Rest assured, the eurozone will prove its durability
The long-term viability of the eurozone has become a hotly debated topic. The blogs are full of it. The latest contribution comes from the London-based Centre for European Reform in the form of a pamphlet entitled: Will the Eurozone Crack?
My own prediction: it is the critics who will crack first.
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There are two questions to distinguish. The first is whether it is conceivable that one or more member countries could leave the eurozone without destroying the monetary union. The answer is yes, it is conceivable, but I would not bet my life savings on it. The second question is whether monetary union itself could collapse and member states revert to national currencies. My answer to that question is unequivocal: no, forget it.
Most hypothetical exit scenarios involve Italy, which has suffered from a large and persistent loss of competitiveness, as measured by the real exchange rate. So what would happen if Italy left or was forced out? Do not believe anyone who claims to know the answer. There is no script for such an event. In particular, it is not clear whether a country that left the eurozone would also have to leave the European Union.
I would expect members of the eurozone to have a different view on this subject from non-members. There are no prescribed proceedings in European law for this hypothetical situation. The uncertainty about a quitter's future status alone may provide sufficient incentive not to leave. But if a country decided to pull out after all, I would expect the EU to be more at risk of cracking up than the eurozone itself.
This brings us to the second question. What are the circumstances under which the eurozone could disintegrate? In practice, that would happen only if either Germany or France decided to quit. A departure by Italy or Spain, or both, would not suffice. However, it is extremely difficult to construct even a purely theoretical scenario under which it would make sense for France or Germany to reintroduce national currencies. A decision to quit would never pay off for the quitter in the short run. The administrative costs would be crippling, financial markets would be in turmoil and the quitter would almost certainly have to pay higher risk premiums on its bonds.
In the long run, a decision to quit would pay off only in one outlandishly hypothetical scenario. Europe's central bankers would have to develop a previously unknown tolerance of high inflation. In that case, countries with a traditionally low inflation rate might be better off leaving. They might still not do so even under those circumstances, deciding to remain members of the eurozone for political reasons. I would challenge anyone to come up with another scenario under which France or Germany would have a rational economic reason to quit. Even if they suffered an economic depression, or were about to default on their national debt, it is far from clear that leaving the eurozone would help.
The hypothetical scenario is, of course, unrealistic. The Maastricht treaty obliges the European Central Bank to pursue price stability and the ECB is more likely to overfulfil its treaty target than to ignore it. As long as this is the case, there is not the slightest danger of a break-up of the eurozone.
On the contrary, I expect the eurozone to be exceptionally stable in the long run. My optimism is supported by current macroeconomic trends. As Joachim Fels of Morgan Stanley argued on this page last week, the world is entering a phase in which we can no longer take low inflation for granted. In a world with even moderately stronger inflationary pressures, central banks matter more than during periods of near-perfect price stability. In the 1990s it was almost sufficient for central banks to pre-announce an inflation target to steer people's inflationary expectations. This is not now the case. In an environment of rising global inflation, some central banks will be more successful than others. Of the big central banks I would trust the ECB more than most to deliver this goal. In such an environment I would expect the euro to become increasingly important as a global reserve currency and as a medium of exchange in global transactions.
Whether the eurozone turns into a successful economy with high rates of growth and employment is an entirely different matter. That will depend on the quality of economic policies in member states, the eurozone and the EU. There is a reasonable chance that the eurozone will do better in the next eight years than in the previous eight, both in absolute terms and relative to the US and the UK. Certainly, that is a contestable proposition. But make no mistake, the eurozone is here to stay.
欧元区不会解体
欧
元区能否长期存在？这已是人们热议的一个话题，博客里尽是这方面的讨论。最新评论来自伦敦的欧洲改革中心(Centre for European Reform)，它的一本小册子用了这样的名称：欧元区会解体吗？
我个人的预测是：首先“解体”的将是那些批评人士。
有两个问题需要弄清楚。首先，一个或多个成员国在不破坏该货币同盟的情况下脱离欧元区，这种情况是否可能？答案是肯定的，这有可能，但我不会拿自己的毕生积蓄押注于此；第二个问题是，这个货币同盟自身是否会瓦解，其成员国是否会重新使用本国货币？对此，我的答案毫不含糊：不会，想都别想。
意大利是最有可能退出欧元区的国家之一。按照实际汇率衡量，该国竞争力已持续大幅下降。如果意大利退出，或是被迫退出，将会出现什么后果呢？不要相信任何自称知道答案的人。如果退出，什么情况都可能发生。特别需要指出的是，目前尚不清楚，一个脱离欧元区的国家，是否也必须脱离欧盟(EU)。
我认为，欧元区成员国对这一问题的看法与非成员国不同。在欧洲法律中，没有规定这种假想情况的程序。退出欧元区国家未来的不确定性本身，可能就足以构成不离开的动机。然而，如果一个国家最终还是决定退出的话，我预计，欧盟将要比欧元区更有可能瓦解。
这就引出了第二个问题：欧元区在何种情况下才会解体呢？实际上，只有当德国或法国决定退出时，这种情况才会出现。意大利或西班牙退出，或者两国都退出，都是不够的。然而，要构建一个哪怕只是纯理论的设想，让法国或德国恢复本国货币有其合理之处，那都是极为困难的。从短期角度来说，退出欧元区的决策肯定不会对退出者有利。行政成本将高得难以承受，金融市场将陷入混乱，几乎可以肯定：退出者将不得不为其债券支付更高的风险溢价。
长期而言，只有在一种特殊的假想情况下，决定退出才会有所收获。欧洲的中央银行家们必须对高通货膨胀养成一种前所未有的容忍态度。在这种情况下，那些传统上通胀率较低的国家，退出之后可能境况会更好。即便在这种情况下，它们也可能还是不会这样做，而是决定出于政治方面的原因而留在欧元区之内。我可以夸下海口：没有任何人可以提出另一种假想情况，使得法国或德国可能出于合理的经济原因而退出。即使它们面临经济萧条，或即将拖欠国家债务，也很难断定退出欧元区就能有所帮助。
当然，上述假想情况是不现实的。《马斯特里赫特条约》(Maastricht Treaty)赋予了欧洲央行(European Central Bank)寻求价格稳定的职责，而欧洲央行超额完成条约规定目标的可能性，要高于忽视该目标。只要这种情况不变，欧元区压根就不存在崩溃的危险。
相反，从长期角度而言，我预计欧元区将非常稳定。当前宏观经济趋势为我的乐观态度提供了的支持。摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)经济师方艾硕(Joachim Fels)上周在本报撰文指出，世界正进入这样一个阶段――我们再也不能将低通胀率视为理所当然。在一个哪怕通胀压力只是相对较大的世界里，央行的作用也比近乎完美的价格稳定时期更为重要。上世纪90年代，央行提前宣布一个通胀目标，来引导人们的通胀预期，这差不多就足够了。如今情况并非如此。在全球通胀不断加剧的环境中，一些央行将比其它央行做得更为成功。全球主要央行中，在实现该目标方面，我更信任欧洲央行。在这样一个环境下，我预计，在作为一种全球储备货币和全球交易媒介方面，欧元的地位将越来越重要。
欧元区能否成为一个高增长率、高就业率的成功经济体？这将是一件截然不同的事情。它将取决于欧元区、欧盟与成员国经济政策的质量。在未来8年内，欧元区很有可能比前8年表现得更好，无论是从绝对角度，还是从相对美国和英国的角度，都是如此。当然，这种说法可以商榷。但千万别搞错，欧元区肯定会继续存在下去。
