An unsettled outlook: strong world growth masks medium-term risks ahead
Optimism about the short-term outlook for the world economy is fairly widespread. Optimism about long-run prospects is less universal, but seems justified. It is the medium term that is most worrying. The new expansionary cycle has, for all its apparent vigour, inherited too many of the frailties of its predecessor. The doctors have, in response, injected monetary and fiscal stimulants in powerful doses. But burdened by both old and newer ailments, this expansion may not live to a healthy old age.
This year is now expected to see something close to a perfectly synchronised global economic recovery. According to Consensus Forecasts, US growth should reach 4.5 per cent and Japan - astonishingly - 4.2 per cent. The UK economy is forecast to grow by 3.2 per cent and even the lagging eurozone by 1.7 per cent. The Asia Pacific region (including Japan) is forecast to achieve 5.1 per cent growth, eastern Europe 5.5 per cent and Latin America 4.6 per cent. Leading the pack is China, forecast to achieve 8.7 per cent growth this year. For the world as a whole, Goldman Sachs forecasts output growth this year of 4.8 per cent, up from 3.4 per cent in 2003.
Next year, growth is expected to slow, but the consensus remains cheerful. US growth is forecast at 3.8 per cent and the UK's at 2.7 per cent. The eurozone is expected to reach 2 per cent, although Japan's growth is forecast to tumble to 1.8 per cent. A soft landing is forecast for China, with growth falling to 7.7 per cent. Latin America is forecast to grow at 3.7 per cent.
A cheerful near term remains in the offing. The longer term looks quite promising, too, provided US productivity growth is sustained at the relatively high rate achieved since the mid-1990s, the catch-up economies of Asia continue to improve both policies and institutions and the world economy remains open to trade in goods, services, capital and ideas.
Yet there are also big medium-term risks ahead. These come in four interconnected boxes: global macroeconomic imbalances; the impact of a rising Asia; protectionism; and vulnerability to terrorist outrages.
Start, then, with some of the elements in the global macroeconomic picture.
The US current account deficit has risen from about 1.5 per cent of gross domestic product to over 5 per cent today. During the recent US slowdown, the current account deficit has, remarkably, continued to rise (see chart). This is the opposite of what one would normally expect and of experience in the early 1990s.
A net creditor for most of the 20th century, the US has seen its net liability position move from a rough balance in 1988 to minus 24 per cent last year (see chart). Yet, despite a current account deficit of 4.9 per cent of GDP in 2003, net liabilities to the rest of the world fell as a share of GDP. The tumbling dollar reduced net liabilities by more than the current account deficit increased them. On average, according to the International Monetary Fund's latest World Economic Outlook, real domestic demand will have grown at 3.8 per cent a year in the US between 1996 and 2005, while real output will have grown at 3.5 per cent (see chart).
The UK has an even bigger discrepancy, at half a percentage point a year. Meanwhile, the eurozone's demand will have grown at a pitiable rate of 1.8 per cent, with output growth of only 2 per cent, and Japan's demand will have grown at a still lower 1.2 per cent, with output growth at 1.5 per cent.
According to the IMF, between the third quarter of 2001 and the fourth quarter of last year, US real domestic demand rose, cumulatively, by 8.9 per cent, while the UK's increased by 6.9 per cent (see chart). Over the same period, Japan's demand rose by just 2.7 per cent and the eurozone's by 2 per cent. Germany's fell by 0.7 per cent.
In 2004, according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Anglosphere (the US, UK and Australia, but not Canada in this case) will run a combined current account deficit of $636bn, with the US deficit alone accounting for $555bn (see chart). No other group of countries is forecast to run significant deficits. Asia's current account surplus was recorded at $322bn.
Between February 2002 (when the dollar's overall real exchange rate started to fall) and April 2004, official foreign currency reserves (predominantly in dollars) rose by $1,211bn to $3,277bn (see chart). Seventy-eight per cent of this massive rise was in Asia alone, with Japan and China accounting for 34 per cent and 19 per cent of the overall increase in reserves, respectively.
