For GM and Fiat, A Messy Breakup Could Be in Works
Nearly five years into a partnership they once touted as made in heaven, General Motors Corp. and Fiat SpA are in tense talks about a possible breakup that could further batter their finances and reverberate across the auto industry.
Despite months of negotiations, the two sides remain miles apart on the major sticking point: a "put" option that could force GM to buy the 90% of Fiat's ailing, debt-laden auto unit that GM doesn't already own. Fiat's chief executive, Sergio Marchionne, has stated repeatedly that he has the right to exercise the put beginning today, when a so-far unsuccessful mediation process expires. GM CEO Richard Wagoner Jr. insists the option is invalid.
On Monday, Fiat said the mediation period has been extended to Feb. 1. After that, the Italian company said it will have the option to exercise its put.
The negotiations are coming to a head as GM, which paid $2.4 billion for a since-diluted 20% stake in Fiat's car unit in 2000, faces a possible cut in its credit rating. In its core market of North America, GM has been losing market share and been forced to cut production amid increased competition from Asian rivals such as Toyota Motor Corp. and Nissan Motor Co. If GM is forced to pay a hefty settlement to wriggle out of the put option -- or worse, has to acquire the Italian auto maker and its $10 billion in debt -- it could weigh heavily on an already burdened balance sheet.
The situation is even more dire for Fiat, an Italian industrial icon that also owns businesses such as Iveco trucks, CNH farm equipment and Ferrari sports cars. Fiat Auto's operating losses for 2004 are expected to total around $1.3 billion. With Fiat Auto burning through cash rapidly, the put option has emerged as a potential lifesaver for Mr. Marchionne, a turnaround specialist who arrived at the Italian auto maker in June following a management shakeup. He has made resolving the issue his top priority and forced GM into a tense set of negotiations.
People close to Mr. Marchionne say he hopes to force GM to pay handsomely to get out of the obligation, thus buying Fiat some time. But the price would have to be high -- in excess of nearly $2 billion -- to provide the car unit the 18 months of extra cash needed to tide it over as it tries to bring important new models to the marketplace. Even then, industry analysts say its ultimate survival is uncertain.
Fiat Auto is running on fumes. In a rapidly consolidating industry of global giants, it is caught in a trap of high fixed costs and shrinking market share. In a document presented to one of Fiat's creditor banks earlier this month and viewed by The Wall Street Journal, Fiat SpA reports that without a payment from GM, the conglomerate's current cash and cash equivalents will last only between 13 months and 20 months. But while Fiat needs a quick resolution, GM stands to benefit by postponing the matter further.
According to a person close to the negotiations, a speedy resolution is unlikely. "Each side is changing its mind almost every day. Everything is possible," said the person.
The showdown over the hobbled Italian auto maker comes as the global auto industry is grappling with vast overcapacity. Auto companies have the ability to make an estimated 24 million more cars than they can sell each year. The glut is prompting price wars that are dragging down profits.
But governments and industry players themselves have largely shied away from the brutal plant closings needed to stabilize the market. The big players' strategy of forming alliances with small and often weak manufacturers has contributed to the glut in recent years, with Ford Motor Co. pumping money into Japan's Mazda Motor Co. and GM acquiring Daewoo and investing in Fiat Auto. Just last week, some of Japan's biggest companies were preparing a $3 billion bailout of Mitsubishi Motors Corp. in order to prop up the ailing auto maker and protect jobs.
Mr. Wagoner, the GM CEO, has been a leading proponent of alliances. GM reasoned that partnerships could yield cost savings by achieving economies of scale without the hassles of a full merger. But the Fiat deal, which included the Italian company taking a 5.1% stake in GM, has sorely tested the logic of that strategy.
When Mr. Wagoner negotiated the Fiat tie-up he also agreed to another clause -- the put. The agreement, which is valid between 2005 and 2010, gives Fiat the right to force GM to buy out all of the Italian company's car unit at a price to be negotiated. Fiat had insisted on including the put option as an insurance policy should its alliance with GM go awry, something which neither company considered likely.
