The case for a Group of Four has new urgency
The multiple failures of the St Petersburg summit raise the question whether the Group of Eight leading industrial nations still serves a useful purpose. The reason is not a lack of important issues that require global co-ordination. On the contrary, rarely has there been a greater need for joint action. But no matter whether you want to rescue a failing trade round, improve energy security or influence global financial markets, the G8 is the wrong group.
The G7/G8 and its precursors were set up specifically to address global imbalances after the breakdown in the early 1970s of the Bretton Woods system of global monetary management. By and large, the G7 did a reasonable job in its first 15 years, but its subsequent agenda became too diffuse. Today, the world is still plagued by global imbalances. To address them, we need a Group of Four, consisting of the US, the eurozone, Japan and China. This proposal is far from new, but there is a renewed urgency since the problem of global imbalances has become more acute in the past few years. The G4 is not only the world's four largest economies. Far more important is that an orderly adjustment will require specific action by each of these four.
This is not just a matter for the US and China. Several theories of global imbalances blame the two countries as the main source of global imbalances - because of the fall in US savings, China's exchange rate policy, or a built-up excess capital stock in the 1990s that caused unbalanced economic growth in Asia.
Just as there are different explanations for global imbalances, there are also different scenarios through which they might unwind. Most involve significant devaluation in the dollar's real exchange rate. The question is not how to prevent this adjustment, but how to sustain global economic growth during the adjustment process and afterwards. Without active participation by the eurozone and Japan, the world's second and third largest economies, this would be difficult to achieve.
Unfortunately, this is not obvious to everybody in those countries. Jean-Claude Juncker, prime minister of Luxembourg, and also president of the euro group of finance ministers in the eurozone, said a month ago: "As the eurozone is not at the origin of the global imbalances, it is not up to us to take any initiative." It is difficult to conceive of greater complacency. Mr Juncker is right only in a trivial sense. The eurozone's current account is indeed close to balance. But this is a freak mathematical accident, not a reflection of macroeconomic stability. For 2007, the European Commission forecasts current account surpluses for Germany of 4.1 per cent of gross domestic product, for the Netherlands of 6.7 per cent and for Luxembourg of 9.9 per cent, while Spain is headed for a current account deficit of 9.2 per cent, Portugal of 9.6 per cent and Greece of 7.8 per cent.
A strong appreciation in the euro/dollar exchange rate, a probable consequence of global adjustment, would constitute a huge asymmetric shock for the eurozone. The eurozone's traditional exporters, such as Germany and Italy, would face recession. Spain, by contrast, would continue to enjoy its housing price bubble while pretending to be a fundamentally healthy economy.
If the adjustment in the euro/dollar exchange turns out to be small - say up to 10 per cent from present levels - monetary and fiscal policy might be effectively deployed to stabilise the eurozone economy, no matter how asymmetric the shock. If the adjustment is bigger - say 20-40 per cent - the eurozone will almost certainly fall into recession, dragged down by Germany and Italy. This is the kind of crisis the eurozone would want to avoid at all costs.
David Vines, economics professor at Oxford university, made an interesting observation at a conference on global imbalances in Beijing last week, organised by the Asia-Europe Economic Forum, a group of economists. He said it was theoretically possible to think of a scenario under which Europe could afford to be complacent. This would require the US and China not only to adopt the correct policies but also to do so simultaneously. The US would increase its national savings while China and other emerging economies would allow their currencies to appreciate against the dollar. This would neutralise the effect of the adjustment on the eurozone.
Judging from the tone of Chinese officials, the probability of the US and China doing the right thing at the right time is close to zero. China and other Asian countries may eventually adjust their domestic policies but probably not sufficiently, nor in time.
The main point for policy co-ordination at G4 level would be to prevent a global recession that might result from a disorderly adjustment. This would be in everybody's interest, even though failure to co-ordinate would not hit everybody to the same extent. The eurozone clearly stands to lose the most if the adjustment is large. It is precisely for this reason that the eurozone may want to raise the initiative even if it is not the main source of imbalances itself.
