China chip piracy
David Wither, chief executive of Sarantel, a company making novel ceramic devices for use in mobile phones, puts forward a strong case for not wanting to join the manufacturing groups setting up production centres in China.
"The Chinese are shameless. If we located [a plant] in China I would worry they would steal our technology," says Mr Wither. Accordingly, Sarantel - a UK company just starting volume manufacture - plans to base all its production in Britain .
"We feel we can protect our technology significantly better if we keep manufacturing out of China," says Mr Wither, whose company's devices form highly sensitive aerials and are made using methods akin to semiconductor production.
Concerns over theft of intellectual property and political risks are significant factors dissuading microchip companies from investing in manufacturing or design in China.
Of 18 US and UK-based companies specialising in semiconductors and related devices, which gave their views to the FT in an informal poll, a third said worries about potential loss of important technologies through intellectual property violation might inhibit them, or had already done so, from setting up new production or research operations in China.
The other 12 companies said they had few fears on this issue, or felt they could manage the problems reasonably well, for instance by insisting on tight safeguards related to their China investments to stop design and process information leaking out to outsiders.
Violation of intellectual property is a sensitive matter both for the Chinese government, which realises it has to improve China's reputation for being the global centre for counterfeited products of all types, and also for the large US microchip industry .
The industry is keen to invest in production operations in China not just to take advantage of low costs but to be close to a rapidly expanding electronics goods industry. According to some estimates, Chinese factories could by 2007 turn out a third of the world's electronic products, from mobile phones to video players.
The question of piracy of designs and process technologies is also important for companies planning or operating semiconductor "foundries" in China. These are subcontracting operations which make microchips on behalf of customers, and so save the latter groups the considerable expense of setting up their own fabrication plants.
Norman Rogers, president of Z-World, a California microchip company, said China had a "cowboy environment" in terms of pirating of designs and technology. "It has no laws whatever on regulating intellectual property," he said.
Alan Taylor , chief executive of Antelope, a US manufacturer of hand-held computers based on advanced microchips, said the company had based production of its key semiconductors in Morocco rather than China because of worries about piracy. "It costs a third more to make the products in Morocco but we feel we can control the technology there better."
China is a logical manufacturing location for many microchip companies. Investment in the Chinese chip industry is projected to reach $12bn (�9.7bn, ?.5bn) a year by the end of 2005 and could double by 2013, according to the US Semiconductor Industry Association.
"There is a great deal of anxiety about enforcement of intellectual property rules in China," says the SIA.
Clive Jones, a manager at the Colorado-based consultancy Economic Data Resources, says many companies may be storing up problems by not taking proper steps to protect their designs and ideas. "The legal framework [for protecting designs] in China is far from developed and as a result it can be extremely difficult, particularly for small companies, to win a fight over intellectual property violation in China," he says.
Other companies say the difficulties involving theft of ideas are less than some make out. David Coller, vice-president for operations at Anadigics, a US chip company, says design secrets are hard to protect anywhere in Asia, so China is no different from Taiwan or Korea where the international industry has operated for some time.
John Fan, chief executive of Massachusetts-based Kopin, which makes advanced electronic devices, says: "The concern about theft of designs and processes is sometimes over- exaggerated. This kind of technology is actually very hard to copy."
Others say intellectual property problems are receding as the China-owned electronics industry matures and sees the benefits of holding patents and copyrighted designs. A commercial framework is gradually created in which legal conventions concerning intellectual property are respected.
"Intellectual property is always a concern but in China people are becoming a lot more educated about this," says Bing Yeh, the Taiwan-born chief executive of Silicon Storage Technology, a US semiconductor company which makes some of its chips in China .
Intel, the biggest microchip company, says setting up a plant in China is not currently an option - its fabrication plants are in the US, Ireland and Israel - because the US government would not allow it to transfer the necessary high-end production equipment. This is because of lingering fears about possible military use in China of sophisticated microchips. The risk of intellectual property violation would be "a factor" if rules were relaxed, Intel says.
Many executives' worries about whether China is the right place for chipmaking are unlikely to go away. Robert Dickinson, chief executive of California Micro Devices, says he is "not aware" of any problems over design and technology theft. But the company has decided on political grounds to start some manufacturing in Japan to ease its dependence on China.
"I have some concerns about China because of the geopolitical risks," says Mr Dickinson. "If there was ever a conflict between China and Taiwan it would cripple the electronics industry."
