Know the limits of corporate venturing
With growth back on the agenda after a period of austerity and cost cutting, it is worth reflecting on the lessons arising from similar periods in the past.
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In the late 1990s, more than three-quarters of companies in the Fortune 100 and an equivalent number of FTSE 100 companies set up corporate venturing units as part of their search for growth. For example, BAT, the tobacco company, set up two units: Imagination, to search for new ideas, and Evolution, to develop the ideas into new businesses. While these units helped the company explore a number of areas, they failed to develop any significant new businesses.
Recent research into corporate venturing units and corporate incubators by both Ashridge and London business schools concluded that less than 5 per cent of corporate venturing units created new businesses that were taken up by the parent company. Moreover, many failed to make any positive contribution.
So why do corporate venturing units fail to help their parent companies find new legs? There are three reasons.
First, early stage venturing is a tough job, even for professional, independent venture capital companies. Many VC companies earn less than their cost of capital unless they are fortunate enough to invest in one of the rare big winners. Angels, another form of independent investor in early stage ventures, also frequently fail to earn a good return on their investments. Without some advantage, corporate venturers are unlikely to beatthese odds.
Second, corporate venturers rarely have an advantage over the professionals. Those business opportunities where the company does have a clear advantage are normally dealt with through the strategic planning process. At BAT, for instance, acquisitions of tobacco companies in new regions would not be allocated to a corporate venturing unit. Instead, BAT's venturing focused on areas such as e-commerce, where its sources of advantage were questionable.
Further, individuals in a corporate venturing unit rarely match their independent competitors. They may include some of the most entrepreneurial managers in the company, but they do not usually have theaccumulated experience of seasoned venture capitalists.
Third, the new ventures that start up within a corporate venturing unit often attract little attention or commitment from the core of the company. Because they are developed within a separate unit, they are not part of the strategic planning discussions that drive resource allocation.
When the parent company is short of resources, either because of an economic downturn or because the new activities begin to compete with existing businesses, the new ventures lose out. Since it takes longer to nurture a new venture than most business cycles, competition for resources is almost inevitable.
These obstacles to corporate venturing appear to be insurmountable. In our research, we could find no examples of new legs being developed from a venturing unit that passed the test of being “significant, permanent new businesses” - meaning that they are profitable, are part of the parent company's portfolio and amount to 20 per cent of sales or $1bn in value. Even when the research was extended back to venturing units set up in the 1970s or 1980s, none of them spawned a new business that passed our significance and permanence tests. Corporate venturing units do not, it appears, deliver growth. Managements looking for new growth have two routes: strategic planning (thinking through the options and choosing one or more with reasonable chances of success), or opportunistic investments (reacting to events or external proposals when they appear sufficiently promising).
In a separate strand of research, we assembled a database of companies that had created new businesses that passed the significance and permanence tests. In only one of these cases did the new business begin its life in a corporate venturing unit or corporate incubator. Two-thirds were the result of carefully considered strategic decisions and one-third were more opportunistic.
So, if corporate venturing does not create new businesses, does it have any place within large companies? The answer is yes. The techniques of corporate venturing can be harnessed for four purposes.
Harvest venturing. This is appropriate when some corporate resources, such as technology, managerial skills, brands and even fixed assets, are surplus to requirements. It uses the techniques of venturing to convert existing corporate resources into commercial ventures, and then into cash.
Lucent New Ventures Group was an example of harvest venturing before it was sold to Coller Capital. Set up to exploit Lucent's technology, the unit evaluated over 300 opportunities, started 35 ventures and drew in $350m (￡192m) of external venture capital.
Ecosystem venturing. This is appropriate when the success of a business unit depends on a community of connected businesses, such as suppliers, agents, distributors, franchisees, technology entrepreneurs or manufacturers of complementary products.
If this ecosystem is short of venture capital funds there is an opportunity for the company to act as a support to entrepreneurs in the community. The benefit to the company is the vibrancy of the community and the impact this has on its core businesses, rather than the prospect of capital gain from the investments.
Intel Capital and Microsoft both use corporate venturing to stimulate their ecosystems. Intel Capital's early investments were made in suppliers, often to guarantee availability of components. As the component industry matured, Intel switched to investing in software companies and supercomputer makers to promote the use of Intel technology.
Innovation venturing. This is appropriate when an existing function within a business unit, normally research or new product development, is underperforming because there is insufficient energy directed towards innovation. There must also be some belief that entrepreneurial energy is latent inside the company and can be fostered by stimulating “intrapreneurs” or by tapping into external entrepreneurs.
