。政策制定者之间相互推卸责任的做法愚不可及：他们共同制造了麻烦，现在必须共同去解决麻烦。
目标是要在保持全球经济活动的同时，减少世界其他国家对美国以及另外几个高收入国家(特别是英国、西班牙和澳大利亚)过度需求的依赖性。为此，我们需要作出两项调整：相对于潜在供应，减少赤字国家的累计总需求(并抵消盈余国家的增长)；赤字国家实际汇率贬值，使产出转向可贸易产品和服务，而使需求与之脱离。
作出必要的调整有多么困难呢？要找到答案，首先应判定美国经常账户逆差多大才是可持续的。在最近一篇专栏文章(12月15日《金融时报》)中，国际货币基金组织(IMF)首席经济学家拉古拉姆?瑞占(Raghuram Rajan)辩称，美国可以长期维持占国内生产总值(GDP)3%的经常账户逆差(相当于目前水平的一半)。考虑到美国的增长潜力，其外债净额将稳定在国内生产总值的50%，而如今大约为30%。考虑到日本和其他几个高收入国家的长期储蓄盈余，对世界最大、最强有力的发达经济体来说，这样的逆差和债务似乎是合理的。
然后，假设在未来6年内，美国经常账户逆差从占国内生产总值的6%减少到3%。当供应的潜在增长速度为每年3.5%时，实际内需就要增长大约3%。从1996年到2005年，实际需求增长率每年将比产出快了0.4个百分点(见图)。因此，总的来说，实际内需增长率每年将比过去10年的水平低一个百分点。这将产生引人注意的效果，但并不会太痛苦。
世界其他国家经常账户顺差占GDP的比重，也将相应减少1%左右。这看上去相当适度。但按市价计占全球GDP逾三分之一的欧元区和日本，将需要相对于供应扩大需求。这将意味着过去10年的趋势出现明显逆转(见图)。
现在转到实际汇率必需的调整。为减少在充分就业情况下占GDP 3%的经常账户逆差，美国对可贸易产品和服务的国内供应增长和国内需求减少，将相当于该领域目前产出的八分之一左右。一些分析师表示，与3年前的最高点相比，实际汇率必需的调整总幅度或许接近30%。这将意味着美元进一步贬值的幅度，几乎相当于迄今为止的贬值幅度。
如果我们的调整旨在实现经常账户逆差占GDP比重减半，并且实际汇率比2002年初的最高点总共贬值30%，那么市场是否会遵照执行呢？答案是：只有当市场获准这样做的时候。
正如德意志银行(Deutsche Bank)的经济学家所说，一个新的非正式美元区已然浮现，其中包括对美元实行固定汇率的国家(尤其是中国)，或者至少是强力干预外汇市场的国家。新的美元区占世界经济总量的一半以上。但2004年，其赤字总额也将达到大约2600亿美元(见图)。美元区的货币对其他国家货币一直在贬值，这并不令人奇怪。
德意志银行辩称，随着问题恶化，即使欧洲中央银行(European Central Bank)反对，欧元区可能也会对外汇市场进行干预，从而加入非正式美元区。由此一来，世界上大多数国家都将为美国外部(和国内)财务赤字进行担保。短期而言，这将是美国政策制定者的天堂。但这也将推迟并加剧所需的调整。
有一种更好的做法：全体参与调整。对此，关键的参与者将是亚洲发展中国家。几乎在任何情况下，日本的经常账户顺差都将保持多年。欧洲大陆国家同样如此。在这两个地区，人们自然而然地趋向于更多储蓄而非投资。但除日本以外的亚洲国家，包括了世界上增长最快、人口最多的经济体。在长期资本流入的支持下，这些国家在正常情况下应保持经常账户逆差。
然而，这一情形并未出现，主要是因为汇率干预和货币冲销阻碍着自然调整。结果，这些国家的外汇储备一直保持着惊人的增长(见图)。根据任何可以想像得到的标准，其外汇储备都超出需要。例如，中国的外汇储备相当于国内生产总值的三分之一，而4年前仅为六分之一。中国人出口实实在在的商品，换取的却是在兑现时价值暴跌的纸币，其意义何在？更明智的做法是：保持适度的经常账户逆差，使其至少相当于流入的外国直接投资总量。
只有当除日本以外的亚洲国家，特别是中国发挥出世界上增长最快、人口最多的国家所应发挥的作用时，世界才能摆脱对美国日益高筑的债台的依赖性。幅员辽阔的国家不应总是玩弄无限增加外汇储备的重商主义游戏。
除日本以外的亚洲国家需要成为资本的净进口大国。以现值计算，经常账户逆差总额至少达到每年1500亿美元，将大有裨益。对全球宏观经济政策来说，推动实现这一目标所需的高效率资本市场和强大消费需求的出现，是重中之重。此类改革不仅将带来摆脱美国债务陷阱的唯一持久途径，而且还是亚洲国家为实现自身长期发展所必需的调整。