中国的芯片盗版
Sarantel公司专业制造用于移动电话的新颖陶瓷元器件。公司首席执行官戴维?威瑟(David Wither)强烈反对象众多其它企业那样，到中国去建立生产基地。
“中国人没有羞耻感。假如我们在中国设立(一家工厂)，我担心他们会偷去我们的技术，”威瑟先生说。有鉴于此，作为一家刚开始投入批量生产的英国公司，Sarantel准备把所有生产活动都保留在英国。
“我们觉得，在中国以外进行生产，我们能更好地保护自己的技术，而且能保护得好很多，”威瑟先生说。他的公司制造的产品用在高灵敏度天线中，采用的工艺类似于半导体生产。
对于知识产权失窃以及政治风险的担心，是阻碍芯片企业在中国投资进行制造或设计的重要因素。
在《金融时报》对18家英美半导体及相关元器件企业进行的一项非正式调查中，三分之一的企业表示，由于担心知识产权遭到侵犯，造成重要技术落入外人之手，他们有可能(或者已经)决定不在中国进行生产或科研活动。
另外12家公司则表示，它们不怎么担心这个问题，或者它们觉得能够比较妥善地处理这方面的问题，比如对它们在中国的投资实行严格的安全保障措施，以防止设计和工艺信息落入外人之手。
知识产权遭到侵犯，对中国政府和庞大的美国芯片产业而言都是一个敏感的话题。中国政府则意识到，中国“全球各类假冒产品中心”的名声实在不大好，有必要摘掉这顶帽子。
而美国芯片产业之所以热衷于在中国投资进行生产，不光是为了利用低成本的生产条件，也是为了靠近中国快速发展中的电子产品工业。根据某些估计，到2007年，世界上三分之一的电子产品将在中国生产，这些产品从移动电话到录像机，无所不包。
设计和工艺技术遭遇盗版的问题，对于正计划或已经在中国建立半导体“代工工厂”(foundries)的企业也同样重要。“代工工厂”属于转包业务，即专为客户制造芯片，使客户能够省下自行建厂的可观费用。
加利福尼亚芯片企业Z-World总裁诺曼?罗杰斯(Norman Rogers)表示，在设计和技术盗版方面，中国有一个“牛仔般的环境”。“中国没有任何规范知识产权的法律，”他说。
Antelope是一家制造掌上电脑的美国企业，其产品离不开先进的芯片。公司首席执行官阿伦?泰勒(Alan Taylor)介绍说，由于担心盗版问题，该公司把关键的半导体元器件生产放在摩洛哥进行，而不是中国。“在摩洛哥生产，成本虽然高出三分之一，但我们觉得在那里能够更好地控制自己的技术。”
对许多芯片企业来说，在中国进行生产是合乎逻辑的。根据美国半导体产业协会(SIA)的预测，到2005年底，中国芯片产业吸引的投资将达到每年120亿美元，到2013年有望再翻一番。
SIA表示：“人们对于知识产权规则在中国的具体执行情况存有很多忧虑。”
克莱夫?琼斯(Clive Jones)是美国科罗拉多州“经济数据资源”(Economic Data Resources)咨询公司的一名经理。他说，许多企业没有及时采取妥善措施保护自己的设计与创意，为日后问题的产生埋下了祸根。“(保护设计的)法律框架在中国还远远没有发展到位。其结果是，要在中国打赢一场侵犯知识产权的官司极为困难，尤其是对小公司而言，”他说。
其他公司则表示，技术失窃方面的困难没有某些人说得那么严重。美国芯片公司Anadigics负责运营的副总裁戴维?科勒(David Coller)表示，在亚洲任何地方都很难保护设计机密，因此在这方面，中国大陆与台湾或韩国没有什么区别，而国际芯片产业在台湾和韩国已经运作了一段时间。
Kopin公司位于麻萨诸塞州，专门制造先进的电子装置。公司首席执行官约翰?法恩(John Fan)说：“对设计和工艺失窃的担心有时被夸大了。这种技术其实是很难复制的。”
其他人则表示，随着中国自主电子工业逐步发展成熟，并认识到持有专利及受版权保护设计的优越性，知识产权方面的情况正在好转。中国正在创建一个商业框架，在这个框架内，有关知识产权的法律惯例能得到尊重。
美国超捷半导体公司(Silicon Storage Technology)在中国生产部分芯片。出生于台湾的公司总裁叶炳辉(Bing Yeh)说：“知识产权始终是一个值得关注的问题，但在中国，人们对此的认识已经有了很大提高。”
世界上最大的芯片企业英特尔(Intel)目前在美国、爱尔兰和以色列设有制造厂。英特尔表示，目前还不可能到中国去开厂，因为美国政府对高级芯片被中国用于军事用途存有戒心，因此不会允许该公司转移必要的高端生产设备。英特尔表示，假如美国政府放松了限制，那么企业遭到知识产权侵犯的风险会是“一个因素”。
许多企业主管对于在中国从事芯片制造是否合适存有忧虑，而且这样的忧虑不太可能消失。加利福尼亚微器件公司(California Micro Device)首席执行官罗伯特?迪肯森(Robert Dickinson)表示，他“没有意识到”任何设计和技术失窃问题的存在。但出于政治考虑，该公司已决定在日本开展一部分生产活动，以减轻对中国的依赖。
“我对中国有些担忧，是因为那里存在地缘政治风险，”迪肯森先生说。”假如中国大陆和台湾发生冲突，电子工业将遭受沉重打击。”
(back)East and west are not a world apart
If there is anythingmore challenging than the world of Asian business - one of the best books on the subject in the 1990s was an A-Z of doing business in Thailand in which the "A" stood for Assassination - it must be the linguistic netherworld inhabited by management strategists.
