Revaluation set to challenge China’s capital control
Ever since China shrugged off the currency crises that swept through Asia in 1997, its capital controls have been praised for keeping its currency steady and insulating the country from economic troubles.
However, China’s restrictions on short-term capital movements could now come under a new onslaught following the government’s decision to abandon the renminbi’s peg to the US dollar and move to a more flexible exchange rate regime.
With Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of the People’s Bank of China, the central bank, signaling that Thursday’s 2.1 per cent revaluation against the dollar was only an “initial step”, Beijing runs the risk of provoking a massive inflow of speculative funds into the country.
It is unclear how well the country’s increasingly leaky curbs on capital movements will cope, but there is no question that China’s government remains committed to staying in control.
“Any developing country with a currency that is not international has to be particularly cautious at a time when it is adjusting its exchange rate mechanism,” says Mei Xinyu, of the an expert on currency controls at the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation under China’s commerce ministry.
“It’s impossible to open up the systems of capital control and exchange rate setting at the same time,” he says.
Calculating how much money slips past capital controls is guesswork in any country; it is harder still in China because of the practice of “round-tripping” where companies take funds offshore, only to bring them back with the tax benefits some foreign investment receives.
China’s foreign exchange reserves currently stand at $711bn, of which some economists say $100bn is the result of speculative capital inflows.
A government report published in February said that between August and December, the authorities raided 155 underground banks involved in trading $1.5bn in foreign currency.
However, according to Caijing, an investigative magazine, a government inspection of the banking system last year uncovered 4.3m suspicious foreign currency transactions involving $1,200bn.
Anecdotal evidence also suggests widespread abuse of the rules. The China operations of cross-border companies can overcharge offshore units for goods to bring in funds. Ventures can also use investment in new Chinese plant as cover to bring in funds they pump into property or other assets with little connection to their business.
Media reports say some people have bought fake Chinese artifacts as a ruse to being foreign currency into the country.
And late last year, police in the eastern city of Qingdao arrested a South Korean man accused of operating an illegal foreign exchange business that had turnover of Rmb240m a year.
Even if China does suffer substantial capital inflows, however, some economists say the impact might be limited. Capital controls cannot stop all speculative flows, but they slow them down. China is unlikely to suffer the violent capital movements that have destabilised other developing countries.
The central bank has successfully “sterilised” incoming funds over the last two years with bill issues, restraining inflation. Indeed, over-capacity in many industries means the current risk could be deflation.
Moreover, holding renminbi assets might not be the sure bet some investors hope. The stockmarket has slumped this year and many regional housing markets have cooled - especially in Shanghai where foreigners invested heavily in luxury flats.
And many analysts believe the government will continue to take a slow and cautious approach to the level of the currency, which would mean only modest returns for anyone with money in a Chinese bank.
Despite the concerns over speculative fund inflows, the biggest worry for policymakers remains the possibility of future outflows if the economy slows or the prospects for renminbi revaluation diminish.
And Beijing is nervous of the continuing power of hedge funds that took on Asian central bankers in 1997.
“There's more than $800 billion to $1 trillion of hedge funds in the world and the Chinese financial system is relatively weak,” Bloomberg quoted Li Deshui, a member of the People’s Bank’s monetary committee, as saying. “If the (yuan) becomes fully convertible it would be attacked by these hedge funds.”
To ease upward pressure on the renminbi, Beijing has in recent years allowed businesses more freedom to export capital, but officials have never stopped worrying about the risks of being too lax.
One reason why can be found in the spectacular boom enjoyed by casinos in south-east Asia, which is being partly sustained by Chinese travellers - who are banned from betting at home - illegally taking money out of the renminbi area. The casino industry in Macau, the former Portuguese colony, now rivals Las Vegas and Atlantic City.
