An eye on expanded prospects
d4 When Chip Goodyear became head of BHP Billiton in January last year, he was the Anglo-Australian group's third chief executive in six months. Yet, if the 46-year-old Yale graduate had not turned up in Melbourne four years earlier, the world's biggest mining group might not have existed at all.
Mr Goodyear, a former Wall Street investment banker, was one half of the American duo hired to transform BHP, the iconic but ailing Australian mining company, after it had lost its way with a string of ill- conceived acquisitions and projects in the 1990s.
Together with his then boss, Paul Anderson, Mr Goodyear oversaw a radical reshaping of the "Big Australian". It plunged A$2.31bn into the red in 1999 - mainly due to their extensive write-downs - and in a two year period, shed A$6.9bn worth of assets in some 30 deals.
The restructuring was brutal, but it primed the group for its merger with Billiton, the UK company, in 2001 - a deal that created the world's largest mining company. Net profits have since soared - reaching US$3.38bn (￡1.8bn) in June 2004, the highest ever for an Australian company - on the back of high prices for virtually all of its commodities.
It has been a significant turnround. Now, Mr Goodyear is focused on expansion - with China as his number one destination.
In an interview, he says that, with China's huge demand for commodities, the mining industry stands on the edge of a new era - one reminiscent of the decades after the second world war.
Back then, there was huge demand for resources as Japan industrialised, Europe re-industrialised and the US experienced a consumer revolution. He thinks that China's appetite for raw materials is so great that it could create another sustained boom period for the mining industry. But if that provides companies - and the wider industry - with a huge opportunity, it also presents them with a huge challenge: to avoid the mistakes of the previous generation. In the past, mining companies have over-expanded to meet growing demand and, in the process, precipitated a boom and bust cycle.
Mr Goodyear says the dramatic growth in Chinese demand caught BHP Billiton and its rivals off guard, for several reasons. For one thing, fewer new mining projects were approved in the 1990s - not least because of a wave of consolidation that was driven by cost-cutting rather than growth considerations. "If everybody wanted a copper project, when you put two companies together, you only really needed to do one," he says.
For another, the art of doing business in China made it difficult to detect any industrial change. In the past, foreign companies typically conducted business through intermediaries and letters of credit. "You really didn't know where [things were] going," he says. "China's history, certainly in the 1980s and 1990s, was that they would buy heavily for a little while and then they would be out of the market for some time. So, even when we saw increases over the last several years, the view was perhaps 'this isn't real, it isn't sustainable'."
Mr Goodyear, who became chief executive after the abrupt departure of Brian Gilbertson - who had fallen out with the board - says BHP Billiton did approve some projects early on which were designed to feed the Chinese market. For instance, in 2001, it ordered the expansion of its iron ore business in the Pilbara region of Western Australia. Even so, it did not foresee the scale of the demand. "We still didn't identify [China's impact] to the extent we are seeing it today," he says.
Like others, BHP Billiton is now playing catch up. Last year, it invested US$3.1bn. It expanded its giant Escondida copper mine in Chile. It also increased production of its huge Mozambique aluminium smelter - a project known as Mozal 2 - in a move that will almost triple the African country's exports.
This year, Mr Goodyear plans to spend a further US$4bn - more than ever before. But, in a break with the past, the company, wary of over-expansion, subjects new projects to an unprecedented risk assessment. In the past, the norm was for projects to be assessed using just one forecast price for the commodity being mined. Now, it uses three. As well as simulating project proposals to identify what could go wrong, it also measures a project's expected impact on cash flow and earnings against a share buyback. Projects requiring more than US$1bn of investment are then reassessed in order to ensure the company has a proper balance between geographies and commodities. "We have enough money in this industry to fund every project that needs to get funded," Mr Goodyear says. "We just have to make sure the returns make sense."
This process is ensuring that most of the expansion - for BHP Billiton and many of its rivals - is incremental. "Most of it is taking out bottlenecks as opposed to creating a new greenfield operation," he says.
But the mining industry's new-found caution has also been prompted by other factors. These days, it is harder to get projects up and running, not only because the resources are increasingly scarce, but because environmental and community pressures often slow the process.
Moreover, mining's image as yesterday's industry means that it has not attracted sufficient talent in recent years. "The pool of talent to develop new projects is actually a significant factor in terms of being successful in building projects on time and on budget," says Mr Goodyear.
