Asian Rivals Put Pressure On Western Energy Giants
Major Western oil companies, already feeling squeezed as easy-to-exploit oil and natural-gas fields become scarcer, have brash new rivals to contend with in Asia.
As a flurry of proposed and completed deals attest, energy companies in India and China want bigger slices of the global oil patch. They're aided by the political and financial might of their government backers and spurred by the need to keep their billion-person economies racing ahead and to ease their dependence on oil and gas imports.
The companies have other advantages. They don't shy from oil-rich countries like Sudan deemed too dangerous or politically unsavory in the West. They settle for less-favorable commercial terms that scare away Western competitors cowed by demanding shareholders. And they're more prepared to risk losses drilling holes that come up dry.
On Friday, India signed a 25-year agreement to import liquefied natural gas from state-owned National Iranian Gas Export Corp. starting in 2009. It also agreed to develop three oil fields in Iran, the second-largest exporter after Saudi Arabia in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
China and Canada could be ready this month to sign a general agreement on Chinese investment in Canadian oil resources, including so-called oil sands in the province of Alberta, although details are still sketchy.
India's state-owned Oil & Natural Gas Corp. said it had its eye on a stake in Yuganskneftegaz, the key oil-production unit of troubled Russian oil giant OAO Yukos. Yugansk, as it is known, produces 1% of world crude output. Just a few weeks ago, Russia said it would offer a minority stake in the same asset to China. There has been no official Russian comment on either deal.
And in the most eye-catching evidence so far of these global ambitions, China's third-largest oil-and-natural-gas company, China National Offshore Oil Corp., may be interested in buying Unocal Corp., the ninth-largest U.S. oil company in terms of reserves. Investment bankers in Hong Kong confirmed the Chinese company's interest. (See related article.)
"Over the next 10 years, Chinese and Indian oil companies will emerge as major players in the global oil industry," says Daniel Yergin, oil historian and chairman of Cambridge Energy Research Associates in Cambridge, Mass. "It reflects the reality of economic growth and the scope of China and India in the world oil market."
A key reason the Chinese and Indian oil companies have a chance to challenge the U.S. and European giants is that the Western majors are losing their stomach for risk. Investors in the majors insist on high returns on any drilling or exploration project into which the companies pour their dollars, a practice the industry dubs "capital discipline."
The obsession with returns derives from the 1990s, when the high-technology sector sucked in capital and the oil industry was seen headed the way of steel and coal, mature industries faced with low prices and dim financial prospects. The oil-price crash of 1997-1998 reinforced this view, and the more successful oil companies gobbled up weaker ones.
"At the end of the day, [Chinese and Indian companies] don't have shareholders," says Rick Mueller , an analyst at Energy Security Analysis Inc., a Wakefield, Mass., consulting company.
There isn't a Chinese Exxon Mobil Corp. on the horizon. Indian and Chinese companies lack the technology and know-how offered by their Western competitors. Some analysts question the commercial merits of China's interest in Unocal, and it would be a huge swallow for China National Offshore Oil. Politically, it might prove impossible for China to buy one of the biggest U.S. companies, even assuming any were for sale.
Nor does the growing economic might of China and India guarantee that they will spawn energy giants as mighty as Exxon Mobil or BP PLC. Japan, Asia's first economic superpower, tried in the 1970s and '80s to create a national oil powerhouse but failed.
But the Unocal idea indicates that China may have learned from Japan's mistakes. Japan invested heavily in exploration; China is more focused on buying existing, producing assets. And while those fields don't come close to meeting China's demand, they give its oil companies an opportunity to pick up the technical expertise they need to become more formidable competitors to Western rivals in the years ahead. India, too, is going for existing oil and natural-gas assets abroad.
China, long self-sufficient in oil, is now becoming one of the world's biggest importers, and accounted for more than half of world oil-demand growth in 2002 and 2003. The IEA expects China to be importing 82% of its oil by 2030. Right now, China's biggest oil companies have massive reserves but aren't nearly as productive as the Western majors. What is more, it now appears that predictions of an oil bonanza in China's offshore fields and in its remote far west have been overblown, giving added impetus to China's overseas shopping expeditions.
