The Euro's 'Soft Underbelly'
For months, the foreign-exchange market has been squarely focused on the huge U.S. trade and budget deficits, the weakening dollar, even the possibility of a dollar crisis. Now some money managers and others are beginning to examine the highflying euro's soft underbelly. What they see isn't very appealing.
Take Bridgewater Associates, a Westport, Conn., institutional bond and currency manager and one of the world's biggest institutional hedge-fund managers with just under $100 billion under management. The firm, whose managers have been longtime dollar bears, now has a short-euro position that's as big as its short position in the dollar.
Among major developed countries, the 12-nation euro zone "has the weakest economy, the lowest interest rates, the strongest currency and among the highest probabilities for significant capital outflow," says Bob Prince , Bridgewater's co-chief investment officer.
Shorting both the dollar and euro, Bridgewater is long the Swiss franc, pound sterling and Swedish krona. "And in particular, we like the yen against the euro," says Mr. Prince. While Bridgewater forecasts the euro to be little changed against the dollar in 12 months, the firm sees the euro roughly 15% lower at about 114 yen. In a little-noticed decline, the euro has already fallen to 135.147 yen from above 141 yen in late December.
Meanwhile, at a two-day shindig last week that Morgan Stanley hosts annually for its clients, "there was a remarkably strong sense that the dollar could surprise on the upside against several European currencies" and that the euro could decline against the yen and other Asian currencies, says Stephen Jen, the firm's global head of currency research. He suspects that this outlook largely reflects investors' reaction to the dollar's new-year's rally that has seen the euro retreat 4.5% against the U.S. currency since Dec. 30 to $1.3081.
Even so, as it was climbing against the euro, the U.S. currency was also falling to multiyear lows against Asian currencies, such as the yen, Thai baht, South Korean won and Indian rupee, notes Paul Mackel, a foreign-exchange strategist at ABN Amro Bank in London. "Hence, this year's dollar recovery can perhaps be better characterized as a euro selloff," said the firm in a report to clients.
"Quite a few investors are asking what factors could take the euro lower," says Mr. Mackel.
One is weak growth. Deutsche Bank, for instance, estimates that euro-area gross domestic product expanded 1.8% in 2004. That compares with 3.2% for the U.K., 2.9% for Japan and 4.5% for the U.S. Largely because of the European common currency's rally against the dollar, yen and other Asian currencies, the euro zone "has remained stagnant in the face of what is otherwise a global expansion," says Mr. Prince.
The poor growth outlook has left Europe with lower nominal short-term interest rates than the U.S., U.K., Canada and Australia. Japan's are lower; but, adjusted for inflation, euro-zone rates are below even Japan's. Mr. Prince says that the low rates, poor growth and new U.S. tax laws that promote the movement of capital to the U.S. from abroad will encourage a flow of investment out of Europe, as "companies seek out more fruitful consumer markets."
"The euro zone looks more like Japan every year -- aging, ossified, incapable of forward-thinking economic reforms," says Donald Straszheim, head of Straszheim Global Advisors, an economic-research firm in Los Angeles.
The sinking-euro thesis doesn't represent a majority opinion. But it's worth bearing in mind at a time when currency-market volatility is expected to be high.
Lawrence Greenberg, chief international economist at Ried Thunberg ICAP, an economic-research company, sees "unfavorable structural factors," such as the large U.S. trade deficit, undermining the dollar and buoying the euro. But, he adds, "This being an inaugural year, it's a good idea not to become overly attached to any single scenario."
