Nominee May Favor Explicit Embrace Of 'Inflation Target'
Advocates Say Setting Goals
Can Boost Transparency,
But Critics See Restraints
A Departure From Greenspan
How would a Bernanke Fed differ from the Greenspan Fed?
One area of change could lie in the way the Fed approaches -- and talks about -- inflation.
As an academic and as a Federal Reserve governor, Ben Bernanke, nominated by President Bush yesterday to head the Federal Reserve, was an outspoken proponent of setting a formal, public goal for a specific low inflation rate that the central bank is committed to meet, a practice known as "inflation targeting."
That somewhat controversial position stands in contrast to the approach taken by retiring Chairman Alan Greenspan. During his 18-year tenure, the U.S. hasn't set such an explicit target, satisfied with Mr. Greenspan's independent stewardship of the Fed and the economy.
While advocates say an explicit target would help increase Fed transparency and its commitment to low inflation, building on Mr. Greenspan's record, critics argue it could limit flexibility.
During the past two decades, inflation targeting has become more widely used around the globe. Nearly two dozen countries -- including Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand -- have adopted such targets, and the European Central Bank has set a target, too.
Inflation targets come in different forms. The Bank of England, for instance, has a policy of keeping inflation close to 2% over a two-year horizon. The Reserve Bank of Australia has a target range of 2% to 3%.
If Mr. Bernanke wins Senate confirmation, the U.S. may follow suit, especially if he is looking for ways to assure financial markets that rampant inflation -- and the economic instability that accompanies it -- won't make a comeback in the post-Greenspan era. The subject of inflation targeting could take on added importance now, when worries of inflation have risen at the Fed in response to the substantial increase in oil prices.
Proponents of inflation targets say an optimal inflation rate promises not just stable prices but also the foundation for a healthy economy. "A well-conceived and well-executed strategy of inflation targeting can deliver good results with respect to output and employment as well as inflation," Mr. Bernanke told the National Association for Business Economics in a 2003 speech.
In the past, Mr. Bernanke has proposed a target in the range of 1% to 2% for the U.S., though he also has said the best rate would need to be studied more carefully by the Fed if it were to become a part of its formal goals.
Mr. Bernanke has been a leading advocate of inflation targets in scholarly articles and books, and has helped define some of the concepts and phrases used by other academics. He has argued that a formal inflation target would "help guide policy" and keep the central bank focused on its long-run objective of keeping prices stable.
"You're talking about a leading thinker on this issue," said Frederic Mishkin, a co-author with Mr. Bernanke on the subject and a professor at Columbia University. (Read a 1997 paper on inflation targeting co-written by Messrs. Bernanke and Mishkin.)
Mr. Greenspan has pursued a low-inflation policy like the other central bankers, but he has looked upon the idea of a formal target with some skepticism. Opponents of inflation targeting worry such a policy could hamstring central bankers at critical junctures, by forcing them to mechanically raise or lower interest rates when the economy might need more leeway.
That's a point of view for which Mr. Greenspan -- who had to navigate two recessions, two stock-market collapses and several emerging-market crises in his 18-year tenure running the Fed -- has expressed some sympathy. "At crucial points," Mr. Greenspan said in a speech in 2004, "simple rules will be inadequate" to guide monetary policy.
Some of Mr. Bernanke's future colleagues at the Fed, moreover, could resist the idea. "I start from the premise that the United States has had a very successful monetary policy over the past two decades," said Donald Kohn, a Fed governor, in a speech on inflation targeting in 2003, who also had been seen as a potential Fed chairman. "We have achieved price stability, inflation expectations are low and stable, and we have done this with two relatively shallow recessions in 20 years. ...For me, the default option is to keep doing what we have been doing -- however hard it might be to model or explain."
Supporting a formal inflation target does not necessarily make Mr. Bernanke a hawk on inflation. In fact, when consumer prices faced downward pressure in 2002 and 2003 due to falling prices of many imported goods, Mr. Bernanke worried that prices might fall too much below a desired level, and supported an easy monetary policy in response.
Given the disagreement among economists about the idea, it seems unlikely that inflation targeting would be adopted quickly inside the Fed. But it does seem likely to be debated vigorously in the Bernanke era.