Perhaps it is rash for journalists to complain about clichés. No doubt many, like Peter Williamson here, have felt the urge to write "corporate czar" where "chief executive" or "boss" would do. And perhaps the jargon in Prof Williamson's new book should come as no surprise from a professor of Asian business and international management whose previous work was entitled From Global to Metanational. But unwary readers should be warned that management- speak is a language in which things are rarely "used" when they can be "leveraged"; in which the word "change" is preceded by "sea", "step" or "quantum"; and in which technology is "cutting-edge", "best-of-breed" or "state-of-the-art".
Behind this fog of unnecessary epithets, however, lie some important assumptions and recommendations. The assumptions should be obvious to those in Asia but may not be evident to company executives in Europe or America: the Asian economy is big and getting bigger and is becoming more competitive. Large companies, Asian and western, must adopt the right strategies to succeed in the world's fastest-growing markets.
The recommendations are more problematic, not because they are wrong but because many are based on the controversial and largely discredited idea that Asia has a peculiar business culture that differentiates it from the west. Advice for Asian companies in Asia is thus awkwardly juxtaposed with different advice for western companies in Asia.
Take the case of Taiwan's Evergreen group. The company is among those used to illustrate the distinctive nature of Asian business, including an ability to act "with the acumen of street traders in seeking out and exploiting new opportunities". But it is hard to see what is so "Asian" about making bold investments in new ships, manning cargo vessels with skeleton crews to cut costs or launching an airline that starts off by losing money.
The truth is that Asian business has some characteristics that are old-fashioned, rather than Asian; that almost every "Asian" business habit has been or is still practised in the west; and that Asian business is modernising fast as globalisation takes hold. Foreign investors in Japan have started to shake up the banking sector and industrial companies such as Nissan. Samsung Electronics of South Korea, as Prof Williamson notes, embarked on a drastic restructuring and hired hundreds of US-educated MBA graduates.
Diligent readers will glean some useful tips. Prof Williamson is right about the need for growth in Asian manufacturing productivity to be matched by improved productivity in services, and about the "wage illusion" that deludes investors in Asia into thinking that low wages automatically translate into lower costs.
Yet these practical thoughts are too often crowded out by contentious assertions about the nature of Asian business. Maybe it is unfair to expect a book on business strategy to dwell on good governance but it is surely going too far to excuse Indonesian-style crony capitalism because it "did develop a subtle understanding in Asia of how to align corporate strategies with government economic and social goals for the benefit of both parties".
Like other authors, Prof Williamson has to grapple with what he means by "Asian". He excludes India and focuses on east Asia but even then struggles to find common ground between the Korean chaebol, the bumiputra companies of Malaysia, and the family-controlled Chinese conglomerates of south-east Asia.
This geographical challenge is understandable. It is less easy to forgive his publishers for their approach to time. Once again, the languid cycle of writing, editing and publishing a book has proved no match for the rapidity of the business cycle. The companies cited in the book have all moved onwards, or backwards, since it was written, and some of the financial and economic figures quoted are from 2001 or earlier. As any investor will testify, three years is a long time in Asian business.
Most readers, thankfully, will buy this book not for its historical analysis or its prose style but for the bullet-point recommendations that mark it out as a true business book. They include making the most of - sorry, leveraging - your company's strengths; making a "step change" in total productivity; innovating; creating strong brands; extending and integrating international networks; and reshaping the playing field by driving industry consolidation. All true, but not peculiar to the growing markets of Asia.