In 2002 and 2003, the increased foreign currency reserves of the Asian countries totalled $718bn. Of this $540bn was generated by the current account surplus, while the other $178bn represented the recycling of Asia's private capital inflow.
What do these facts tell us? First, the US has long been exporting demand stimulus to the rest of the world. Second, this new business cycle, with its set off imbalances is taking off where the last one ended. Third, at recent real exchange rates, the US has been able to generate rapid growth of domestic output only with still faster growth in real domestic demand. Fourth, Asian countries have intervened massively to prevent the revaluation of their currencies. Finally, they have, in this way, also made it extremely difficult for the US to shift to greater reliance on foreign demand for its growth. he big question for the years ahead is how far this pattern can be sustained for another entire cycle and, if not, what will replace it. This, in turn, breaks down into several further issues.
One is what happens if the current trends do continue. A huge current account deficit must have domestic counterparts in the financial deficits (excess of spending over income) of the US public sector, the US private sector, or both.
As Wynne Godley, the Cambridge economist, notes in a paper out later this week, the overall current account deficit could rise to 8 per cent of GDP as the balance on investment income worsens.* This would, in turn, generate an explosive further increase in US net external liabilities, to well over 50 per cent of GDP by the end of the decade and, if the US private sector began to retrench, an explosive rise in the US fiscal deficit.
A further question is whether the asset prices that have helped maintain consumer spending at high levels in Anglosphere countries are themselves sustainable. As Andrew Smithers of London-based Smithers & Co has noted, the stock market looks overvalued even today. A recent paper by Goldman Sachs suggests, similarly, that house prices are now 10 per cent too high in the US and 15 per cent too high in the UK.**
Alternatively, is it possible to envisage a rebalancing of the growth of global demand? The English-speaking countries generate close to 40 per cent of global GDP (this time including Canada), the eurozone another 23 per cent, Japan 12 per cent and the rising economies of Asia only another 11 per cent. Can the eurozone and Japan deliver better demand growth in this cycle than in the last?
Yet again, will Asian governments be prepared to lend to the US without limit or are they likely, at some point, to change their exchange rate policies abruptly?
Moreover, how big a further fall in the dollar would be required, given what happens to external demand, if the US is to combine acceptable growth with a significant reduction in its current account deficit? The further fall would probably need to be at least as large as - and probably larger than - the 13 per cent real depreciation that has already occurred.
In all, there seem to be two threats: that the trends towards rising deficits and debt continue unchecked or that they change too abruptly. What is needed, instead, is smooth adjustment of the dollar and global growth in demand. How likely is that? "Not very," seems to be the answer.
Yet, for all their significance, the macroeconomic (im)balances are far from the only medium-term challenge to the expansion. Another is the impact of a second elephant. China is now big enough to have an appreciable effect on the dynamism of the world economy. In the course of the present cycle, its impact is likely to become ever larger.
One way in which China will affect the recovery is via instability in the growth of its domestic demand, which has, unlike that of the US, been investment-led. Investment growth peaked at over 40 per cent in the year to the first quarter of 2004. This is slowing and will almost certainly slow further, perhaps to as little as 10 per cent next year. This will, in turn, mean a drastic slowdown in the construction boom. HSBC suggests that the true economic slowdown could be from 12 per cent economic growth this year to 7 per cent in 2005. et another way in which China and the rest of Asia affects the world economy is through relative prices. China and India drive down the prices of labour-intensive manufactures and services. Both are also tightening the world market for oil. The big question here is not the balance between existing demand and supply but rather the ability to meet the rising demand that the Asian expansion and US recovery will generate.
According to the International Energy Agency, China will generate one-third of global incremental demand for oil between 2002 and 2004 and the rest of Asia another 15 per cent (see chart). North America generates another 26 per cent. Moreover, the 2.9 per cent increase in global demand this year is the highest figure since 1980.
As Asian growth continues, the global balance between demand and supply will continue to be tight, unless (or until) a vast increase in investment takes place. With such tight markets, relatively modest disruptions could eaily lead to explosive jumps in oil prices, as happened twice in the 1970s. That might, in turn, feed into the inflationary spiral that many observers already fear.
