Not much fizz left in the global economy
There is nothing like the seduction of a boom. The recent vigour of global economic growth is a siren song. By International Monetary Fund metrics, world gross domestic product growth probably averaged 4.8 per cent over 2003-06, the strongest four years since the early 1970s. As tempting as it is to extrapolate this into the future, that may be a serious mistake. There is a much better chance that global growth has peaked and the boom is about to fizzle.
The world's main growth engine, the US, is slowing. That is the verdict from the labour market, with job growth in the past four months running 35 per cent below average since early 2004. It is the verdict from the housing market, where an emerging downturn in residential construction activity is knocking at least 1 percentage point off the GDP growth trend of the past three years. And, notwithstanding July's temporary bounce-back in retail sales, it is a message from the consumer, whose inflation-adjusted spending growth fell to 2.5 per cent in the spring period - one percentage point below the heady trend of the past decade.
ADVERTISEMENT
America's slowdown represents an important transition in the sources of economic growth, away from the vigorous wealth creation of asset bubbles - first equities, then housing - and back towards more subdued labour income generation. The delayed impact of higher interest rates is also taking a toll. Even though the Federal Reserve has put its two-year monetary tightening campaign on hold, there is a risk it has already gone too far. The confluence of higher energy prices, rising debt-servicing burdens and negative personal saving rates reinforces the possibility of a pullback in discretionary US consumption and GDP growth.
This is an equally critical transition for the global economy. The world is about to lose significant support from the key driving force on the demand side of the equation - the American consumer. In a post-bubble climate, US households will be unable to save through asset appreciation, prompting America to increase income-basedsaving and reduce its claim on the pool of global saving. That points to a long-awaited reduction in the big US current account deficit - initially painful for export-dependent economies elsewhere in the world but ultimately a welcome resolution for global imbalances.
But who will fill the void as the US consumer pulls back? The simple answer is: maybe no one. Europe, the world's second largest consumer, is an unlikely candidate. Surprising economic growth on the Continent this year may be borrowing from gains that might have otherwise occurred in 2007. The European economy is about to be hit with a "triple whammy": a big tightening in fiscal policy, the delayed impact of monetary tightening and the drag of a stronger euro. Growth in the eurozone may exceed 2.5 per cent this year, marking the strongest gain since 2000. Next year, it could slip back below 1.5 per cent.
Do not count on a rejuvenated Japanese economy to fill the gap either. In dollar terms, Japanese personal consumption is only 30 per cent of that in America; that means every 1 percentage point of slower consumption growth in the US would have to be replaced by about 3 percentage points of acceleration from Japan. As a weak second quarter GDP report indicates, such a surge is unlikely, especially as Japan copes with a stronger yen and higher energy prices. While growth in Japanese GDP should exceed 2.5 per cent this year, in 2007 it could slow to less than 2 per cent.
Nor are the two dynamos of developing Asia - China and India - likely to counter the slowing trend in the developed world. China has a seriously overheated economy. With real GDP surging at an 11.3 per cent annual rate in the spring period and industrial output growing at a record 19.5 per cent year on year in June, Beijing has little choice but to introduce tightening initiatives. A failure to do so could see trade protectionism squeezing exports and a deflationary overhang of excess capacity leading to an investment bust. China must shift its economy towards private consumption, a sector that sagged to just 38 per cent of GDP in 2005. (A healthy rate would be at least 50 per cent.)
All this points to a moderation of China's growth beginning in 2007, with attendant reductions in its voracious appetite for commodities. That should spawn additional ripple effects in commodity producers such as Australia, Canada, Brazil and Africa. The world's big oil producers would also feel repercussions from a Chinese slowdown. As would China's Asian suppliers, such as Japan, Korea and Taiwan.
India is far too small to pick up the slack - less than half the size of China on a purchasing power parity basis. After more than 15 years of reforms, its growth has broken out to the upside - averaging 8 per cent in fiscal years 2004-5. There was hope a rebalancing from services to manufacturing would provide new impetus to growth and the government seemed willing to tackle deficiencies of infrastructure, foreign direct investment and saving. Unfortunately, the reformers have been stymied by the politics of coalition management. Imperatives of fiscal consolidation, with the delayed effects of recent monetary tightening, could also tip growth risks to the downside.
There is a deeper meaning to the coming slowdown. The global boom of the past four years was never sustainable. It was supported by the excesses of the liquidity cycle, which arose from emergency anti-deflationary actions of the world's big central banks. The ensuing vigour of global growth was dominated by the US consumer but America's binge came at the cost of a record drawdown of domestic saving funded by the capital inflows of a record US current account deficit. The boom was balanced precariously on unprecedented global imbalances.
Excess liquidity bought time for a precarious world. As central banks move to normalise monetary policy, that time has run out. Without the unsustainable support of asset bubbles, it is back to basics - with aggregate demand supported by more modest labour income generation rather than the excesses of wealth creation. So much for the art???-ificial boom of an unbalanced world. It could be about to fizzle out.