东西方商界 无天壤之别
东方企业的运作熟悉得惊人。如果有比亚洲商界更具挑战性的地方，那一定是管理战略家所居住的语言地狱。有关亚洲商界这个题目，《泰国经商大全》(A-Z of doing business in Thailand)是上世纪90年代期间最好的几本书之一，其中书名中的“A”代表暗杀。
也许记者对陈词滥调的抱怨是轻率的。无疑，许多人已经非常迫切地感到，要用“公司独裁者”这样的字眼来代替“首席执行官”或“老板”的说法，比如这里要说的彼得?威廉森(Peter Williamson)。威廉森是一位商业和国际管理学教授，这位教授以前有一本名为《从全球化到超国家化》(From Global to Metanational)的著作，因此他新书中的术语应该不会令人感到惊讶。但应该警告粗心的读者，在管理语言这种语言中，当东西可以被“利用”(leveraged)时，就很少用“使用”(used)来表达；“变化”这个词之前总是有“海量”(sea)、“梯级”(step)或“量子”(quantum)等词；而且科技总是“尖端的”、“出众的”或“先进的”。
然而，在这些多余的、令人如坠云雾的修饰词背后，有一些重要的假设和建议。对在亚洲的人来说，这些假设应该是显而易见的，但对于在欧美的公司管理人员来说，这些假设可能不那么明显：亚洲经济体本来就很大，且正在不断变得更大，并变得越来越有竞争力。亚洲和西方的大型公司必须采取正确的战略，才能在世界成长最快的亚洲市场获得成功。
这些建议则更成问题，这倒不是因为它们不正确，而是因为其中有许多是建立在尚有争议的观点之上的，且该观点在很大程度上并不足信。这个观点认为，亚洲有着奇特的商业文化，与西方迥然不同。于是在亚洲，为亚洲公司提供的建议与为西方公司提供的建议截然不同，放在一起都不太协调。
以台湾的长荣集团(Evergreen group)为例。这是一家被用来证明亚洲商业特色的公司之一，其中包括该公司“在寻找和利用新机会方面，能以街头小贩式的敏锐”行事的能力。但是，该公司也大胆投资建造新船，只为货轮配备最基本的人手以求削减成本，或者推出一家不惜以赔钱开始的航空公司。在这些做法上，很难看出该公司有多么“亚洲”。
事实是，亚洲企业的某些特色是过时的，而不那么“亚洲”。几乎每个“亚洲的”商业习惯都曾在(或者仍在)西方存在，而且随着全球化趋势的进展，亚洲企业正在快速实现现代化。在日本的外国投资者已开始整顿日本的银行业和日产(Nissan)等工业公司。就像威廉森教授所指出的，韩国的三星电子(Samsung Electronics)已开始进行大幅重组，并雇佣了数百名在美国毕业的MBA毕业生。
细心的读者将能注意到一些有用的建议。威廉森教授有两点论述是对的。第一，亚洲制造业生产率的增长需要与服务业生产率的提高相匹配；第二，“薪资幻觉”让投资于亚洲的人误以为低薪会自动转化为低成本。
然而，上述这些有实际意义的想法，却经常因为有关亚洲商业特性的各类争议性主张太多，因而被忽略了。或许，要期望一本有关企业战略的书详细讲述良好的公司治理不太公平，但这本书为印尼式任人唯亲的资本主义开脱，说它“的确在亚洲培育了一种微妙的看法，懂得如何协调企业的战略与政府的经济和社会目标，从而取得双赢”，但这种说法显然过头了。
像其他作者一样，威廉森教授也不得不想方设法弄明白他所说的“亚洲”的含义。他把印度排除在外，然后把目光集中到东亚，但尽管那样，他还是很难找出韩国企业集团、马来人办的公司和东南亚华人家族控制的联合企业之间的共同点。
这种地理上的挑战可以理解。但要原谅他的出版商在时间上采取的方式就不那么容易了。书的写作、编辑和出版周期又一次如此缓慢，根本跟不上商业周期的速度。自该书写成以来，书中援引的各家公司全都前进或者倒退了。此外，书中引用的一些财务和经济数据来自2001年或更早时期。任何一个投资者都可以证明，三年在亚洲商业领域是很长的一段时间。
幸好，大多数会买这本书的读者，并不是因为它历史性的分析或它的散文体裁，而是看中它那些“点句式”(bullet-point)的建议。正是这些建议，才使它成为一本真正的商业书籍。这些建议包括最大限度地使用(use)(对不起，是利用(leverage))公司的长处、在总劳动生产率上作出“梯级改变”(step change)、创新、创立强势品牌、拓展及整合国际网络，以及通过推动行业整合来重塑产业格局。这些都对，但并不特别针对成长中的亚洲市场。
