China's Challenge
IN THE 1980S, the decade of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the American public was more fascinated with Japan's rise to the global economy and the challenge it posed to American business. In the late 1990s and the early 2000s, a period of retreat for Japan's economy, the American public has become more fascinated with China's rise in the global economy, and the challenge it poses to American business.
Some argue that export-led industrialization, a vast labor force and acquisition of foreign technology is turning China into a far more formidable competitor than Japan, threatening U.S. corporations on their home turf. A closer look at China's economy doesn't support this argument, however. Challenging American corporations on their home turf and in the global economy takes more than export-led industrialization and foreign technology. It takes two indigenous resources China lacks: entrepreneurship and management.
To be fair, entrepreneurship flourishes in the rural areas of China, in small towns and cities, where farmers are turning into entrepreneurs and wages are determined by market forces. And Chinese innovation has thrived in other parts of the globe, from computer pioneer An Wang in the U.S. to the technology powerhouses next door in Taiwan.
On the mainland, entrepreneurship is flourishing in southeast coastal regions, the so-called free-enterprise zones, where individuals have amassed fortunes by exporting low-cost Chinese-made products. Hong Kong companies, in particular, have prospered by distributing and marketing products made in other regions of China. And companies such as Panda Electronics, Huawei Technologies, Haier Group, and Little Swan are developing new products, with aspirations of becoming the next Dell Computer, Cisco Systems, Sony or Mitsubishi Corp.
Unfortunately for China, however, these companies are the exception rather than the rule. In the Chinese economy today, entrepreneurship is about producing, marketing and merchandising standard products invented and innovated elsewhere.
The very concept of entrepreneurship in the Schumpeterian sense -- the discovery and exploitation of new market opportunities and the introduction of new products and processes -- doesn't blend well with China's culture of complacency and conformity.
For centuries, Chinese leaders believed they were at the center of the universe and had little to learn from the rest of the world. Foreign and domestic innovators were treated as troublemakers, drawing angry protests from merchants and craftsmen threatened by the changes posed to their business and livelihood. This was especially the case during the Cultural Revolution, when entrepreneurs and capitalists were viewed as the bourgeoisie, the capitalist class, the exploiter, the enemy of the working class.
Even after the Cultural Revolution and the 1978 reforms, the very perception of entrepreneurship remains radically different from market economies. Entrepreneurs are considered socialists, members of the working class striving for China's development, rather than pioneers and risk-takers who stand to reap big gains or losses.
As was the case with worker-heroism under the Leninist-Maoist regime, entrepreneurial-heroism won't work now. In spite of the post-liberalization period's reforms, Chinese enterprises generally have neither the freedom nor the incentive to develop new products, because they are "units" within a central plan, rather than "firms" within a market economy.
Chinese state-owned enterprises and town or village enterprises pursue business opportunities in the opposite direction from firms in market economies. Instead of starting the ventures with market research to identify new consumer demands, state- and town-owned enterprises start from the opposite direction. They amass the financing, build the facilities, hire the labor, then search to identify new consumer demands.
Such a "supply-side" driven entrepreneurship that puts the cart before the horse doesn't lead to innovations or create sustainable competitive advantages in a global economy.
Even privately owned enterprises and foreign joint ventures depend on good relations with government bureaucrats to obtain the appropriate licenses to enter and remain in a certain line of business. That limits their ability to pursue genuine ideas and business opportunities. Worse, since property rights aren't well-defined and fully binding, private enterprises are never sure which resources are their property and under their command and for what length of time.
China has made considerable progress in introducing market-management practices in Chinese corporations, delegating more authority to management. Yet far too many Chinese corporations are run not by professional managers either recruited in the market or climbing the corporate ladder, but by individuals hired by government-appointed boards.
Regardless of their intentions, their heroism and their dedication to the cause of China's prosperity, Chinese managers generally lack the experience, the expertise, and the freedom to run companies efficiently and effectively in a global market. They tend to be conformists, adhering to standard rules and procedures, rather than to personal insights based on their professional experiences.