India has the world's fastest-growing car market, which is driving oil consumption and imports. The International Energy Agency forecasts oil demand in South Asia will grow by 3.3% a year between 2000 and 2030, the highest of any region in the world.
The Western majors and the Asian energy companies all face the same big problem: a lack of easy-to-tap oil. The vast oil reserves of the Persian Gulf states, some two-thirds of the world's total, are mostly off-limits to foreign companies. International oil giants jealously guard choice assets elsewhere, and have already picked over the best of the smaller oil companies on sale. China was rebuffed in 2003 by Western majors when it tried to grab a stake in an enormous field in Kazakhstan.
At the same time, the growing obsession of China and India with owning oil and gas assets for energy security means they are likely to pay high prices.
The Chinese, despite their famed negotiating skills, "are noted for overpaying" in the commodities sector, says David Hurd, a Hong Kong-based energy analyst with Deutsche Bank. Japan discovered how costly miscalculation can be when it tried to develop its own energy giant: A state-owned Japanese oil-exploration company ended up as a black hole for taxpayers and was disbanded last March with debts of at least one trillion yen, or about $9.5 billion, and little oil to show for its 300 exploration projects. Japan now buys its oil on global markets.
Another problem for the huge Asian neighbors may be their own rivalry. Distrust runs deep between them. ONGC Videsh, the Indian unit dealing with equity oil purchases, has spent more than $3.5 billion since 2000 in its global hunt for energy. Most of this has gone to stakes in blocks in Syria, Angola, Russia and Sudan. But the Chinese regularly outbid India for the juiciest leases. As a sweetener to a deal last year in Angola, the Chinese extended a $2 billion loan to help the nation build infrastructure after three decades of civil war. While the deal has yet to be completed, industry observers say India seems to have been left out in the cold after offering substantially less in credit.
"They get beaten by the Chinese on almost every important deal nowadays," says Madhu Nainan, editor in chief of Petrowatch, an online petroleum-industry newsletter in India. "Maybe the Indians aren't willing to play the game the way the Chinese are."
China is worried that most of its oil is shipped on sea lanes that run close to the Indian subcontinent, says Mikkal Herberg, director of the Asian Energy Security Program at the National Bureau of Asian Research in Seattle. Partly to counter this, Mr. Herberg says, it is projecting its navy into regional waters. That, in turn, has India worried about the security of its own sea lanes. "There is the potential in broad terms for rivalry between China and India," he says.
China and Japan are already scrambling for resources in Russia. Beijing felt bitterly betrayed this month when Moscow opted to build an oil pipeline from Siberia to the Pacific coast, a jumping-off point for Japan, instead of to China's oil heartland around Daqing in the northeast.
When China pitches for energy business in countries from Angola to Ecuador it can offer a wealth of inducements -- everything from interest-free loans to help building phone networks, plus political benefits that flow from its role as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.
Some oil strategists see this kind of broad state-to-state cooperation as a potential threat to the current energy giants in the private sector. Indian and Chinese oil companies often act less as commercial entities and more as extensions of government policy. In the future, some oil experts say, big oil-producing countries will increasingly cut deals directly with big oil-consuming countries, leaving state companies to ink in the details.
