Governance Business leaders return to class
The global economy pulled out of recession in 2002 and is predicted to grow this year by about 4 per cent. The threat of deflation has receded, yet inflation remains subdued. Interest rates worldwide are on a rising trend but financial markets are taking the increasing cost of money in their stride.
In other words, this is as good as it gets. If your business is not earning a decent rate of return at this point in the business cycle, there is probably something wrong with your strategy, your execution of strategy or both.
The articles that appear on these pages over the next month will not fix these problems. But with luck, this year's FT Summer School will help managers think in new ways about the challenges they face.
The world is divided into two types of people, the old gag goes - those who like to divide the world into two types of people and those who do not.
At the risk of simple-mindedness, management thinkers tend to fall into one of two camps. In one corner are strategists, who believe that most companies fail because they try to sell the wrong products to the wrong customers at the wrong price. In the other corner are pragmatists, who see business failure as mainly the result of poor execution: missed sales targets, poor quality products and tactical errors. The truth, of course, is that the best managers have the mental agility to deal with both the strategic and operational issues.
When Lou Gerstner arrived at International Business Machines in the early 1990s, the gruff former management consultant famously declared that the last thing Big Blue needed at that moment was a vision. Yet, having steered the company away from break-up or bankruptcy, he delivered a strategic makeover that propels IBM forward to this day, demonstrating his masterful ability to tackle immediate problems and long-term issues simultaneously. Still, the contributions to this year's series can be separated into sheep and goats. Among those with an eye on the long-term is Don Sull of the London Business School, who weighs in against the fashionable notion that leadership “vision” is a good thing. This up-and-coming business thinker believes that too much vision can move an organisation's “centre of gravity” into the distant future. Managers become fixated on a long-term goal rather than concentrating on the evolving here and now.
The risk is particularly acute in markets where the competitive landscape is fluid. In developing economic or high technology sectors, he argues, vision can be a bad thing.
Take Microsoft's early vision of a world with “a computer on every desk and in every home, running Microsoft software”. Ambitious? Certainly. Inspiring? For Microsofties, yes. But it was a vision so centred on the personal computer - Microsoft's core business - that arguably it blinded the company to the early potential of the internet.
It is against this background that John Chambers, chairman and chief executive of Cisco and a man never short on visionary fervour, argues that his company should have “no technology religion”. His vision is of a networked world powered by Cisco equipment. The type of equipment will be decided by customers.
Alongside Mr Sull in the “big picture” camp is David Soberman of Insead, who writes about the fragmentation of mass media caused by the rise of digital technology. He points out that the proliferation of television and internet media allows advertisers to address precise market segments. This, Prof Soberman suggests, can actually reduce competition between companies by enabling them to concentrate on distinct sub-markets.
Yet fragmentation also increases the complexity of advertising planning. It also makes it necessary for companies to think hard about their value proposition - this is the very essence of strategy.
Nicholas Carr, author and formerly an editor at the Harvard Business Review, looks at competitive advantage through the lens of information technology. He argues that IT has become so diffused through the economy that it is no longer a source of differentiation; technology is now a cost of doing business. This challenges managers to think again about how they can add value in ways that are difficult for competitors to replicate.
In the UK, Andrew Campbell, director of the Ashridge Strategic Management Centre, and Julian Birkinshaw of the London Business School, tackle the thorny topic of innovation. They point to research showing that only 5 per cent of “corporate venturing” units succeed in creating new businesses that are taken up by their parent company.
Why? Because, they argue, corporate venture units usually lack the skills to compete with venture capitalists, those hungry hunters for new ideas. Even if the venturing unit does find a promising opportunity, it is often in a sector where the parent company has no competitive advantage.
Besides, ideas identified by corporate venturing units are too often isolated from the strategic planning process. As such, they receive scant attention or funding. They argue that the lesson is that corporate venturing makes sense only when goals are clear and limited. Prof Campbell and Prof Birkinshaw offer four models where they believe venturing units can succeed.
Another contributor offering a high level view is Peter Williamson, professor of international management at Insead, whose focus is on Asia. He argues that increasing cross-border competition means Asian companies must get to grips with low productivity in administration and services. As is often observed, there is a sharp contrast between the lean manufacturing at which Asian companies excel and the waste and bureaucracy found away from the factory floor.
Prof Williamson believes this situation is unsustainable: “The low productivity that was often tolerated outside the factory will become a potentially fatal handicap.” Strategy or execution? Here the boundary begins to blur. Suffice to say, if he is correct, it will take more than a round of cost-cutting for Asian companies to shed old mindsets.
Tony Cram of Ashridge Business School deals with another micro topic with macro implications: pricing. He argues that the fourth of the “four Ps” - famously described by E. Jerome McCarthy in his 1960 book Basic Marketing - has been sorely neglected. He reminds us that a 1 per cent increase in the selling price of products usually has a greater impact on profits than a 1 per cent improvement in volume, fixed or variable costs.
