How to turn an upswing into sustained growth
We begin a new year marred by catastrophe. We must succour the survivors. Beyond that, words fail. I shall turn instead to the world economy in 2005.
In 2004, the economies of the members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development grew by some 3.6 per cent, a healthy improvement over 2.2 per cent in 2003 and 1.6 per cent in 2002. The US led the way, yet again, with an expansion forecast by the OECD secretariat at 4.4 per cent. Surprisingly, Japan managed 4 per cent. Less surprisingly, the UK achieved 3.2 per cent. Not at all surprisingly, the eurozone remained the laggard, on 1.8 per cent. Yet even this was a big improvement on a miserable 0.6 per cent in 2003.
Last year seems to have seen the fastest global economic growth for almost three decades. China, says the OECD, grew by 9.2 per cent last year. Brazil's gamble on orthodoxy seems to be paying off, with growth recovering to 4.5 per cent. Russia, buoyed by high oil prices, grew by more than 6 per cent.
That such a recovery has arrived in a world economy buffeted by the bursting of the high-technology bubble, terrorist attacks, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and soaring oil prices is testament to resilience. Particularly encouraging is the 9.5 per cent growth of world trade.
Yet the most important asset is credibly low inflation. Central banks are confident that a one-off jump in oil prices will not feed a wage-price spiral. The Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank have not responded at all. The Federal Reserve and the Bank of England have continued with measured tightening. In real terms, oil prices are at the same level as in the mid-1970s (see chart). But the inflationary and so monetary policy consequences have been comfortingly different.
What now? The conventional assumption is that there will be sustained, albeit more modest, growth this year: the OECD forecasts growth among its members at 2.9 per cent, with the US on 3.3 per cent, Japan on 2.1 per cent and the eurozone on 1.9 per cent. Elsewhere, the OECD forecasts China's growth to slow smoothly to 8 per cent, Brazil's to 3.6 per cent and Russia's to 5.5 per cent.
That forecasters almost always assume a smooth transition to a steady state is too well known to need comment. The more interesting question is what might influence the outcome. If we ignore further visitations from the four horsemen of the apocalypse, we need to focus on six risks, positive or negative.
The first is oil prices. There are reasons to expect higher levels over the next two to three decades than over the past two: strong demand from emerging economies, notably China and India, is the most important. The world economy is also likely to become more dependent on output from the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, particularly those in the Gulf, as reserves elsewhere dwindle. Even so, the OECD concludes, plausibly, that prices overshot substantially last year and should now tend to trend downwards. But oil markets are very tight. Big shocks remain possible.
The second is the dollar. The US currency is in what is likely to be a long-term bear market, comparable to that of the 1970s and 1985-95 (see chart). The reason is simple: its external financing requirement exceeds what the private sector seems prepared to bear, at least at current US asset prices. Many believe that the US current account deficit needs to halve in relation to gross domestic product. If so, the question is not only how smooth that adjustment will be, but also how widely it is shared. Much depends on whether China and other countries that have intervened to keep their currencies down against the dollar persist in doing so. Alas, I expect them to do so.
The third is the prospects for demand in Japan and, above all, the eurozone. If the US external deficit is to adjust in a growing global economy, the other big high-income economies must export stimulus, for a change, instead of importing it. Real domestic demand has been strengthening in both areas: growth was about 3.2 per cent in Japan last year, according to the OECD, and 1.7 per cent in the eurozone.
Unfortunately, domestic demand remains disturbingly weak in Germany: it was some 2 per cent lower last year than in 2000. The OECD hopes investment will strengthen. The attractions of much higher investment in a slow-growing, high-cost economy must be limited. But some sort of turnround seems at least conceivable.
The fourth risk is adjustment to the end of house-price booms in some high-income economies (see chart). The countries with the biggest rises in house prices have been Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands, the UK and Australia. But the US has also seen a sizeable rise.
Buoyant house prices have been a factor fortunately, not the only one in sustaining household spending. An important question is whether the stabilisation of house prices, let alone falls, weakens household spending.
The fifth risk is to the momentum of Chinese demand. In 2002-03, the growth in Chinese imports accounted for a fifth of the export market growth for the US, a quarter to a third for Japan and Australia and two-fifths for South Korea. China has seen a sharp slowdown in the growth of domestic lending. The question is how far investment growth must slow and whether private consumption can pick up the slack. A sharper than forecast slowdown is perfectly possible.
The last risk is to the sustainability of an open world economy. The Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations needs to be completed as soon as possible. Understandable worries about the consequences of “offshoring” jobs from high-income countries need to be met with creative policies, not protectionism. Reversing the US tendency towards ever-larger current account deficits will also help diminish protectionist pressure in the world's largest economy.
What does all this amount to? The present upswing may well turn into sustained and broadly shared growth. But if it is to do so, policymakers must both improve domestic policies and sustain global co-operation. A start on the latter, this year, should involve full Chinese participation in meetings of the finance ministers of the Group of Seven leading high-income countries. With three members from the eurozone, the G7 is outmoded. Institutions need to adapt. The G7's time to do so is now.
