The west needs a new sense of self
Once upon a time there was the west, winner of history's race to modernity, and there were the rest, twrying to catch up. Every society was thought to make the same journey, at greater or lesser speed, from hide-bound tradition to the bright promise of industrial modernity and unrestricted economic growth. If it did not, something had gone wrong: it might be excessive attachment to (non-Christian) religions and creeds, or to pre-modern sources of loyalty such as the family and the tribe. Women were a litmus test: where their feet were bound or heads covered, there was little hope for their communities without radical change delivered by eastern-oriented saviours. Secularism, urbanisation and market forces would propel them forward.
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During the cold war, fleshing out this self-congratulatory model kept academics busy. According to the historians, the west owed its ascent not just to anything as recent or crudely violent as 19th-century colonial expansion or the preceding industrial revolution but to other, more venerable institutions and values. For some, the west's ascent was thanks to a 17th-century “scientific revolution” the moment at which humanity supposedly asserted its claim to knowledge over the censorious power of religious authorities; for others, it was the rise of capitalist banking, perhaps even the emergence of a church-state balance of powers centuries before.
All this reflected the realities of the time. Europe's dreams of world domination, shattered in the bloodletting of war, had passed to the US: extolling the west's virtues served to assert the depth of shared transatlantic values, and simultaneously defined them against the cold war barbarians to the east. So it should not surprise us now, as US power approaches its military and economic zenith and confronts the rapid emergence of India and China, that the shifting global balance is altering our understanding of the past once again. According to some east Asia experts in the US, the west's ascent was reasonably recent and fortuitous: in 1800, China's gross national product was probably still higher than Europe's. For them the Pacific, not the Atlantic, is key to understanding the long run of world development. Their findings give western policymakers reason to pause before seeking to spread their own values around the globe. For if the west's rise is no more than two centuries old, its success may owe more to contingency and less to values than its cheerleaders believe. For states as for stock markets, what goes up may also come down.
From the Enlightenment onwards, the ascendancy of the west was contrasted with the moribund east. Its origins were traced back to Greece and Rome rather than, say, Egypt and Mesopotamia. India was ignored, at least until the British marched in. The Chinese were credited, thanks to Marco Polo, with pasta and ice cream and occasionally, paper. Yet we now know that in terms of per capita income or density of trading networks there was little to choose between the most advanced parts of Europe and sophisticated Asian economies before the late 18th century. It was not lack of curiousity or weakness that explains why the Ottomans, the Moghuls, the Russians and the Chinese did not join the European mania for exploration and colonisation; they did not need to. Their expansion took place mostly by land and they left costly maritime ventures to the profligate but technologically inventive Europeans. Conversely, it was not brilliant success but rather imminent impoverishment that forced a resource-bare, crowded island off Europe's north-west coast to move to a labour-intensive, coal-based economy. Britain's embrace of new technologies was fostered by its rulers' ruthless priorities. Whereas the older empires placed a premium on social stability, successive British governments focused on developing military technologies, state-licensed trading companies and market-driven systems of credit. The outcomes were often internally destabilising but in small countries, this mattered less than in large ones. Britain's European rivals could hardly afford not to follow.
Only in the 19th century did Europe, a conflict-torn region of small, belligerent states, leap decisively ahead of the great Eurasian land empires, spreading capitalism and colonialism across the globe, before being overtaken in turn by its child-rival, the US. Today, barely 200 years since the west's ascendancy, its end may be in sight. Yet many western policymakers continue to see their own values as universally desirable, the key not only to their past but to everyone else's future. A precarious argument. If Chinese historians, from a resurgent Beijing in two centuries' time, point to those western values as the source of America's 23rd-century decline, will we say they are wrong?
States that believe promotion of their interests depends on export of their culture and values are doomed to fail. Better to realise that religious politics is not necessarily a sign of medievalism, and that privatised democracies are not a one-size cure for the world's ills. Of course China's rise does not portend the downfall of the US or Europe but it does challenge the west's self-perception as the civilisational hegemon in global affairs. In this context revitalising the United Nations becomes more vital than ever, for ideas translate precariously across the boundaries of language and belief, and life will not be easier in the absence of the international forums that make mutual comprehension possible. The world before 1800 was one of multiple power-centres and value systems: let us adjust to the fact that it is starting to look like that again.