The launch price of new products is often set too low, he argues, leading to high volumes but low margins. Among his examples is the British Motor Corporation Mini, an almost immediate sales success that earned no profits for the company because the launch price was cut at the last minute to below ￡500. He might have added that BMW has avoided making the same mistake with its modern reincarnation of the iconic small car. The German company's decision to price the new Mini as a premium compact car broke new ground in the US market and has meant high profits on every sale.
Herminia Ibarra, a professor at Insead, argues that managers have an opportunity to learn leadership skills at a few critical points in their career. These are “leadership transitions”; situations in which managers find old habits are no longer effective. At these pivotal moments, managers need to learn to sell ideas as well as come up with them, to work through informal networks instead of hierarchy, to delegate and to communicate clear messages.
None of this is easy, argues Prof Ibarra. Managers will only make the transition if they are motivated to succeed, given opportunities to practice new skills and provided with feedback and coaching. James Sebenius, of Harvard Business School, and David Lax, a consultant, say managers become so transfixed with negotiating tactics that they forget to ask basic questions. Are the right parties dealing with the right issues at the right tables?
This set-up, they believe, often determines the outcome of negotiations. The proposition is compelling. While negotiation may be at the heart of micro level execution, managers still need to take a strategic view. Successful negotiators, like successful managers, need to be able to do both things at once - ambidexterity rules.
FT商学院2004: 商业领袖又到进修时
全球经济步出了2002年时的衰退，预计今年将增长4%左右。通货紧缩的威胁消退了，通货膨胀也处在掌控之中。全球的利率都处于上升趋势，但面对日益上升的资金成本问题，金融市场正在从容应对。
全球经济步出了2002年时的衰退，预计今年将增长4%左右。通货紧缩的威胁消退了，通货膨胀也处在掌控之中。全球的利率都处于上升趋势，但面对日益上升的资金成本问题，金融市场正在从容应对。
换句话说，目前的形势相当不错。如果你的企业在当前的商业周期里不能获得相当好的回报率，那可能是你的战略出了错，或者是你的战略执行出了错，或者，两者都出了错。
《FT商学院2004》专刊的系列文章并不能解决这些问题。但如果运气好的话，它能帮助经理人以新的方式思考面临的挑战。
有一个古老的玩笑是这样说的，世界上的人分为两种，一种是喜欢将世界上的人分成两类的人，一种是不喜欢这么做的人。
管理思想家们往往容易分为以下两大阵营。一个阵营是战略家，他们认为多数企业之所以失败，是因为它们以错误的价格向错误的客户销售了错误的产品；另一个阵营是实用主义者，他们认为企业之所以失败，多数源于执行太差：销售不达标，产品质量低和战术错误等。当然，这样看问题有思维简单化的风险。但毫无疑问，事实真相是，最好的经理具有同时处理战略和执行问题的敏捷思维。
郭士纳(Lou Gerstner)曾是一位粗暴的管理顾问。当他在20世纪90年代初来到IBM时，他宣布：蓝色巨人此刻最不需要的就是远见(vision)。这个宣布世人皆知。在带领公司走出分裂或破产的境地后，郭士纳实施了一项战略性的全面革新计划，将IBM发展到今天的格局，展示了他同步解决当前问题和长期发展事务的大师级管理能力。尽管如此，为今年暑期班系列讲课的学者仍然可分为两类，其中着眼于长远发展的一位是伦敦商学院的萨尔先生(Don Sull)，在“领导层有远见是个好事情”这一时髦观点上，他是持反对意见的。这位崭露头角的商业思想家认为，太多的远见会把一个组织的重力中心转移到遥远的将来，经理们会变得集中关注长期目标，而不是把精力用来重点解决此时此地的问题。