Now, five consecutive years of losses in Europe are forcing GM to hack at its overcapacity. It is shedding roughly 12,000 jobs, mostly in Germany. In the U.S., GM is closing plants in Maryland and New Jersey.
Rivals would benefit greatly if weaklings such as Fiat Auto -- whose capacity of around 2.3 million cars a year outstrips its annual sales by more than 400,000 vehicles -- went out of business. But shutting Fiat Auto would spark a political firestorm in Italy, where the company remains a linchpin of the industrial base and its controlling shareholders, the illustrious Agnelli family, enjoy a status close to royalty.
Thus executing a clean divorce between GM and Fiat won't be easy or quick. Even as the two car makers gird for a possible courtroom battle over how to separate, their industrial operations in Europe have grown increasingly entangled.
As part of the 2000 agreement, GM and Fiat formed two joint ventures in Europe and Latin America, the two markets in which they were both players. One venture pooled purchasing operations to save money. Another, called Fiat-GM Powertrain BV, developed engines and transmissions. Though both ventures got off to a rough start, they are now yielding significant economies. The companies estimate the accumulated savings will total about $2.6 billion this year.
Neither company can afford to bear the increased costs that would come with dissolving them. At the same time, however, the protracted negotiations and the uncertainty of the alliance are threatening the health of the joint ventures. One senior executive who has worked at the Powertrain venture says the mood there is "like a mortuary." Major decisions have been frozen for six months because neither side is willing to invest in a product as long as the two are threatening to sue each other. The venture, says the executive, is "hostage" to the put negotiations. Keeping the ventures alive amid a prolonged legal battle between the parents -- or after a breakup -- would be exceedingly difficult, analysts and some executives say.
With so much at stake, the two companies have moved onto war footing. GM has enlisted an armada of investment bankers and lawyers to argue its case: that financial moves by Fiat have rendered the put option invalid, including the sale of a chunk of Fiat Auto's financing arm. Mr. Marchionne, by contrast, is conducting negotiations with little help from the outside. A lawyer by training, he has argued repeatedly that he believes GM's claims are groundless.
In a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission in the U.S. last year, GM indicated that if it were forced to take over Fiat Auto it would be reluctant to contribute any additional capital to the Italian company. GM also indicated that if Fiat Auto was insolvent at the time of acquisition, GM wouldn't have to assume the Italian unit's debt. Without fresh funds, Fiat Auto could quickly turn insolvent, possibly leading to massive factory closings and the loss of tens of thousands of jobs in Italy. The threat of such action, say industry analysts, could prompt Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi to intervene with a government bailout package. Ministers in Mr. Berlusconi's government insist that no state aid will be forthcoming. GM also indicates that if Fiat Auto is insolvent, GM wouldn't have to take on the Italian car maker's billions in debt.
Last week, GM wrote down its remaining stake in Fiat Auto to zero. That step, part of several pretax charges GM took during the week, put the Detroit company on stronger ground as it tries to prove that Fiat Auto is worthless.
According to a person close to the negotiations, GM is trying to argue that Fiat Auto has a negative value. Fiat SpA, the parent company, has an overall market cap of about $7.5 billion. The Fiat Auto unit alone carries debt on its books totaling about $10 billion. This person argues that if Fiat tries to exercise the put option, the Italians may have to compensate GM. The original deal between the companies stipulates that advisers to each side must propose a value for Fiat Auto before the put is exercised.
"The issue is: What is the value of Fiat Auto?" this person adds.
Fiat rose to prominence in the '50s and '60s, when it could claim dominance of the Italian market. Its owners, the Agnellis, were powerful and fashionable figures, hobnobbing with the likes of the Kennedys. As the market liberalized in the 1990s, Fiat's clunky sales network and laggard technology left it unprepared to handle the flood of competition. When GM and Fiat linked up in the boom year of 2000, neither believed things would ever get so ugly.
