Raising the flag of brands
Say what you like about David Aaker, he could never be described as flashy. A marketing guru without a bow tie or PowerPoint slides? What will they think of next?
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But the laid-back style and "aw-shucks" delivery are deceptive. In a field populated by more than its fair share of shallow self- publicists, Prof Aaker has the respect of academics and executives alike.
His books on branding, from the early 1990s onwards, have been instrumental in establishing notions such as "brand equity" as part of mainstream business.
"Before David Aaker, only trademark lawyers thought about brands," wrote Sam Hill and Chris Lederer, the consultants, in The Infinite Asset (2001), their contribution to the marketing oeuvre.
We meet over coffee to discuss Prof Aaker's new book, Brand Portfolio Strategy, a handbook for marketers who want their brands to work together.
The topic is hardly new. Marketers realised many years ago that brand management is a team sport. It is more than a decade, for example, since Procter & Gamble created a new cadre of "category managers" to oversee multiple brands.
So why another book on brand portfolios?
"It seems that just about every company I visit is struggling with this stuff," comes the unfazed reply. "Either they are not sure which brands to grow, or they have too many brands and can't cut through the clutter, or they have brands that are losing relevance."
Loss of relevance is a problem that is especially widespread, he believes. Competition is moving so fast that market-leading brands can become marginal faster than you can say "Oldsmobile".
One of Prof Aaker's favourite examples is PowerBar, the brand that in the late 1980s established energy bars as a product category.
PowerBar's inventor, Brian Maxwell, who died last month, positioned his gooey, foil-wrapped product as instant energy for athletes. But other companies were quick to realise that the idea could be applied to other sub-markets.
Supermarket shelves were soon stacked with energy bars aimed at women (Luna), bars with greater emphasis on taste and texture (Clif) and bars aimed at the diet-conscious (Balance).
The market was growing fast, but in directions that had little relevance for PowerBar's ultra-athletic positioning. Should the company create new brands or try to extend the PowerBar brand into new territory?
The case - and the outcome - are described in more detail in the book. Prof Aaker's point is that even market-leading products can become irrelevant very quickly.
To avoid this fate, marketers need not just one or two brands but, if necessary, a portfolio of master brands, endorser brands, branded differentiators, alliance brands and so on.
But surely loss of relevance has always been a challenge for brand managers? New markets are always emerging.
Prof Aaker does not disagree. He believes, however, that the pace of change leaves companies struggling to keep up: "Every CEO I talk with is challenged by managing in this very dynamic environment. Time and again we find brands that are very strong - with high awareness, high quality, high loyalty - but are losing market share. Sub-markets are emerging where they are just not relevant."
I say this reminds me of Levi-Strauss, the privately owned company once synonymous with denim that is now struggling to compete in sub-markets ranging from the designer (Calvin Klein) to the discount (Wal-Mart).
It is a piquant example. Prof Aaker retired two years ago from the faculty of the University of California, Berkeley's Haas School of Business. The Haas family fortune came from Levi- Strauss; they remain big operators in San Francisco where Prophet, the consulting firm where he is vice-chairman, is based.
Levi-Strauss last year launched a new brand, Levi-Strauss Signature, to sell through discount retailers Wal-Mart and Target. This gives it a portfolio of three brands (Levi's, Levi_Strauss Signature and Dockers, a smart-casual label) with which to address the market.
But is Levi-Strauss Signature strong enough to stand in its own right?
Prof Aaker is sceptical: "This is a really weak brand. I don't think anyone buys Signatures; they buy Levi's. [The company] would be better off making completely new brands for growth. It worked with Dockers."
In response, Levi-Strauss says it believes that the Signature brand will be successful, and that its market research shows no damage to the original Levi's brand.
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Only time will tell whether Prof Aaker's critique is correct. The wider point is that creating a portfolio of complementary brands, with just the right degree of connection between them, is a complex proposition.
So which companies have mastered the art of brand portfolio strategy?
Perhaps surprisingly, Prof Aaker nominates not a consumer goods group but Intel, a company that makes a product (microprocessors) that few of us ever see.