The possible combination of unstable growth in global demand with large and rising current account deficits and shocks to oil markets threaten a third danger: protectionism. So far this has been contained. International trade has also recovered strongly from the slowdown. But an outright failure to make progress in the Doha round, a new US administration and geopolitical frictions could threaten the present liberal order.
Last but not least is the ever-present threat of large-scale terrorist action. September 11, 2001 has already inflicted substantial damage on the movement of people into the US. Some sort of nuclear explosion in a container is at least conceivable. World trade is highly vulnerable to such an event.
Despair is certainly unwarranted. But so is today's official complacency. Encouraging the Asian countries towards greater exchange rate flexibility, achieving a better balance in the pattern of global demand, promoting completion of the Doha round, encouraging investment in energy production and conservation and effective co-operation against terrorism are the medicines our policy doctors should provide.
If they fail to act, the medium term may come sooner than many expect.
* Godley, Alex Izurieta and Gennaro Zezza, Prospects and Policies for the US Economy, July 2004,
www.cerf.cam.ac. uk; ** House Prices: a Threat to Global Recovery or Part of the Necessary Rebalancing? Global Economics Paper no 114, Goldman Sachs, 15 July 2004.
世界经济中期前景不容乐观
当前，人们普遍看好世界经济的短期前景。对于长远前景的乐观看法虽然不那么普遍，但似乎也还说得通。最令人担心的是中期前景。新一轮的扩张周期虽然表面上气势不凡，但实质上继承了前一个扩张周期的太多弱点。“医师们”对此所开的处方是，大剂量注射货币和财政兴奋剂。但在新老病患的双重拖累下，此轮扩张未必能够健康步入晚年。
中期前景有重大风险
预计今年将出现近乎完美的全球经济同步复苏。根据《共识预测》(Consensus Forecasts)的研究，今年美国经济的增长率应达到4.5%，而日本经济预计将令人惊讶地增长4.2%。与此同时，英国经济将增长3.2%，就连落在后面的欧元区也将增长1.7%。根据预测，包括日本在内的亚太区经济将增长5.1%，东欧增长5.5%，拉美增长4.6%。这其中，中国将一马当先，实现8.7%的经济增长。就全球经济整体而言，高盛(Goldman Sachs)预测今年的产出增长将达到4.8%，高于2003年的3.4%。