欧元的“软肋”
几个月以来，外汇市场把全部注意力都放在了美国的贸易逆差和财政赤字、美元的持续走软乃至爆发危机的可能性上。不过，一些资产管理公司和机构指出，即便欧元现在如日中天，但也存在著软肋。在他们看来，欧元前景不容乐观。
机构债券及外汇管理公司Bridgewater Associates便是其中的一员。这家公司管理著接近1,000亿美元资产，是全球最大的对冲基金机构管理公司之一。该公司一直以来看空美元，但现在其作空欧元的头寸已和美元空头头寸不相上下。
Bridgewater的联席首席投资长鲍勃?普林斯(Bob Prince)表示，在各主要的发达经济体中，由12个成员国组成的欧元区经济增长最为乏力，利率也最低，但汇率却是最强劲的，而且出现大量资金外流的可能性也最大。
在作空美元和欧元的同时，Bridgewater还在作多瑞士法郎、英镑和瑞典克朗。普林斯表示，“我们尤为看好的是日圆兑欧元的前景。”Bridgewater预测在接下来的12个月内，欧元兑美元汇率将大体持平，但欧元兑日圆将下跌约15%，至114日圆附近。在不知不觉中，欧元兑日圆的汇率已经从12月底时的超过141日圆下跌至134.71日圆。
与此同时，摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)在上周举行了为期两天的客户年会。摩根士丹利的首席货币经济师任永力(Stephen Jen)表示，与会人士强烈认为，美元兑几种欧洲货币可能出乎意料地上涨，而欧元兑日圆及其他几种亚洲货币则可能下跌。他认为，这个观点和投资者在看到美元进入新年后强劲反弹后的想法基本一致。伴随著美元的反攻，欧元兑美元跌至1.3074美元，较12月30日下跌了4.5%。
不过，荷兰银行(ABN AMRO Bank)外汇策略师保罗?麦克尔(Paul Mackel)说，与美元兑欧元走高形成对比的是，美元兑日圆、泰铢、韩圆、印度卢比等几种亚洲货币却跌至了数年来的低点。因此，麦克尔认为，今年外汇市场上的重头戏与其说是美元反弹，还不如说是欧元遭到抛售。
麦克尔表示，不少投资者都在询问哪些因素会导致欧元走软。
经济增长乏力便是原因之一。例如，德意志银行(Deutsche Bank)预测欧元区2004年的经济增长率为1.8%，这个增幅与英国的3.2%，日本的2.9%以及美国的4.5%都有差距。普林斯表示，在全球各国经济普遍增长之际，欧元区经济却在裹足不前，欧元兑美元、日圆及其他亚洲货币的上扬是造成这种现象的罪魁祸首。他补充说，欧元的上涨造成欧元区出口在全球市场上的占有率下降。
暗淡的经济增长前景使得欧元区的名义短期利率低于美国、英国、加拿大以及澳大利亚等国。虽然日本的名义短期利率更低，但考虑到通货膨胀因素后，欧元区的实际利率水平其实比日本还要低。普林斯指出，低利率环境，经济增长疲软，以及美国制定了鼓励企业把海外盈利汇回国内的法律，这些都会促使资金撤离欧洲，因为毕竟企业追求的是更大的回报。
洛杉矶顾问公司Straszheim Global Advisers的负责人唐纳德?斯特拉斯汉姆(Donald Straszheim)表示，欧元区经济的状况年复一年地向日本经济靠齐：因循守旧，思想僵化，看不到具有前瞻性的经济改革措施。
不过，欧元下跌还不算是主流意见，至少从目前来看还不是。但在眼下这个时候保持谨慎是有必要的，因为历史经验表明，在美国总统就职的第一年间，外汇市场往往呈现出很大的波动性。
Thunberg ICAP首席国际经济学家劳伦斯?格林伯格(Lawrence Greenberg)认为，美国巨额贸易逆差等结构性负面因素将起到削弱美元、提振欧元走势的作用。但他同时表示，今年是美国总统就职的第一年，不宜把大量的资金都用于押注在某一种情况之上。
(back)Fed Meeting to Pose Question Of Setting Clear Inflation Rate
As Federal Reserve officials prepare to raise interest rates again to keep inflation from rising, they are grappling anew with an old question: Should they aim for a specific inflation number?
On the agenda for next week's two-day meeting of Fed policy makers is a discussion of whether the Fed should set a numerical objective for inflation and, if so, what it should be, according to people familiar with the matter. The Fed ponders such long-term topics twice a year, and no formal decision is likely. Nor is an explicit, public inflation target on the table.
The Fed is required by law to maintain stable prices, but it doesn't quantify that objective as a specific inflation rate. Doing so needn't be the same as setting an explicit target, which implies a duty to adjust interest rates when inflation goes above or below the specified range. Still, if Fed officials can ultimately agree on a number -- a big if -- it would be an important change from its generally successful practice of letting investors infer from its actions what constitutes acceptable inflation.