All the more remarkable, then, that Intel has established itself as an important ingredient brand (Intel Inside) in personal computers made by others, while developing a portfolio of sub-brands (Celeron, Pentium, Xeon, Itanium, Centrino) and branded features (Xscale, Hyperthreading) of its own.
Prof Aaker says: "Intel is really good at working the branding strategy with the business strategy.
"They have created brands to help [the company] go after new markets and counter competitive threats."
But doesn't this kind of approach imply imposing another layer of bureaucracy - category management or portfolio management - on the marketing process?
"It's a dilemma, no question," says Prof Aaker. "There are so many advantages to decentralisation. The drawback is that you leave a lot of synergy on the table and create a lot of waste. You can't create global brands without some kind of centralisation."
There is a parallel here with the development of investment management in the 1950s and 1960s. Just as investors for the first time started to analyse investments in terms of overall portfolio risk, so marketers are now learning how to analyse brands in portfolio terms.
By analogy, this makes Prof Aaker the marketing equivalent of Harry Markowitz, the Nobel Prize- winning godfather of financial portfolio theory.
The mild-mannered marketing professor is far too self-effacing - and well-versed in financial economics - to accept the comparison.
Besides, he points out with a smile, there is no Nobel Prize in marketing.
True enough. But if there were one, Dave Aaker would surely have won it. * Brand Portfolio Strategy by David A Aaker. Published by Free Press, $28
扛起组合品牌的大旗
要问你觉得戴维o艾克(David Aaker)教授怎么样，你永远也不会用炫耀来形容他。一个不打蝴蝶领结、不用PowerPoint的市场营销大师？人们接着还会怎么想?
但是，他这种随和的风格和谦恭的谈吐容易让人上当。在他所处的领域，浅薄、自吹自擂的宣传家太多了，但艾克教授却得到了学术界人士和企业管理者的一致尊敬。
自上世纪90年代初以来，艾克教授有关品牌建设的著作一直在发挥作用，令"品牌资产"之类的概念确立为主流业务的一部分。
"在戴维o艾克之前，只有商标律师考虑品牌的问题，"咨询师萨姆o希尔(Sam Hill)和克里斯o李德勒(Chris Lederer)在《无限资产》(The Infinite Asset)（2001年出版）一书中写道。该书是他们对营销类著作的一份贡献。
我和艾克教授一边喝咖啡，一边探讨他的新书《品牌组合战略》(Brand Portfolio Strategy)。一些营销者想让自己的各种品牌联合起来发挥作用，该书就是供他们使用的手册。
