The world has a dangerous hunger for American assets
The growing external deficits of the world’s “sole superpower” have put the global economy on a path that is not merely unsustainable but also dangerously so. This has been the theme of my last two columns (
www.ft.com/wolf). US and Asian policymakers seem determined to take no decisive action in response. This is understandable, but a big mistake.ll
This year, according to last September’s forecasts from the International Monetary Fund, the US deficit should reach $631bn (see chart). It will absorb close to a sixth of the rest of the world’s gross savings. The biggest suppliers of funds are Japan ($159bn), “old Europe” (the eurozone, plus Denmark, Norway and Sweden) ($138bn), the Middle East ($104bn) and non-Japan Asia ($154bn).
It is hardly surprising that Japan and continental western Europe run surpluses, since these are rich, ageing societies. Nor are the surpluses of the oil exporters of the Middle East astonishing, given high oil prices. What should be astonishing is the behaviour of non-Japan Asia. This region is the world’s most economically dynamic. Its biggest countries are still poor. But, instead of importing capital, it is sending sizeable quantities to the world’s richest country.
Apart from bemoaning the perversity of such investment by poor countries in a very rich one, why should one worry? One reason not to do so is that the alternative looks worse. It takes two sides to create huge surpluses and deficits. It is senseless to blame the global pattern of deficits and surpluses on the US alone. A more sensible view is that the US is accommodating the rest of the world’s surplus savings. This is the argument put forward last week on this page by Wynne Godley and Alex Izurieta. The sum of the financial deficits in the US public and private sectors must equal its external deficit. If the US tried to reduce the latter through tighter monetary and fiscal policies, it would merely generate a world recession.
Up to the end of 2001, the US was accommodating the behaviour of private investors who pushed the dollar up in their misguided enthusiasm for US assets. Since then, markets have come to their senses. Left to themselves, they would bring adjustment through a sharper decline in the dollar and higher US interest rates. But they have not been left to themselves. Between the end of 2001 and September, foreign governments accumulated $1,400bn in official reserves (see chart). They also financed 43 per cent of the $1,318bn cumulative US current account deficit in 2002, 2003 and the first half of 2004. This, as I remarked last week, has been the biggest aid programme in history.
Yet, however understandable, there are big dangers in present trends, as Nouriel Roubini of the Stern School at New York University and Brad Setser of Oxford University have explained.*
First, since 1991, the share of exports in US GDP has remained static, at close to 10 per cent, while the share of imports has jumped by five percentage points (see chart).
Second, US gross external liabilities are some 11 times export earnings, while net liabilities are about three times exports. The latter figure is similar to those of crisis-hit Latin American economies such as Argentina and Brazil.
Third, the current account deficit could, on present trends, reach 8 per cent of GDP by 2008. At that point, the US could be adding 80 per cent of the total value of its exports of goods and services to its net liabilities each year.
Fourth, the US ability to run a small surplus on net investment income, despite net liabilities of three times GDP, reflects the desperately low returns earned by its foreign creditors: last year the average return on gross assets held by foreigners in the US was only 2? per cent. Yet the risks, particularly when lending vast sums in the debtor’s own currency, increase with exposure. The higher the risk, the higher the return investors need. If interest rates on US gross liabilities were to rise by a mere 2 percentage points, the current account deficit would automatically worsen by 2 percentage points of GDP.
Fifth, internal price changes must, as explained last week, be a part of the overall adjustment. As investors ought to realise, the dollar depreciation needs to be large enough to bring these about. Since the pass-through from the exchange rate to prices is itself low, the dollar will have to fall a long way.
Sixth, the longer the delay, the bigger and more painful the ultimate adjustment must be, since net liability and net income positions will be worse and the required expansion in exports and contraction of imports even bigger. Adjustment will come via a mixture of exchange rate depreciation and measures to reduce spending. The latter will probably come from higher interest rates, rising household bankruptcies and weak investment.
Finally, these threats are not just to the US but also to the world economy as a whole. The immediate danger is growing protectionist pressure in the US. Should the dollar continue to slide against the euro, that pressure will shift across the Atlantic as well. The shock to the creditor countries will also be worse the longer adjustment is postponed. At present, to take just one example, a 40 per cent devaluation of the US dollar against the renminbi would cost the Chinese government up to $200bn, as the domestic currency value of its dollar reserves fell. In a few years’ time, that cost might double. Even China’s government might be embarrassed by losses on that scale. What is certain is that its reserves already far exceed what is required by the dictates of reasonable prudence.
The challenge to the world is to wean itself off ever-rising US indebtedness sooner rather than later. Yet this is clearly not what the significant policymakers intend. Europeans may well moan. But US policymakers are happy with their aid programme from abroad, while Asian policymakers seem content to subsidise their exports to the US. The result is what Laurence Summers, the former US treasury secretary, has called a “balance of financial terror”, with both sides preferring continuation of the status quo to the risks of change. But the behaviour that is creating this balance is unstable, because the predicament is worsening. The world needs a credible plan for escape from its reliance on the US debt trap. That will be the subject of next week’s column.