But the alliance was fraught with fissures. Shortly after the deal was announced, in March 2000, Gianni Agnelli, longtime patriarch of the Agnelli clan, revealed that he had turned down an $11 billion offer to sell the entire car unit to DaimlerChrysler. Selling only 20% to GM, he thought, would allow him to retain control of the business his grandfather had founded in Turin more than a century earlier -- saving the family honor and the Italian character of Fiat.
Other members of the family, including Mr. Agnelli's younger brother, Umberto, disagreed. They no longer felt duty bound to keep Fiat in Italian hands -- especially if doing so risked the family's own fortune. They also faced the serious prospect that Fiat Auto would be unable to achieve the scale and financing to survive in the global auto industry.
Still, both companies acted as if they had just sealed a love match. GM held a lavish event that June at Palazzo Arzaga, a 15th-century monastery in northern Italy converted into a modern-day resort, to outline its global strategy for analysts and journalists. Fiat's then-chairman, Paolo Fresco, landed in a helicopter to join Mr. Wagoner and other GM brass to extol the partnership. Senior GM executives had driven Ferraris around Fiat's test track several days earlier. The put option, Fiat executives emphasized, was merely an insurance policy, something Fiat never expected to use.
But inside Fiat's Turin headquarters, "the crisis was evident," says Mario Rosso, a former Fiat executive who headed human resources and ran the government liaison office in Rome. The company was hobbled by slow product rollouts, high costs and slow decision-making, he says, "but these issues hadn't fully expressed themselves on the books yet."
Moreover, General Motors never grasped the complexity of Fiat Auto, and the tactics it used to prop up sales in its most important market of Italy, according to Mr. Rosso. Fiat Auto relied on the government to offer frequent tax breaks for trading in used cars for new ones. This helped pump up sales, but foreign competitors were barreling into Italy with cheaper cars and stronger sales networks. And the Italian government no longer doled out favors the way it once had.
GM "did a classic financial due diligence, when in reality, the situation was much more complicated, and required understanding the strategic, political and social situation of the company," says Mr. Rosso.
Nor did GM fully understand how provincial Fiat's corporate culture was. In the late 1990s, 80% of Fiat's top management came from the Piedmont region in Italy's northwest. At board meetings top managers would sometimes speak in the local dialect, recalls Mr. Rosso.
GM declined to comment on the diligence it conducted before the deal.
Meanwhile, disastrous decisions began to haunt Fiat Auto. Gianni Agnelli, who died in 2003, had been smitten with creating a "world car" -- a single model to sell around the world. So, Fiat poured money into expanding global production. It vowed that its world car, the Palio, would sell one million vehicles a year; it is only now reaching 400,000 vehicles a year. In 2001, Fiat bet heavily on one model -- the Stilo -- to boost margins. Consumers found the car too bulky and loaded with gadgets they didn't want to pay for. It flopped.
By the end of 2002, Fiat Auto was out of gas and sucking cash from the group's truck and tractor units. Desperate, the group put many of the unit's best assets up for sale. It also sold off its stake in GM to raise cash. The government, worried about the social repercussions should Fiat go bankrupt, lined up banks to extend the group nearly $4 billion in new loans, convertible into equity. After some hesitation, the Agnellis agreed to crack open the family treasure chest and kick in about $325 million for a recapitalization.
GM, asked to pitch in, stayed out, and its 20% stake in Fiat Auto was diluted to 10%.
As Fiat Auto skidded, the put option swelled in importance. Fiat's calculation: With the put, it could force GM to pay up to free itself from the obligation to buy the Italian auto unit. Fiat struck up negotiations with GM about how to cancel the put option for cash.
But negotiations went nowhere because of disarray in Fiat's senior ranks. The company's worsening finances prompted the Agnellis to run through five CEOs in less than two years. The chairmen changed as well, as Umberto Agnelli took over from Mr. Fresco and then died a little more than a year later.