这个话题并不新鲜。市场营销者在多年前就意识到，品牌管理是一项团队运动。举例来说，早在10多年前，宝洁公司(Procter & Gamble)就创设了一种名为"产品类别经理"(category managers)的新管理岗位，其职能是管理多种品牌。
那么艾克教授为何还要再写一本关于品牌组合的书呢？
"几乎每一家我拜访的公司都似乎感到这个问题棘手，"艾克教授不慌不忙地回答说，"它们要么吃不准该发展哪些品牌；要么就是品牌太多，难以理顺头绪；或者就是它们的品牌正在失去相关性。"
他认为，失去相关性是个尤为普遍的问题。市场竞争变化是如此之快，市场领先的品牌很快就可能已濒临淘汰了。
艾克教授最喜欢的一个例子是能量棒(PowerBar)，在上世纪80年代末，该品牌使能量棒确立为一个产品种类。
能量棒的发明者布莱恩o麦克斯韦尔(Brian Maxwell)已于上月辞世。他对这种银箔包裹的黏甜产品的定位是，为运动员提供即时能量的食品。但其它公司很快意识到，这一创意可应用到其它次级市场中。
超市的货架上很快堆满了针对女士的能量棒(Luna)、更强调味道和质地的食用棒（Clif），以及针对那些节食者的食用棒（Balance）。
这一市场迅速增长，但其走向与能量棒的超级运动型食品定位几乎没有相关性。这家公司是应该创立新的品牌，还是把能量棒的品牌拓展到新领域呢？
这一个案及其结果在书中有更详细的描述。艾克教授的观点是，即使是市场领先产品，也会很快变得没有相关性。
为避免这种命运，营销者需要的不只是一两个品牌，而是若有必要的话，需要一个由主打品牌、支持品牌、差异品牌以及联盟品牌等的组合。
但对品牌经理来说，相关性的丧失确实总是一种挑战，难道不是吗？新的市场总在不断涌现。
艾克教授也这么看。但他认为，变化太快，因此各公司都在疲于追赶："同我交谈过的每位首席执行官都面临挑战，要在这个非常动态的环境中进行管理。我们一次又一次看到非常强势的品牌，它们知名度高、质量高，用户忠诚度也高，但却不断丧失市场份额。次级市场就在它们缺乏相关性的地方兴起了。"
这让我想起了私人公司利维o斯特劳斯(Levi-Strauss)，该公司一度是牛仔布的同义词，而今则竭力在次级市场上竞争，对手从设计师卡尔文o克莱恩(Calvin Klein)到折扣商沃尔玛(Wal-Mart)都有。
这是一则有趣的例子。艾克教授两年前退休，辞去加利福尼亚大学伯克利分校哈斯商学院的教职。哈斯家族的财富来自利维o斯特劳斯，他们依然在旧金山经营大量生意。咨询公司先知(Prophet)也坐落在该市，而艾克教授现为该公司的副董事长。
利维o斯特劳斯去年推出新品牌Levi-Strauss Signature，并通过折扣零售商沃尔玛和Target进行销售。由此，利维o斯特劳斯获得一个包括三种品牌的组合（Levi's、Levi_Strauss Signature和时尚休闲品牌Dockers）。
但Levi-Strauss Signature是否能强大到足以凭借自己的力量立足呢？
艾克教授对此表示怀疑："这实在是个弱势品牌。我觉得不会有人买Signature，他们会买Levi's。为取得发展而制造全新品牌，会让(公司)情况更好。Dockers品牌这样做就成功了。"
利维o斯特劳斯的反应是，它相信Signature品牌会取得成功，而且公司的市场研究表明，这没有损害原来的Levi's品牌。
艾克教授的评论是否正确，只有时间能够证明。一个更普遍的观点的，创造一个互补品牌的组合，让组合内各品牌之间又保持着恰当程度的联系，这是个复杂的命题
那么哪些公司已掌握了品牌组合策略的技巧呢？
也许出人意料，艾克教授提名的不是一家消费品集团，而是英特尔(Intel)，该公司的产品(微处理器)我们之中几乎没人见过。
而更不寻常的是，英特尔已确立了自身作为一个重要组件品牌(Intel Inside)的地位，即为其他生产商制造的个人电脑提供组件，公司同时开发了一个次级品牌和自身特色品牌的组合。前者包括赛扬(Celeron)、奔腾(Pentium)、至强(Xeon)、安腾(Itanium)和迅驰(Centrino)，后者则有Xscale和超线程(Hyperthreading)。
艾克教授表示："英特尔的确善于将品牌战略与商业战略相结合。"
"他们创建的品牌有助于（公司）寻求新的市场，并还击竞争对手造成的威胁。"
但是，这种途径意味着，将在市场营销过程中再施加一层官僚架构（产品类别管理或产品组合管理），难道不是吗？
"毫无疑问，这是个两难问题，"艾克教授说，"分权有许多优势。缺点是你闲置了大量增效作用，并导致了大量浪费。没有一定程度的集中管理，你就无法创建全球品牌。"
这里就产生了一种与上世纪50和60年代投资管理发展平行的现象。正如投资者当时第一次开始根据投资组合的整体风险来分析投资一样，市场营销人士眼下也已开始根据品牌组合来学习怎样分析品牌。
可以说，艾克教授就是营销领域的哈里o马科维茨(Harry Markowitz)。哈里o马科维茨是诺贝尔奖获得者，投资组合理论的创始人。
这位温文尔雅的营销学教授实在太过谦慎，因此不愿接受这个比喻，尽管他在金融经济学领域造诣很深。
此外，他微笑着指出，营销学也不设诺贝尔奖。
的确如此。但如果有营销学诺贝尔奖的话，戴夫o艾克肯定已经赢到手了。