"His view on inflation targeting is a little bit controversial, and he may go a little bit farther with that than many would," said Edward Gramlich, a former Fed governor who is now interim provost of the University of Michigan. Mr. Gramlich added that "Ben is very flexible" and would be unlikely to impose his views about targeting on others who strongly oppose the idea.
The notion of inflation targeting grew out of academic research a generation ago. Economists came to realize in the 1970s that to contain inflation in the present, they needed to control the expectations of individuals and businesses about where inflation was going in the future. If the public expected inflation to accelerate, employers and workers would demand price and wage increases in anticipation of a jump -- thereby aggravating the problem.
Economist Milton Friedman proposed that central banks adopt formal targets for the expansion of money circulating in the economy -- like bank deposits -- because money growth was an important determinant of inflation. But measures of money growth proved to be poor predictors of economic activity.
So central banks have gravitated to targeting inflation directly. The Bank of Canada and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand were among the first to adopt such a policy in the early 1990s.
Ultimately, the inflation performances of central banks with formal targets and those without them haven't been very different. The International Monetary Fund estimates that between 1997 and 2006, the average inflation rate in Canada will be about 2% -- the same as in the U.S. In the U.K., Australia and New Zealand, it's expected to be only slightly higher.
Prof. Mishkin said Mr. Greenspan gets credit for ratcheting down inflation without a formal target during the past two decades, but that there are no guarantees that Mr. Greenspan's successors will manage the economy as effectively. A target, therefore, is seen by him and some others as a sort of insurance policy that the success of the past two decades will be continued.
"What we really want to do is clone Greenspan, and this is the way to do it," said Mr. Mishkin. "We want to make sure that future Federal Reserve chairmen hew to Greenspan's precepts."
The movement globally toward inflation targets is part of another broad trend toward more central bank transparency. When they adopt inflation targets, central banks are moving toward explicitly stating their intentions, and central banks that have adopted targets have also put out regular reports to update markets on how they think they're doing.
"Making the investment now in greater transparency about the central bank's objectives, plans, and assessments of the economy could pay increasing dividends in the future," Mr. Bernanke said in 2003.
The Fed already has become a much more transparent institution under Mr. Greenspan, for instance by announcing explicitly its target for the federal-funds rates -- which is the rate charged by banks on overnight loans -- and by releasing minutes from its regular meetings earlier than it used to.
Still, an informal survey by The Wall Street Journal earlier this year found some uncertainty over the Fed's tolerance for inflation. Six of eight firms that closely watched the Fed believed it had an implicit inflation target range. Four -- Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, Macroeconomic Advisers and Morgan Stanley -- said they thought the Fed wanted inflation to stay in the range of 1% to 2%, as measured by the price index of personal consumption excluding food and energy. (The Fed believes that index measures the cost of living more accurately than the better-known consumer-price index.)
A fifth, ISI group, said the Fed's target was 1.5% to 2.5%. Merrill Lynch said it was 1.5% to 2%, and J.P. Morgan Chase and Lehman Brothers said there isn't any implicit target.