A unit with a venturing approach is set up to take on part of the function that is underperforming. By providing the right conditions, internal or external managers with entrepreneurial instincts will take more risks and invest more energy in developing new technologies or ways of working. Shell's GameChanger programme was set up in 1996 to increase innovation in the technical function of Shell's exploration business. The idea was to take 10 per cent of the technical budget and spend it in a “venturing” way. This new approach to innovation was taken up by other divisions in Shell and is viewed as having produced a step-change in some areas.
Private equity venturing. This is appropriate under rather limited circumstances. It is equivalent to a diversification into the private equity business, so the company needs to believe that it has better access to a flow of good deals than independent private equity companies. Also, managers must be confident that the deal flow they are tapping into is in the early stages of an upswing. To make money in the cycle of boom and bust, managers need to invest early and exit before the shake-out.
Nokia Venture Partners was set up to make minority investments in wireless internet projects. As one of the partners explained: “We do not do strategic investments [for Nokia] but the reason we exist is strategic for Nokia.” Managers planning any kind of venturing unit need to be clear about which type they are setting up and why. “New leg venturing” and units with mixed objectives do not work (see figure, below left). Unless managers are clear about which of the four types they want, they will not build the necessary business model or skills to be successful. Companies wanting to do more than one kind of venturing need more than one type of venturing unit.
Andrew Campbell is director of Ashridge Strategic Management Centre and author, with Robert Park, of The Growth Gamble (forthcoming, to be published by Nicholas Brealey). Julian Birkinshaw is an associate professor of strategic and international managementat the London BusinessSchool.
商学院2004: 企业风险投资部门的局限
经过了一段萧条萎缩和成本削减时期，经济正在重回增长的轨道。此时，有必要回顾一下，我们能从过去类似的时期中得到什么经验教训？
在1990年代末，财富百强企业中，四分之三以上都建立了风险投资部门，以帮助企业寻求增长。富时(FTSE)百强中，这样做的企业数量也差不多。例如，烟草企业英美烟草公司(BAT)就建立了两个业务部门：一个名叫“想象”(Imagination)，负责寻找新的想法；另一个名为“演进”(Evolution)，负责将找到的新想法发展成新业务。这两个新业务部门确实帮助公司对一些领域进行了探索，但却没能产生任何有重大意义的新业务。
阿什里奇(Ashridge)商学院和伦敦商学院(London Business School)最近对企业风险投资部门和孵化器开展了一项研究。研究的结论是，在所有的企业风险投资部门中，只有不到5%创建的新业务最后为母公司所采纳。更有甚者，很多新创业务没能产生任何积极作用。
那么，为什么企业风险投资部门无法帮助母公司找到新的出路？这里有三方面的原因。
第一，即使对专做风险投资业务的独立企业来说，早期风险投资也非易事。如果不是运气足够好，投资了少见的大赢家，很多风险投资公司的收益还抵不上资金成本。天使投资人是另一类早期的独立投资商，它们也往往得不到较好的投资回报(Angels, 天使投资人，是指在公司产品和业务处在萌芽期就投入资金的投资人，通常是创业者的亲朋好友或商业伙伴，对创业者的未来或业务有很强的信心。―― 译者注)。对企业的风险投资部门来说，如果没有一些优势，不大可能打破这些常规。