中、印或改变世界能源格局
感谢印度和中国，世界能源巨头的竞争格局可能将要发生永久性改变。
就像西方国家快速发展的经济以及由此产生的庞大市场和政治影响力在20世纪曾孕育了埃克森美孚(Exxon Mobil Corp.)和皇家壳牌石油公司(Royal Dutch/Shell Group)等能源业巨头一样，印度和中国这两个日益重要的亚洲经济增长推动力已经达成和计划达成的一系列能源协议也表明，同样的发展态势可能正在21世纪的亚洲形成。
这两个人口超10亿的大国为了维持自身经济的继续增长，不得不进口越来越多的石油和天然气。它们各自的国有能源公司已受命在世界各地搜寻数量有限的可开发能源资产。
上周五，印度签署了一项25年期协议，将于2009年开始从伊朗国家天然气出口公司(National Iranian Gas Export Corp.)进口液化天然气。印度还签署了在伊朗开发三座油田的协议；伊朗是石油输出国组织(OPEC)中仅次于沙特阿拉伯的石油出口国。印度的国有油气公司Oil & Natural Gas Corp.称，它希望参股尤甘斯克石油公司(Yuganskneftegaz)，后者是俄罗斯陷入困境的石油巨头尤科斯石油公司(OAO Yukos)的一家重要石油生产子公司。而仅在几周前，俄罗斯曾表示它愿意将尤甘斯克石油公司的少数股份出售给中国。
与此同时，有消息称中国第三大油气公司中国海洋石油总公司(China National Offshore Oil Corp.)可能有兴趣收购美国油气储备排名第九的石油公司Unocal Corp.，这是迄今为止表明中国能源业全球扩张雄心的最明显证据。
中国和加拿大本月将有可能就中国投资开发加拿大的石油资源签署一项全面协议，其中包括双方将合作开发加拿大阿尔伯塔省油砂矿的内容，不过这一协议的具体细节尚未最终确定。
剑桥能源研究协会(Cambridge Energy Research Associates)主席、石油史专家丹尼尔?尤金(Daniel Yergin)说，未来10年内，中国和印度的石油公司将在世界石油业扮演举足轻重的角色，这既反映了两国经济增长的现实，也是中印两国在世界石油市场所占份额的反映。
其结果是：已经因易采油气田日益稀少而倍感压力的西方石油巨头还要应对新竞争对手的咄咄逼人挑战。能源专家们说，这些亚洲竞争者将越来越多地借助其本国政府提供的政治和经济力量，在苏丹这类西方公司眼中政治风险太大但却石油储量丰富的国家争取能源开发合同时，它们往往会动用这种力量。这些亚洲公司会接受苛刻的商业条款，而西方公司迫于股东的压力对这类条款只能望而却步。亚洲公司还更能承受钻探失败所造成的损失。
当然中国短时间内还不会出现埃克森美孚那样的公司。印度和中国的企业还缺乏其西方竞争对手的技术和专门知识。一些分析师已在质疑Unocal对中国究竟有何商业价值，这可是颗中国海洋石油总公司不那么容易吞下的果子。
从政治角度看，中国要购买美国最大的公司之一或许是不可能的，即使假设这家公司已处于待售状态。
此外，中国和印度不断增加的经济实力也不能确保它们就能孕育出像埃克森美孚和英国石油公司(BP PLC)那样大规模的能源业巨头。亚洲的首个经济超级大国日本在上世纪70、80年代就曾做过类似尝试，但却以失败告终。
但有意收购Unocal一事表明，中国可能已从日本的失败中吸取了教训。日本曾投巨资从事新油田的勘探，而中国则将更多的注意力放在了收购现有油田和油气生产设施上。 这些油田虽远未能满足中国的石油需求，但却可使中国的石油企业能有机会获得必要的技术专长，这对它们在未来成为埃克森美孚和英国石油等公司更加强有力的竞争对手是必不可少的。印度也正在海外采购现有的油气资产。
中国还能向供应商提供一个更加诱人的奖赏：确保进入世界最大的新兴消费市场。印度有著世界增长最快的汽车消费市场，这正在推动印度的石油消费和进口。国际能源署(IEA)预测，2000至2030年期间，南亚的石油需求每年将增长3.3%，是世界上增长最快的地区。
长期以来石油一直自给自足的中国，现在成了世界最大的石油进口国之一，2002和2003年世界石油需求增长量的一半以上来自中国。IEA预计，到2030年时，中国82%的石油需求都将依赖进口。中国最大的几家石油公司目前虽然仍拥有巨大的油气储备，但其开采价值却不及西方石油巨头的油田。此外，人们对中国海上油气田和西部边远地区油气储量的预期可能也过于乐观了，这也增加了中国到海外寻找油气供应的动力。虽然印度正在提供各种优惠措施吸引外国公司来印度寻找石油，但该国在人们眼里仍是一个相对贫油的国家。