Another factor is that, like all businesses, mining companies now have to listen to their shareholders as never before. Mr Goodyear's past life on Wall Street means that he is more in tune with investors than many CEOs.
Reflecting this, BHP Billiton is, as well as investing record amounts in new and expanded projects, preparing to return US$2bn to shareholders. This is on top of the US$1.5bn the company is paying out in dividends.
Yet Mr Goodyear is not going to succumb to the short-term temptation to boost profits by trying to keep commodity prices high. That would only serve to fuel a boom and bust cycle.
"If you have growth in the industry and you have demand from your customer, it is best if you try to meet it," he says, "otherwise they will end up supporting an uneconomic project and creating a long-term problem," he says.
BHP Billiton's recent decision to order a near-doubling of its coking coal production - it is already by far the world's biggest supplier of the commodity for export - was partly intended to calm customer fears of shortages. It was also a warning shot to rivals, including potential newcomers lured by the high prices, that it will defend its market share.
"Prices [have risen] to a very high level," he says. "We have the opportunity to bring the market more into balance by bringing the product on and at a lower cost [than many other producers]."
Staying ahead of rivals, while trying to avoid the urge to expand too quickly, is Mr Goodyear's big challenge. But, by taking decisions from a position of strength, the task is altogether different to the one he faced when he first arrived in Australia.
矿业第一巨人放眼中国市场
去年1月，奇普?古德伊尔（Chip Goodyear）出任必和必拓公司（BHP Billiton）首席执行官，成为这家英澳集团在6个月中更换的第三位老总。然而，如果4年前这位年约46岁的耶鲁毕业生并未来到墨尔本的话，那么这家世界上最大的矿业集团或许根本就不存在。
上世纪90年代，当必和（BHP）因一连串欠缺考虑的并购和开发项目而迷失方向时，这个巨大却百病缠身的澳大利亚矿产公司聘请了两位美国人来对其进行改造，其中之一便是这位曾是华尔街投资银行家的古德伊尔先生。
古德伊尔先生同他当时的老板保罗?安德森（Paul Anderson）一起，共同领导了对这个“澳大利亚巨人”的彻底重组。主要受大规模冲销坏帐的影响，1999年该公司收入剧减23.1亿澳元，陷入亏损，并且还在两年时间内从大约30项交易中放弃了价值69亿澳元的资产。
必和的重组过程是残酷的，但却为2001年与英国必拓公司（Billiton）合并奠定了基础。通过这项交易，组成了世界上最大的矿产公司。自那以来，由于其所有商品实际上都价格高企，该公司纯利润猛增，2004年6月达到33.8亿美元，创下澳大利亚公司获取纯利润的最高纪录。
这是个影响深远的转折点。现在，古德伊尔先生正把注意力集中于业务的拓展，而中国则是其头号目标。