在竞争形势多变的市场上，这种风险特别严重。萨尔先生强调说，在发展中国家经济或高科技行业，远见可能会成为一样坏东西。
以微软(Microsoft)早期的远见为例，它想让全世界每张桌子上和每间屋子里的每台电脑都运行微软的软件。这算不算雄心壮志？肯定算。令人鼓舞吗？对微软人来说，是的。但该远见如此以个人电脑为中心(微软的核心业务就是个人电脑)，以致于我们可以说，这使微软没能及早看到互联网的早期潜力。
正是在这种背景下，思科(Cisco)董事长和首席执行官约翰?钱伯斯(John Chambers)争论说，他的公司不应该有什么技术信仰。钱伯斯是个从不缺乏幻想热情的人，在他的设想里，世界将借助思科的设备连结成网，而设备的类型将由客户来决定。
欧洲工商管理学院(Insead)的戴维?索伯曼(David Soberman)与萨尔先生同属“战略全景”阵营，他写的文章是关于数字技术的兴起是怎样令大众媒体支离破碎的。他指出，电视和互联网的普及，使广告客户可以精确地向细分市场投放广告。索伯曼教授表示，这使得公司能集中关注较为清晰的次级市场，实际上能减少公司之间的竞争。
然而，这种市场的分化也增加了广告计划的复杂性，也使得公司有必要努力思考它们的价值主张，这正是战略的本质。
前《哈佛商业评论》(Harvard Business Review)编辑尼古拉斯?卡尔(Nicholas Carr)也是此次系列文章的作者之一，他通过信息技术来考察竞争优势。他认为，信息技术已经在经济中变得如此普及，因而不再是导致差异的来源；技术现在是经商的成本。这就向经理人提出挑战，要他们再次考虑，怎样才能以一种竞争对手难以复制的方法来增加价值。
在英国，亚西里吉战略管理中心(Ashridge Strategic Management Centre)的安德鲁?坎贝尔(Andrew Campbell)和伦敦商学院(London Business School)的朱利安?伯金肖(Julian Birkinshaw)要处理的是革新这个棘手的命题。他们称，研究显示,在公司设立的开拓型部门中，只有5%最后创造出了值得它们母公司从事的新业务。
为什么会这样？他们认为，这是因为风险投资家如饥似渴般地捕猎着新点子，而企业的开拓型部门通常缺乏与他们竞争的技能。即使开拓型部门确实找到了一个有前途的机会，也往往是在一个其母公司没有竞争优势的领域。
此外，企业开拓型部门发现的机会，往往脱离企业的战略规划过程，导致这些机会受重视的程度不够，或资金支持不足。他们指出，只有当目标明确并有限定的时候，企业自身的开拓才有意义，这便是教训。坎贝尔教授和伯金肖教授给出了四种模型，他们相信，开拓型部门能借助这些模型获得成功。
另一位提供了一个高水平观点的学者是Insead学院的国际管理教授彼得?威廉森(Peter Williamson)，他的研究重点是亚洲。威廉森教授主张，跨国界竞争日益激烈，意味着亚洲公司必须努力解决在管理和服务上生产率低下的问题。人们经常可以看到，亚洲公司的精细制造(lean manufacturing)水平世界领先，但工厂之外却有着惊人的浪费和官僚作风，两者形成鲜明对比。
威廉森教授认为，这种情况无法持续下去：人们对工厂以外领域低下生产率的容忍，将成为一个潜在的致命障碍。这是战略问题还是执行问题？在这里，两者的界限开始变得模糊。可以说，如果他是正确的，那么亚洲公司需要实行不止一轮的成本削减，来摈弃陈旧的理念体系。
Ashridge商学院的托尼?克拉姆(Tony Cram)讨论的是另一个微观话题：定价，但这个话题也有宏观意义。他指出，E?杰罗姆?麦卡锡(E.Jerome McCarthy)在其1960年的著作《基础营销》(Basic Marketing)中提出了著名的四“P”概念，但其中的第四个“P”已被完全忽视。他提醒我们，销售价格增加1%带来的利润增加，比产品的产量增加1%、固定或可变成本改善1%带来的利润增加更大。
他认为，新产品的推出价格往往定得太低，结果导致销量虽大，利润却低。在他举出的例子中，有British Motor Corporation推出的Mini型汽车。该车型一经推出，就几乎立刻在销售上获得成功，可是却没能为公司带来任何利润，因为推出价格在最后一刻降到了500英镑以下。他或许还可以补充说，宝马(BMW)在推出这款标志性小型车的现代版时，就没有犯同样的错误。这家德国公司决定将新款Mini车的价格定在优质紧凑型车的价位，从而在美国市场开辟了新天地，每一笔销售都能获得高额利润。
Insead的教授赫米尼亚?伊巴拉(Herminia Ibarra)认为，经理人有机会在其职业生涯的几个关键时刻学习领导技能，这就是“领导层过渡期”，经理人会在此期间发现，旧的习惯不再有效。在这些关键时期，经理人在学会怎样想出创意的同时，还必须学会推销他们的创意。同时，他们也要学会通过非正式的网络而不是管理层级来开展工作，学会分派权力，并学会传达清晰的信息。
伊巴拉教授认为，要做到其中任何一点都不容易。只有经理人自己有想成功的动机，并得到实践新技能的各种机会，再加上别人的反馈和辅导，他们才能顺利过渡。哈佛商学院的詹姆斯?西贝尼斯(James Sebenius)和咨询师戴维?拉克斯(David Lax)表示，经理人太专注于谈判战术，结果他们忘了问一些最基本的问题，比如，参加谈判的各方与议题是否有关？议题本身是否恰当？谈判的地点是否合适？
他们相信，这种对大局的设定通常就决定了谈判的结果。这一观点很有说服力。在微观层面的执行上，谈判或许处于中心地位，但经理人仍有必要具备战略观点。成功的谈判能手就像成功的经理人一样，必须能同时做两件事――这就是大事小事都要能做的原则