Many central banks have committed to meeting an explicit target for inflation, believing a target makes them more transparent, credible and accountable. But the Fed is unlikely to join them under Chairman Alan Greenspan, who thinks a target limits his discretion to respond to differing risks as he sees fit.
The issue probably won't affect near-term monetary policy. Mr. Greenspan has defined price stability as a zone where inflation no longer materially affects companies' or individuals' decisions. At 1.5% by the Fed's preferred measure, inflation is now "roughly consistent with a working definition of price stability," Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland President Sandra Pianalto said last week, expressing a view shared by most of her colleagues on the 19-member Federal Open Market Committee, the central bank's policy panel. The Fed wants to keep inflation in that zone, by raising its target for the federal funds rate, now 2.25%, until it no longer stimulates spending and thus poses a long-term risk of inflation.
But the issue may become more pressing if inflation drifts higher this year, and investors start to wonder how much, if at all, the Fed will raises interest rates in response.
Mickey Levy, chief economist at Bank of America, notes that in May 2003, the Fed declared that any further fall in inflation -- then running at a little over 1% -- would be "unwelcome," in effect announcing a floor for inflation. The Fed's fear was that further declines would raise the risk of deflation, or falling prices. "While they have revealed through action and statement their lower bound [for inflation] they have not had the opportunity or been forced to reveal their upper bound."
An informal survey by The Wall Street Journal found some uncertainty over the Fed's tolerance for inflation. Six of eight firms that closely watch the Fed believe it has an implicit inflation target range. Four -- Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, Macroeconomic Advisers and Morgan Stanley -- say it is 1% to 2%, as measured by the price index of personal consumption excluding food and energy. (The Fed believes that index measures the cost of living more accurately than the better-known consumer-price index.) A fifth, ISI group, says it is 1.5% to 2.5%. Merrill Lynch says 1.5% to 2%, and J.P. Morgan Chase and Lehman Brothers say there isn't any implicit target.
FOMC members who have advocated a numerical objective or target have offered varying ranges. Governor Ben Bernanke has said 1% to 2%. Governor Edward Gramlich has suggested 1% to 2.5%. Philadelphia Fed President Anthony Santomero last October proposed 1% to 3%, and St. Louis Fed President William Poole advocates a target of zero, with some allowance for errors in measurement.
Advocates believe a target would enable investors to better predict how the Fed will respond to changing economic circumstances and solidify its commitment to price stability under Mr. Greenspan's successor next year.
But opponents, who include governors Roger Ferguson and Donald Kohn, fret that targets would confer an obligation to change interest rates whenever inflation deviated from the target, even if unemployment or financial stability called for different actions.
An inflation "objective" might be a compromise between an explicit target and no number. Mr. Gramlich said in a speech in 2003 that the Fed could simply state its preferred long-run range for inflation: "The FOMC would not have to defend any deviations from the preferred range."
History suggests Mr. Greenspan would resist even that step. When the FOMC last formally addressed the issue in July 1996, it reached a near consensus that 2% was the right goal. Mr. Greenspan then, according to a transcript, warned his colleagues, "If the 2% inflation figure gets out of this room, it is going to create more problems for us than I think any of you might anticipate."