他在接受采访时说，由于中国的矿产需求庞大，采矿业即将步入一个新时代――一个令人回想起二战后几十年的时代。
那时，日本的工业化、欧洲的再工业化以及美国的消费革命，带来了巨大的资源需求。他认为，中国对原材料的渴望如此强烈，以至于能够促成矿产业的新一轮持续繁荣期。不过，假如说这将为各个企业乃至整个行业带来巨大机遇的话，那么也意味着严峻的挑战：避免重蹈覆辙。从前为满足日益增长的需求，矿产公司过度扩张，并陷入繁荣―衰退的循环周期中。
古德伊尔先生说，由于多种原因，中国需求的大幅增长使必和必拓及其竞争对手都措手不及。首先，90年代批准的新采矿项目寥寥无几，这部分是因为由削减成本而非促进增长引发的一轮兼并重组浪潮。他说：“如果大家都想得到一个铜矿项目，那么当你把两家公司合而为一时，实际上你只需做一个项目。”
另外，在中国做生意的技巧使得业内的变化难以察觉。过去，外国公司往往通过中介和信用证来进行交易。他说：“你真的不知道（情况）如何。根据中国的情况，当然是80年代和90年代的情况，他们会在短时间内大量买入，然后在一段时间里撤离市场。因此，尽管过去几年需求激增，但我们也许仍认为‘这不是真的，难以持续。’”
布莱恩?吉尔伯特森（Brian Gilbertson）因与董事会闹翻而突然辞职后，古德伊尔先生成为了首席执行官。他说，早先必和必拓确实批准了一些旨在满足中国市场需求的项目。例如，2001年，该公司下单要求扩大在澳大利亚西部皮尔巴拉（Pilbara）地区的铁矿石业务。尽管如此，它仍未能准确地预测到需求的规模。他说：“那时我们仍未看出（中国）具有今天这么大的影响力。”
同其他企业一样，必和必拓正迎头赶上。去年该公司投资了31亿美元。它扩大了在智利的巨大的埃斯康迪达（Escondida）铜矿的规模，并提高了莫桑比克称作Mozal 2的大型铝厂的产量，从而使这个非洲国家的出口额差不多将增至3倍。
今年，古德伊尔先生计划再投资40亿美元，达到历史最高点。但与从前不同的是，该公司为防止过度扩张，对所有新项目都进行了前所未有的风险评估。过去的规则是，只利用将要开采的矿产品的一个预测价格，对该项目进行评估。而现在，该公司要使用3个。除了要通过项目企划书的模拟来发现问题外，它还要衡量该项目对现金流转以及股票回购收益等造成的预期影响。投资超过10亿美元的项目还要进行再评估，以确保该公司在地缘和矿产品之间保持适当的平衡。古德伊尔先生说：“在业内，我们资金充裕，可以投资于每一个需要资金的项目。我们只是必须确保合理的回报。”
对于必和必拓及其竞争对手来说，这一程序保证了它们的扩张大多会带来递增效应。他说：“这主要是消除障碍，而非创造一种崭新的运营方式。”
不过，矿产行业新形成的审慎态度还源于其他一些因素。如今开发新项目变得日益困难，这不仅是因为资源越来越稀缺，而且因为环保和社会压力常常使进度放缓。
此外，矿产业作为夕阳产业的形象，使其近年难以吸引到足够的人才。古德伊尔先生说：“为使新项目在保证工期和预算的基础上顺利完成，吸引人才是个重要因素。”
另一个因素在于，矿产公司像所有行业一样，现在都必须倾听股东的意见，与以往截然不同。古德伊尔先生曾任职于华尔街的经历意味着，他与投资者的关系比很多首席执行官都更和谐。
一个例证是，必和必拓在以创纪录的数字投资于新项目或项目的拓展时，还准备给予股东20亿美元的回报。除此之外，该公司还将支付15亿美元的红利。
但古德伊尔先生并不打算因短期的诱惑，就通过让矿产品价格居高不下来获取利润。这只会加剧繁荣―衰退的循环。
他说：“如果你面对着产业内部的增长和客户的需求，你最好去满足这一需求。否则他们最终将支持一个不赢利的项目，并造成长期的问题。”
必和必拓现已是世界焦煤出口的最大供应商，但最近仍决定下单使焦煤产量近乎翻一番，这部分是为了消除客户对该产品短缺的忧虑。这也向其竞争对手，包括受高价格诱惑而要涉足该产业的新企业发出警告，表明自己将捍卫其市场份额。
他说：“价格（已上升）到非常高的水平。我们通过增加生产并保持（比其他许多生产商）更低的成本，有机会使市场趋向平衡。”
在避免过快扩张的同时保持领先地位，是古德伊尔先生面临的巨大挑战。但是，由于可以从握有实权的职位上作出决策，他面对的任务与其刚来澳大利亚时已大相径庭。
维克托?马莱（Victor Mallet）补充报道。有关采访的原文请见
www.ft.com/goodyear。
为何中国充满机遇
奇普?古德伊尔谈在中国做生意：问题的关键在于，14亿中国人和10亿印度人是否创造了一种环境，即他们对产品和原材料的需求能够使得未来几十年的实际价格保持增长。现在人人都想知道这一问题的答案，可不幸的是我们却不知道。因此，我们所做的就是让自己作出选择，拓展业务，增加新矿井或油田，从而使我们一旦认为市场能够吸纳这么多产品时，就可以使用这些矿井或油田。这就是我们的战略。这更是掌握时机的问题。在中国，人们的一个忧虑是，你可能会被要求参与一个不赢利的项目。我们没有这样的经历。有人问，中国是否会倒退。答案是，一旦魔仆被从魔瓶中放出，就很难再收回。一旦人们知道你可以提供冰箱、教育等等，而你却说“没有了，”那你就会有麻烦。