预计明年经济增长将放缓，但多数人依然较为乐观。根据预测，美国经济明年将增长3.8%，英国将增长2.7%。尽管日本经济的增长率预期将跌落至1.8%，但欧元区仍将增长2%。中国预期将实现软着陆，经济增长率降低至7.7%。拉美预期将增长3.7%。
短期经济前景仍被看好。而长远的经济前景看上去也十分光明，只要美国的劳动生产率增长能够保持90年代中期以来达到的较高水平，只要正在急起直追的亚洲各经济体能够继续在政策和机构两方面加以改进，再加上世界经济继续保持开放，使商品、服务、资本乃至创意能够自由交易。
但就中期前景而言，仍然存在着重大风险。这些风险构成四个相互关联的板块，即：全球宏观经济层面的失衡；亚洲崛起所产生的影响；保护主义；以及面对恐怖活动威胁时所表现出的脆弱性。
经常项目赤字和负债失衡
让我们从全球宏观经济全景中的某些因素开始分析。
美国的经常项目赤字，已从占国内生产总值(GDP)的1.5%左右，增加到现在占GDP的5%以上。在美国经济的这次减速过程中，经常项目赤字不跌反升(见图表)，引人注目。这既与人们通常的预期相反，也不符合90年代早期的情况。
在20世纪的多数时间里，美国曾是一个净债权国。但美国的净负债状况已从1988年的基本持平，一路滑落至去年的-24%(见图表)。然而，尽管经常项目赤字在2003年达到GDP的4.9%，美国对全世界其余地区的净负债在GDP中所占的比重却降低了。换句话说，美元贬值对净负债的削减幅度，超过了经常项目赤字对净负债的增加幅度。根据国际货币基金组织(IMF)最新发表的《世界经济展望》(World Economic Outlook)，1996年至2005年间，美国国内实际需求的年平均增长率将达到3.8%，而同期实际产出的年平均增长率将达到3.5%(见图表)。
两者的差别在英国更大，达到每年0.5个百分点。与此同时，欧元区需求的年平均增长率将只有可怜的1.8%，产出增长率只有2%。日本需求的年增长率更低，将只有1.2%，而产出增长率将达到1.5%。
根据IMF的数据，在2001年第3季度至去年第4季度期间，美国的实际国内需求累计增长了8.9%，而英国的实际国内需求增长了6.9%(见图表)。同期，日本的国内需求仅增长了2.7%，欧元区仅增长了2%。德国的国内需求甚至下降了0.7%。
根据经济合作与发展组织(OECD)的研究，2004年，“盎格鲁国家”(这里指美国、英国和澳大利亚)的经常项目赤字总额将达到6360亿美元，其中单是美国的赤字就将达到5550亿美元(见图表)。没有任何其他国家群体预计将出现巨额赤字。亚洲国家和地区的经常项目盈余总额已达到3220亿美元。
从2002年2月(美元的总体实际汇率开始下跌之时)至2004年4月，各国官方外汇储备(主要是美元)增加了1.211万亿美元，达到3.277万亿美元(见图表)。这一巨额增量的78%来自亚洲，其中日本和中国分别占了外汇储备增量总额的34%和19%。
2002和2003年间，亚洲各国的外汇储备总共增加了7180亿美元，这其中，5400亿美元由经常项目盈余产生，其余的1780亿美元则反映了亚洲私人资本流入的再循环。
这些事实说明什么呢？首先，长期以来，美国一直在向世界其他地区输出需求刺激。其次，此次新一轮的商业周期在上一个周期结束的地方重新开始，本身就带有种种失衡状况。第三，在近期的实际汇率下，美国之所以能够实现国内产出的快速增长，只是因为它的实际国内需求增长更快。第四，亚洲各国为了防止它们的货币被重新估值，已经进行了大规模的干预。最后，亚洲国家的这种做法，也使美国经济要想更多地借助海外需求来实现增长变得极为困难。
未来几年的一大问题是，这种状况能否再持续一个完整的周期？假如不能的话，它将被什么状况取代？而这个问题又可进一步分成数个小问题。
其中一个问题是，假如目前的趋势得以保持，将会发生什么情况。巨额的经常项目赤字必将给美国国内带来同等庞大的财务赤字(花费超出收入的部分)(见图表)，公共部门避免不了，私营部门也一样，甚至两者同时卷入其中。
剑桥大学经济学家韦恩?哥德莱(Wynne Godley)在本周发表的一篇论文中指出，随着投资收入进一步失衡，经常项目赤字总额可增至GDP的8%*。而这将进一步引发美国对外净负债的又一轮爆炸性增长，使其到2010年远远超出GDP的50%。此外，假如美国的私营部门开始紧缩开支，国家的财政赤字也将出现爆炸性增长。
更深层的一个问题是，使“盎格鲁国家”的消费者支出水平一直维持至今的高资产价格，本身是否可持续下去？伦敦咨询机构Smithers & Co的安德鲁?史密瑟斯(Andrew Smithers)指出，即使在目前水平下，股市价值仍显偏高。同样，高盛最近发表的一份研究报告也提到，美国的房地产价格偏高10%，而英国的房地产价格偏高15%。**
