Big spenders are keeping the global economy moving
The world economy has a classic Keynesian problem: excessive desired savings. It has found a Keynesian solution: a spender of last resort. Goaded by George W. Bush and Alan Greenspan, the US public and private sectors have spent the excess desired savings generated elsewhere. John Maynard Keynes would have approved. But how long will this last?
For the world as a whole, desired savings need to match desired investment, at a level of economic activity that employs available resources. This generally happens without excessive strain. But not in the past 10 to 15 years. More precisely, huge excess desired savings in the private sectors of advanced countries have required offsetting deficits in creditworthy countries elsewhere.
These balancers have been the Anglo-Saxons - above all, the US. It is their willingness to drive spending that has kept the global economic show on the road. Now, exceptionally aggressive US fiscal and monetary policies, combined with a Chinese investment boom, have brought about a robust recovery. This happy picture is painted by the International Monetary Fund, in its latest World Economic Outlook.
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For this year, the IMF forecasts global growth at 4.6 per cent, up from 3.9 per cent in 2003. The result for last year and the forecast for this year are both 0.6 percentage points higher than the September 2003 forecast.
Between the third quarter of 2001 and the last quarter of 2003, the US, UK and Canada generated cumulative increases in real domestic demand of 7-9 per cent . France and Italy have had much smaller growth in domestic demand. Germany and Japan continued to rely on external demand.
China is acting as a supercharger on the expansionary policies of the US. US demand lifts its exports. Aggressive US monetary policy and the weakening dollar generate a falling renminbi, a huge reserve accumulation and strong credit expansion. These, in turn, produce rapid expansion in Chinese investment and imports. Japan is a main beneficiary. The WEO shows that the big difference between this Japanese expansion and the past two (1993-95 and 1999-2001) is the strength of exports.
The driving force of global recovery has been, in short, strong domestic demand in countries with large current account deficits, above all the US. Not surprisingly, those deficits have grown further. To understand the prospects, we need to ask why this has happened. The answer has structural and cyclical components. We can better appreciate this if we divide the world into four main components: the "Anglosphere" (the US, the UK, Canada and Australia), which generated 39 per cent of world gross domestic product, at market prices, in 2003; "old Europe", or the eurozone, which generated 21 per cent; "old Asia", or Japan, which generated 12 per cent; and "new Asia", or non-Japan Asia, which generated 11 per cent. Together, these economies account for well over four-fifths of the world economy, at market prices.
These zones can be further distinguished by savings behaviour and by potential for productive domestic investment. The US and the UK had average national savings rates of 17 per cent and 15 per cent of GDP, respectively, between 1998 and 2002. Old Europe's savings rates were close to 22 per cent of GDP; old Asia's were 28 per cent. New Asia can be divided into the newly industrialised economies (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan), with savings rates of 30 per cent, and developing countries (dominated by China) with savings rates of 32 per cent. The Anglosphere has good opportunities for high-return investment, by the standards of advanced economies. It is a savings-short region, with structural current account deficits and capital inflows. Old Europe and old Asia have more savings to absorb than the Anglosphere (except Canada). These are savings surplus regions, with low returns on capital and structural current account surpluses.
Finally, new Asia has colossal savings rates but also huge investment opportunities, as it is trying to catch up on the income levels of the advanced countries. Its current account position varies, but tends to be strong. When investment is overheating, as is happening in China now and happened in other east Asian economies in 1997-98, current account deficits emerge.
Because of its size, creditworthiness and commitment to full employment, the Anglosphere balances the world's macro-economy. In doing so, it runs a huge structural current account deficit while its domestic private and public sectors must run an aggregate financial deficit of equal size. The Anglosphere will run smaller external and so internal deficits only if it can force the rest of the world into smaller surpluses.
Now consider the business cycle. In the late 1990s, the domestic counterpart of the current account deficits in the Anglosphere were big private sector financial deficits. When the bubble burst, these shrank, largely because of corporate sector adjustment. The offset was the explosion in the fiscal deficit. If no fiscal action had been taken, the fiscal deficit would still have exploded - but because of the shrinkage of domestic activity. In a global slowdown, the chances of shrinking the US current account deficit, instead, were small.
In essence then, the Anglosphere's response to the slowdown has been to offset the world's rise in desired savings when its own bubble-hit private sector was retrenching. It has succeeded, but only by means of an aggressive fiscal and monetary loosening. In the US, the cyclically adjusted fiscal balance will have deteriorated by 5 per cent of GDP between 2000 and this year. The inevitable result is a further lowering of national savings rates: in 2003, US and UK national savings rates were a mere 13 and 14 per cent of GDP, respectively.
