We need to distinguish between brain drain and brain strain
There are apparently more Malawian doctors working in Britain's regional city of Manchester than in Malawi itself. That is ideal for Britain's rapidly expanding health service but not so good for Malawi. What to do about this so-called brain drain from poor to wealthy countries is one of the most enduring and difficult challenges in international migration.
One proposal conveniently deployed by anti-immigration lobbyists in rich countries is to limit emigration from developing countries. However, policymakers should be suspicious of such approaches and instead find more creative ways to address the issue. Evidence of large numbers of highly-skilled people emigrating from the developing world is not hard to find: between a third and half of the developing world's science and technology personnel live in the developed world and about 40 per cent of all African professionals have left the continent's shores in the post-colonial period. A recent report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development suggests that up to three-quarters of all highly-skilled workers in some small developing countries such as Guyana, Jamaica, Haiti, Trinidad & Tobago and Fiji, have emigrated to OECD countries. For larger countries, the relative scale of loss may be much smaller but evidence suggests that their emigrants are disproportionately well-educated. For example, nearly 80 per cent of working-age Indian emigrants to developed countries have a tertiary education, compared with 2.5 per cent of the overall Indian population.
Is all this mobility a problem? Yes, to the extent that some small countries are losing the type of people critical to driving economic growth, delivering public services and filling the ranks of the political classes. However, we should not forget that in most cases, highly skilled emigration brings considerable benefits to all concerned. It can be a hugely enriching experience for the individuals involved. Their home countries benefit from remittance income, from inward investment by diaspora communities and, if migrants return, from accumulated skills and capital. Receiving countries, where demand is driving these flows, pay less for training immigrants and can fill vacancies quickly. Finally, greater labour mobility helps improve global economic efficiency.
This nuanced picture of costs and benefits shows how inappropriate a one-size-fits-all response can be, particularly when it involves limiting migration from all developing countries. Here, we need to distinguish between brain drain and what I call brain strain. While the former refers to the movement of people, the latter refers to the instances in which their movement has negative development impact. The clearest example of brain strain can be found in some sub-Saharan African countries where emigration, particularly from the education and health sectors, may be hampering progress in critical poverty eradication efforts.
The important point is that brain drain does not always lead to brain strain. For example, the emigration of Indian information technology workers may not be hampering India's development. Given that the emigration potential may actually be fuelling additional human capital investment locally and that India receives huge remittances (about $8bn per annum), the net impact of migration may be positive. Limiting mobility across the developing world may deprive countries such as India of these benefits. Limiting mobility from only the most vulnerable countries is also problematic because it might infringe the human rights of the individuals concerned and, in any case, might not work. Resourceful migrants will always find a way of getting around recruitment bans.
We need interventions that acknowledge that mobility is, in itself, not necessarily the problem. Rather, we should pay attention to the impact of that mobility. Improving the development prospects of the Guyanas and the Malawis of the world will require targeted strategies such as limiting active recruitment from the most vulnerable sectors and creating incentives for return. But the most enduring interventions may lie outside the remit of immigration policies. Financing additional training facilities in vulnerable sectors may help meet local demand. Delivering aid to bolster local wages may promote the retention of key workers. Additional funding for professionals in the developed world to spend time in poorer countries could also be effective, certainly in the short term.
Migration is here to stay. Strategies to limit mobility may end up being ineffective or counter-productive. Instead, we need strategies to optimise the impact of greater mobility. This requires better understanding of the relationship between poverty, migration and development. It also requires greater political will on the part of the leaders of developed countries to counter the negative impact of their demand for workers where and when it occurs rather than pull up the drawbridges.