The music changed abruptly when Mr. Marchionne arrived. An Italian who grew up in Canada, he was an outsider to the insular world of Fiat. He was also a hard negotiator who felt no bond to Fiat's storied automotive unit. He quickly seized on the put option as the best solution for tackling the auto unit. Alexis Boyer , Paris-based auto analyst at Deutsche Bank, says when he met with Mr. Marchionne last fall, the Fiat chief didn't even try to argue that the company's auto unit could be fixed.
"We didn't think he was the kind of guy who was interested in fixing a company that's beyond repair," says Mr. Boyer. "He only perked up when we talked about the put."
Asked about Mr. Marchionne's strategy, Fiat insists that it is executing a turnaround plan that includes rolling out new models, cutting costs and streamlining its decision making. Mr. Marchionne declined to be interviewed for this article.
梦幻佳偶美梦难再续通用菲亚特分手在即
通用汽车(General Motors Corp.)和菲亚特公司(Fiat SpA)曾将双方的联姻誉为天作之合，然而在携手走过将近5个年头后，这对佳偶眼下却面临彻底诀别的命运。双方正在就此进行剑拔弩张的谈判，一旦分手成为定局，不但两家公司的财务状况会因此进一步恶化，整个汽车行业都会由此产生强烈反响。
尽管谈判已经持续数月，但双方在关键问题上的立场依然存在极大的分歧，而这个最关键的问题就是一项卖出期权的有效性。如果期权有效，则通用将被迫买下菲亚特旗下债务缠身的汽车子公司另外90%的股权。菲亚特首席执行长马其奥尼(Sergio Marchionne)反复强调，从今天开始他就有权行使这项期权，而通用首席执行长瓦格纳(Richard Wagoner Jr.)则矢口否认这项期权的有效性。今天是调解程序的终止日，而迄今为止，调解显见未能取得任何成效。
随著通用面临信用评级被下调的威胁，谈判也到了紧要关头。面对诸如丰田(Toyota Motor Corp.)和日产汽车(Nissan Motor Co.)等亚洲竞争对手日益激烈的竞争，通用在北美核心市场的市场占有率正在日渐遭受侵蚀，公司也被迫不断削减产量。此番如果被迫为逃避期权责任而支付数额可观的和解费，或者更有甚者乾脆接受期权买下这家意大利汽车制造商同时一并接过其高达100亿美元的巨额债务，那么通用公司本已沉重的财务负担必将进一步加码。