If some managers do have the experience, the expertise and freedom, they are running organizations with different objectives and different structures than enterprises in market economies. Chinese corporations, especially state- and town-owned enterprises, aren't primarily enterprises engaged in the production of goods and services for profit, but welfare agencies that have to provide for the needs of their community, rather than maximize shareholder value. As part of this function, Chinese corporations must provide employment to labor allocated by central planners, regardless of when and where this labor is needed or has the appropriate skills. This means that managers are constrained in adjusting work forces to changing market conditions and technologies. They must continue to hire labor, even during economic contractions.
In addition, Chinese managers, especially managers of foreign joint ventures, must deal with a shortage of individuals educated in market economics and business management, as well as a shortage of individuals who are fluent in foreign languages.
The rational business strategy for government-appointed managers is to adhere to routine and predictable activities. Thus they are devoted to the mass production of products invented and developed in the U.S., Japan, and Europe or to less-risky service businesses, rather than to the introduction of new production methods or the genuine and unpredictable business of developing new products.
Chinese state- and town-owned enterprises could be privatized, but that would require the Chinese government to deal with the massive unemployment and social unrest that would follow such a policy.
American observers must be careful when comparing China's challenge to U.S. business with that of Japan's. Japan's challenge occurred in different times, under a different domestic and international regime that allowed Japanese corporations to manage resources efficiently and effectively, and to innovate.
To challenge U.S. corporations, China must develop the two resources that can't be easily transferred across country and company boundaries -- entrepreneurship and management. Those resources challenge her socialist past, her market future, her cultural strengths and economic realities.
"中国威胁"别论
上个世纪八十年代，即前苏联(Soviet Union)逐步走向解体的十年间，美国公众惊异于日本在全球经济体系中的崛起，担心他们会给美国经济带来挑战。时移世易，到了九十年代末期和本世纪初期，日本经济日薄西山，而美国公众开始著迷于突飞猛进的中国经济，又开始担心美国经济将要遭遇的挑战了。