* The US as Net Debtor: The Sustainability of the US External Imbalances,
www.stern.nyu.edu/globalmacro 美国资产：诱人的陷阱
世界“唯一超级大国”的外部赤字日益扩大，已使全球经济走上一条充满危险的不可持续之路。这是我最近两次专栏(
www.ft.com/wolf)的主题。美国和亚洲各国的政策制定者们似乎无意对此采取果断行动。这固然可以理解，但却是一个重大错误。
据国际货币基金组织(IMF)今年9月的预测，美国今年的赤字将达到6310亿美元（见图）。美国将吸收世界其它地方储蓄总额的近六分之一。资金的最大提供者是日本(1590亿美元)、“老欧洲”(欧元区加上丹麦、挪威和瑞典)(1380亿美元)、中东(1040亿美元)和除日本以外的亚洲地区(1540亿美元)。
日本和西欧大陆有顺差不足为奇，因为这些都是富裕和老龄化社会。鉴于石油价格高企，中东石油出口国出现顺差也不奇怪。令人惊讶的是日本以外的亚洲地区的行为。这个地区是全球最具经济活力的地区。该地区一些最大的国家依然贫穷。但这一地区并未吸收资本，而是在向世界上最富裕的国家输送着数量可观的资本。
除了哀叹穷国投资于一个富国的荒唐外，人们何必对此担心呢？不用担心的理由之一是，换一种情况会更糟。巨大的顺差和逆差需要双方共同创造。把全球顺差和逆差局面完全归罪于美国是没有意义的。更明智的观点是，美国正在容纳全球其它地方的多余储蓄。这是韦恩?戈德利(Wynne Godley)和亚历克斯?伊苏列塔(Alex Izurieta)上周在本版提出的论点。美国公共和私人部门的财务赤字总额必须等于其外部赤字。如果美国试图通过紧缩货币和财政政策来减少外部赤字，那只会导致全球经济衰退。
2001年底前，美国一直在顺应私人投资者的行为，他们对美国资产的热情推高了美元，即使这种热情是被误导的。自那以后，市场已恢复理性。如果由市场自行决定，市场会让美元更急剧地贬值并提高美国利率，以完成调整。但市场终究不具有这样的自由。从2001年底至今年9月，外国政府总共积累了1.4万亿美元（见图）的官方储备。在2002、2003和2004年上半年，它们还为累计达1.318万亿美元的美国经常账户赤字中的43%提供资金。上周我已说过，这已成为有史以来最大的援助项目。
然而，不管有多么可以理解，目前的趋势存在很大的危险，纽约大学斯特恩学院的鲁里埃尔?鲁比尼(Nouriel Roubini)和牛津大学的布拉德?塞泽(Brad Setser)对此做了解释*。
首先，自1991年以来，出口占美国国内生产总值(GDP)的份额一直不变，即接近10%，而进口占GDP的份额已跳升了5个百分点。
第二，美国外债总额约为出口收入的11倍，而净债务是出口的3倍左右。后一个数据类似于那些遭危机打击的拉美经济体，如阿根廷和巴西。
第三，以目前的趋势发展，经常账户赤字到2008年将达到GDP的8%。届时，美国年均净债务增长将达商品及服务出口总值的80%。
第四，尽管净债务是出口的3倍，但美国仍有能力实现少量投资净收入盈余，这表明外国债权人获得的回报率极低：去年外国人在美所持总资产的平均回报率只有2.5%。然而，风险会随信贷的上升而增加，尤其是在以债务人本国的货币大量放贷时。风险越高，投资者要求的回报就越高。如果美国债务总额的利息仅上升2个百分点，那么其经常账户赤字占GDP的份额将自动增加2个百分点。
第五，如上周所解释的，国内价格变动必须是全面调整的一部分。投资者应该意识到，美元贬值必须足够大，才能让价格出现变动。由于外汇汇率向价格的传导效应本身就很低，所以美元将必须大幅下跌。
第六，拖延得越久，最终调整幅度就越大、越痛苦，因为那时净债务和净收入状况将会更糟，所需的出口扩张和进口收缩程度会更大。调整将通过汇率贬值和减少支出相结合来实现。支出减少可能要求提高利率、家庭破产增加，以及投资疲弱。
最后，这些不只是威胁到美国，而且还威胁到整个全球经济。最直接的危险是美国与日俱增的贸易保护主义压力。如果美国对欧元继续下跌，那么这种压力也会转移到大西洋对岸的欧洲。调整拖延得越久，债权国遭受的冲击就越大。仅举一例，如果目前美元兑人民币贬值40%，中国政府就将损失高达2000亿美元，因为按本国货币计值，其美元储备的价值将下降。几年之后，这一损失可能会翻一倍。就连中国政府也可能会为如此巨大的损失而感到尴尬。可以肯定的是，中国的外汇储备已远远超出财政稳健政策所要求的合理水平。
世界面临的挑战，是尽快与美国日益上升的债务断绝关系。但这显然不是那些重要国家的决策者们想要的。欧洲人可能会叫苦，但美国决策者对来自海外的援助计划很满意，同时亚洲决策者似乎也乐意为本国对美出口提供补贴。结果就是美国前财长劳伦斯?萨默斯(Laurence Summers)所说的“财政恐怖平衡”，双方都宁可维持现状，而不愿承担改革的风险。但正在造就这种平衡的行为是不稳定的，因为困境在恶化。世界需要一个可信的计划来逃离对美国债务陷阱的依赖。这将是下周本专栏的主题。
*《美国作为净债务人：美国外部不平衡的可持续性问题》，
www.stern.nyu.edu/globalmacro