对于菲亚特而言，眼下的情形更是进退维谷。作为意大利工业的杰出代表，这家集团公司同时还拥有依维柯(Iveco)卡车、CNH农用设备和法拉力(Ferrari)跑车等诸多其他业务。汽车子公司2004年全年的运营亏损预计会高达13亿美元。面临现金日渐枯竭的尴尬局面，这份期权无疑便成了公司首席执行长马其奥尼的一棵救命稻草。作为一位扭转企业亏损局面的行家里手，去年6月在菲亚特管理层调整时临危受命的马其奥尼已经将解决期权问题列为他的首要大事。正是他将通用拖进了这场争斗激烈的谈判。
据接近马其奥尼的人士透露，马其奥尼希望通用能支付一笔数额可观的费用来解除自身的期权义务，从而为菲亚特争取一些扭转局面所需要的时间。但是这笔费用必须有足够的规模──须超过20亿美元──方能满足菲亚特18个月的额外之需，供其推出计划中的重要新款车型。而据行业分析师所言，即便如此，菲亚特最终能否生存依然还是未知数。
菲亚特如今已经到了油尽灯枯的境地。面对全球行业巨头不断整合的现状，菲亚特深陷于固定成本居高不下、市场占有率日渐萎缩的泥沼。据《华尔街日报》(The Wall Street Journal)看到的菲亚特本月初提交给债权银行的一份文件，该公司现有现金和现金等价物只够再维持13到20个月。从这一点看，菲亚特无疑希望期权问题能够尽快解决，可从通用公司的角度看，此事当是能拖则拖方对它有利。
据一位了解谈判进展的人士透露，这件事不大可能很快解决。他说：“各方的主意几乎每天都在变。什么事都有可能发生。”
当前全球汽车行业深陷产能极度过剩的困境。该行业现有年度产能据估计比年销售量多出2,400万辆。产能和销售量之间如此巨大的反差势必要引发价格大战，进而使汽车行业的利润急剧下降。
然而政府和业内企业自身大多想方设法避开了为稳定市场而必须采取的关闭工厂的残酷行动。近年来大企业所施行的与势单力薄的小公司结盟的战略，如福特(Ford Motor Co.)注资马自达(Mazda Motor Co.)，通用收购大宇(Daewoo)、入股菲亚特等，是造成全球汽车行业产能和销售量之间巨大反差的主要根源。就在上周，日本几家最大的公司还在准备投入30亿美元去拯救在困境中挣扎的三菱汽车(Mitsubishi Motors Corp.)，目的之一是要避免众多业内工人遭遇失业厄运。
通用首席执行长瓦格纳一直是结盟战略的主要支持者。通用公司在解释结盟的好处时说，这种形式的合伙关系既可避免全面合并所面临的种种麻烦，同时又可通过实现规模经济而达到成本节约的目标。然而其2000年收购菲亚特部分股权同时又让菲亚特持有5.1%通用股份的交易却使人们对这种战略的合理性产生了严重质疑。
当时瓦格纳与菲亚特商谈互持股份的结盟事宜时同时也接受了另外一项交易条款，那就是上文说到的期权。根据这份有效期为2005年至2010年的期权协议，菲亚特有权迫使通用以一个可协商的价格买下其汽车子公司所有的剩余股份。当时菲亚特坚持要将期权协议纳入保险范围以防双方联盟关系有朝一日出现裂痕，不过双方当时皆认为没有出现这种情况的可能。
如今，继在欧洲市场遭遇连续5年的亏损之后，通用迫于无奈要缩减过剩的产能。它已计划裁员12,000人（主要在德国），同时还打算关闭其在本土马里兰州和新泽西州的工厂。
如果像菲亚特汽车这样相对较弱的公司能够退出汽车市场，那么业内其他公司自然会受益匪浅（菲亚特汽车年产能230万辆，比其年销售量多出40多万辆）。但是另一方面，菲亚特汽车一旦关门大吉则将在意大利引发政治风暴。菲亚特如今依然是意大利工业的支柱，而该集团的控股股东阿涅利(Agnelli)家族在该国所享有的地位几乎不亚于当年的王室。
这样看来，通用和菲亚特要想痛痛快快地分手怕是没那么容易，也非一时之间可以实现。即便双方最终诉诸法庭解决纷争，两家公司在欧洲的业务之间千丝万缕的复杂关系也绝难理得清楚。
根据2000年签订的协议，通用和菲亚特在欧洲和拉丁美洲这两个双方均有业务的市场组建了两家合资企业。一家企整合了双方的采购业务以节约资金。另一家命名为Fiat-GM Powertrain BV的合资企业负责研制发动机和变速器。尽管两家合资企业的开局都不太顺利，但如今都产生了巨大的规模效益。据估计，两家合资企业今年可节省约26亿美元的成本。