一些人认为，出口拉动的工业化进程，广阔的劳动力市场，以及对外国技术的消化吸收，会使中国的竞争力远胜于日本，对美国本土的企业构成更大威胁。但是，仔细体察一下中国经济的方方面面，就会发现这种担心没有多大必要。要想在美国国内外市场上对美国企业构成威胁的话，仅有出口导向的工业化进程和外国技术还远远不够。中国企业缺乏两项内在的原生资源：企业家精神和管理方法。 公平一点儿地说，企业家精神在中国的农村和小城镇地区并不鲜见。农民创业并崛起成为企业家，工资水平也由市场因素确定。中国人的创新精神也在世界其他地区蓬勃发展，从美国的华裔电脑大亨王安，到台湾的诸多大型科技公司都可见一斑。
在中国大陆，企业家精神在东南沿海地区，也就是所谓的自由经济区随处可见。通过出口低成本的国内产品，这里的企业家们聚集了大量财富。特别是香港企业，它们通过分销在国内其他地区生产的产品而迅速发展壮大。而熊猫(Panda Electronics)、华为(Huawei Technologies)、海尔(Haier Group)和小天鹅(Little Swan)等国内企业纷纷开发新产品，意欲成为下一个戴尔(Dell Computer)、思科(Cisco Systems)、索尼(Sony)或三菱(Mitsubishi Corp.)。
但问题是，这样的企业在中国只是特例，而非普遍现象。在当今的中国经济体系中，所谓的企业家精神指的是照搬别处发明或创新的标准产品，之后进行生产、推广和销售。
但根据熊彼得(Schumpeterian)理论，企业家精神的确切含义是：发现并开拓新的市场机会，引入新产品或新方法。而这与中国传统文化中的知足常乐和墨守成规的理念格格不入。 数个世纪以来，中国的统治者一直认为中国是宇宙的中心，无需向世界其他地区学习。外来的和本土的创新者被视作惹是生非的人，他们倡导种种变革威胁到了商人和手工业者的生意和生计，激起后者的极大愤慨。这在文化大革命(Cultural Revolution)中表现得尤为明显，企业家和资本家当时被视为资产阶级和剥削阶级，是工人阶级的敌人。
即使在文革结束和1978年改革开始后，中国人对企业家精神的理解也与市场经济国家的理解迥然不同。企业家又被看作是社会主义者，是工人阶级的一分子，他们携手并肩为中国的发展贡献力量，而不是承担风险面临巨大收益或损失的开路先锋。
在列宁主义和毛泽东思想统治的年代，以工人阶级成为歌颂对象的环境中，具有企业家精神特质的英雄主义是行不通的。但现在也一样，虽然改革已经走到了后自由化时期，中国企业仍然普遍缺乏开发新产品的自由和动机，因为它们都是中央计划下的"单位"，而非市场经济体中的"企业"。
中国的国有企业或乡镇企业所追寻的商业机会与市场经济体系中的企业背道而驰。在市场经济体系中，创办一家企业首先要进行市场调研，调研消费者的新需求；而国有企业和乡镇企业却反其道而行之，它们先是大量筹集资金，兴建工厂，雇佣工人，然后才开始调查消费者的新需求。
"重生产、轻市场"催生了这种本末倒置的企业家精神，它既不能在全球经济体系中引导创新意识，也无法创造出长久的竞争优势。
即使是私营企业和外商合资企业，也要依靠与政府官员的良好关系来获得营业执照，进入某个特定的市场并展开经营。这就限制了这些企业追求独创性和开拓商业机会的能力。更糟糕的是，财产所有权在中国还没有得到良好的规范，私营企业也无从得知哪些资源是它们的财产，可以供它们支配，更无从得知这种权力能维系多长时间。
此外，中国在企业管理中引入市场管理经验，向企业管理层下放更多权力方面虽说已经取得了长足的进步，但仍然有很多中国企业由非专业人士管理，他们既不是通过市场竞争招募而来的，也不是从企业内部逐级提拔上来的，而是由政府任命的董事会聘请的。
抛开他们推动中国繁荣发展的良好意愿，勇敢的行为和无私的奉献不谈，中国的经理人普遍缺乏管理经验和专业知识，也没有在全球市场范围内有效经营企业的自主权。他们普遍循规蹈矩，遵守各项标准的规章制度和程序，而不具备专业经验基础上的个人的远见卓识。
就算一些经理人具备了管理经验，专业知识和自主权，他们经营一家企业的目的以及企业的结构也与市场经济国家中的企业大相径庭。中国企业，尤其是国有和乡镇企业不是通过生产产品和提供服务来追求利润的实体，而是不得不满足社会需求的福利机构，它们的宗旨也不是尽力将股东价值最大化。除此之外，中国企业还必须按照中央政府的规划提供就业机会，而这些制定计划的人并不考虑哪里需要，何时需要这些劳动力，也不考虑这些工人是否具备相应的技能。这就意味著，在市场条件和科技进步瞬息万变的情况下，企业经理人无法及时调整劳动力状况。即使在经济衰退期间，企业也必须不断增加雇佣人数。
此外，中国的经理人，尤其是外商合资企业的经理人还必须面对的难题是：员工缺乏市场经济意识和商业管理知识，外语也不够流利。
对那些由政府指派的经理人来说，合理的经营策略就是按部就班地展开那些容易预见到结果的经营活动。他们安逸于大量生产由美国、日本和欧洲发明的产品，或者从事于低风险的服务业，而不愿引入新的生产方式，也不愿涉足新产品开发这类独创的但结果难料的业务。
中国的国有企业和乡镇企业有可能走上私有化的改革道路，但政府首先要处理好推行这项政策会引起的大量失业和社会不稳定等问题。
美国的观察人士在比较中国经济和日本经济对美国的挑战时一定要小心谨慎。日本经济的崛起有著完全不同的时代背景和不同的国内外环境，日本企业因此能够有效地管理各项资源，能够不断创新。
要对美国企业构成挑战，中国企业还需要大力发展企业家精神和管理方法这两方面的资源，这在一个国家或者一个企业内部进行普及都不是一件容易的事。这不仅要向中国的社会主义发展历程和市场经济前景发起挑战，也要向中国的传统文化和种种经济现实发起挑战。
帕诺斯?穆都库塔是美国长岛大学(Long Island University)的经济学教授，他是《中国之自我战胜及培育企业家精神》(China Against Herself and Nurturing Entrepreneurship)一书的联合作者。