贝南克可能信奉“通货膨胀目标”
本?贝南克(Ben Bernanke)麾下的联邦储备委员会(Fed)将与格林斯潘(Greenspan)时代有何不同？
也许最大的变化就是Fed对待及讨论通货膨胀的方式。
作为学者，作为Fed理事，贝南特一直是目标通货膨胀政策的大力倡导者，他主张设立正式、公开的通货膨胀率目标，由央行负责维系，也就是通常所说的“目标通货膨胀政策”。
这种主张目前争议颇多，自然也对即将卸任的Fed主席格林斯潘的路线有所背离。在格林斯潘的18年任期中，由于他在独立领导Fed和掌控美国经济方面的出色表现，美国从未设立过明确的通货膨胀率目标。
尽管这一政策的倡导者声称设立确切目标将有助于提高Fed的透明度以及履行Fed维持低通胀率的职责，但基于格林斯潘的以往功绩，反对者仍然坚称，此举将不可避免地限制Fed的灵活性。
最近20年，目标通货膨胀政策在全球范围内得到了日益广泛的采用。包括加拿大、英国、澳大利亚和新西兰在内的20几个国家已先后采用此项政策，欧洲央行也在此之列。
设立目标的形式多种多样。英国央行(Bank of England)将两年内通货膨胀目标设定为接近2%的水平，而澳大利亚央行(Reserve Bank of Australia)则设定了2%-3%的目标区域。
若贝南克的任命获得参议院批准，美国也很可能如法炮制，特别是考虑到贝南克正在设法使金融市场相信，猖獗的通货膨胀以及与之相伴的经济不稳定性不会在后格林斯潘时代卷土重来。眼下正值高昂的油价使Fed对通货膨胀形势日感担忧之际，对通货膨胀目标的讨论更是尤显重要。
支持者表示，理想的通货膨胀率不仅能够确保物价稳定，也是经济健康发展的基础。“一个成熟并且得到有效执行的通货膨胀目标可以带来产出、就业以及通货膨胀等多方面的良好效果，”贝南克2003年在美国商业经济协会(National Association for Business Economics)发表讲话时表示。
过去，贝南克一直主张将美国的通货膨胀目标设在1%-2%的区域内，但他也表示，如果真的让它成为一个正式目标，最佳利率仍有待于Fed的仔细研究。
贝南克是目标通货膨胀政策的先行倡导者，这在其诸多学术文献及著作中均有体现，学术界在讨论这一问题时所使用的一些概念及短语就出自他手。他主张，一个正式的通货膨胀目标将有助于指导政策，确保央行将重点放在保持物价稳定的长期目标上。
“你们谈论的人正是这一问题的先行思考者，”与贝南克就这一问题共同发表过文章的哥伦比亚大学(Columbia University)教授弗里德里克?米甚金(Frederic Mishkin)说。
与其他央行官员一样，格林斯潘也遵循低通胀政策，但他并不赞成设立正式的通货膨胀率目标。目标通货膨胀政策的其他反对者也表示，这一政策可能在关键的环节将央行束缚住，迫使它们在经济需要更大回旋余地时却要机械地提高或降低利率。
那正是格林斯潘在某种程度上表示认同的观点，在格林斯潘出任Fed主席的18年中，美国经历了两次衰退、出现了两次股市崩盘，世界经历了数次新兴市场危机。格林斯潘在2004年的一次讲话中说，在关键的时候，运用简单的规则来指导货币政策是不够的。
但贝南克在Fed未来的一些同僚却有可能反对这一观点。Fed理事唐纳德?科恩(Donald Kohn) 2003年在一次讲话中谈到通货膨胀率目标时说，他讲话的前提是认定美国在过去20年中执行了一套非常成功的货币政策。科恩也一直是Fed主席一职的潜在竞争者。他说：“我们实现了物价稳定，通货膨胀预期不高且保持稳定，而我们在实现这一切的20年中只经历了两次相对轻微的经济衰退......对我来说，继续原来的一贯做法是自然而然的选择，当然，这种做法可能是难以界定或解释的。”
支持设定一个正式的通货膨胀率目标未必就会使贝南克在通货膨胀问题上成为鹰派。事实上，当2002和2003年许多进口商品的价格不断下跌导致美国的消费者价格指数面临下行压力之时，贝南克对物价可能跌至人们乐见水平以下太多表示了担忧，他支持通过放松货币政策来应对这一局面。
鉴于经济学家们在设定正式的通货膨胀率目标一事上无法达成共识，看来Fed不大可能很快采取这一做法。但在贝南克执掌Fed的时代，各方围绕这一问题确实有可能展开激烈的辩论。