The spenders of last resort have done the right thing. They must continue to do so. As long as old Europe and old Asia retain structural excess savings, the world economy's dynamism will continue to depend on the Anglosphere's excess consumption and new Asia's excess investment. The result is big increases in private and public sector indebtedness in the former and much bad investment in the latter. But these countries must behave in this way. Only when old Europe and old Asia spend like the Anglosphere can the "imbalances" finally disappear
世界经济的最后支出人
世界经济面临一个经典的凯恩斯式问题：超额预期储蓄(excessive desired savings)。世界经济已经找到一个凯恩斯式的解决方案：最后支出人(spender of the last resort)。在乔治oWo布什(George W. Bush)和艾伦o格林斯潘(Alan Greenspan)的激励下，美国公共和私人部门已在花费其它国家创造的超额预期储蓄。如果约翰o梅纳德o凯恩斯(John Maynard Keynes)在世，他会同意这么做，但这种做法将持续多久呢？
就整个世界而言，在经济活动处在一个可用资源得到了利用的水平上，预期储蓄（desired savings）需要与预期投资（desired investment）相匹配。这一点往往无需过分费力就能做到。但在过去10到15年中并非如此。说得更精确些，发达国家私人部门中庞大的超额预期储蓄，是靠其他信用好的国家出现赤字来抵消的。
盎格鲁-撒克逊国家向来是平衡者，其中首推美国。正是它们推动支出的意愿保持了全球经济增长态势。现在，美国异常积极的财政与货币政策，加上中国的投资热潮，已为全球经济带来生机勃勃的复苏。国际货币基金组织(IMF)在最新一期《全球经济展望》(World Economic Outlook)中描绘了这幅美景。
国际货币基金组织预测，今年全球经济增长率将为4.6%，高于2003年的3.9%。去年的经济增长率和今年的经济增长率预测值都比2003年9月的预测值高0.6个百分点
在2001年第三季和2003年第四季期间，美国、英国和加拿大创造了7%至9%的实际国内需求累积增长率。法国和意大利的国内需求增长要小得多。德国和日本则继续依赖于外部需求。
中国正在充当美国扩张性政策的超级充电器。美国的需求提升了中国的出口。美国积极的货币政策和走软的美元导致中国人民币贬值，出现巨额外汇储备和强劲的信贷扩张。这些状况转而又令中国的投资和进口快速增长。日本是主要的受益者。《全球经济展望》显示，日本这次经济扩张与前两次扩张（1993至1995年，以及1999至2001年）有个很大的区别，即出口强势不同。
简而言之，全球经济复苏的驱动力，来自经常账户赤字庞大的国家的强劲需求，这些国家中首推美国。它们的赤字已进一步加大，这毫不奇怪。要了解未来的状况，我们有必要弄清这一切是如何发生的。答案包括结构性和周期性两个方面。为了更好地理解这一点，我们可将世界划分为四大组成部分："盎格鲁经济圈"（包括美国、英国、加拿大和澳大利亚)、"老欧洲"（即欧元区）、"老亚洲"（即日本），以及"新亚洲"（即除日本外的亚洲地区）。以市场价格计算，2003年盎格鲁经济圈创造了全球生产总值(GDP)的39%，老欧洲创造了21%，老亚洲创造了12%，新亚洲则创造了11%，这些经济区的生产总值在全球生产总值中所占比例大大超过五分之四。
根据储蓄行为及生产性国内投资的潜力，能进一步区分这些地区。1998至2002年期间，美国和英国的平均国民储蓄率分别为本国国内生产总值的17%和15%。老欧洲的储蓄率将近区内生产总值的22%；老亚洲的储蓄率是28%。新亚洲可分为新兴工业化经济体（包括香港、新加坡、韩国和台湾）和发展中国家（主要是中国），前者的储蓄率是30%，后者的储蓄率为32%。以发达经济体的标准来衡量，盎格鲁经济圈有机会进行回报高的投资。这是一个储蓄短缺的区域，有着结构性经常账户赤字和资本流入。相比盎格鲁经济圈（加拿大除外），老欧洲和老亚洲有更多的储蓄可吸收，它们都是储蓄盈余地区，资本回报率低，且有结构性经常账户盈余。
最后，新亚洲既有巨大的储蓄率，又有大量投资机会，因为该地区正试图赶超发达国家的收入水平。这一地区的经常账户状况各异，但都趋向强劲。当投资过热时（目前在中国，以及1997至1998年在其他东亚经济体中正是这种情况），经常账户赤字就会出现。
由于盎格鲁经济圈规模大、信用好，且承诺要实现充分就业，因此该区域平衡着全球的宏观经济。在这样做的同时，该区域背负了巨额的结构性经常账户赤字，同时区域内私有和公共部门则必须承担对等规模的总计财政赤字。只有当盎格鲁经济圈能迫使世界其他地区减少盈余，才会缩小自身的对外赤字，进而也缩小内部赤字。
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现在来考虑商业周期。上世纪90年代末，在盎格鲁经济圈内，与经常账户赤字相应的是国内私人部门的巨额财政赤字。当泡沫破裂时，这些赤字缩减了，其中很大一部分原因是企业领域的调整。而财政赤字的爆炸式增长抵消了这个趋势。若当时不采取任何财政措施，财政赤字还会激增，但原因在于国内经济活动的收缩。而在全球经济滑坡时，美国经常账户赤字减少的概率非常小。
因此从本质上说，尽管盎格鲁经济圈内受泡沫打击的私人部门一度不断紧缩，但该地区一直都在抵消全球预期储蓄的上升，以此应对全球经济的滑坡。该区域已获得成功，但只是通过积极的财政和货币放松政策。从2000年至今年，美国经周期调整的财政收支状况不断恶化，预计恶化幅度将相当于国内生产总值的5%。不可避免的结果就是国民储蓄率进一步下降：2003年，美国和英国的储蓄率分别仅占各自国内生产总值的13%和14%。
最后支出人已采取了正确行动。它们必须继续这样做。只要老欧洲和老亚洲保持结构性储蓄超额，世界经济的活力就会继续仰仗盎格鲁经济圈的超额消费和新亚洲的超额投资。结果将是，盎格鲁经济圈的私人和公共部门负债大幅增加，而新亚洲出现大量不良投资。但这些国家必须这样做。只有当老欧洲和老亚洲像盎格鲁经济圈那样花钱时，这种"不平衡"才会最终消失。