The writer is senior research fellow at the UK's Institute for Public Policy Research
人才外流未必是坏事
目前，在英国曼彻斯特工作的马拉维医生显然比在马拉维本国还要多。这对英国迅速发展的医疗服务业而言，是再理想不过了，然而对马拉维来说却不太妙。如何应对这种从贫穷国家向富裕国家的所谓“人才外流”现象，是国际移民中最持久、也是最困难的挑战之一。
对此，富裕国家中反对移民的说客提出了一个权宜性建议，即限制来自发展中国家的移民。然而，决策人应该对这种方式持怀疑态度，并寻求创新途径对待这一问题。要想找到发展中国家大量高技能移民的证据并不难：发展中国家1/3到1/2的科技人员生活在发达国家；在后殖民时期，约有40%的非洲专业人才离开了非洲大陆。经济合作和发展组织(OECD)最近的一份报告显示，在一些小的发展中国家，如圭亚那、牙买加、海地、特立尼达和多巴哥以及斐济，高达3/4的高技术工人已经移民到了经济合作和发展组织成员国。对较大的发展中国家而言，人才流失的相对规模可能小得多。然而，有证据显示，这些国家海外移民的教育程度远远高于本国平均教育程度。比如，从印度移民到发达国家的劳动力中，近80%接受过高等教育，而印度人口的总体高等教育普及率只有2.5%。
这种流动算是问题吗？回答是肯定的，因为就其造成的后果来说，一些小国目前所流失的，正是对推动本国经济增长、提供公共服务和补充各级政府职位都至关重要的人才。然而，我们不应忘记在多数情况下，高技能移民会使相关各方都大为受益。对个人而言，移民能够大大丰富个人阅历。对国家而言，移民输出国也可以从海外移民汇回的收入、国外散居移民社团在国内的投资以及归国移民所积累的技能和资金中获益。移民输入国国内的需求促进移民流入，而输入国可以节约大量移民培训经费，并且迅速填补其职位空缺。最后，劳动力流动性的增强还有助于提高全球经济效率。
以上深入细致的成本/收益分析表明，对移民采取“一刀切”的应对方式是多么片面――特别是针对所有发展中国家的移民限制而言。在这里，我们需要分清“人才外流”(brain drain)和“人才紧缺”(brain strain)这两个不同的概念。前者指人员流动，而后者指人员流动对发展产生的负面影响。最明显的“人才紧缺”实例发生在撒哈拉沙漠以南的一些非洲国家，这里特别是教育和医疗行业移民的输出，可能已经对消除贫困这项重要工作造成了阻碍。
重要的一点是，“人才外流”并非总会导致“人才紧缺”。比如，印度IT业工人移居海外可能并不会阻碍印度的发展。由于潜在的移民机会可能会刺激当地额外的技能资本投资，而且印度每年收到约80亿美元的巨额汇款流入，因此移民对印度而言，产生的影响可能是积极的。限制所有来自发展中国家的移民，可能会使印度这样的国家丧失这些利益。而仅仅限制最弱势国家的移民输出，同样也存在问题，因为这可能会侵犯到当事人的人权，而且在很多情况下，也可能不奏效。聪明的移民永远能找到规避招聘禁令的方法。
我们需要采取一些调解措施，但首先要承认人员流动本身并不一定是症结所在，我们要做的是把注意力集中在人员流动所带来的影响上。改善圭亚那和马拉维的发展前景，需要采取有针对性的策略，如限制输出国最弱势行业的海外招聘，同时建立鼓励移民归国机制。然而，最长久的调解措施可能在移民政策之外：为弱势行业的额外培训设施提供资金，可能有助于满足当地需求；通过援助提高当地工资水平，可能有助于留住关键岗位的工人；为在相对贫穷国家工作的发达国家专业人员提供更多资金支持，可能同样有效――至少在近期内必定如此。
移民是必然的。限制人员流动的种种策略最终可能不会奏效，或者起反作用。相反，我们需要相关策略，以优化人员流动幅度增大后造成的影响。这就要求我们更好的理解贫穷、移民和发展之间的关系。此外，这还要求发达国家的领导人不管何时何地，当国内工人需求对输出国产生负面影响时，都应该在政治上加强力度，给予帮助以缓解影响，而不是拉起城堡的吊桥。
本文作者是英国公共政策研究院(Institute for Public Policy Research)高级研究员。