Fed前理事艾德华?格兰里奇(Edward Gramlich)说：“人们对他在设定通货膨胀率目标一事上的观点有所争议，他在坚持己见方面可能会比许多人走得更远些。”格兰里奇目前担任密歇根大学(University of Michigan)的临时教务长。他还说，贝南克非常具有灵活性，他不大可能将自己倾向于设定通货膨胀率目标的观点强加给强烈反对这一做法的人。
设定通货膨胀率目标的做法是学术界30年前提出来的。经济学家们在上世纪70年代逐渐认识到，为了控制住目前的通货膨胀率，需要控制住个人和企业对通货膨胀率未来走势的预期。如果公众预计通货膨胀形势会加速恶化，由于认为物价将会大幅跃升，因此雇主将会要求提高售价，而雇员则会要求涨工资，而这会使物价形势更加恶化。
经济学家米尔顿?弗里德曼(Milton Friedman)建议，各央行应为货币流通量设定正式的增长目标，比如说为银行存款设定增长目标，因为货币增长量是影响通货膨胀形势的一个重要决定性因素。但事实证明，衡量货币增长情况的指标不能很好地预示未来的经济活动情况。
所以各央行乾脆直接为通货膨胀率设定目标。加拿大央行(Bank of Canada)和新西兰央行(Reserve Bank of New Zealand)在这方面先行一步，在上世纪90年代初就实行了这一政策。
从结果来看，在央行制定正式通货膨胀目标与没有制定正式目标的国家中，实际通货膨胀率的高低并没有很大差别。据国际货币基金组织(International Monetary Fund, 简称：IMF)估计，从1997年2006年，加拿大的平均通货膨胀率将约为2%，与美国相同；而英国、澳大利亚和新西兰预计只略高一些。
米甚金表示，在过去20年中，格林斯潘在没有制定正式通胀目标的情况下，依然能一步步将通货膨胀率降低下来，这为他赢得了不少赞誉。然而，格林斯潘的继任者能否继续有效地控制经济就不得而知了。因而，他和其他一些人认为，制定一个通货膨胀目标也许可以确保过去20年的成就能够延续下去。
“我们真正想要做的就是克隆格林斯潘，而这就是克隆的方式，”米甚金说，“我们希望确保未来Fed主席接班人能够遵守格林斯潘的原则。”
如今全球都在朝著制定通货膨胀目标的方向迈进，这也是更大范围内提高央行透明度的趋势的一部分。当各央行采用通货膨胀目标的时候，就是在明确地阐述自己的意图；采用通胀目标的央行还会定期向市场发布报告，让市场了解央行的想法。
贝南克2003年曾这样说道：“眼下在提高央行目标、计划、经济评价的透明度上进行投资，将来就可能获得更高的回报。”
在格林斯潘的领导下，Fed已经变得越来越透明，比如明确公布联邦基金利率目标、提早公布定期会议的纪要等等。
不过，据《华尔街日报》(The Wall Street Journal)年初进行的一项非正式调查显示，外界对于Fed对通货膨胀的容忍度仍然没有把握。8家密切关注Fed动态的公司中，有6家认为Fed有一个隐含的通货膨胀目标区间；包括高盛(Goldman Sachs)、美国银行(Bank of America)、Macroeconomic Advisers和摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)在内的4家公司表示，他们认为Fed希望通货膨胀率能维持在1%至2%之间。这里的通货膨胀率指的是不包括食品和能源价格的核心消费者价格指数。（Fed认为这一指标在衡量生活成本方面比消费者价格指数更为准确。）
ISI group认为Fed的通胀目标为1.5%至2.5%；美林认为是1.5%至2%；摩根大通公司(JPMorgan Chase & Co.)和雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)则表示Fed并没有隐含的通胀目标。
那正是格林斯潘在某种程度上表示认同的观点，在格林斯潘出任Fed主席的18年中，美国经历了两次衰退、出现了两次股市崩盘，世界经历了数次新兴市场危机。格林斯潘在2004年的一次讲话中说，在关键的时候，运用简单的规则来指导货币政策是不够的。
但贝南克在Fed未来的一些同僚却有可能反对这一观点。Fed理事唐纳德?科恩(Donald Kohn) 2003年在一次讲话中谈到通货膨胀率目标时说，他讲话的前提是认定美国在过去20年中执行了一套非常成功的货币政策。科恩也一直是Fed主席一职的潜在竞争者。他说：“我们实现了物价稳定，通货膨胀预期不高且保持稳定，而我们在实现这一切的20年中只经历了两次相对轻微的经济衰退......对我来说，继续原来的一贯做法是自然而然的选择，当然，这种做法可能是难以界定或解释的。”