只有G4才能救经济
圣
彼得堡峰会的诸多失败提出了八大工业国集团(G8)是否还有用的问题。这么说并不是因为目前缺少需要全球协调的重大问题。恰恰相反，很少有比现在更需要共同行动的时候了。但无论是想挽救一轮失败的贸易谈判、加强能源安全，还是想对全球金融市场施加影响，八国集团都不合适。
七国集团(G7)/八国集团及其前身，是在20世纪70年代初全球货币管理体系――布雷顿森林体系(Bretton Woods system)崩溃后，专门为解决全球失衡问题而创建的。总体来说，七国集团在最初15年做出了有益贡献，但随后的议程却变得过于分散。如今，全球失衡问题仍困扰着我们。为解决这些问题，我们需要由美国、欧元区、日本和中国组成“四国集团”(Group of Four)。这绝不是一个新提议，但由于全球失衡问题在过去几年变得更加尖锐，这个提议重新具有了迫切性。“四国集团”的意义不仅仅在于它们是全球最大的4个经济体，更为重要的是，全球经济有序的调整需要这四方各自采取具体行动。
这不只是美国和中国的问题。几个有关全球失衡的理论都将全球失衡的主要原因归咎于这两个国家――比如美国储蓄的下降，中国的汇率政策，或是20世纪90年代初导致亚洲经济增长失衡的过度资本存量的累积等。
正如对全球失衡有不同的解释一样，对问题的解决也有不同的设想。多数设想都涉及美元实际汇率的大幅贬值。问题不是如何防止美元的调整，而是如何在调整过程中及其后维持全球经济的增长。没有作为世界第二大和第三大经济体的欧元区和日本的积极参与，上述目标将难以达成。
不幸的是，在这些国家，并不是每个人都清楚这一点。卢森堡首相、欧元区财长集团轮值主席让-克洛德?容克(Jean-Claude Juncker)一个月前就表示：“由于欧元区不是全球失衡的源头，因此不应该由我们来主动采取行动。”很难想象还会有谁比他更为自满。容克只是有一点点正确而已。欧元区的经常项目确实接近平衡。但这是数学上的意外，而不时宏观经济稳定性的反映。欧盟委员会(European Commission)预测，2007年，德国经常项目盈余将占国内生产总值(GDP)的4.1%，荷兰为6.7%，卢森堡为9.9%；而西班牙经常项目赤字将占GDP的9.2%，葡萄牙和希腊分别为9.6%和7.8%。
全球调整可能导致欧元兑美元汇率强劲升值，而这将对欧元区构成不均衡的巨大冲击。欧元区的传统出口国，例如德国和意大利，将面临经济衰退。反之，自称经济基本面稳健的西班牙则将继续出现房价泡沫。
如果欧元兑美元汇率实际调整幅度较小――比如说，不超过现有水平的10%，那么，不论冲击有多么不均衡，也许都能够有效运用货币政策和财政政策，稳定欧元区经济。如果调整幅度较大――比如说，20%至40%，那么几乎可以肯定，欧元区会在德国和意大利的拖累下陷入衰退。这种危机将是欧元区希望不惜一切代价避免的。
在经济学家组织亚欧经济论坛(Asia-Europe Economic Forum)近日于北京召开的全球失衡会议上，牛津大学(Oxford university)经济学教授戴维?瓦因斯(David Vines)发表了有趣讲话。他表示，想象一个欧洲有资本自鸣得意的场景，在理论上是可行的。这要求中美两国不仅要采取正确的政策，而且还要同步行动。美国要增加国民储蓄，而中国和其它新兴经济体要允许本国货币兑美元汇率升值。这会中和调整对欧元区的影响。
从中国官员的语气中来看，要让中美两国在正确的时机执行正确的策略，这种可能性接近于零。中国和其它亚洲国家最终可能会调整国内政策，但调整幅度可能并不够大，也不及时。
在四国集团层面上进行政策协调，其主要意义在于防止无序调整可能导致的全球性衰退。这将符合每个人的利益，即使协调失败也不会对各方造成同等冲击。如果调整幅度较大，欧元区显然会蒙受最大损失。正因为如此，即便本身不是全球失衡的主要根源，欧元区可能也会愿意主动采取行动。