The writer, professor of history at Columbia University, is author ofSalonica, City of Ghosts: Christians,Muslims and Jews 1430-1950 (Harper-Collins/Knopf)
中印崛起 西方如何定位
曾几何时，西方在现代化的历史竞赛中成为赢家；而其它地区都试图赶上它的步伐。人们认为：每个社会无一例外都要走上这条必由之路，从封闭守旧的传统走向美好的现代化工业和永无止境的经济发展，只是有的走得快些，有的慢些罢了。如果一个社会偏离这条轨道，那一定是什么地方出问题了：或许是对(非基督教的)宗教和信仰的过于执迷，抑或是对现代化之前时期忠诚来源的强烈依附，如家庭和部落。妇女是这类问题的试金石：如果她们缠脚裹头，那么除非西方救世主送来巨变，否则那里的社会不会有希望。世俗主义、城市化和市场力量会推动他们前进。
冷战期间，学者忙着充实这种洋洋自得的学说。在历史学家们看来，西方的崛起，并不只是因为近代的野蛮作为，如19世纪的殖民扩张和之前的工业革命，而是应该追溯到其它更值得尊敬的制度和价值观。一些人认为，西方的崛起得益于17世纪的“科学革命”，当时人类制服了宗教权威的审查权，掌握了寻求和表述知识的权利；另一些人则认为，其崛起得益于资本主义银行业的发展，甚至可能是因为几百年前就出现的教会与国家的权力制衡。
这些都反映当时的现实。欧洲统治世界的梦想，虽然本身在血流成河的战争中破灭，但却传给了美国：赞美西方的优势体现了欧美共享的价值观的深度，也与东方的冷战野蛮人形成反差。因此，我们现在不该惊讶于看到，随着美国的军事和经济实力接近顶峰，它正面临来自迅速崛起的印度和中国的挑战，世界格局的扭转正又一次改变我们对过去的理解。美国的一些东亚专家认为，西方的崛起在相当程度上是近期、幸运的事件：就在1800年，中国的国民生产总值很可能仍高于欧洲。在他们看来，理解世界长期发展的关键是太平洋，而非大西洋。在西方政策制定者试图在全球传播其价值观之前，这些学者的发现给了他们一个审慎的理由。因为，如果西方的昌盛只不过是近200年的事，那么它的成功可能更多是出于偶然，其鼓吹者所相信的价值观可能只是次要原因。国家如同证券市场，有起也有伏。
自启蒙运动以来，西方的繁荣昌盛就与东方的死气沉沉形成对比。其起源可追溯到希腊和罗马，而不是埃及或美索不达米亚。在英国人大举进入印度之前，没有人注意到这片土地。因为马可?波罗的关系，中国人得到了发明面条和冰淇淋的功劳（有时还包括纸）。但我们现在知道，在18世纪下半叶前，就人均收入或贸易网络的密度而言，最发达的欧洲地区也无法与成熟的亚洲经济体相提并论。土耳其人、莫卧尔人、俄国人和中国人没有加入欧洲疯狂的探险和殖民运动，不是因为他们没有好奇心，也不是因为他们的弱点，而是因为他们不需要这么做。他们的扩张主要是在陆地上进行，代价高昂的海上探险留给了肆意挥霍、但善于技术创新的欧洲人。换句话说，不是什么了不起的成功，而是迫在眉睫的贫困，逼得欧洲大陆西北海岸外某个资源贫乏、人口拥挤的小岛，走上以煤为基础的劳动密集型产业之路。英国对新技术的信奉，因为其统治者无情的重视而得到鼓励。当更古老的帝国把社会稳定摆在首位时，历届英国政府则侧重于发展军事技术、国家许可的贸易公司和市场化的信贷体系。这些往往会影响到内部稳定，但这在小国不像在大国那样重要。英国的欧洲竞争者们不得不亦步亦趋。
只有在19世纪，欧洲这个被各交战小国扯得四分五裂的地区，才明显跃居欧亚大陆帝国的前面，并把资本主义和殖民主义传播到全世界。随后，它的地位被其“晚辈”美国所取代。今天，自西方崛起仅仅才200年的时间，其结局就已隐约可见。然而，许多西方政策制定者仍认为自己的价值观是人人想要的，仿佛这些价值观不仅是过去西方成功的关键，还是将来每个国家的希望所在。这是一种臆断。假设200年后，来自重新崛起的北京的中国历史学家，指出那些西方价值观是美国在23世纪衰退的原因，我们会说他们错了吗？
那些相信靠输出文化和价值观来推进自身利益的国家注定要失败。它们最好意识到，宗教政治不一定是中世纪的象征；私有化民主也不是普遍适用的万灵药。中国的崛起当然并不预示着美国或欧洲的衰落，但它确实对西方“全球事务文明霸主”的自我形象提出了挑战。在这方面，重振联合国比以往任何时候都重要，因为各种观念正不稳定地跨越着语言和信仰的界限。如果没有促成相互理解的国际论坛，生活不会变得方便。1800年之前的世界具有多极权力和多元化价值观体系。让我们适应这一事实，即世界又开始重现那种格局了。
作者是美国哥伦比亚大学历史学教授，著有《幽灵之城――萨罗尼卡：1430年至1950年的基督徒、穆斯林和犹太人》(Salonica, City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims and Jews 1430-1950)。