支持设定一个正式的通货膨胀率目标未必就会使贝南克在通货膨胀问题上成为鹰派。事实上，当2002和2003年许多进口商品的价格不断下跌导致美国的消费者价格指数面临下行压力之时，贝南克对物价可能跌至人们乐见水平以下太多表示了担忧，他支持通过放松货币政策来应对这一局面。
鉴于经济学家们在设定正式的通货膨胀率目标一事上无法达成共识，看来Fed不大可能很快采取这一做法。但在贝南克执掌Fed的时代，各方围绕这一问题确实有可能展开激烈的辩论。
Fed前理事艾德华?格兰里奇(Edward Gramlich)说：“人们对他在设定通货膨胀率目标一事上的观点有所争议，他在坚持己见方面可能会比许多人走得更远些。”格兰里奇目前担任密歇根大学(University of Michigan)的临时教务长。他还说，贝南克非常具有灵活性，他不大可能将自己倾向于设定通货膨胀率目标的观点强加给强烈反对这一做法的人。
设定通货膨胀率目标的做法是学术界30年前提出来的。经济学家们在上世纪70年代逐渐认识到，为了控制住目前的通货膨胀率，需要控制住个人和企业对通货膨胀率未来走势的预期。如果公众预计通货膨胀形势会加速恶化，由于认为物价将会大幅跃升，因此雇主将会要求提高售价，而雇员则会要求涨工资，而这会使物价形势更加恶化。
经济学家米尔顿?弗里德曼(Milton Friedman)建议，各央行应为货币流通量设定正式的增长目标，比如说为银行存款设定增长目标，因为货币增长量是影响通货膨胀形势的一个重要决定性因素。但事实证明，衡量货币增长情况的指标不能很好地预示未来的经济活动情况。
所以各央行乾脆直接为通货膨胀率设定目标。加拿大央行(Bank of Canada)和新西兰央行(Reserve Bank of New Zealand)在这方面先行一步，在上世纪90年代初就实行了这一政策。
从结果来看，在央行制定正式通货膨胀目标与没有制定正式目标的国家中，实际通货膨胀率的高低并没有很大差别。据国际货币基金组织(International Monetary Fund, 简称：IMF)估计，从1997年2006年，加拿大的平均通货膨胀率将约为2%，与美国相同；而英国、澳大利亚和新西兰预计只略高一些。
米甚金表示，在过去20年中，格林斯潘在没有制定正式通胀目标的情况下，依然能一步步将通货膨胀率降低下来，这为他赢得了不少赞誉。然而，格林斯潘的继任者能否继续有效地控制经济就不得而知了。因而，他和其他一些人认为，制定一个通货膨胀目标也许可以确保过去20年的成就能够延续下去。
“我们真正想要做的就是克隆格林斯潘，而这就是克隆的方式，”米甚金说，“我们希望确保未来Fed主席接班人能够遵守格林斯潘的原则。”
如今全球都在朝著制定通货膨胀目标的方向迈进，这也是更大范围内提高央行透明度的趋势的一部分。当各央行采用通货膨胀目标的时候，就是在明确地阐述自己的意图；采用通胀目标的央行还会定期向市场发布报告，让市场了解央行的想法。
贝南克2003年曾这样说道：“眼下在提高央行目标、计划、经济评价的透明度上进行投资，将来就可能获得更高的回报。”
在格林斯潘的领导下，Fed已经变得越来越透明，比如明确公布联邦基金利率目标、提早公布定期会议的纪要等等。
不过，据《华尔街日报》(The Wall Street Journal)年初进行的一项非正式调查显示，外界对于Fed对通货膨胀的容忍度仍然没有把握。8家密切关注Fed动态的公司中，有6家认为Fed有一个隐含的通货膨胀目标区间；包括高盛(Goldman Sachs)、美国银行(Bank of America)、Macroeconomic Advisers和摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)在内的4家公司表示，他们认为Fed希望通货膨胀率能维持在1%至2%之间。这里的通货膨胀率指的是不包括食品和能源价格的核心消费者价格指数。（Fed认为这一指标在衡量生活成本方面比消费者价格指数更为准确。）
ISI group认为Fed的通胀目标为1.5%至2.5%；美林认为是1.5%至2%；摩根大通公司(JPMorgan Chase & Co.)和雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)则表示Fed并没有隐含的通胀目标。