另一方面，人们希望看到全球需求的增长重新得到平衡，这是否可能？目前，全球GDP中有将近40%来自各英语国家(这里包括了加拿大)，23%来自欧元区国家，12%来自日本，而只有另外11%来自正在崛起的各亚洲经济体。在当前这个周期，欧元区和日本能否出现比上一个周期更好的需求增长？
这就把我们带回一个老问题：亚洲各国政府是否准备无限制地向美国放贷，还是有可能在某个时候突然改变其汇率政策？
此外，考虑到海外需求方面的情况，假如美国既要实现可以接受的经济增长，又要显著削减其经常项目赤字，那么美元汇率还需要再跌多少？迄今为止，美元已经实际贬值13%，而进一步的贬值可能需要达到至少同等幅度，甚至还可能要超出这一幅度。
总之，现在看来有两大威胁：一是赤字和负债继续增加，其势头没有得到抑制，二是两者的变化太过突然。真正需要平稳调整的，是美元比值和全球需求的增长。 然而成功做到这两点的几率有多大？答案似乎是：“不太大。”
中国经济影响全球
不过，宏观经济平衡不平衡的影响固然重大，却还远远不是当前扩张周期所面临的唯一中期挑战。另一项挑战是“第二头大象”带来的冲击。中国经济已具有相当的规模，足以对世界经济动态产生可观的影响。在当前这个周期中，中国的影响有望变得越来越大。
国内需求增长的不稳定性，是中国影响全球经济复苏的方式之一。与美国不同的是，中国的国内需求增长是由投资拉动的。在截至2004年第1季度的一年中，投资增长达到40%以上的顶峰。该增速目前正在放缓，并几乎可以肯定将继续放缓，到明年可能下降到只有10%。这意味着飞速发展的建筑行业将出现急刹车。据汇丰银行(HSBC)估计，实际的经济减速将使经济增长率从今年的12%下降到2005年的7%。
中国以及亚洲其他国家影响世界经济的另一种方式，是通过相对价格。中国和印度压低了劳动力密集型制造业和服务业的价格，同时，它们也导致世界石油市场供应趋紧。这里的大问题不在于平衡原有的供需关系，而在于如何满足亚洲经济扩张和美国经济复苏将要带来的与日俱增的需求。
根据国际能源研究所(International Energy Institute)的研究，从2002年至2004年，全球石油需求增量的三分之一将来自中国，另外15%来自亚洲其他国家和地区(见图表)，而北美占需求增量的26%。而且，今年全球对石油需求的增幅达到2.9%，是1980年以来最高的。
随着亚洲经济继续增长，除非(或直至)投资得到巨幅增加，否则全球供需状况将继续偏紧。在如此紧张的市场状况下，即便是相对轻微的供应中断，也很容易造成油价爆涨，就象20世纪70年代曾经两次发生过的那样。而这将进一步推动通涨率呈螺旋式上升。许多观察家已经对这种情况的出现表示了担忧。
保护主义等新威胁
全球需求的不稳定增长，数额巨大且不断增加的经常项目赤字，再加上石油市场的动荡，这些因素相互交织，有可能带来第三项危险：保护主义。就目前看来，保护主义倾向得到了遏制。国际贸易也比经济衰退时有了强劲的复苏(见图表)。但如果多哈回合谈判在谋求进展方面彻底失败，同时美国有新政府上台，再加上可能出现的地缘政治摩擦，目前的自由贸易格局就可能受到威胁。
最后一点比较重要的是，大规模恐怖活动的威胁始终存在。“9.11”事件已经对美国的人员入境造成了重大损害。装在容器中的某种核装置发生爆炸，这种情形至少是可以想像的。世界贸易对此类事件极为敏感。
虽然人们绝不应该感到绝望，但当今官方的自满态度也同样没有理由。我们的“政策医师们”应该开出如下一张处方：鼓励亚洲国家提高汇率灵活度，取得全球需求模式的更佳平衡，推进多哈回合谈判的进展，鼓励对能源生产与节能领域的投资，以及开展有效的反恐合作。
假如这些“医师们”无所作为，“中期”就有可能来得比许多人所预料的更早。
* Godley, Alex Izurieta和 Gennaro Zezza，《美国经济的前景与政策》(Prospects and Policies for the US Economy)，2004年7月,
www.cerf.cam.ac.uk;** 《房地产价格：对全球复苏的威胁，还是再平衡过程中必要的一部分？》(House Prices: a Threat to Global Recovery or Part of the Necessary Rebalancing?)，全球经济论文第114号，高盛(Goldman Sachs)，2004年7月15日。