一旦通用和菲亚特决定分道扬镳，那么这两家公司谁都经受不起随之带来的成本上升。此外，谈判的旷日持久以及合作前景的扑朔迷离都会危及到两家合资企业的健康发展。据一位在Powertrain工作的高层管理人士说，“公司现在的气氛就像是“太平间”一样。”由于均威胁要将对方告上法庭，双方都不愿为产品研发投入资金，因此这家合资企业已经有整整6个月的时间没有做出重大决定了。这位管理人士称，Powertrain的命运现在完全要视双方谈判的结果而定。分析师和一些管理人士表示，不论是通用和菲亚特陷入旷日持久的法律纠纷，抑或分道扬镳，两家合资企业都难以存活。
由于牵扯到双方巨大的利益，通用和菲亚特都在进行战前准备。通用聘请大批投资银行家和律师大造声势：称菲亚特种种财务行为已经导致卖出选择权失效，如菲亚特已将Fiat Auto旗下融资子公司的大部分业务出售。而马基奥尼领导下的菲亚特却几乎没有依赖任何外界帮助。正在自学成才的律师──马基奥尼反复表示，通用的指责根本站不住脚。
根据去年提交给美国证券交易委员会(Securities and Exchange Commission)的文件，通用曾表示，一旦被逼无奈收购Fiat Auto，它不会为这家意大利公司注入新的资金。通用还表示，如果在收购时Fiat Auto资不抵债，那么通用不会承担Fiat Auto的债务。如果得不到资金援助，Fiat Auto可能很快就会走向破产，然后就是大量工厂关闭，上万名意大利员工失业。业内分析师认为，这一前景会促使意大利总理西尔维奥?贝卢斯科尼(Silvio Berlusconi)出面干预，动用政府财力拯救Fiat Auto。但意大利内阁的多位部长表示，政府不会向Fiat Auto注资。
上周，通用把对Fiat Auto的投资冲减完毕，加上当周冲减的其他几笔税前支出，通用在证明Fiat Auto已经一钱不值时就会变得更加底气十足。
据一位熟悉谈判内情的人士透露，通用正在竭力辩称Fiat Auto已经资不抵债。母公司菲亚特公司现在的市值为75亿美元，而仅Fiat Auto一家子公司的账面债务就高达100亿美元左右。这位知情人士认为，如果菲亚特坚持执行卖出期权，那它可能不得不给通用一定的补偿。两家公司在签订协议时规定，在执行卖出期权之前，双方的顾问必须评估Fiat Auto的价值。
他还说，“问题是Fiat Auto价值几何？”
上世纪50年代和60年代，菲亚特如日中天，在意大利汽车市场上占据著霸主地位。控股人阿涅利家族则是风云一时的权势和时尚代表，随之成为驰骋商界的风云人物，与肯尼迪家族来往密切。但90年代意大利汽车市场开放之后，缺乏变通的销售网络以及落后的生产工艺使菲亚特在咄咄逼人的竞争势头前节节败退。通用和菲亚特在2000年汽车行业繁荣兴旺之时签订了合作协议，当时谁也不曾料想会落到如此境地。
这项合作在启动之初就充满了各种不和谐的声音。2000年3月双方达成协议不久，阿涅利家族的掌门人吉安尼?阿涅利(Gianni Agnelli)就透露说，他当初拒绝了戴姆勒-克莱斯勒(DaimlerChrysler)110亿美元全盘收购的出价，而是选择把20%的股份出售给通用汽车，目的就是保留控制权，将他的爷爷在一个世纪前在都灵打下的基业保留下来，以此捍卫家族的荣誉以及菲亚特的意大利血统。
他弟弟温贝尔多(Umberto)等其他家族成员纷纷反对。他们认为没必要再抱残守缺地让菲亚特这个品牌保持纯正的意大利特色，特别是这样做会让整个家族的财富都悬于一线。他们还担心Fiat Auto的生存前景，因为该公司难以具备全球汽车行业赖以生存的两个重要条件──规模和融资。