第二，企业风险投资部门很难比得上专业的风险投资机构。就算在企业擅长的方面有商机出现，企业一般情况下也是按照战略规划的过程进行处理。比如，在英美烟草公司，一般不会把收购新兴地区烟草公司这样的任务交给风险投资部门来执行。相反，英美烟草的风险投资部门侧重的是象电子商务这样的领域，但在这类领域里，英美烟草的优势来源很成问题。
另外，企业风险投资部门的员工也很少能比得上他们独立的竞争对手。他们当中或许不乏公司最具创业精神的经理，但他们不太可能具备那些风险资本老手多年积累起来的经验。
第三，风险投资部门的新创业务往往得不到企业核心部门和人员的关注和投入。由于这些新业务是独立的部门开发出来的，因此不属于企业战略规划讨论的范围。可是，资源的分配却是由战略规划讨论决定的。
如果母公司资源短缺，无论是因为经济滑坡，还是因为新创业务和现有业务发生冲突，结果都是新创业务败下阵来。由于培育新创业务周期要比多数商业周期长，所以对资源的争夺几乎无可避免。
企业风险投资部门面临的这些障碍似乎难以逾越。在我们的研究中，还没能找到有哪家企业的风险投资部门能发展出一个符合“重要的、持久的”这一标准的新增业务。这个标准意味着：新创业务要有赢利，要属于母公司业务组合的一部分，且销售收入占总销售额20%以上，或总价值达到10亿美元。即使我们把研究回溯到1970和1980年代，也没有哪家企业的风险投资部门发展出了经得起这种重要性和持久性检验的新业务。这样看来，企业内部的风险投资是不能推动增长的。管理层寻求增长要通过以下两个途径：一个是战略规划(仔细考虑多种方案，然后选择一个或几个最有可能成功的方案)，另外就是机会性投资(针对看上去很有潜力的外部事件或建议作出反应。)
在另外一项研究中，有一些企业的新创业务通过了重要性和持久性的检验，我们将这些企业汇编为一个数据库。在所有这些案例中，只有一家企业的新创业务是从内部的风险投资部门或企业孵化器开始的，其中三分之二业务出自精心安排的战略决策，另外三分之一则更具投机性。
既然企业的风险投资部门并不能带来新业务，那么它在企业中是否仍占有一席之地？答案是肯定的。企业风险投资的技巧可以用来实现四个目标。
第一，收获式风险投资(harvest venturing)。当企业的资源，如技术、管理能力、品牌、甚至固定资产出现供过于求的局面时，比较适合采用收获式风险投资的做法。这种方法能将现有的企业资源转换成商业性风险投资，继而产生现金流。
朗讯新创业务集团(Lucent New Ventures Group)在被科勒资本公司(Coller Capital)收购之前，就是收获式风险投资的典范。该集团的创立就是为了充分利用朗讯的技术。自成立后，它评估了300多个商业机会，启动了35项风险投资业务，吸引了3.5亿美元的外部风险投资基金。
第二，生态系统式风险投资(ecosystem venturing)。如果某业务部门的成功取决于所有关联企业所组成的群落(community)，如供应商、代理商、分销商、特许经销商、技术提供商或补充产品的生产商所组成的群落，那么生态系统式风险投资就比较适合。
如果生态系统内存在风险资金的缺口，那么公司就有机会充当群落内新创企业的支持者。这对公司的好处是整个群落都会增添活力，对公司的核心业务也会发生影响，而投资的资金收益倒在其次。
英特尔资本(Intel Capital)和微软(Microsoft)都曾动用公司的风险投资来刺激各自的生态系统。英特尔资本的早期投资都给了供应商，这往往是为了保证零部件的供应。等零部件行业成熟了，英特尔就转而投资软件公司和超级电脑生产商，在这些企业中推广英特尔的技术。
第三，创新式风险投资(innovation venturing)。如果企业对创新的扶持力度不足，导致某业务部门(通常是研究和新产品开发部门)的现有职能绩效低下，那么创新式风险投资方法比较合适。另外，大家还得相信，企业内部有创业的潜能，可以通过激励“企业内部创业人”(intrapreneurs)或利用外部创业家把它释放出来。
企业可以设立一个运用风险投资方法的业务部门，来接管绩效不佳的部分职能。只要提供合适的条件，公司内外具有创业精神的管理人员就会承担更多风险，投入更多精力，去开发新技术，或寻找新型的工作方式。壳牌石油(Shell)的“游戏改变者”项目(Game Changer)创立于1996年，目的是提高壳牌钻探技术职能部门的创新能力。办法是将10%的技术预算按“风险投资”的方法来使用。该方法与创新相关，后来被壳牌其它部门所采用。有人认为，采用这个方法后，某些领域逐步发生了变化。
第四，私人股本式风险投资(private equity venturing)。这种方法的适用范围比较有限。它等同于向私人股本领域的多元化发展。在这种情况下，企业得有信心，认为自己比独立的私人股本公司更有能力接触到大量优良业务。另外，经理人还得相信，他们所摸索的业务正处在上升的早期。他们需要尽早投资，然后在大家清盘前退出，才能在繁荣和萧条的交替循环中赢利。
诺基亚风险投资伙伴公司(Nokia Venture Partners)的创立，就是为了向无线互联网项目提供小股投资。正如一位合伙人解释的那样：“我们不(为诺基亚)作战略性投资，但我们的存在却对诺基亚有着战略性意义。”经理人在规划任何一种风险投资部门时都必须清楚，他们建立的是哪种类型的业务部门，以及为什么要建成这种类型。“新出路式风险投资”(new leg venturing)，或者风险投资部门的目标含混不清，都是行不通的(见附图)。除非经理人明白自己需要哪一种类型，否则他们就建不起必要的商业模型，也养不成取得成功的好习惯。如果企业想从事多种风险投资，则需要搭建多个风险投资部门。
安德鲁?坎贝尔是阿什里奇战略管理中心(Ashridge Strategic Management Center)的主任，他和罗伯特?帕克(Robert Park)合著有《增长的博弈》(The Growth Gamble)一书。该书即将由尼古拉斯?布莱雷出版社(Nicholas Brealey)出版。
朱利安?伯金肖是伦敦商学院的战略与国际管理副教授。
