CHINA WILL CONTINUE TO GROW
For how long can China's rapid growth continue? This is an obvious, even banal, question. But asking it suggests that there is something extraordinary about the growth of the Asian colossus over the past two-and-a-half decades. Yet the only way in which China is exceptional is in its scale. Otherwise, it is merely at an early stage on the path of rapid convergence previously trodden by Japan, Taiwan and South Korea.
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According to data from the economic historian Angus Maddison (updated to 2004), China's gross domestic product per head at purchasing power parity rose by 370 per cent between 1978 and 2004, a trend rate of 6.1 per cent a year (see chart). Yet between 1950 and 1973, Japan's GDP per head had increased by 460 per cent, a trend rate of 8.2 per cent. Between 1962 and 1990, South Korea's GDP per head rose by 680 per cent, a trend rate of 7.6 per cent, while Taiwan's rose by 600 per cent, between 1958 and 1987, a trend rate of 7.1 per cent.
China's growth then has been far from spectacular by the standards of its smaller Asian neighbours. Yet there are reasons to believe that China should have been able to outperform them all.
First, the speed with which a country can grow is a function of how far it is behind the productivity levels of the world's most advanced economies. This is why each generation of catch-up economies has tended to grow faster than the previous one. When China's surge began, its GDP per head at PPP was only one-twentieth of that of the US. Even now, after a quarter century of fast growth, China's output per head is about one-sixth of that of the US. Japan's GDP per head was one-fifth of that of the US in 1950, even before its unmatched surge began (see chart).
Second, China possesses all the ingredients of rapid growth, as did Japan, South Korea and Taiwan before it: a hard-working and initially cheap labour force, the ability to transfer huge numbers of workers from low productivity agriculture to higher productivity manufacturing, an accommodating external environment, political stability and a development-oriented government.
Third, China apparently possesses an extraordinarily high rate of gross fixed investment, at over 40 per cent of gross domestic product (see chart). What makes China's high investment rate so extraordinary is that it is occurring at such a low level of GDP per head. China's GDP per head (at PPP) is today the same as that of South Korea's in 1982, Taiwan's in 1976 and Japan's in 1961. In those years, the gross
fixed investment rates of South Korea and Taiwan were both below 30 per cent of GDP, while Japan's was
32 per cent.
Given the opportunities it enjoyed and its investment effort, China should have grown even faster. The failure to do so is explained by the inefficiency of investment.
A simple measure of investment efficiency is the “incremental capital output ratio” the ratio of investment to additional output. The lower the ICOR the greater the bang for the investment buck. China's ICOR has now risen to a five-year moving average of five. In its period of rapid growth in the 1960s, Japan's ICOR was close to three. In the 1960s and 1970s, the ICORs of South Korea and Taiwan were between two and three.
Several further pieces of evidence support the view that China's growth pattern has been inefficient. One is the high level of bad loans in the banking system. If an economy growing at close to 10 per cent a year generates bad loans on this scale, the misallocation of capital has to be huge.
The principal explanation for the high level of losses has been the pouring of credit into the voracious maw of the state-owned enterprises. Between 1993 and 2000, more than 60 per cent of all credit to enterprises went to state enterprises. According to two economists from the International Monetary Fund, the share of private investment in total investment was only between 15 and 27 per cent between 1991 and 1997, largely because private business had little recourse to bank lending. Yet jobs created by the private sector accounted for 56 per cent of the total*.
Still more remarkably, inward foreign direct investment was only about 4 per cent of GDP in the first half of the 1990s and 5 per cent in the second. Yet, according to two other IMF economists, FDI generated almost all of the efficiency gains**. The share of foreign-owned companies in gross exports is also close to 50 per cent. Their share in the gross output of industrial enterprises rose from nothing in the early 1980s to 12 per cent in 1995 and 29 per cent in 2002.
Objectors to the position that China could have grown even faster may argue that a country of China's scale needed higher investment in infrastructure than its smaller neighbours. But this high investment is likely to bear fruit in the years to come.
Some also argue that China's GDP is underestimated and its investment rate exaggerated. But if the investment rate is indeed lower than officially estimated, it may well go even higher in the years ahead.
Furthermore, at present rates of economic growth, it would take more than a quarter of a century for China to achieve Japan's current level of GDP per head. It would take more than three decades for China to achieve the same GDP per head, relative to the US, as South Korea has today. The potential for catching up remains immense.
Do not assume that China's rapid growth is an extraordinary flash in the pan. It is neither extraordinary nor a flash in the pan. The social and political obstacles to rapid and sustained growth are large. But the catch-up opportunity remains enormous. The era of China's rapid catch-up growth could well be in its middle, not at its end.