Fed本月会议将讨论是否设定通胀目标
就在美国联邦储备委员会(Federal Reserve, 简称Fed)的官员们准备为防止通货膨胀上升而再次加息之际，他们再次为一个老问题纠缠，那就是是否应该制定一个具体的通货膨胀控制目标呢？
下周，为期两天的Fed月度政策会议即将召开。据消息人士透露，届时会议的议题之一就是讨论是否应该为控制通货膨胀制定一个目标；如果要制定，那么目标值应该是多少。Fed每年都会讨论两次这样的长期性话题，这次可能不会作出正式决定。最后也不大可能有公开具体的目标摆到桌面上。
保持物价稳定是Fed的法定职责之一，但Fed从未制定量化的通货膨胀率目标。虽然制定明确的通胀目标并不意味著一旦通货膨胀率高于或低于这个目标Fed就有义务调整利率，不过，如果Fed成员能就具体指标达成一致（这在很大程度上也只是一种可能），那么，到目前为止它所成功做到的让投资者自己从它的行动中揣测什么是它所能接受的通胀水平的局面将发生重大变化。
许多国家的央行都制定了具体的通货膨胀目标，并致力于实现目标要求，他们认为，一个具体目标会让央行的工作更透明、更可信和可靠。但在格林斯潘(Alan Greenspan)统治下的Fed是不会苟同他们的，这位Fed主席认为，具体目标会限制他在看到各种风险时作出回应的裁量空间。
这个问题可能不会影响近期的货币政策。格林斯潘对物价稳定的定义是物价水平不对企业和个人的消费决定构成实质性影响。克利夫兰联邦储银行行长皮阿纳托(Sandra Pianalto)上周表示，目前，Fed最偏爱的通货膨胀指标处于1.5%的水平，与它对物价稳定定义的水平大体一致。她的观点也代表了她在Fed 19人决策小组──联邦公开市场委员会(Federal Open Market Committee)中大多数同仁的看法。
Fed希望通过上调联邦基金利率将通货膨胀维持在那样的一个区间，直到利率水平不再有刺激支出的效果并且可能带来长期通货膨胀风险的时候。
但如果通货膨胀今年进一步走高，那么这个问题会变得比较紧迫，而投资者也开始猜测，如果Fed相应地继续上调利率，那它会上调到什么程度。
美国银行(Bank of America)首席经济学家莱维(Mickey Levy)在2003年5月指出，Fed曾宣称通货膨胀率（当时仅略高于1%）如果继续下跌将是人们“不愿看到的”，这实际上透露了Fed对通货膨胀的心理底线。Fed担心的是如果继续下降，将带来通货紧缩风险。莱维说，虽然Fed在行动或言辞中暴露了他们能忍受的通货膨胀下限，但他们一直没有机会或没有被迫使过向市场“透露”他们的上限。
据《华尔街日报》所作的非正式调查显示，Fed对通货膨胀的忍耐限度不太容易确定。在8家对Fed政策动向有所研究的被访机构中，有6家机构认为，Fed自己对通胀目标有一个默认的范围。这其中，有高盛(Goldman Sachs)、美国银行(Bank of America)、Macroeconomic Advisers和摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)等4家机构认为，这个范围以核心消费价格指数衡量是在1%-2%。（Fed认为，不含食品和能源价格的核心消费价格指数比总体消费价格指数更能反映生活费用水平。）其余两家中，ISI group估计的区间是1.5%-2.5%，美林(Merrill Lynch)预计是1.5%-2%。接受调查的摩根大通(J.P. Morgan Chase)和雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)认为不存在这样的内部控制目标。
赞成制定具体目标的公开市场委员会成员提出的建议区间也都不同，伯南克(Ben Bernanke)提出设在1%-2%，格拉姆里奇(Edward Gramlich)建议设在1%-2.5%。费城联邦储备银行行长桑托马洛(Anthony Santomero)去年10月建议设在1%-3%，而圣路易斯联储行行长波尔(William Poole)将目标设为零，同时允许一定的上下浮动。
支持设定目标的人士认为，这样能让投资者更好地预测Fed对经济形势的变化会作何反应，并且，也有助于在格林斯潘明年卸任交班后，新的Fed班子仍能加强在稳定物价方面的职能。
但Fed理事弗格森(Roger Ferguson)和柯恩(Donald Kohn)等反对者则认为，制定目标后，一旦通胀水平较目标有所偏离，Fed就将被迫调整利率，而根据就业状况或金融稳定状况有时或许不需要调整，这样就会产生矛盾。
为在特别具体的目标和没有任何目标的两个极端中作一妥协，或许Fed可以制定一个松散的目标区。格拉姆里奇在2003年的一次讲话中说，Fed可以只发布一个比较偏向的长期通胀控制区间。他说，公开市场委员会无需对偏离控制区间的任何情况都采取行动。
不过从以往的经验看，即使是这样的建议格林斯潘恐怕也不会采纳。1996年7月，当公开市场委员会终于决定正式解决这个问题时，委员们就设定2%的目标值已基本达成一致。但据档案记载，当时格林斯潘警告他的同仁们说，如果2%这个数字从这间屋子里捅出去，那它带来的麻烦我想将超过在座任何一位的想像。