The authorities have begun to take steps to prevent money laundering, requiring banks to report suspicious transactions. Specific legislation on money laundering is also being prepared. However, experts say many banks lack the operational structure to monitor funds transferred between regions
中国资本管制的困局
中国摆脱1997年席卷亚洲的货币危机后，其资本控制措施因成功保持人民币汇率稳定，并使中国免遭经济危机，而得到人们的赞誉。
不过，在中国政府决定放弃人民币盯住美元的汇率制度，转而实行更为灵活的汇率制度之后，中国对短期资本流动的限制可能会面临新的挑战。
中国人民银行行长周小川表示，周四人民币兑美元汇率上调2.1%仅是“初始的汇率调整”，中国面临投机资金大举涌入的风险。
目前尚不清楚中国漏洞越来越多的资本流动限制有多大的应对能力，但中国政府无疑会坚持对资本流动的控制。
“任何本币为非国际性货币的发展中国家，在调整其现有汇率机制时都必须特别谨慎，”中国商务部国际贸易和经济合作研究院货币控制专家梅新育说。
他说：“这些国家的资本控制和汇率形成机制不可能同时放开”。
计算究竟有多少资金绕过资本控制流入境内，是任何国家只能猜测的事情；在中国就更难计算了，因为许多国内企业将资金先转移至海外，之后再转回境内，为的是获得外资企业享受的税收优惠，这就是所谓的“资金回流”。
中国的外汇储备目前为7110亿美元，一些经济学家指出，其中有1000亿美元是投机资本流入所致。
中国政府2月份发表的一份报告称，去年8月至12月间，当局突击捣毁了155个地下钱庄及非法买卖外汇交易窝点，涉案金额达15亿美元。
不过，据《财经》杂志报道，去年中国政府对银行系统的检查发现了430万笔可疑外汇交易，金额达1.2万亿美元。
另有传闻证据显示，中国的有关规定被普遍滥用。跨国公司在中国的业务机构可通过向其海外机构多收取货款将资金带入境内。企业还可利用在中国投资新厂作为掩护，将携入的资金投向与其业务几乎不相干的地产或其它资产。
媒体报道称，一些人借口购买中国古董的仿制品，将外汇转移入境。
去年年末，中国东部城市青岛的警方逮捕了一名韩国男子，此人被控非法经营外汇业务，年营业额达2.4亿元人民币。
然而，一些经济学家指出，中国即便遭遇大规模的资本流入，所受到的影响也可能有限。资本控制无法阻止所有投机资本流动，但毕竟可以减缓这种流动。中国不大可能遭遇剧烈的资本流动冲击，这种资本流动曾破坏其它发展中国家的稳定。
过去两年间，中国人民银行通过发行票据和抑制通胀，成功地“中和”了海外资金流入的冲击。事实上，许多行业的产能过剩，意味着当前的风险可能是通缩。
另外，持有人民币资产可能也并非像某些投资者所期望的那样，是包赚不赔的买卖。中国股市今年出现下跌，许多地区的住宅市场已经降温(特别是在上海，海外人士曾投入巨资购买豪华公寓)。
许多分析师认为，政府将继续对人民币汇率采取谨慎慢行的态度，这意味着在中国银行有存款的人仅能获得微薄回报。
尽管存在对投机资金流入的担忧，但决策者们最大的忧虑，仍是未来一旦经济增长放缓或人民币升值前景黯淡所导致的资金外流。
此外，对曾在1997年给亚洲各国央行造成压力的对冲基金的能量，北京也感到不安。
“全世界有规模超过8000亿至1万亿美元的对冲基金，中国的金融体系相比之下是脆弱的，” 彭博通讯社(Bloomberg)援引中国人民银行货币政策委员会成员李德水的话报道称。“人民币若完全实现自由兑换，便会遭到这些对冲基金的攻击。”
为减轻人民币的升值压力，北京近几年已赋予企业更大的资本输出自由度，但政府官员们对控制过松的风险忧虑从未消除。
从东南亚赌场的繁荣景象，可以窥见其中的一个理由。这些赌场的繁荣，在一定程度上是由非法携带资金出境的中国旅游者(中国国内禁止赌博)支撑起来的。前葡萄牙殖民地澳门的博彩业，如今可与美国拉斯维加斯和大西洋城媲美。
中国当局已开始采取措施防范洗钱，要求各银行报告可疑交易。专门针对洗钱的立法也已处于准备阶段。不过，专家指出，许多银行缺乏相应的运作架构，无法监视跨地区资金转移。