不过，两家公司当时表现得就像结束了一场爱情长跑，终于可以步入结婚礼堂的样子。当年6月，通用在意大利北部始建于十五世纪的Palazzo Arzaga修道院举行盛大庆典，向分析师和记者阐述其全球化战略。菲亚特时任董事长保罗?弗雷斯科(Paolo Fresco)乘直升飞机赶来同瓦格纳等通用高级管理人士共同庆祝。几天前，通用汽车的高级管理人员曾在菲亚特的测试跑道上试驾了法拉力跑车。菲亚特管理人员强调，卖出期权只相当于一份保单，菲亚特永远也用不上。
但在菲亚特的都灵总部，前菲亚特负责人力资源及驻罗马政府联络办公室的马里奥?罗索(Mario Rosso)表示，“危机显而易见。”他说，公司受到新产品推出缓慢、成本居高不下以及决策过程冗长的困扰，但这些问题尚未反映到财务数据上。
罗索还认为，通用从未真正认识到Fiat Auto的复杂性，也没有真正掌握在意大利大多数主要市场应采取的促销策略。Fiat Auto依靠政府频繁为二手车更换新车提供税收优惠来提高销量，但外国竞争对手正在以更廉价的汽车和更强大的销售网络竞相进入意大利。意大利政府也不再倾向于采用这种方法。
罗索称，通用汽车只进行了通常的财务尽职调查，而实际情况则要复杂得多，需要了解公司的战略、政治和社会状况。
通用汽车也没有完全了解菲亚特企业文化的地方特色。90年代后期，菲亚特还有高达80%的高级管理人士自意大利东北部的皮德蒙特地区。罗索回忆到，在董事会上，高级管理人员有时会讲本地方言。
通用汽车拒绝对交易前的尽职调查予以置评。
与此同时，灾难性的决策开始重创Fiat Auto。2003年去世的吉安尼?阿涅利(Gianni Agnelli)疑迷于推出“世界级轿车”，即在全球销售同一种款式的轿车的计划。因此，菲亚特开始大举投资，扩大在全球各地的产量。公司宣称，其世界级轿车派力奥(Palio)的年销量将达到100万辆，但现在仅达到了每年40万辆。2001年，菲亚特投入巨资推出了Stilo，希望提高利润率。但消费者认为这款车体积过大，充斥著各种他们不愿购买的新潮配置。Stilo项目也以失败告终。
到2002年年底前，Fiat Auto难以为继，开始消耗菲亚特集团旗下卡车及拖拉机子公司的现金。绝望之中，菲亚特集团准备出售该子公司旗下许多最优良的资产。公司还出售了所持通用汽车的股份，以获得现金。政府对菲亚特破产可能产生的社会冲击感到担忧，组织银行给菲亚特集团增加了近40亿美元可转换为股票的新贷款。在几经犹豫后，阿涅利家族同意动用约3.25亿美元的家庭财富调整公司的资本结构。
通用汽车也被要求援手拯救，但决定保持观望。其持有的Fiat Auto股份已经从20%稀释为10%。
Fiat Auto的状况日益艰难，卖出期权的重要性就日益彰显。菲亚特的如意算盘是：凭藉这项期权要求通用支付现金，以免除收购Fiat Auto的义务。于是，菲亚特开始与通用协商如何通过现金中止这一卖出期权。
但菲亚特高层一片混乱，谈判没有取得进展。该公司不断恶化的财务状况导致阿涅利家族在不到两年的时间里更换了五位首席执行长；董事长也相继更迭，温贝尔多?阿涅利(Umberto Agnelli)接替了弗雷斯科，但一年多后就去世了。
马其奥尼上任后，形势陡然转变。作为在加拿大长大的意大利人，他对菲亚特封闭的世界而言是一位外来者。他是一个强硬的谈判对手，立刻把卖出期权视为振兴这家汽车子公司的最好解决方案。德意志银行(Deutsche Bank)驻巴黎的汽车分析师亚历克西?博耶尔(Alexis Boyer)说，去年秋季他会晤马其奥尼时，马其奥尼甚至没有争辩说这家汽车子公司有望振兴。
博耶尔说：“我们觉得，如果一家公司已经没有重组振兴的希望，马其奥尼根本不会有兴趣著手振兴。只有谈到卖出期权时，他才表现出兴趣。”
在问及马其奥尼的战略时，菲亚特坚称，公司正在执行一项复苏计划，包括推出新款汽车、削减成本和精简决策过程。马其奥尼拒绝就本文接受采访。