西方大型石油企业和亚洲能源公司都面临著同一个难题：易开采的油田越来越少了。
海湾地区石油储量占全球总储量的三分之二，但大多数都不允许外国公司染指。国际性石油巨头满怀妒意严密防守著其他地区的个别储量资产，而且从待售的中小型石油公司中精挑细选，已经买下了最好的资产。2003年中国试图在储量丰富的哈萨克斯坦油田获得开采权的努力，就被西方大型石油企业联手击败。
与此同时，中国和印度日益看重获得油气资产，确保能源安全的势头也意味著他们很可能愿意为此支付高价。
德意志银行(Deutsche Bank)驻香港的能源分析师大卫?赫德(David Hurd)说，中国公司在大宗商品领域颇有出手慷慨之名。日本的经验表明七、八十年代计算失误带来了怎样的灾难。日本一家国有石油勘探企业最终成了纳税人填不满的黑洞，去年3月身负至少1万亿日圆（约95亿美元）债务而倒闭。公司的300多个勘探项目几乎没有一个找到石油。现在日本从全球市场购买所需石油。
另一个问题就是中国和印度这两个亚洲大国之间的敌对态度，他们的互不信任由来已久。印度从事油田股份收购的ONGC Videsh从2000年以来已经花费超过35亿美元，在全球各地寻找能源供应渠道。大部分资金都投向了叙利亚、安哥拉、俄罗斯和苏丹，但也不断被中国给出的更优厚条件击败。去年在安哥拉达成的一项协议中，中国政府延长了向安哥拉贷款20亿美元兴建基础设施的期限。业内观察人士称，印度许诺的贷款低很多，所以就被晾在一边了。
印度石油行业网络通讯《Petrowatch》的主编马杜?奈南(Madhu Nainan)说，近来几乎每笔重要交易中印度公司都被中国公司击败。也许是印度公司不愿按照中国公司的游戏规则行事。
总部位于西雅图的全美亚洲研究所(National Bureau of Asian Research)亚洲能源安全项目主管米克尔?赫伯格(Mikkal Herberg)说，中国进口大部分原油的航道都靠近印度次大陆，这让中国政府颇为担忧。再加上其他考虑，中国正在地区海域内部署更多舰艇。这又反过来让印度担心自己海上航道的安全。他说，这是中印两国在更大范围陷入敌对状态的潜在因素。
中国和日本早就在抢夺俄罗斯的原油储备。本月莫斯科宣布计划兴建西伯利亚至太平洋沿岸的输油管道，而不是中国争取的直抵中国大庆油田的管道计划。从太平洋沿岸港口，原油可以直接装船启运抵达日本。这让中国痛苦地感到被俄罗斯背叛了。
中国在安哥拉至厄瓜多尔等许多国家争取能源业务的做法就是提出大量优厚条件──从兴建电话网络的无息贷款，到利用自己联合国安理会常任理事国的地位提供政治上的好处等，无所不包。
实际上，一些石油行业的策略师认为，这种政府间的广泛合作会给目前私营领域的能源巨头带来潜在威胁。印度和中国的石油企业谈起交易来，更像是政府政策的执行者，而不是商业性实体。利比亚和缅甸等美国公司难以涉足的地区他们长驱直入。一些石油业专家称，石油生产大国会逐渐减少同石油消费大国直接签约，而是让国有石油公司出面协商细节问题。
其他因素也给中国和印度公司向美国和欧洲的石油巨头发起挑战提供了可乘之机。最关键的就是西方大型石油企业的冒险精神日渐衰退。任何一个投入了资金的开采和勘探项目，大型石油公司的投资者们都坚持看重高额回报，这种做法被业内通称为“资金纪律”。
这股追求高额回报的势头起源于九十年代。当时高科技企业吸引了大量资金，人们普遍认为石油行业会逐渐走上钢铁和煤炭行业的老路，成为一个面临低价和财务前景黯淡威胁的成熟行业。1997-1998年油价暴跌进一步加剧了这个观点，业务较好的石油公司大量收购实力较弱的同行，不但能压缩成本，还能轻易获得现成的油气储备。
马萨诸塞州咨询公司Energy Security Analysis Inc.的分析师里克?穆勒尔(Rick Mueller)说，毕竟中国和印度的这些公司都没有股东。
其他人也同意他的说法。华盛顿智囊机构美国国际经济研究所(Institute of International Economics)高级研究员菲利普?费勒格(Philip Verleger Jr.)说，人们总是错误地低估中国和印度的实力。他说，每次走进沃尔玛(Wal-Mart)购物，就是在为中国全球范围内的油气搜寻提供资助。