The writer is chief economist at Morgan Stanley
全球经济即将逆转？
什
么都比不上经济繁荣的诱惑。近年全球的强劲经济增长，就像一首迷人但危险的海妖之歌。根据国际货币基金组织(IMF)的统计，2003年至2006年全球GDP的平均增幅达4.8%，是上世纪70年代以来最为强劲的4年。尽管人们倾向于推断未来的经济增长将延续这种势头，但这也许是一个严重的错误。更大的可能是：全球经济增长已见顶，此轮繁荣即将结束。
作为全球主要的经济增长引擎，美国增长速度正在放缓。这是来自美国劳动力市场的结论，在过去4个月，美国就业增速比2004年初以来的平均值低35%。这也是美国房地产市场的结论，美国住宅建设活动正在显现的下滑，使其过去3年间GDP增长趋势至少下降1个百分点。同时，这也是来自消费者的信息，尽管7月份零售额出现了暂时反弹：今年春季，通胀调整后的消费支出增幅降至2.5%――较过去10年间迅猛的增速低1个百分点。
美国经济增长的放缓，标志着经济增长源泉的一个重要转变，即从资产泡沫――先是股票，后是房产――带来的强劲财富创造，回归到更为和缓的劳动力收入产生。利率上调的滞后效应，也开始影响经济增长。尽管美联储(Federal Reserve)已暂停持续2年的货币紧缩，但有一个可能性是：美联储可能已经走得太远。油价上涨、偿债负担上升以及负值的个人储蓄率，这些因素结合在一起，加大了美国可支配消费和GDP增长下滑的可能性。
对于全球经济而言，这是一个同样关键的转变。世界将要失去“供需方程式”需求方一个关键变量――美国消费者――的重要支撑。在后泡沫时代，美国家庭将无力通过资产升值储蓄，促使美国增加基于收入的储蓄，并减少其对全球储蓄的吸引力。这将导致期待已久的美国巨额经常账户赤字的下降――最初这将令世界其它地方的出口依赖型经济体感到痛苦，但最终对于解决全球失衡问题是有益的。
但是，谁将来填补美国消费者所留下的空缺呢？一个简单的答案是：也许没人能做到这一点。欧洲作为全球第二大消费体，不太可能担当这一任务。欧洲大陆今年令人惊讶的经济增长，也许是从2007年“预支”来的。欧洲经济将要面临三大打击：财政政策大幅紧缩、货币紧缩的滞后效应，以欧元走强所造成的拖累。欧元区今年的增长率或许会超过2.5%，为2000年以来的最高水平。而明年的增长率可能会跌回至1.5%以下。
同样，也不要指望重新复苏的日本经济能够填补这一空缺。以美元计算，日本的个人消费仅为美国的30%；这意味着，美国消费增幅放缓1个百分点，日本消费增幅就需要加速3个百分点才能填补空缺。正如日本疲软的第二季度GDP报告所显示的那样，这种幅度的增长是不可能的，尤其是日本还需面对日元走强和能源价格上涨。虽然日本今年的GDP增幅应能超过2.5%，但2007年可能会放缓至2%以下。
发展中亚洲的两大强劲经济体――中国和印度――也不太可能抵挡发达国家的经济减速趋势。中国经济严重过热。今年春季，该国实际GDP以11.3%的年度增幅飙升，6月份工业产出也较上年同期增长19.5%，达到创纪录水平，对此，中国政府别无选择，只能施行紧缩举措。若不采取这些举措，贸易保护主义可能会挤压出口，而产能过剩形成的通缩压力，可能导致投资低迷。中国经济必须向个人消费转型，2005年，该国个人消费占GDP的比例下滑至仅38%。（合理水平至少应为50%）
所有这些预示着，中国经济增长将从2007年开始趋缓，对大宗商品的强烈需求将随之减弱。这会冲击澳大利亚、加拿大、巴西和非洲等大宗商品生产国。全球产油大国也将感受到中国经济放缓所造成的冲击。中国在亚洲的供应者，如日本、韩国和台湾等地，也会受到影响。
就填补需求空缺而言，印度的经济规模太小――以购买力平价计算，其规模还不到中国的一半。经过逾15年的改革，印度的经济增长已提速。2004-2005财政年度，该国平均经济增长率达8%。从服务业到制造业的调整，有望为经济增长提供新的动力，同时政府似乎也愿意解决基础设施、外国直接投资和储蓄不足的问题。不幸的是，印度政府联合执政的模式阻碍了改革的步伐。由于近期货币紧缩的滞后效应，印度需要巩固财政，这可能也会影响经济增长。
即将到来的经济放缓有着更深层的意义。过去4年全球经济的繁荣，从来就不是可持续的。它是在流动性过剩的支撑下实现的，而这些流动性来自全球各大央行的反通缩紧急措施。随之产生的全球增长活力，是由美国消费者主导的。然而，美国的消费狂热，是以国内储蓄降至创纪录低点为代价的，为其提供融资的，则是造成创纪录美国经常帐户赤字的资本流入。这一繁荣是建立在不稳定的全球空前失衡的基础上的。
流动性过剩为脆弱动荡的世界赢得了时间。但随着各国央行回归常规的货币政策，这段时间已经耗尽。没有了资产泡沫难以维系的支持，全球经济回归基本面因素――总需求受更为温和的劳动力收入产生的支撑，而非财富创造。一个失衡世界的人为繁荣已经到头。它也许即将消散。
作者是摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)首席经济学家。
