China reaches for a monetary policy weapon
China's first interest rate rise in nine years would seem to be tailor-made to buttress the central government's policy to slow sections of the economy and ease them into a soft landing before they have to be reined in more violently.
Until now, Beijing's prime weapon has been one it has used since the days of the command economy, so-called “administrative measures”, a polite way of describing the choking-off of credit to out-of-favour borrowers.
However, the government and the People's Bank of China have other more important targets in mind in the short term with the interest rate changes, according to commentators and scholars in China.
The rise in both deposit and lending rates will begin to address the problem of negative real interest rates, which had started to introduce new distortions into the Chinese finance system.
Until yesterday, the deposit and lending rates were 1.98 per cent and 5.31 per cent respectively, and the home mortgage rate was 5.04 per cent. Inflation was 5.2 per cent in September, down from 5.3 per cent in August.
The benchmark one-year deposit and lending rates have been increased by 27 basis points, to 2.25 and 5.58 per cent respectively. Banks have also been given greater flexibility to increase lending rates for riskier customers.
“It's a good move it is getting closer to the real cost of borrowing money,” said Stephen Harner, a Shanghai-based banking consultant.
At a time when the government is attempting to prick a growing bubble in property prices in some cities, officials could not countenance a situation for too long where people got a better deal borrowing money than saving it.
“Given the negative mortgage rate, unheard of in other parts of the world, the decision whether to invest in real estate is practically a no-brainer,” said Hu Shuli, the editor of Caijing, a finance magazine, in a recent article.
Just as worrying for the government was the fact that many depositors, browned-off at the lousy returns in state banks, were taking their business elsewhere, to the illegal, informal financial sector.
These so-called underground banks, which have long existed in many Chinese provinces, have done a thriving business during the credit squeeze lending to customers unhappy with the state institutions.
Fixed-asset investment grew by 31.1 per cent in the six months to July, but bank deposit rates by only 15.5 per cent, according to Caijing, evidence that many new loans did not come official banks.
“[The interest rate rise] will curb underground banks by helping official banks absorb more funds,” said Fan Jianping, a researcher at the State Information Centre.
“As the cost of capital is better reflected in the market, enterprises with real competitiveness will find little difficulty financing themselves, while those that are poorly managed will be washed out.” Not all commentators in China applauded the decision. Peng Xingyun, of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said the higher cost of financing would hurt many manufacturers and increase the non-performing loans of state banks.
“The crucial point at present is not squeezing but easing,” said Mr Peng.
“And in any case, the decrease in bank deposits has more to do with the falling of residents' income than the present interest rate.”
An increase in deposit rates has also raised fears of a renewal of large capital inflows, which in turn would put further pressure on the government to revalue the renminbi as reserves rise. Capital inflows had eased in recent months.
However, with the US Federal Reserve in a tightening cycle, rising Chinese rates may not be attractive enough to provoke any substantial inflow of new funds.
“It is unlikely that the differential between China and foreign rates will widen,” said a Shanghai-based banking analyst.
In the long term, however, the greatest import of yesterday's announcement is not so much the size of the rate increase, nor its immediate impact but the fact that it was made at all.
Monetary policy is now in play in China in a way that it has not been before. Already, there are expectations of further rises within the next six months.
“The market will now be convinced that the central bank is prepared to raise rates,” said Mr Harner. Editorial Comment, Page 12
中国拿起货币政策武器
经过九年之后，中国第一次宣布加息。中央政府最近的政策是放缓局部经济，实现软着陆，以免出现必须剧烈控制的局面。加息之举旨在支持这一政策。
到目前为止，北京的主要武器，还是从计划经济时代沿袭下来的所谓“行政手段”，这是一种委婉的说法，实际上是控制贷款，不发放给不在优惠之列的借贷人。
但是，评论界和学术界人士指出，政府和中国人民银行最近的加息决定，考虑的还有一些短期的重要目标。
提高储蓄和贷款利率，还可解决实际利率呈负值的问题。这个问题不解决，会进一步扭曲中国的金融系统。
截止到昨天为止，储蓄和贷款利率分别为1.98%和5.31%，住房按揭贷款利率为5.04%，9月份通货膨胀率为5.2%，低于8月份的5.3%。
作为基准的一年定期储蓄利率和贷款利率各增加了27个基点，分别达到2.25%和 5.58%。各家银行也有了更大灵活性，能够对高风险借贷者提高利率。
“这是一项好的行动，越来越趋近贷款的实际成本，”在上海执业的金融顾问斯蒂芬?哈纳尔(Stephen Harner)说。
这段时期，政府一直想把某些城市的房地产泡沫戳破。很长时期以来，借贷比存钱合算，所以形成了房地产泡沫，政府一直苦于没有应对之策。
“贷款利率为负值，这在其它国家闻所未闻，要不要投资于房地产？这是个想都不用去想的问题。”金融杂志《财经》的编辑胡舒立在最近一期的文章中表示。
还有一个问题同样让政府担心：很多储蓄者由于不满国有银行极低的回报，正在把储蓄业务带到别的地方，比如非法、非正规的金融领域。
这些所谓的地下钱庄在中国很多省份都存在，在银行惜贷的时期，这些地下钱庄借贷给对国有金融机构不满的客户，它们的生意一直比较兴旺。
根据《财经》的报道，到7月份为止的今年前6个月，固定资产投资增长了31.1%，但是银行储蓄利率只增加了15.5% 。很多新增贷款来自于官方银行以外的渠道。
“加息会帮助官方银行吸收到更多资金，从而可以限制地下钱庄，”国家信息中心的研究人员范建平表示。
“如果市场能够更好地反映资金成本，那么真正具有竞争力的企业就不会有贷款难的问题，而管理不善的企业就会面临淘汰。”中国的评论人士并不都是欢迎加息决定。中国社会科学院的彭兴韵说，提高融资成本，会损害很多制造业企业，增加国有银行的不良贷款。
“目前最关键的问题不是收紧，而是放松。”彭先生说。
“其实，银行储蓄下降更主要的原因，是居民收入的下降，而利率的下降则在其次。”
增加储蓄利率，也让人担忧会引发新一轮资金大幅度流入的问题，如果这样，会对政府形成压力。在储备上升面前，政府必须再次考虑人民币升值的问题。最近几个月，资金流入问题已经有所缓解。
但是，由于美联储（US Federal Reserve）正处在收紧期，中国利率的上升并不会形成巨大的吸引力，引发大量的资金流入。
“中国和国外利率的差距不大可能扩大，”一位在上海执业的金融分析人士表示。
但是，从长远来看，近日宣布的加息决定最重要的意义既不是加息幅度，也不是短期影响，而是作出这一决定的事实本身。
货币政策正在以一种前所未有的方式发挥着作用。即便在目前，就已经有人预测未来六个月会有新的加息决定出台。
“市场开始相信，中央银行正准备提高利率，” 哈纳尔先生说。