世界经济六大风险
新年伊始，我们便为天灾所累。我们必须援救幸存者。除此之外，言多无益。我还是把话题转向2005年的世界经济。
2004年，经合组织(OPEC)成员国的经济增长率约为3.6%，与2003年的2.2%和2002年的1.6%相比有稳步提高。美国再次成为领头羊，经合组织秘书处对其经济增长的预测为4.4%。日本也实现了4%的增长，令人称奇。不太出乎意料的是，英国增长了3.2%。最不出所料的是欧元区仍处于落后地位，仅增长1.8%，但即便如此，与2003年低迷的0.6%相比，仍有显著提高。
去年似乎是近30年来全球经济增长最快的一年。经合组织说，去年中国的增长率为9.2%。巴西对传统做法所下的赌注似乎有了回报，增长率回升至4.5%。俄罗斯在油价高企的支撑下，增长超过6%。
高科技泡沫破灭、恐怖主义袭击、阿富汗和伊拉克战争、以及油价暴涨等，都冲击着世界经济。在此背景下的复苏，印证了世界经济的弹性。尤其令人鼓舞的是，世界贸易增长率达到了9.5%。
然而最重要的资产则是可信的低通胀。各央行都确信，油价的一次性飙升不会推动工资物价的螺旋上涨。日本银行(Bank of Japan)和欧洲中央银行(European Central Bank)根本未做任何反应。美联储(Federal Reserve)和英格兰银行(Bank of England)继续采取有条不紊的紧缩政策。按扣除通涨因素后的实际价格计算，油价与20世纪70年代中期的价格持平(见图)。但令人欣慰的是，其通胀乃至货币政策的效应却有所不同。
今年又会如何呢？一般假设认为，今年经济将保持比较低速但却持续的增长。经合组织预测，其成员国的增长率为2.9%，其中美国为3.3%，日本2.1%，欧元区1.9%。对于其它地区，经合组织预测，中国的增长将稳步放缓至8%，巴西为3.6%，俄罗斯5.5%。
预测者几乎总是假定经济将平稳过渡到下一个稳定状态，这已众所周知，毋庸赘言。更耐人寻味的问题在于，什么因素会影响到最后结果。把天灾人祸排除在外，我们需要关注的六大(积极或消极的)风险。
一是油价。有理由预测，今后20、30年的油价将比过去20年更高。新兴经济体，特别是中国和印度对石油的旺盛需求是最重要的原因。随着其它地方的石油储量减少，世界经济有可能更加依赖石油输出国组织(OPEC)、特别是海湾国家的产出。即便如此，经合组织得出的可信结论是去年油价明显偏高，现在应呈现下降势头。但石油市场供应非常紧张，仍有可能构成严重冲击。
二是美元。与70年代和1985至1995年的情况(见图)相似，美元很可能处于长期熊市。原因显而易见：至少根据目前的美元资产价格，其外部融资需求超过了私有部门似乎准备承担的水平。许多人相信，相对于国内生产总值，美国经常账户赤字需减半。果真如此，那么问题不仅是这种调整的平稳性如何，而且还将涉及其分担的广度。这在很大程度上取决于中国和其它国家是否会坚持采取干预手段，将其货币对美元汇率维持在低水平。不幸的是，我预计这些国家会这么做。
三是日本和欧元区(特别是后者)的需求前景。如果美国要在日益增长的全球经济中调整其外部赤字，那么其它高收入经济大国就必须输出(而非吸纳)刺激因素。这两个地区的实际内需一直在增强。据经合组织统计，去年日本的需求增长约为3.2%，欧元区为1.7%。
不幸的是，德国的内需仍然疲软，令人不安，去年比2000年还低了2%左右。经合组织希望投资会增大。对于增长缓慢、成本又高的经济体而言，吸引投资的能力注定有限，但某种形式的转变看来至少是可能的。
四是一些高收入经济体房价上涨结束的调整(见图)。房价涨幅最大的国家是西班牙、爱尔兰、荷兰、英国和澳大利亚，但美国房价的涨幅也不小。
房价上涨是维持家庭支出的一大因素(幸运的是并非唯一因素)。一个重要的问题在于，房价回稳(且不谈下跌)是否会削弱家庭支出。
五是中国需求的增长势头。2002至2003年，中国进口增长占美国出口市场增长的五分之一、日本和澳大利亚的四分之一至三分之一、韩国的五分之二。中国国内贷款的增长已大幅放缓。问题是投资增长放缓的幅度到底须多大，以及私人消费是否能填补空缺，推动经济增长。增长放缓幅度超出预测是完全可能的。
最后的风险是世界经济开放的可持续性问题。多哈回合的多边贸易谈判需尽早结束。高收入国家工作“离岸”所引发的忧虑是可理解的，但需要通过创造性的政策来解决，而非贸易保护主义。扭转美国经常账户赤字日益扩大的趋势，也将有助于在这个世界最大经济体缓和保护主义压力。
所有这些意味着什么呢？目前的经济反弹固然有望转变为持续的、广泛共享的经济增长。但要朝这方面发展，决策者们必须一方面改进国内政策，一方面保持全球合作。在后一方面，今年首先应让中国全面参加七国集团(G7)财长会议。由高收入国家组成的七国集团中有三国来自欧元区，这种结构已经过时。机构需要调整。七国集团现在就需要这么做。