* Christopher Duenwald and Jahanguir Aziz, The Growth-Financial Development Nexus, in China: Competing in the Global Economy (International Monetary Fund);
** Wanda Tseng and Harm Zebregs, Foreign Direct Investment in China: some Lessons for Other Countries (IMF)
中国经济为何没有更快增长
中国的快速增长还能持续多长时间？这是个明显、甚至有些陈腐的问题。但是，这么问就意味着，在过去25年间，中国这个亚洲巨人的增长有些不同寻常之处。而中国经济增长的唯一不寻常之处在于其规模庞大。若非如此，它目前仅仅处于快速趋同道路的初期阶段，而此前日本、台湾和韩国都走过这条道路。
经济史学家安格斯?麦迪森(Angus Maddison)提供的数据(更新至2004年)显示，从1978年到2004年间，中国以购买力平价计算的人均国内生产总值(GDP)上升了370%，年趋势增长率为6.1%(见表)。而在1950年至1973年间，日本的人均GDP增长了460%，趋势增长率为8.2%。在1962年至1990年间，韩国的人均GDP增长了680%，趋势增长率达7.6%，而台湾在1958至1987年间增长了600%，趋势增长率为7.1%。
以较小的亚洲邻近国家和地区的标准来衡量，中国的经济增长还远远算不上惊人。但有理由相信，中国的表现能够超过所有这些国家和地区。
首先，一个国家所能达到的经济增长速度，视它与全球最发达经济体生产力水平之间的差距而定。这就是为什么每一代赶超他人的经济体，其增长往往快于上一代同类经济体。当中国的经济开始猛增时，以购买力平价衡量，其人均GDP仅是美国的二十分之一。即使现在，在经历25年的快速增长后，中国的人均产出仍然只有美国的约六分之一。而1950年，即使当时日本无与伦比的迅猛增长尚未开始，它的人均GDP达到美国的五分之一。
第二，与日本、韩国和台湾以前一样，中国也拥有快速增长需要的所有要素：勤劳且起初便宜的劳动力、将大量工人从低生产力的农业转移至高生产力的制造业的能力、一个适宜的外部环境、政局稳定，以及一个以发展为导向的政府。
第三，中国的总固定投资率显然高得出奇，相当于GDP的40%以上。而中国的投资率之所以高得出奇，是因为其人均GDP水平非常低。现在，(按购买力平价计算)中国的人均GDP同1982年的韩国、1976年的台湾，以及1961年的日本相同。在那些年，韩国和台湾的总固定投资占GDP的比率都低于30%，而日本为32%。
考虑到中国享有的机遇及其投资力度，它本该以更快的速度增长。它之所以没能做到这点，是因为投资缺乏效率。
投资效率的一个简单衡量指标是“增量资本产出率”(ICOR)，即投资与增量产出之比。这个比率越低，投入资金的效益就越大。中国增量资本产出率的5年移动平均值现已升至5。日本在上世纪60年代的快速增长时期，其增量资本产出率接近3。上世纪60年代和70年代，韩国和台湾的这个指标在2至3之间。
中国的增长模式缺乏效率，若干证据进一步支持了这个观点。一是银行系统的坏账水平很高。如果一个每年增长近10%的经济体产生如此大规模的坏账，那么资本配置不当状况就必定很严重。
造成这种高损失的主要原因是，银行向难以餍足的国有企业大量倾注信贷。1993年至2000年间，企业贷款总额中60%以上流入了国有企业。据国际货币基金组织(IMF)的两位经济学家称，1991年至1997年间，总投资中私人投资只占15%至27%，很大程度上是因为私营企业几乎不能求助于银行贷款。然而，私营部门创造的就业占总就业创造的56%*。
更令人瞩目的是，上世纪90年代的前5年中，外国直接投资只占中国GDP的4% 左右，后5年只占5%。然而，据另两位国际货币基金组织的经济学家称，几乎一切有效收益都是由外国直接投资产生的**。外资企业在总出口中所占比例接近50%。上世纪80年代初，外资企业在工业企业总产出中所占比例为零，而1995年升至12%，2002年已升至29%。
对于中国本可以更快增长这一观点，一些人表示反对。他们或许会称，与较小的邻国相比，像中国这么大的国家需要更多基础设施投资。但这种高投资可能要在数年后才会见效。
有些人还声称，中国的GDP被低估了，而投资率被夸大了。但如果投资率确实低于官方的估计数字，那么今后数年内就会上升到更高水平。
此外，按中国目前的经济增长速度，它需要25年以上的时间，才能达到日本目前的人均GDP水平，需要30多年，才能达到如今韩国人均GDP相对于美国人均GDP的比例。追赶的空间还是很大的。
不要以为中国的快速增长是非同寻常的昙花一现。那既不是非同寻常，也不是昙花一现。要实现快速、持续的增长，在社会和经济方面还有很大障碍。然而，赶超的机会依然是巨大的。中国经济快速赶超的时代也许正处于中期，而非末期。
*克里斯托弗?丁瓦尔德(Christopher Duenwald)和贾汉吉尔?阿齐茨(Jahangir Aziz)，《增长与金融发展》(The Growth-Financial Development Nexus)，见《中国：参与全球经济竞争》(国际货币基金组织)。
**曾旺达(Wanda Tseng)和哲布克(Harm Zebregs)，《中国的外国直接投资：可供他国借鉴的经验教训》(国际货币基金组织)。
本文的早期版本刊于2005年1/2月号《外交政策》(Foreign Policy)杂志，题为《为何中国增长如此缓慢》(Why is China Growing so Slowly)。
